Court File No. CV-09-7966-00CL

ONTARIO
COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,* R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc. and the other Applicants listed on Schedule "A"

Applicants

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY AND PAPERWORKERS UNION OF CANADA

October 6, 2009

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Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 513 4

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TAB 1

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended and in the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with respect to Stelco Inc., and other Applicants listed in Schedule "A" Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended

[Indexed as: Stelco Inc. (Re)]
[* Editor's note: Schedule "A" was not attached to the copy received from the Court and therefore is not included in the judgment.]

75 O.R. (3d) 5

[2005] O.J. No. 1171

Docket: M32289

Court of Appeal for Ontario,

Goudge, Feldman and Blair JJ.A.

March 31, 2005

Corporations -- Directors -- Removal of directors -- Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation -- In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

Debtor and creditor -- Arrangements -- Removal of directors -- Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation - In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

On January 29, 2004, Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") obtained protection from creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). Subsequently, while a restructuring under the CCAA was under way, Clearwater Capital Management Inc. ("Clearwater") and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. ("Equilibrium") acquired a 20 per cent holding in the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper, who were associated with Clearwater and Equilibrium,

asked to be appointed to the Stelco board of directors, which had been depleted as a result of resignations. Their request was supported by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represented about 40 per cent of the common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board acceded to the request and Woollcombe and Keiper were appointed to the Board. On the same day as their appointments, the board of directors began consideration of competing bids that had been received as a result of a court-approved capital raising process that had become the focus of the CCAA restructuring.

The appointment of Woollcombe and Keiper to the Board incensed the employees of Stelco. They applied to the court to have the appointments set aside. The employees argued that there was a reasonable apprehension that Woollcombe [page6] and Keiper would not be able to act in the best interests of Stelco as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders. Purporting to rely on the court's inherent jurisdiction and the discretion provided by the CCAA, on February 25, 2005, Farley J. ordered Woollcombe and Keiper removed from the Board.

Woollcombe and Keiper applied for leave to appeal the order of Farley J. and if leave be granted, that the order be set aside on the grounds that (a) Farley J. did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test had no application to the removal of directors, (c) he had erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) in any event, the facts did not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court.

Held, leave to appeal should be granted, and the appeal should be allowed.

The appeal involved the scope of a judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process of the CCAA. In particular, it involved the court's power, if any, to make an order removing directors under s. 11 of the CCAA. The order to remove directors could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and it permits the court to maintain its authority and to prevent its process from being obstructed and abused. However, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted and, in the CCAA context, the discretion given by s. 11 to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion given by s. 6 to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair supplanted the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. A judge is general ly exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it was designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

The issue then was the nature of the court's power under s. 11 of the CCAA. The s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise was guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. What the court does under s. 11 is establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. In the course of acting as referee, the court has authority to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. The court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructurin g efforts. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors or into the seat of the chair of the board when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

The matters relating to the removal of directors did not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11. The

fact that s. 11 did not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors, however, did not mean that the supervising judge was powerless to make such an order. Section 20 of the CCAA offered a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the Canada [page7] Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA") and similar provincial statutes. The powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute.

Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. In determining whether directors have fallen foul of their obligations, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. The evidence in this case was far from reaching the standard for removal, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought. The record did not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. Further, Farley J.'s borrowing the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias was foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors and to corporate governance considerations in general. There was nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisaged the screening of directors in advance for their ability to a ct neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment. The issue to be determined was not whether there was a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there was some conduct on the part of the director that would justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach did not fit this sort of analysis.

For these reasons, Farley J. erred in declaring the appointment of Woollcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect, and the appeal should be allowed.

Cases referred to

Alberta Pacific Terminals Ltd. (Re), [1991] B.C.J. No. 1065, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (S.C.); Algoma Steel Inc. (Re), [2001] O.J. No. 1943, 147 O.A.C. 291, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (C.A.); Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78, [2003] O.J. No. 71, 39 C.B.R. (4th) 5 (C.A.), revg in part [2001] O.J. No. 5046, 30 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (S.C.J.); Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (Re) [2000] O.J. No. 786, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75 (S.C.J.); Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5 N.R. 515, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 1, 20 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240; Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, [1995] S.C.J. No. 29, 25 O.R. (3d) 480n, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 187 N.R. 241, 24 B.L.R. (2d) 161; Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, [1991] O.J. No. 683, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.); Catalyst Fund General Partne r I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 4722, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (S.C.J.); Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.); Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc. [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (C.A.); Country Style Foods Services Inc. (Re), [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.); Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.); Ivaco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 2483, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (S.C.J.); Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (Re), [1993] O.J. No. 14, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Gen. Div.); London Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Banking Service Corp. Ltd., [1922] O.J. No. 378, 23 O.W.N. 138 (H.C.); Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Gen. Div.) (sub nom. Olympia & York Dev. v. Royal Trust Co.); Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 2004 SCC 68, 49 B.L.R. (3d) 165, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 215; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] [page8] S.C.J. No. 3, 88 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2001] 6 W.W.R. 1, 86 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 39 C.R. (5th) 72, [2001] SCC 2; Richtree Inc. (Re) (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 294 (S.C.J.); Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R.

27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, 36 O.R. (3d) 418n, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 221 N.R. 241, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 98 CLLC 210-006 (sub nom. Ontario Ministry of Labour v. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour); Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re), [1999] O.J. No. 864, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293, 96 O.T.C. 279 (Gen. Div.); Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Gen. Div.); Stephenson v. Vokes (1896), 27 O.R. 691, [1896] O.J. No. 191 (H.C.J.); Westar Mining Ltd. (Re), [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360, 14 C.B.R. (3d) 88, 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6, [1992] 6 W.W.R. 331 (S.C.)

Statutes referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 2 [as am.], 102 [as am.], 106(3) [as am], 109(1) [as am.], 111 [as am.], 122(1) [as am.], 145 [as am.], 241 [as am.]

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11 [as am.], 20 [as am.]

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Jacob, I.H., "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 27-28

Peterson, D.H., Shareholder Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Markham: LexisNexis--Butterworths, 1989)

Sullivan, R., Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002)

APPLICATION for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, an appeal from the order of Farley J., reported at [2005] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (S.C.J.), removing two directors from the board of directors of Stelco Inc.

Jeffrey S. Leon and Richard B. Swan, for appellants Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg and Robert A. Centa, for respondent United Steelworkers of America.

Murray Gold and Andrew J. Hatnay, for respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd. And Welland Pipe Ltd.

Michael C.P. McCreary and Carrie L. Clynick, for USWA Locals 5328 and 8782.

John R. Varley, for Active Salaried Employee Representative.

Michael Barrack, for Stelco Inc.

Peter Griffin, for Board of Directors of Stelco Inc.

K. Mahar, for Monitor.

David R. Byers, for CIT Business Credit, Agent for DIP Lender. [page9]

The judgment of the court was delivered by

BLAIR J.A.: --

Part I -- Introduction

[1] Stelco Inc. and four of its wholly-owned subsidiaries obtained protection from their creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA")[1] at the end of the document] on January 29, 2004. Since that time, the Stelco Group has been engaged in a high profile, and sometimes controversial, process of economic restructuring. Since October 2004, the restructuring has revolved around a court-approved capital raising process which, by February 2005, had generated a number of competitive bids for the Stelco Group.

[2] Farley J., an experienced judge of the Superior Court Commercial List in Toronto, has been supervising the CCAA process from the outset.

[3] The appellants, Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper, are associated with two companies -- Clearwater Capital Management Inc. and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. -- which, respectively, hold approximately 20 per cent of the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Most of these shares have been acquired while the CCAA process has been ongoing, and Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper have made it clear publicly that they believe there is good shareholder value in Stelco in spite of the restructuring. The reason they are able to take this position is that there has been a solid turn around in worldwide steel markets, as a result of which Stelco, although remaining in insolvency protection, is earning annual operating profits.

[4] The Stelco board of directors (the "Board") has been depleted as a result of resignations, and in January of this year Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper expressed an interest in being appointed to the Board. They were supported in this request by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represent about 40 per cent of the Stelco common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board appointed the appellants directors. In announcing the appointments publicly, Stelco said in a press release:

> After careful consideration, and given potential recoveries at the end of the company's restructuring process, the Board responded favourably to the requests by making the appointments announced today.
>
> Richard Drouin, Chairman of Stelco's Board of Directors, said: "I'm pleased to welcome Roland Keiper and Michael Woollcombe to the Board. Their [page10] experience and their perspective will assist the Board as it strives to serve the best interests of all our stakeholders. We look forward to their positive contribution."

[5] On the same day, the Board began its consideration of the various competing bids that had been received through the capital raising process.

[6] The appointments of the appellants to the Board incensed the employee stakeholders of Stelco (the "Employees"), represented by the respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco and the respondent United Steelworkers of America ("USWA"). Outstanding pension liabilities to current and retired employees are said to be Stelco's largest long-term liability -- exceeding several billion dollars. The Employees perceive they do not have the same, or very much, economic leverage in what has sometimes been referred to as "the bare knuckled arena" of the restructuring process. At the same time, they are amongst the most financially vulnerable stakeholders in the piece. They see the appointments of

Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper to the Board as a threat to their well being in the restructuring process because the appointments provide the appellants, and the shareholders they represent, with direct access to sensitive information relating to the competing bids to which other stakeholders (including themselves) are not privy.

[7] The Employees fear that the participation of the two major shareholder representatives will tilt the bid process in favour of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of bids that might be more favourable to the interests of the Employees. They sought and obtained an order from Farley J. removing Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from their short-lived position of directors, essentially on the basis of that apprehension.

[8] The Employees argue that there is a reasonable apprehension the appellants would not be able to act in the best interests of the corporation -- as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders -- in considering the bids. They say this is so because of prior public statements by the appellants about enhancing shareholder value in Stelco, because of the appellants' linkage to such a large shareholder group, because of their earlier failed bid in the restructuring, and because of their opposition to a capital proposal made in the proceeding by Deutsche Bank (known as the "Stalking Horse Bid"). They submit further that the appointments have poisoned the atmosphere of the restructuring process, and that the Board made the appointments under threat of facing a potential shareholders' meeting where the members of the Board would be replaced en masse. [page11]

[9] On the other hand, Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper seek to set aside the order of Farley J. on the grounds that (a) he did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test applied by the motion judge has no application to the removal of directors, (c) the motion judge erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) the facts do not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court in any event.

[10] For the reasons that follow, I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and order the reinstatement of the applicants to the Board.

Part II -- Additional Facts

[11] Before the initial CCAA order on January 29, 2004, the shareholders of Stelco had last met at their annual general meeting on April 29, 2003. At that meeting they elected 11 directors to the Board. By the date of the initial order, three of those directors had resigned, and on November 30, 2004, a fourth did as well, leaving the company with only seven directors.

[12] Stelco's articles provide for the Board to be made up of a minimum of ten and a maximum of 20 directors. Consequently, after the last resignation, the company's corporate governance committee began to take steps to search for new directors. They had not succeeded in finding any prior to the approach by the appellants in January 2005.

[13] Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper had been accumulating shares in Stelco and had been participating in the CCAA proceedings for some time before their request to be appointed to the Board, through their companies, Clearwater and Equilibrium. Clearwater and Equilibrium are privately held, Ontario-based investment management firms. Mr. Keiper is the president of Equilibrium and associated with Clearwater. Mr. Woollcombe is a consultant to Clearwater. The motion judge found that they "come as a package".

[14] In October 2004, Stelco sought court approval of its proposed method of raising capital. On October 19, 2004, Farley J. issued what has been referred to as the Initial Capital Process Order. This

order set out a process by which Stelco, under the direction of the Board, would solicit bids, discuss the bids with stakeholders, evaluate the bids and report on the bids to the court.

[15] On November 9, 2004, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced they had formed an investor group and had made a [page12]capital proposal to Stelco. The proposal involved the raising of $125 million through a rights offering. Mr. Keiper stated at the time that he believed "the value of Stelco's equity would have the opportunity to increase substantially if Stelco emerged from CCAA while minimizing dilution of its shareholders." The Clearwater proposal was not accepted.

[16] A few days later, on November 14, 2004, Stelco approved the Stalking Horse Bid. Clearwater and Equilibrium opposed the Deutsche Bank proposal. Mr. Keiper criticized it for not providing sufficient value to existing shareholders. However, on November 29, 2004, Farley J. approved the Stalking Horse Bid and amended the Initial Capital Process Order accordingly. The order set out the various channels of communication between Stelco, the monitor, potential bidders and the stakeholders. It provided that members of the Board were to see the details of the different bids before the Board selected one or more of the offers.

[17] Subsequently, over a period of two and a half months, the shareholding position of Clearwater and Equilibrium increased from approximately five per cent as at November 19, to 14.9 per cent as at January 25, 2005, and finally to approximately 20 per cent on a fully diluted basis as at January 31, 2005. On January 25, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced that they had reached an understanding jointly to pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco. A press release stated:

> Such efforts will include seeking to ensure that the interests of Stelco's equity holders are appropriately protected by its board of directors and, ultimately, that Stelco's equity holders have an appropriate say, by vote or otherwise, in determining the future course of Stelco.

[18] On February 1, 2005, Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe and other representatives of Clearwater and Equilibrium met with Mr. Drouin and other Board members to discuss their views of Stelco and a fair outcome for all stakeholders in the proceedings. Mr. Keiper made a detailed presentation, as Mr. Drouin testified, "encouraging the Board to examine how Stelco might improve its value through enhanced disclosure and other steps". Mr. Keiper expressed confidence that "there was value to the equity of Stelco", and added that he had backed this view up by investing millions of dollars of his own money in Stelco shares. At that meeting, Clearwater and Equilibrium requested that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper be added to the Board and to Stelco's restructuring committee. In this respect, they were supported by other shareholders holding about another 20 per cent of the company's common shares. [page13]

[19] At paras. 17 and 18 of his affidavit, Mr. Drouin, summarized his appraisal of the situation:

> 17. It was my assessment that each of Mr. Keiper and Mr. Woollcombe had personal qualities which would allow them to make a significant contribution to the Board in terms of their backgrounds and their knowledge of the steel industry generally and Stelco in particular. In addition I was aware that their appointment to the Board was supported by approximately 40 per cent of the shareholders. In the event that these shareholders successfully requisitioned a shareholders meeting they were in a position to determine the composition of the entire Board.
> 18. I considered it essential that there be continuity of the Board through the CCAA process. I formed the view that the combination of existing Board members and these additional members would provide Stelco with the most

> appropriate board composition in the circumstances. The other members of the Board also shared my views.

[20] In order to ensure that the appellants understood their duties as potential Board members and, particularly that "they would no longer be able to consider only the interests of shareholders alone but would have fiduciary responsibilities as a Board member to the corporation as a whole", Mr. Drouin and others held several further meetings with Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper. These discussions "included areas of independence, standards, fiduciary duties, the role of the Board Restructuring Committee and confidentiality matters". Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper gave their assurances that they fully understood the nature and extent of their prospective duties, and would abide by them. In addition, they agreed and confirmed that:

(a) Mr. Woollcombe would no longer be an advisor to Clearwater and Equilibrium with respect to Stelco;
(b) Clearwater and Equilibrium would no longer be represented by counsel in the CCAA proceedings; and
(c) Clearwater and Equilibrium then had no involvement in, and would have no future involvement, in any bid for Stelco.

[21] On the basis of the foregoing -- and satisfied "that Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe would make a positive contribution to the various issues before the Board both in [the] restructuring and the ongoing operation of the business" -- the Board made the appointments on February 18, 2005.

[22] Seven days later, the motion judge found it "appropriate, just, necessary and reasonable to declare" those appointments "to be of no force and effect" and to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board. He did so not on the basis of any actual conduct on the part of the appellants as directors of Stelco but [page14] because there was some risk of anticipated conduct in the future. The gist of the motion judge's rationale is found in the following passage from his reasons (at para. 23):

> In these particular circumstances and aside from the Board feeling coerced into the appointments for the sake of continuing stability, I am not of the view that it would be appropriate to wait and see if there was any explicit action on behalf of K and W while conducting themselves as Board members which would demonstrate that they had not lived up to their obligations to be "neutral". They may well conduct themselves beyond reproach. But if they did not, the fallout would be very detrimental to Stelco and its ability to successfully emerge. What would happen to the bids in such a dogfight? I fear that it would be trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. The same situation would prevail even if K and W conducted themselves beyond reproach but with the Board continuing to be concerned that they not do anything seemingly offensive to the bloc. The risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence is simply too great to risk the wait and see approach.

Part III -- Leave to Appeal

[23] Because of the "real time" dynamic of this restructuring project, Laskin J.A. granted an order on March 4, 2005, expediting the appellants' motion for leave to appeal, directing that it be heard orally and, if leave be granted, directing that the appeal be heard at the same time. The leave motion and the appeal were argued together, by order of the panel, on March 18, 2005.

[24] This court has said that it will only sparingly grant leave to appeal in the context of a CCAA proceeding and will only do so where there are "serious and arguable grounds that are of real and significant interest to the parties": Country Style Food Services Inc. (Re), [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158

O.A.C. 30 (C.A.), at para. 15. This criterion is determined in accordance with a four-pronged test, namely,

(a) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice;

(b) whether the point is of significance to the action;

(c) whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious or frivolous;

(d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action.

[25] Counsel agree that (d) above is not relevant to this proceeding, given the expedited nature of the hearing. In my view, the tests set out in (a) - (c) are met in the circumstances, and as such, leave should be granted. The issue of the court's jurisdiction to intervene in corporate governance issues during a CCAA restructuring, and the scope of its discretion in doing so, are questions of considerable importance to the practice and on [page15] which there is little appellate jurisprudence. While Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper are pursuing their remedies in their own right, and the company and its directors did not take an active role in the proceedings in this court, the Board and the company did stand by their decision to appoint the new directors at the hearing before the motion judge and in this court, and the question of who is to be involved in the Board's decision-making process continues to be of importance to the CCAA proceedings. From the reasons that follow it will be e vident that in my view the appeal has merit.

[26] Leave to appeal is therefore granted.

Part IV -- The Appeal

The Positions of the Parties

[27] The appellants submit that,

(a) in exercising its discretion under the CCAA, the court is not exercising its "inherent jurisdiction" as a superior court;
(b) there is no jurisdiction under the CCAA to remove duly elected or appointed directors, notwithstanding the broad discretion provided by s. 11 of that Act; and that,

(c) even if there is jurisdiction, the motion judge erred:

(i) by relying upon the administrative law test for reasonable apprehension of bias in determining that the directors should be removed;
(ii) by rejecting the application of the "business judgment" rule to the unanimous decision of the Board to appoint two new directors; and,
(iii) by concluding that Clearwater and Equilibrium, the shareholders with whom the appellants are associated, were focussed solely on a short-term investment horizon, without any evidence to that effect, and therefore concluding that there was a tangible risk that the appellants would not be neutral and act in the best interests of Stelco and all stakeholders in carrying out their duties as directors.

[28] The respondents' arguments are rooted in fairness and process. They say, first, that the appointment of the appellants as directors has poisoned the atmosphere of the CCAA proceedings and,

second, that it threatens to undermine the even-handedness and integrity of the capital raising process, thus jeopardizing the [page16] ability of the court at the end of the day to approve any compromise or arrangement emerging from that process. The respondents contend that Farley J. had jurisdiction to ensure the integrity of the CCAA process, including the capital raising process Stelco had asked him to approve, and that this court should not interfere with his decision that it was necessary to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board in order to ensure the integrity of that process. A judge exercising a supervisory function during a CCAA proceeding is owed considerable deference: Re Algoma Steel Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 1943, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (C.A.), at para. 8.

[29] The crux of the respondents' concern is well-articulated in the following excerpt from para. 72 of the factum of the Retired Salaried Beneficiaries:

> The appointments of Keiper and Woollcombe violated every tenet of fairness in the restructuring process that is supposed to lead to a plan of arrangement. One stakeholder group -- particular investment funds that have acquired Stelco shares during the CCAA itself -- have been provided with privileged access to the capital raising process, and voting seats on the Corporation's Board of Directors and Restructuring Committee. No other stakeholder has been treated in remotely the same way. To the contrary, the salaried retirees have been completely excluded from the capital raising process and have no say whatsoever in the Corporation's decision-making process.

[30] The respondents submit that fairness, and the perception of fairness, underpin the CCAA process, and depend upon effective judicial supervision: see Re Olympia & York Development Ltd. (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Gen. Div.); Re Ivaco Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 2483, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (S.C.J.), at paras. 15-16. The motion judge reasonably decided to remove the appellants as directors in the circumstances, they say, and this court should not interfere.

Jurisdiction

[31] The motion judge concluded that he had the power to rescind the appointments of the two directors on the basis of his "inherent jurisdiction" and "the discretion given to the court pursuant to the CCAA". He was not asked to, nor did he attempt to rest his jurisdiction on other statutory powers imported into the CCAA.

[32] The CCAA is remedial legislation and is to be given a liberal interpretation to facilitate its objectives: Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (Re), [2000] O.J. No. 786, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75 (S.C.J.), at para. 11. See also, Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hong Kong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.), at p. 320 C.B.R.; Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Gen. Div.). [page17]Courts have adopted this approach in the past to rely on inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively on the broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA, as the source of judicial power in a CCAA proceeding to "fill in the gaps" or to "put flesh on the bones" of that Act: see Re Dylex Ltd., [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div. (Commercial List)), Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re), [1999] O.J. No. 864, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Gen. Div. (Commercial List); and Westar Mining Ltd. (Re), [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360, 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (S.C.).

[33] It is not necessary, for purposes of this appeal, to determine whether inherent jurisdiction is excluded for all supervisory purposes under the CCAA, by reason of the existence of the statutory discretionary regime provided in that Act. In my opinion, however, the better view is that in carrying out his or her supervisory functions under the legislation, the judge is not exercising inherent jurisdiction but rather the statutory discretion provided by s. 11 of the CCAA and supplemented by other statutory powers that may be imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion from other statutes through s. 20 of the CCAA.

Inherent jurisdiction

[34] Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived "from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law", permitting the court "to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused". It embodies the authority of the judiciary to control its own process and the lawyers and other officials connected with the court and its process, in order "to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner". See I.H. Jacob, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 27-28. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: LexisNexis UK, 1973 --), vol. 37, at para. 14, the concept is described as follows:

> In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particularly to ensure the observation of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.

[35] In spite of the expansive nature of this power, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted. As Farley J. noted in Royal Oak Mines, supra, inherent jurisdiction is "not limitless; if the legislative body has not left a functional gap or vacuum, then inherent jurisdiction should [page18] not be brought into play" (para. 4). See also, Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, at p. 480 S.C.R.; Richtree Inc. (Re) (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251 (S.C.J.).

[36] In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme, and that for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. In that regard, I agree with the comment of Newbury J.A. in Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (C.A.), at para. 46, that:

> ... the court is not exercising a power that arises from its nature as a superior court of law, but is exercising the discretion given to it by the CCAA. ... This is the discretion, given by s. 11, to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion, given by s. 6, to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair, to be in accord with the requirements and objects of the statute, and to make possible the continuation of the corporation as a viable entity. It is these considerations the courts have been concerned with in the cases discussed above[2] at the end of the docuemnt], rather than the integrity of their own process.

[37] As Jacob observes, in his article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", supra, at p. 25:

> The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion. These two concepts resemble each other, particularly in their operation, and they often appear to overlap, and are therefore sometimes confused the one with the other. There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always be observed.

[38] I do not mean to suggest that inherent jurisdiction can never apply in a CCAA context. The court retains the ability to control its own process, should the need arise. There is a distinction, however -- difficult as it may be to draw -- between the court's process with respect to the restructuring, on the one hand, and the course of action involving the negotiations and corporate actions accompanying them, which are the company's process, on the other hand. The court simply supervises the latter [page19] process through its ability to stay, restrain or prohibit proceedings against the company during the plan negotiation period "on such terms as it may impose"[3] at the end fo the document]. Hence the better view is that a judge is generally exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it is designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

The section 11 discretion

[39] This appeal involves the scope of a supervisory judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process and, in particular, whether that discretion extends to the removal of directors in that environment. In my view, the s. 11 discretion -- in spite of its considerable breadth and flexibility -- does not permit the exercise of such a power in and of itself. There may be situations where a judge in a CCAA proceeding would be justified in ordering the removal of directors pursuant to the oppression remedy provisions found in s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA"), and imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion through s. 20 of the CCAA. However, this was not argued in the present case, and the facts before the court would not justify the removal of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper on oppression remedy gr ounds.

[40] The pertinent portions of s. 11 of the CCAA provide as follows:

Powers of court

> 11(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or the Winding-up Act, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Initial application court orders
>
> (3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days.
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1); [page20]
> (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Other than initial application court orders

(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

. . . . .

Burden of proof on application

(6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfied the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

[41] The rule of statutory interpretation that has now been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada, in such cases as R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 33, and Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, at para. 21, is articulated in E.A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) as follows:

> Today, there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

See also Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002), at p. 262.

[42] The interpretation of s. 11 advanced above is true to these principles. It is consistent with the purpose and scheme of the CCAA, as articulated in para. 38 above, and with the fact that corporate governance matters are dealt with in other statutes. In addition, it honours the historical reluctance of courts to intervene in such matters, or to second-guess the business decisions [page21]made by directors and officers in the course of managing the business and affairs of the corporation.

[43] Mr. Leon and Mr. Swan argue that matters relating to the removal of directors do not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11 because they fall outside of the parameters of the court's role in the restructuring process, in contrast to the company's role in the restructuring process. The court's role is defined by the "on such terms as may be imposed" jurisdiction under subparas. 11(3)(a) -- (c) and 11(4)(a) -- (c) of the CCAA to stay, or restrain, or prohibit proceedings against the company during the "breathing space" period for negotiations and a plan. I agree.

[44] What the court does under s. 11 is to establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. In the course of acting as referee, the court has great leeway, as Farley J. observed in Lehndorff, supra, at para. 5, "to make order[s] so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors". But the s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. Moreover, the court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructuring efforts.

[45] With these principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of the various factors underlying the interpretation of the s. 11 discretion.

[46] I start with the proposition that at common law directors could not be removed from office during the term for which they were elected or appointed: London Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Banking Service Corp. Ltd., [1922] O.J. No. 378, 23 O.W.N. 138 (H.C.); Stephenson v. Vokes, [1896] O.J. No. 191, 27 O.R. 691 (H.C.J.). The authority to remove must therefore be found in statute law.

[47] In Canada, the CBCA and its provincial equivalents govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, as well as providing for their duties and responsibilities. Shareholders elect directors, but the directors may fill vacancies that occur on the board of directors pending a further shareholders meeting: [page22] CBCA, ss. 106(3) and 111[4] at the end of the document]. The specific power to remove directors is vested in the shareholders by s. 109(1) of the CBCA. However, s. 241 empowers the court -- where it finds that oppression as therein defined exists -- to "make any interim or final order it thinks fit", including (s. 241(3)(e)) "an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office". This power has been utilized to remove directors, but in very rare cases, and only in circumstances where there has been actual conduct rising to the level of misconduct required to trigger oppression remedy relief: see, for example, Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 4722, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (S.C.J.).

[48] There is therefore a statutory scheme under the CBCA (and similar provincial corporate legislation) providing for the election, appointment and removal of directors. Where another applicable statute confers jurisdiction with respect to a matter, a broad and undefined discretion provided in one statute cannot be used to supplant or override the other applicable statute. There is no legislative "gap" to fill. See Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Cooperative Ltd., supra, at p. 480 S.C.R.; Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re), supra; and Richtree Inc. (Re), supra.

[49] At para. 7 of his reasons, the motion judge said:

> The board is charged with the standard duty of "manage[ing], [sic] or supervising the management, of the business and affairs of the corporation": s. 102(1) CBCA. Ordinarily the Court will not interfere with the composition of the board of directors. However, if there is good and sufficient valid reason to do so, then the Court must not hesitate to do so to correct a problem. The directors should not be required to constantly look over their shoulders for this would be the sure recipe for board paralysis which would be so detrimental to a restructuring process; thus interested parties should only initiate a motion where it is reasonably obvious that there is a problem, actual or poised to become actual.

(Emphasis added)

[50] Respectfully, I see no authority in s. 11 of the CCAA for the court to interfere with the composition of a board of directors on such a basis.

[51] Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy, and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. This reluctance is rooted in the historical unwillingness of courts to interfere with the internal management of corporate affairs and in the court's well-established deference to decisions made by directors and officers in [page23] the exercise of their business judgment when managing the business and affairs of the corporation. These factors also bolster the view that where the CCAA is silent on the issue, the court should not read into the s. 11 discretion an extraordinary power -- which the courts are disinclined to exercise in any event -- except to the extent that that power may be introduced through the application of other legislation, and on the same principles that apply to the application of the provisions of the other legislation.

The oppression remedy gateway

[52] The fact that s. 11 does not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors does not mean that the supervising judge is powerless to make such an order, however. Section 20 of the CCAA offers a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes. Section 20 states:

> 20. The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

[53] The CBCA is legislation that "makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them". Accordingly, the powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute. I do not read s. 20 as limiting the application of outside legislation to the provisions of such legislation dealing specifically with the sanctioning of compromises and arrangements between the company and its shareholders. The grammatical structure of s. 20 mandates a broader interpretation and the oppression remedy is, therefore, available to a supervising judge in appropriate circumstances.

[54] I do not accept the respondents' argument that the motion judge had the authority to order the removal of the appellants by virtue of the power contained in s. 145(2)(b) of the CBCA to make an order "declaring the result of the disputed election or appointment" of directors. In my view, s. 145 relates to the procedures underlying disputed elections or appointments, and not to disputes over the composition of the board of directors itself. Here, it is conceded that the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper as directors complied with all relevant statutory requirements. Farley J. quite properly did not seek to base his jurisdiction on any such authority. [page24]

The level of conduct required

[55] Colin Campbell J. recently invoked the oppression remedy to remove directors, without appointing anyone in their place, in Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., supra. The bar is high. In reviewing the applicable law, C. Campbell J. said (para. 68):

> Director removal is an extraordinary remedy and certainly should be imposed most

sparingly. As a starting point, I accept the basic proposition set out in Peterson, "Shareholder Remedies in Canada".[5] at the end of the document]

> SS. 18.172 Removing and appointing directors to the board is an extreme form of judicial intervention. The board of directors is elected by the shareholders, vested with the power to manage the corporation, and appoints the officers of the company who undertake to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. [Footnote omitted.] It is clear that the board of directors has control over policymaking and management of the corporation. By tampering with a board, a court directly affects the management of the corporation. If a reasonable balance between protection of corporate stakeholders and the freedom of management to conduct the affairs of the business in an efficient manner is desired, altering the board of directors should be a measure of last resort. The order could be suitable where the continuing presence of the incumbent directors is harmful to both the company and the interests of corporate stakeholders, and where the appointment of a new director or directors would remedy the oppressive conduct without a receiver or receiver-manager.

(Emphasis added)

[56] C. Campbell J. found that the continued involvement of the Ravelston directors in the Hollinger situation would "significantly impede" the interests of the public shareholders and that those directors were "motivated by putting their interests first, not those of the company" (paras. 82-83). The evidence in this case is far from reaching any such benchmark, however, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought.

[57] Everyone accepts that there is no evidence the appellants have conducted themselves, as directors -- in which capacity they participated over two days in the bid consideration exercise -- in anything but a neutral fashion, having regard to the best interests of Stelco and all of the stakeholders. The motion judge acknowledged that the appellants "may well conduct themselves beyond reproach". However, he simply decided there was a risk -- a reasonable apprehension -- that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper would not live up to their obligations to be neutral in the future. [page25]

[58] The risk or apprehension appears to have been founded essentially on three things: (1) the earlier public statements made by Mr. Keiper about "maximizing shareholder value"; (2) the conduct of Clearwater and Equilibrium in criticizing and opposing the Stalking Horse Bid; and (3) the motion judge's opinion that Clearwater and Equilibrium -- the shareholders represented by the appellants on the Board -- had a "vision" that "usually does not encompass any significant concern for the long-term competitiveness and viability of an emerging corporation", as a result of which the appellants would approach their directors' duties looking to liquidate their shares on the basis of a "short-term hold" rather than with the best interests of Stelco in mind. The motion judge transposed these concerns into anticipated predisposed conduct on the part of the appellants as directors, despite their apparent understanding of their duties as directors and their assurances that they would act in the best interests of Stelco. He therefore concluded that "the risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence [was] simply too great to risk the wait and see approach".

[59] Directors have obligations under s. 122(1) of the CBCA (a) to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interest of the corporation (the "statutory fiduciary duty" obligation), and (b) to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (the "duty of care" obligation). They are also subject to control under the oppression remedy provisions of s. 241. The general nature of these duties does not change when the company approaches, or finds itself in, insolvency: Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3

S.C.R. 461, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, at paras. 42-49.

[60] In Peoples the Supreme Court noted that "the interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders" (para. 43), but also accepted "as an accurate statement of the law that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment" (para. 42). Importantly as well -- in the context of "the shifting interest and incentives of shareholders and creditors" -- the court stated (para. 47):

> In resolving these competing interests, it is incumbent upon the directors to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. In using their skills for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors must be careful to attempt to act in [page26]its best interests by creating a "better" corporation, and not to favour the interests of any one group of stakeholders.

[61] In determining whether directors have fallen foul of those obligations, however, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. Although the motion judge concluded that there was a risk of harm to the Stelco process if Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper remained as directors, he did not assess the level of that risk. The record does not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of sufficient misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. The motion judge was not asked to make such a finding, and he did not do so.

[62] The respondents argue that this court should not interfere with the decision of the motion judge on grounds of deference. They point out that the motion judge has been case-managing the restructuring of Stelco under the CCAA for over 14 months and is intimately familiar with the circumstances of Stelco as it seeks to restructure itself and emerge from court protection.

[63] There is no question that the decisions of judges acting in a supervisory role under the CCAA, and particularly those of experienced commercial list judges, are entitled to great deference: see Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78, [2003] O.J. No. 71 (C.A.), at para. 16. The discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the principles governing its operation. Here, respectfully, the motion judge misconstrued his authority, and made an order that he was not empowered to make in the circumstances.

[64] The appellants argued that the motion judge made a number of findings without any evidence to support them. Given my decision with respect to jurisdiction, it is not necessary for me to address that issue.

The business judgment rule

[65] The appellants argue as well that the motion judge erred in failing to defer to the unanimous decision of the Stelco directors in deciding to appoint them to the Stelco Board. It is well-established that judges supervising restructuring proceedings -- and courts in general -- will be very hesitant to second-guess the business decisions of directors and management. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Peoples, supra, at para. 67:

> Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making ... [page27]

[66] In Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, [1991] O.J. No. 683 (C.A.),

at p. 320 O.R., this court adopted the following statement by the trial judge, Anderson J.:

> Business decisions, honestly made, should not be subjected to microscopic examination. There should be no interference simply because a decision is unpopular with the minority.[6] at the end of the document]

[67] McKinlay J.A. then went on to say [at p. 320 O.R.]:

> There can be no doubt that on an application under s. 234[7] at the end of the document] the trial judge is required to consider the nature of the impugned acts and the method in which they were carried out. That does not meant that the trial judge should substitute his own business judgment for that of managers, directors, or a committee such as the one involved in assessing this transaction. Indeed, it would generally be impossible for him to do so, regardless of the amount of evidence before him. He is dealing with the matter at a different time and place; it is unlikely that he will have the background knowledge and expertise of the individuals involved; he could have little or no knowledge of the background and skills of the persons who would be carrying out any proposed plan; and it is unlikely that he would have any knowledge of the specialized market in which the corporation operated. In short, he does not know enough to make the business decision required.

[68] Although a judge supervising a CCAA proceeding develops a certain "feel" for the corporate dynamics and a certain sense of direction for the restructuring, this caution is worth keeping in mind. See also Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., supra; Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Gen. Div.); Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re), supra; Re Alberta Pacific Terminals Ltd., [1991] B.C.J. No. 1065, 8 C.B.R. (4th) 99 (S.C.). The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors, or into the seat of the chair of the board, when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

[69] Here, the motion judge was alive to the "business judgment" dimension in the situation he faced. He distinguished the application of the rule from the circumstances, however, stating at para. 18 of his reasons:

> With respect I do not see the present situation as involving the "management of the business and affairs of the corporation", but rather as a quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation entrusted albeit to the Board pursuant to s. 111(1) of the CBCA. I agree that where a board is actually engaged in the business of a judgment situation, the board should be given appropriate deference. However, to the contrary in this situation, I do not see it as a [page28]situation calling for (as asserted) more deference, but rather considerably less than that. With regard to this decision of the Board having impact upon the capital raising process, as I conclude it would, then similarly deference ought not to be given.

[70] I do not see the distinction between the directors' role in "the management of the business and affairs of the corporation" (CBCA, s. 102) -- which describes the directors' overall responsibilities -- and their role with respect to a "quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation" (i.e., in filling out the composition of the board of directors in the event of a vacancy). The "affairs" of the corporation are defined in s. 2 of the CBCA as meaning "the relationships among a corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by such bodies corporate". Corporate governance decisions relate directly to such relationships and are at the heart of the Board's business decision-making role regarding the corporation's business and affairs. The dynamics of such decisions, and the intricate balancing of competing interests and other corporate-related factors that goes into making them, are no more within the purview of the court's knowledge and

expertise than other business decisions, and they deserve the same deferential approach. Respectfully, the motion judge erred in declining to give effect to the business judgment rule in the circumstances of this case.

[71] This is not to say that the conduct of the Board in appointing the appellants as directors may never come under review by the supervising judge. The court must ultimately approve and sanction the plan of compromise or arrangement as finally negotiated and accepted by the company and its creditors and stakeholders. The plan must be found to be fair and reasonable before it can be sanctioned. If the Board's decision to appoint the appellants has somehow so tainted the capital raising process that those criteria are not met, any eventual plan that is put forward will fail.

[72] The respondents submit that it makes no sense for the court to have jurisdiction to declare the process flawed only after the process has run its course. Such an approach to the restructuring process would be inefficient and a waste of resources. While there is some merit in this argument, the court cannot grant itself jurisdiction where it does not exist. Moreover, there are a plethora of checks and balances in the negotiating process itself that moderate the risk of the process becoming irretrievably tainted in this fashion -- not the least of which is the restraining effect of the prospect of such a consequence. I do not think that this argument can prevail. In addition, the court at all times retains its broad and [page29] flexible supervisory jurisdiction -- a jurisdiction which feeds the creativity that makes the CCAA work so well -- in order to address fairness and process concerns along the way. This case relates only to the court's exceptional power to order the removal of di rectors.

The reasonable apprehension of bias analogy

[73] In exercising what he saw as his discretion to remove the appellants as directors, the motion judge thought it would be useful to "borrow the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias ... with suitable adjustments for the nature of the decision making involved" (para. 8). He stressed that "there was absolutely no allegation against [Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper] of any actual aebias' or its equivalent" (para. 8). He acknowledged that neither was alleged to have done anything wrong since their appointments as directors, and that at the time of their appointments the appellants had confirmed to the Board that they understood and would abide by their duties and responsibilities as directors, including the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation and not in their own interests as shareholders. In the end, however, he concluded that because of their prior public statements that they intended to "pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco", and because of the nature of their business and the way in which they had been accumulating their shareholding position during the restructuring, and because of their linkage to 40 per cent of the common shareholders, there was a risk that the appellants would not conduct themselves in a neutral fashion in the best interests of the corporation as directors.

[74] In my view, the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias is foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, and to corporate governance considerations in general. Apprehension of bias is a concept that ordinarily applies to those who preside over judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making bodies, such as courts, administrative tribunals or arbitration boards. Its application is inapposite in the business decision-making context of corporate law. There is nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisages the screening of directors in advance for their ability to act neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment.

[75] Instead, the conduct of directors is governed by their common law and statutory obligations to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, and to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably [page30]prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (CBCA, s. 122(1)(a) and (b)). The directors also have fiduciary obligations to the

corporation, and they are liable to oppression remedy proceedings in appropriate circumstances. These remedies are available to aggrieved complainants -- including the respondents in this case -- but they depend for their applicability on the director having engaged in conduct justifying the imposition of a remedy.

[76] If the respondents are correct, and reasonable apprehension that directors may not act neutrally because they are aligned with a particular group of shareholders or stakeholders is sufficient for removal, all nominee directors in Canadian corporations, and all management directors, would automatically be disqualified from serving. No one suggests this should be the case. Moreover, as Iacobucci J. noted in Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, [1995] S.C.J. No. 29, at para. 35, "persons are assumed to act in good faith unless proven otherwise". With respect, the motion judge approached the circumstances before him from exactly the opposite direction. It is commonplace in corporate/commercial affairs that there are connections between directors and various stakeholders and that conflicts will exist from time to time. Even where there are conflicts of interest, however, directors are not removed from the board of directors; they are simply obliged to disclose the conflict and, in appropriate cases, to abstain from voting. The issue to be determined is not whether there is a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there has been some conduct on the part of the director that will justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach does not fit this sort of analysis.

Part V -- Disposition

[77] For the foregoing reasons, then, I am satisfied that the motion judge erred in declaring the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect.

[78] I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and set aside the order of Farley J. dated February 25, 2005.

[79] Counsel have agreed that there shall be no costs of the appeal.

Order accordingly.

[page31]

Notes

Note 1: R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.

Note 2: The reference is to the decisions in Dyle, Royal Oak Mines and Westar, cited above.

Note 3: See para. 43, infra, where I elaborate on this decision.

Note 4: It is the latter authority that the directors of Stelco exercised when appointing the appellants to the Stelco Board.

Note 5: Dennis H. Peterson, Shareholder Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Markham: LexisNexis -- Butterworths, 1989), at 18-47.

Note 6:Or, I would add, unpopular with other stakeholders.

Note 7: Now s. 241.

TAB 2

Case Name:

ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd.

Between
ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd., Appellant,
and
Bricore Land Group Ltd., Bricore Investment Group Ltd., 624796 Saskatchewan Ltd., 603767 Saskatchewan Ltd., 583261 Saskatchewan Ltd. and Horizon West Management Ltd., Respondents

[2007] S.J. No. 313

2007 SKCA 72

[2007] 9 W.W.R. 79

299 Sask.R. 194

33 C.B.R. (5th) 50

159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 671

2007 CarswellSask 324

Dockets: 1443 and 1452

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal

Klebuc C.J.S., Jackson and Smith JJ.A.

Heard: June 7, 2007.
Judgment: June 25, 2007.

(82 paras.)

Civil procedure -- Costs -- Solicitor and client or substantial indemnity -- As damages or punishment for improper conduct -- Appeal from Supreme Court decision that awarded substantial indemnity costs to respondent -- Appeal allowed -- There was no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs.

Insolvency law -- Administration of estate -- Actions by or against estate -- Appeal from a Supreme Court decision that denied the appellant leave to commence an action against the bankrupt -- The claim arose on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Appeal dismissed -- The order applied to post-filing creditors -- The appellant did not reach the necessary threshold required to allow the action to proceed.

Appeal from a Supreme Court decision that denied ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore. The claim by ICR arose on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The restructuring failed. The principal assets of the companies were sold and the net proceeds were being held for distribution. The post-filing claim was asserted against (i) the companies, which were subject to the CCAA order, and (ii) against the companies' Chief Restructuring Officer. ICR claimed a real estate commission with respect to the sale of a building belonging to Bricore. Bricore and four related companies (collectively "Bricore") were all subject to an initial order granted by a Supreme Court judge in January, 2006, pursuant to s. 11(3) of the CCAA. The Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) was appointed by the chambers judge in May, 2006 (the "CRO Order"). The Supreme Court judge remained the supervising CCAA judge from the time of the Initial Order. The Initial Order and the CRO Order imposed a stay of proceedings against Bricore and prohibited the commencement of new actions against Bricore and the CRO without leave of the Court. ICR applied to the supervising judge for directions and, in the alternative, for leave to commence actions against Bricore and the CRO. The supervising judge found that the Initial Order and the CRO Order applied to ICR and that leave of the Court was required. He refused leave and also awarded substantial indemnity costs against ICR. On appeal, ICR raised four issues. First, it alleged that the stay of proceedings imposed did not mean leave to commence an action against Bricore was required. Second, it contended that s. 11.3 of the CCAA did not require that a post-filing claimant was subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order. Third, it claimed that if leave was required, the supervising judge erred when he refused ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore and against the CRO. Finally, ICR contended that the supervising judge erred when he awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

HELD: Appeal allowed in part. The supervising judge erred when he awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis. All other aspects of the appeal were dismissed. The Initial Order applied to post-filing creditors. Leave was required. Ultimately, it was within the discretion of the supervising CCAA judge as to whether the proposed action ought to be allowed to proceed in the face of the stay. ICR did not reach the necessary threshold required to allow the action to proceed. It did not structure its affairs or establish a claim with the specificity that justified the development of a remedy to allow it to participate in the liquidation of the Bricore assets. With respect to costs, there was no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs with respect to the application to lift the stay in relation to Bricore, as bad faith was not alleged on its part. With respect to the CRO, the only basis upon which the stay could be lifted was to make an allegation of "bad faith." In the absence of some other factor, ICR could not be faulted for making the very allegation that it was required to make in order to bring its application within the ambit of the stay of proceedings that had been granted.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(3), s. 11(4), s. 11(6), s. 13

On appeal from Q.B.G. No. 8 of 2006, J.C. Saskatoon

Counsel:

Fred C. Zinkhan for the Appellant.

Jeffrey M. Lee for the Respondents.

Kim Anderson for the Monitor, Ernst & Young.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

JACKSON J.A.:--

I. Introduction

1 This appeal concerns a claim arising on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[1] (the "*CCAA*"). The restructuring failed. The principal assets of the companies have been sold and the net proceeds are being held for distribution. The post-filing claim is asserted against: (i) the companies, which are subject to the *CCAA* order; and (ii) against the companies' Chief Restructuring Officer.

2 The post-filing claimant is ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. ("ICR"). ICR claims a real estate commission with respect to the sale of a building belonging to Bricore Land Group Ltd. Bricore Land and four related companies (collectively "Bricore") are all subject to an initial order ("Initial Order") granted by Koch J. on January 4, 2006 pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*. The Chief Restructuring Officer, Maurice Duval (the "CRO"), was appointed by Koch J. on May 23, 2006 (the "CRO Order"). Koch J. has been the supervising *CCAA* judge since the Initial Order.

3 The Initial Order and the CRO Order impose the usual stay of proceedings against Bricore and prohibit the commencement of new actions against Bricore and the CRO, without leave of the Court.

4 ICR applied to Koch J. for directions and, in the alternative, for leave to commence actions against Bricore and the CRO. By fiats dated April 9, 2007 and April 25, 2007, Koch J. held that the Initial Order and the CRO Order prohibiting the commencement of actions apply to ICR and that leave of the Court is required. He refused leave and also awarded substantial indemnity costs against ICR.

5 On May 23, 2007, ICR applied in Court of Appeal chambers for leave to appeal, pursuant to s. 13 of the *CCAA,* and received leave to appeal the same day. The appeal was heard on June 7, 2007 and dismissed in relation to the lifting of the stay application and allowed in relation to the costs order on June 13, 2007, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

II. Issues

6 The issues are:

1. Does the stay of proceedings imposed by the supervising *CCAA* judge J. under the Initial Order apply to an action commenced by ICR, a post-filing claimant, such that leave to commence an action against Bricore is required?
2. Does s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* mean that a post-filing claimant cannot be subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order?
3. If leave is required, did the supervising *CCAA* judge commit a reviewable error in refusing ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore?
4. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge make a reviewable error in refusing leave to commence an action against the CRO?
5. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis?

III. Background

7 ICR's claim to a real estate commission arises as a result of these brief facts. Bricore owned four commercial real estate properties in Saskatoon and three such properties in Regina (the "Bricore Properties"). ICR argued that it had marketed one of the Regina properties, known as the Department of Education Building (the "Building"), to the City of Regina.

8 Bricore sold the Building, at a purchase price of $700,000,[2] to a proposed purchaser, which assigned its interest to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. 101086849 Saskatchewan in its turn sold the Building to the City of Regina for a price of $1,075,000.[3] The certificate of title to the Building issued in early January, 2007 to 101086849 Saskatchewan, and the certificate of title issued to the City of Regina in late January, 2007. The Building came to be sold pursuant to a series of Court Orders made by Koch J., which I will now summarize.

9 As I have indicated, the Initial Order was made on January 4, 2006. On February 13, 2006 Koch J. appointed CMN Calgary Inc. as an Officer of the Court to pursue opportunities and to solicit offers for the sale or refinancing of the Bricore Properties. He also authorized Bricore to enter into an agreement with CMN Calgary dated as of January 30, 2006 entitled "Exclusive Authority To Solicit Offers To Purchase."

10 In May 2006, it was determined that Bricore could not be reorganized and, therefore, all the Bricore Properties should be sold. On May 23, 2006, Koch J. appointed Maurice Duval, C.A., of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan as an officer of the Court to act as CRO, and to assist with the sale of the assets.

11 The CRO Order confers these powers on the CRO pertaining to the proposed sale of the Bricore Properties:

> 7 ...
>
> (e) subject to the stay of proceedings in effect in these proceedings, the power to take steps for the preservation and protection of the Bricore Properties, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, (i) the right to make payments to persons, if any, having charges or encumbrances on the Bricore Properties or any part or parts thereof on or after the date of this Order, which payments shall include payments in respect of realty taxes owing in respect of any of the Bricore Properties, (ii) the right to make repairs and improvements to the Bricore Properties or any parts thereof and (iii) the right to make payments for ongoing services in respect of the Bricore Properties;
>
> . . .
>
> (g) subject to paragraphs 7C, 7D and 7E hereof, **the power to work with, consult with and assist the court-appointed selling officer (CMN Calgary Inc.) to negotiate with parties who make offers to purchase** the Bricore Properties in a manner substantially in accordance with the process and proposed timeline for solicitation of such offers to purchase the Bricore Properties recommended by the Monitor in the Monitor's Third Report. ...[4] [Emphasis added.]

12 On June 19, 2006, Koch J. authorized the CRO to accept an offer to purchase the Bricore

Properties, including the Building, made by an undisclosed purchaser (the "Proposed Purchaser"), which offer to purchase was filed with the Court and temporarily sealed. The order directed that any further negotiations between the CRO and the Proposed Purchaser were to be completed by August 1, 2006.

13 Negotiations were protracted resulting in a further series of orders:

(a) August 1, 2006: Koch J. extended the timeframe for due diligence and further negotiations to be completed by August 15, 2006;[5]

(b) August 18, 2006: Koch J. authorized the CRO to accept an Amended Offer to Purchase made the 15th day of August, 2006. The Amended Offer to Purchase contemplated the sale by Bricore to the Proposed Purchaser of six of the seven Bricore Properties including the Building;[6]

(c) September 25, 2006: The closing date for the proposed sale by Bricore to the Proposed Purchaser of the six properties was extended from October 15, 2006 to November 15, 2006;[7]

(d) October 10, 2006: Koch J. approved the sale of the six properties to their respective purchasers; in the case of the Building, it was sold to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd.[8]

Koch J. ultimately approved the sale of the Building to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. as of November 30, 2006.

14 ICR said it had introduced the City of Regina to the opportunity to purchase the Building and it was therefore entitled to a real estate commission based on the sale price to the City of Regina. Once its claim was denied by the Monitor, ICR applied to Koch J. on March 22, 2007 contending that (a) "prior Orders of this Court requiring leave to commence action" against Bricore and the CRO "do not apply in the circumstances"; and (b) in the alternative, "it is entitled to an order granting leave to commence the proposed proceedings." In support of its notice of motion, ICR filed a draft statement of claim and a supporting affidavit with exhibits.

15 This is the substance of ICR's draft statement of claim against Bricore and the CRO:

4. At all material times Duval's actions in relation to the matters in issue in the within proceedings were carried out in his capacity as chief restructuring officer for the Bricore Group.

...

7. Duval, pursuant to Order of the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, was authorized in accordance in such order to market various assets of the Bricore Group, including the [Building]. [sic]
8. In the course of his efforts to market the [Building], Duval enlisted the aid of the plaintiff and its commercial realtors, licensed as brokers under *The Real Estate Act*.
9. The plaintiff, in its efforts to market the properties of the Bricore Group under the direction of Duval, including the [Building], introduced a prospective purchaser to Duval, namely the City of Regina.
10. By agreement dated September 27, 2006 made between the Plaintiff, the Bricore Group and Duval, it was agreed that the Plaintiff would be protected as the agent of record to a commission for the sale of any of the Bricore Group Properties for which the Plaintiff had located a purchaser.

11. The Plaintiff says that at the time of execution of the said Agreement by Duval on September 28, 2006, the City of Regina was in the process of doing its "due diligence" on the [Building] and it was expected that a sale of the [Building] to the City of Regina would be completed in the near future.
12. The Plaintiff says that, contrary to the Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, Duval, **without the Plaintiff's knowledge and in bad faith,** proceeded to arrange to sell the [Building] to a third party, namely 101086849 Saskatchewan ltd., which became the owner of the [Building] on or about January 3, 2007.[9] [Emphasis added.]

16 While the words "bad faith" are not repeated in the affidavit evidence, Paul Mehlsen, the principal of ICR, swore an affidavit in support of the application for leave, stating that he had examined the statement of claim and that to the best of his knowledge the allegations contained therein are true. His affidavit also states:

13. Insofar as the attached letter states that "ICR is protected as agent of record", this is commonly understood in the industry as meaning that in the event a sale of the property took place in the protected period to a purchaser introduced by the agent of record, then they would receive the usual commission for such sale, which in this case would be 5%.
14. It would appear from the attached exhibit "A" that Larry Ruf arranged to have the Respondent, Maurice Duval, agree to the arrangement, as well as adding that the protection would extend to the closing of any sale or December 31, 2006, whichever was the earlier.
15. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit "B" to this my Affidavit is a true copy of an email dated October 31, 2006 from Larry Ruf to Evan Hubick, Jim Kambeitz and Jim Thompson of the proposed plaintiff, ICR. Such email states in part:

    I can confirm, on behalf of the CRO, that protection for the potential deals referenced in your letter of September 27, 2006 will be honoured to November 30, 2006.[10]

17 Exhibit "A" is a letter dated September 27, 2006 from Mr. Jim Thompson of ICR to Mr. Larry Ruf of Horizon West Management Inc. It reads, in material part, as follows:

Please be advised that we have had ongoing discussions with potential buyers and tenants as follows:

1. 1500 - 4th Avenue [Department of Education Building] - we have been in regular contact with the City of Regina Real Estate Department for over a year regarding the possibility of this site being acquired by the City. In July a large contingent of City employees including a number from the Works and Engineering Department toured the building over several hours. We have had continuous follow up with a Real Estate Department official who confirmed recently that there still is an interest in the property and officials are in the due diligence stage. In addition, we have exposed the property to Alfords Furniture and Flooring who have an ongoing interest.

. . .

> The purpose of this memo is to reinforce our ongoing efforts to market and represent the Bricore assets in Regina. We are aware that the properties are under contract to sell and request that ICR be protected in the specific situations as outlined.
>
> In the event we are not able to carry on in a formal fashion we would ask that you sign where indicated to acknowledge that ICR is protected as the agent of record for the Tenants/Buyers noted herein for a period to extend to December 31, 2006.[11]

The words "December 31, 2006" are struck out and these words are added: "Date of closing of a sale or December 31, 2006 whichever is earlier." Mr. Ruf's name is crossed out and the signature of Maurice Duval, Chief Restructuring Officer is added in its place.

18 Mr. Ruf, on behalf of Bricore, refuted ICR's claim in a sworn affidavit stating:

> 3. At no time did I approach ICR Regina in 2006 to initiate discussions regarding the sale or lease of the Department of Education Building.
> 4. I received two or three unsolicited telephone calls regarding the Department of Education Building in September of 2006 from representatives of ICR Regina (including Paul Mehlsen, Jim Kambeitz and Evan Hubick). During those calls, representatives of ICR Regina informed me that they knew of certain parties who would be interested in purchasing the Department of Education Building. In response to each of these inquiries, I informed representatives of ICR:
> (a) that I had no authority to participate in communications regarding a sale of the Department of Education Building, and that all such inquiries should be directed to Maurice Duval, the court-appointed Chief Restructuring Officer of Bricore Group; and
> (b) that further information on the status of the restructuring of Bricore Group could be obtained on the website of MLT.[12]

19 The CRO filed a report in response to ICR:

> 6. At the time of my review of the September 27, 2006 letter from ICR Regina, I was working very hard to attempt to negotiate and conclude the final closing of the sale of the Bricore Properties to the purchasers identified in the Accepted Offer to Purchase. I fully expected that sale to close (as it ultimately did effective November 30, 2006). However, I determined that, in the event that such sale failed to close, Bricore Group would need to identify other potential purchasers of the Bricore Properties very quickly. I therefore decided that it would be appropriate for Bricore Group, by the CRO, to agree to protect ICR Regina for a commission in the unlikely event that the sale contemplated by the Accepted Offer to Purchase did not close, and it subsequently became necessary for Bricore Group instead to conclude a sale of the Bricore Properties to one or more of the prospective purchasers of the three Bricore Properties located in Regina (as specifically identified in Mr. Thompson's September 27, 2006 letter). For that reason, and that reason only, I agreed to sign the September 27, 2006 letter.
> 7. In signing the September 27, 2006 letter, my intention, as court-appointed CRO of Bricore Group, was to strike an agreement that, in the unlikely event that:
> (a) the sale of the Bricore Properties identified in the Accepted Offer to Purchase fell apart; and
> (b) it subsequently became necessary for Bricore Group to sell the Bricore

> Properties to one or more of the prospective purchasers identified in the September 27, 2006 letter;
>
> then Bricore Group would agree to pay a commission to ICR Regina. In regard to the Department of Education Building located at 1500 - 4th Avenue in Regina (the "Department of Education Building"), the two prospective purchasers in respect of which ICR Regina was protected for a commission were the City of Regina and Alford's Furniture and Flooring. The reference to closing date was to the closing of the Avenue Sale, which occurred effective November 30, 2006.
>
> 8. In January of 2007, after much effort and expenditure of resources, the sale of the Bricore Properties contemplated in the Accepted Offer to Purchase was unconditionally closed (effective November 30, 2006). The entity named as purchaser of the Department of Education Building in the final closing documents was a numbered Saskatchewan company controlled by Avenue Commercial Group of Calgary. Such entity was a nominee corporation operating entirely at arm's length from the City of Regina and Bricore Group. At all times after June 2006, the CRO had no authority to sell the property, as it was already sold.
> 9. It was subsequently brought to my attention that the numbered company which purchased the Department of Education Building had promptly "flipped" such property to the City of Regina. I knew nothing of such a proposed flip prior to learning of it from ICR Regina.[13]

20 To rebut this, Mr. Mehlsen of ICR swore a further affidavit deposing:

> 3. As indicated in my Affidavit sworn March 22, 2007, ICR had an ongoing relationship with the Bricore Companies prior to 2006. This relationship continued after the Initial Order in January 2006 in that ICR continued to show Bricore Properties for lease or sale, including the [Building].
> 4. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit E to this my Affidavit is a true copy of an e-mail from my contact at the City of Regina ... dated April 13, 2006 advising that the City was interested in purchasing the [Building].
> 5. I immediately passed this information along to Larry Ruf, as evidenced in the e-mail dated April 13, 2006 attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "F" to this my affidavit.
> 6. In reply to paras. 2 and 12 of Mr. Duval's Report, it was not known to ICR that all of the Bricore Properties were sold as claimed; rather, it was known that some of the Bricore Properties had been sold, but not the subject property, [the Building], as it was the "ugly duckling" of the Bricore Properties and therefore had been excluded from the reported sale. ICR's efforts were directed at the sale of [the Building] and leasing the other two Regina properties.
> 7. In response to para. 13 of Mr. Duval's Report, it is true that there were no direct communications between ICR and Mr. Duval as all communications were with Larry Ruf, who indicated that he acted under the authority and with the knowledge of Mr. Duval.
> 8. As a result of contact in early summer with Mr. Ruf, ICR actively marketed the [Building] by placing signage on the property, developing an "information" or "fact" sheet detailing aspects of the building, and showed the property to the City of Regina and other prospective purchasers.

. . .

11. Because of delays on the part of the City of Regina in its due diligence and the fact that ICR has been working without any formal agreement, I caused the letter of September 27, 2006 (exhibit "A" to my Affidavit sworn March 22, 2007) to be sent.
12. At no time did either Mr. Ruf or Mr. Duval advise that the [Building] was sold and that ICR's role was merely that of a "backup offer". The signed letter of September 27, 2006 and Mr. Ruf's e-mail of October 31, 2006 make no mention of these events and this was never disclosed to myself or ICR.

. . .

14. In hindsight, it would appear that the confidential information concerning the intention of the City of Regina to purchase the [Building] that was provided by myself and representatives of ICR to Mr. Ruf and Mr. Duval was communicated to the [Proposed Purchaser], who then incorporated 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. to take advantage of this opportunity. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit "I" to this my Affidavit is a true copy of a Profile Report from the Corporate Registry indicating that 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. was incorporated by solicitors as a "shelf company" on May 31, 2006, with new Directors in the form of Garry Bobke and Steven Butt taking office on August 17, 2006.
15. My understanding is that the [Proposed Purchaser] initially excluded the [Building] from their offer to purchase the Bricore Group properties and made a separate offer through 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. when they were made aware of the confidential information about the City of Regina's plans to purchase the property.[14]

21 In refusing ICR leave to commence action, Koch J. wrote:

> [1] On January 4, 2006, I granted an initial order pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, (the "*CCAA*") protecting the respondent corporations Bricore Land Group Ltd. et al. (collectively "Bricore"), from claims of their respective creditors. The order (paragraph 5) explicitly provides in accordance with the authority conferred upon the Court pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA* that "no Person shall commence or continue any Enforcement or Proceeding of any kind against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property". The initial period of 30 days has been extended many times. The stay of proceedings continues in effect. Ernst & Young Inc. was appointed monitor. That appointment continues.
>
> ...
>
> [16] Although the interpretation of s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* is not necessarily well settled in all aspects, it appears that the import of s. 11.3, which was introduced as an amendment to the Act in 1997, is this:
>
> (a) An application to lift a stay of proceedings must be addressed in the context of the broad objectives of the *CCAA* which is to promote re-organization and restructuring of companies. If s. 11.3 is interpreted too literally, it can render the stay provisions ineffective, leaving the collective good of the restructuring

process subservient to the self-interest of a single creditor. Clearly, s. 11.3 must be construed so as not to defeat the overall objectives of the Act. See *Smith Brothers Contracting Ltd. (Re)* (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 264 (B.C.S.C.).

(b) The standard for determining whether to lift the stay of proceedings is not, as ICR contends, whether the action is frivolous, analogous to the standard which a defendant applicant under Rule 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* must meet to set aside a statement of claim. Rather, to obtain an order lifting the stay ad hoc to permit the suit to proceed, the proposed plaintiff must establish that the cause of action is tenable. I interpret that to mean that the proposed plaintiff has a *prima facie* case. See *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).

(c) In determining whether to lift a stay, the Court must take into consideration the relative prejudice to the parties. See *Ivaco, Inc. (Re), supra*, para. 20; and Richard H. McLaren & Sabrina Gherbaz, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy* (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1995) at 3-18.1. Counsel have cited the case of *GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation - Canada v. T.C.T. Logistics Inc.*, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 123, 2006 SCC 35. The circumstances in that case are somewhat analogous but it is of limited assistance because the *CCAA* does not contain a provision equivalent to s. 215 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, which expressly provides that no action lies against the superintendent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee in certain circumstances without leave of the Court.

[17] For reasons outlined *supra*, I do not find the cause of action ICR asserts against Bricore to be tenable, not even as against Bricore Land Group Ltd. Therefore, the application to lift the stay of proceedings to permit the proposed action against Bricore is dismissed.

[18] Neither is there any basis upon which to lift the stay with respect to the proposed action against Maurice Duval, the Chief Restructuring Officer. Considerations applicable to Bricore under s. 11.3 do not apply to a court- appointed restructuring officer. Maurice Duval, as an officer of the Court, has explained his position in a cogent way. I accept his explanation. He did not sell the Department of Education Building to the City of Regina. He was not aware at the relevant time that the purchaser was going to resell. Indeed, his efforts were directed toward closing a single transaction involving all six Bricore properties. Although the proposed pleading accuses Mr. Duval of acting in "bad faith", it is not suggested on behalf of ICR that Mr. Duval has been guilty of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct; that is, any of the limitations or exceptions expressly listed in paragraph 20(c) of the order of May 23, 2006.

[19] As stated previously, the overriding purpose of the *CCAA* must also be considered. That applies in the Duval situation too. The statute is intended to facilitate restructuring to serve the public interest. In many cases such as the present it is necessary for the Court to appoint officers whose expertise is required to fulfill its mandate. It is clearly in the public interest that capable people be willing to accept such assignments. It is to be expected that such acceptance be contingent on protective provisions such as are included in the order of May 23, 2006, appointing Mr. Duval. It is important that the Court exercise caution in removing such restrictions; otherwise, the ability of the Court to obtain the assistance of needed experts will necessarily be impaired. Qualified professionals will be less willing to

accept assignments absent the protection provisions in the appointing order.[15]

IV. Issue #1: Does the stay of proceedings imposed by the supervising *CCAA* judge under the Initial Order apply to an action commenced by ICR, a post-filing claimant, such that leave to commence an action against Bricore is required?

22 ICR argues that, as a post-filing creditor, the Initial Order does not apply to it, either as a matter of law or on the basis of a proper interpretation of the Initial Order.

23 The authority to make an order staying and prohibiting proceedings against a debtor company is contained in s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*:

> 11.(3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

24 Pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*, Koch J. granted the Initial Order providing for a stay and prohibition of new proceedings in these terms:

> 5. During the 30-day period from and after the date of filing of this application on January 4, 2006 or during the period of any extension of such 30-day period granted by further order of the Court (the "Stay Period"), no Person shall commence or continue any Enforcement or Proceeding of any kind against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property. Any and all Enforcement or Proceedings already commenced (as at the date of this Order) against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended.
> 6. During the Stay Period, no person shall assert, invoke, rely upon, exercise or attempt to assert, invoke, rely upon or exercise any rights:
>
> a) against Bricore Group or the Property;
> b) as a result of any default or non-performance by Bricore Group, the making or filing of this proceeding or any admission or evidence in this proceeding, or
> c) in respect of any action taken by Bricore Group or in respect of any of the Property under, pursuant to or in furtherance of this Order.
>
> . . .
>
> 11. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Order:
>
> a) no creditor of Bricore Group shall be under any obligation, by reason only of the issuance of this Order, to advance or re-advance any monies

or otherwise extend any credit to Bricore Group, except as such creditor may agree; and

b) Bricore Group may, by written consent of its counsel of record, agree to waive any of the protections that this Order provides to them, whether such waiver is given in respect of a single creditor or class of creditors or is given in respect of all creditors generally.

...

13. Any act or action taken or notice given by creditors or other Persons or their agents, from and after 12:01 a.m. (local Saskatoon time) on the date of the filing of the application for this Order to the time of the granting of this Order, to commence or continue Enforcement or to take any Proceeding (including, without limitation, the application of funds in reduction of any debt, set-off or the consolidation of accounts) is, unless the Court orders otherwise, deemed not to have been taken or given.

"Proceeding" is defined in para. 22 of Schedule "A" to the Initial Order as "a lawsuit, legal action, court application, arbitration, hearing, mediation process, enforcement process, grievance, extrajudicial proceeding of any kind or other proceeding of any kind."

25 The authority to extend an initial order is contained in s. 11(4) of the *CCAA:*

> 11(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Koch J., pursuant to this subsection, extended the stay many times and the stay continues in force.

26 As authority for the proposition that the Initial Order does not stay proceedings with respect to claims that arise after the Initial Order, ICR's counsel cites Professor Honsberger's *Debt Restructuring Principles & Practice*:

> The scope of an order staying proceedings extends only to claims that arose prior to the order. A proceeding based on a claim that arose after an order was made staying proceedings is not affected by the stay.[16] [Footnote omitted.]

The only case footnoted is *Ramsay Plate Glass Co. v. Modern Wood Products Ltd.*[17] *In my respectful view, the facts in Ramsay Glass* narrow its application.

27 In *Ramsay Glass*, the initial *CCAA* order, dated April 12, 1951, suspended all proceedings against Modern Wood Products Ltd. Modern Wood Products made an offer of compromise that was accepted by its existing creditors and approved by the Court on May 21, 1951. Ramsay Glass sought to enforce a

claim against Modern Wood Products that arose in 1953. Modern Wood Products sought to strike Ramsay Glass's claim on the basis that its proceedings were stayed by the April 1951 order.

28 In dismissing the application to strike, Prevost J. wrote:

> CONSIDERING that said claim is not provable in bankruptcy and that under *The Bankruptcy Act* an order staying proceedings would not apply to such a claim: *Richardson & Co. v. Storey*, 23 C.B.R. 145, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 182, Abr. Con. 301; *In re Bolf*, 26 C.B.R. 149, [1945] Que. S.C. 173, Abr. Con. 303;
>
> CONSIDERING that s. 10 of *The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and the judgments rendered under its authority should receive the same interpretation in this respect as s. 40 of *The Bankruptcy Act*;
>
> CONSIDERING that the present claim is in no way affected by the judgment rendered on April 12, 1951 by Boyer J. under *The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, ordering suspension of all proceedings against defendant company the present claim being posterior to said date and having not been made the subject of any compromise or arrangement homologated by this Court;
>
> CONSIDERING that the present claim arose in 1953, two years after the judgment of Boyer J. homologating the compromise following the non-payment by defendant company of merchandise purchased by it from plaintiff company during said year;[18]

I do not interpret *Ramsay Glass* as permitting a post-filing claimant to commence an action against a debtor company without obtaining leave while the *CCAA* stay is in effect. In my opinion, *Ramsay Glass* can be read as authority for the proposition that a post-filing creditor need not apply for leave after the stay has been lifted. In that respect, it parallels *360networks Inc., Re;*[19] *Stelco Inc., (Re);*[20] *and Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*[21]

29 In 360networks, a creditor (Caterpillar Financial Services Limited) had both pre-filing and post-filing claims. Caterpillar applied, *inter alia*, for an order lifting the stay of proceedings. Tysoe J. wrote:

> 8 On the hearing of the applications, Caterpillar continued to take the position that all of its claims could properly be determined within the *CCAA* proceedings on the first of its two applications. I agree that the Deficiency Claim and the Secured Creditor Claim are properly determinable within the *CCAA* proceedings, but it is my view that it would not be appropriate to make determinations in respect of the Trust Claim or the Post-Filing Claim in the *CCAA* proceedings. The only remaining thing to be done in the *CCAA* proceedings is the determination of the validity of claims for the purposes of the Restructuring Plan (with Caterpillar's claims being the only unresolved ones). **Neither the Trust Claim nor the Post-Filing Claim falls into this category of claim because each of these types of claim is not affected by the Restructuring Plan.** Indeed, the Post-Filing Claim was not asserted in Caterpillar's proof of claim and surely cannot be adjudicated upon within Caterpillar's appeal of the disallowance of its proof of claim. The B.C. Court of Appeal has recently affirmed, in *United Properties Ltd. v. 642433 B.C. Ltd.*, [2003] B.C.J. No. 852, 2003 BCCA 203 (B.C.C.A.), that it is appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction to resolve a dispute in *CCAA* proceedings which, although it may relate to them, is not part and parcel of the proceedings. [Emphasis added.]

. . .

> 11 Counsel for Caterpillar relies for the first ground on the fact that s. 12 of the *CCAA* authorizes the court to deal with secured and unsecured claims. However, s. 12 deals with the determination of claims for the purposes of the CCAA and does not authorize the court to determine claims which fall outside of *CCAA* proceedings, such as the Trust Claim and the Post-Filing Claim.[22]

In the result, Tysoe J. lifted the stay so as to permit an action to be commenced to resolve all of Caterpillar's claims. The significance of the decision for our purposes is that the Court in *360networks* considered the stay as applying to claims that arose after the initial order.

30 In *Stelco,* Farley J., relying on *360networks*, also held that the post-filing creditor's claim in that case "continues to be stayed and is to be dealt with in the ordinary course of litigation after Stelco's *CCAA* protection is terminated."[23]

31 *Campeau* does not deal with a post-filing creditor, but it does address the situation where a creditor, whose claim is not accepted as part of the plan of arrangement, wants to commence action. Blair J. (as he then was) refused an application brought by Robert Campeau and the Campeau Corporations to lift the stay of proceeding imposed by the initial order. In doing so, he wrote:

> 24. In making these orders, I see no prejudice to the Campeau plaintiffs. The processing of their action is not being precluded, but merely postponed. Their claims may, indeed, be addressed more expeditiously than might have otherwise been the case, as they may be dealt with - at least for the purposes of that proceeding - in the C.C.A.A. proceeding itself. On the other hand, there might be great prejudice to Olympia & York if its attention is diverted from the corporate restructuring process and it is required to expend time and energy in defending an action of the complexity and dimension of this one. While there may not be a great deal of prejudice to National Bank in allowing the action to proceed against it, I am satisfied that there is little likelihood of the action proceeding very far or very effectively unless and until Olympia & York - whose alleged misdeeds are the real focal point of the attack on both sets of defendants - is able to participate.
>
> 25. In addition to the foregoing, I have considered the following factors in the exercise of my discretion:
>
> 1. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the Campeau claim must be dealt with, either in the action or in the C.C.A.A. proceedings and that it cannot simply be ignored. I agree. However, in my view, it is more appropriate, and in fact is essential, that the claim be addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings rather than outside, in order to maintain the integrity of those proceedings. Were it otherwise, the numerous creditors in that mammoth proceeding would have no effective way of assessing the weight to be given to the Campeau claim in determining their approach to the acceptance or rejection of the Olympia & York Plan filed under the Act.
> 2. In this sense, the Campeau claim - like other secured, undersecured, unsecured, and contingent claims - must be dealt with as part of a "controlled stream" of claims that are being negotiated with a view to

> facilitating a compromise and arrangement between Olympia & York and its creditors. In weighing "the good management" of the two sets of proceedings - i.e. the action and the CCAA proceeding - the scales tip in favour of dealing with the Campeau claim in the context of the latter:
>
> see *Attorney General v. Arthur Andersen & Co.* (United Kingdom) (1988), [1989] E.C.C. 224 (C.A.), cited in *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, [1992] O.J. No. 1330, supra.* **I am aware, when saying this, that in the initial plan of compromise and arrangement filed by the applicants with the court on August 21, 1992, the applicants have chosen to include the Campeau plaintiffs amongst those described as "Persons not Affected by the Plan".** This treatment does not change the issues, in my view, as it is up to the applicants to decide how they wish to deal with that group of "creditors" in presenting their plan, and up to the other creditors to decide whether they will accept such treatment. In either case, the matter is being dealt with, as it should be, within the context of the C.C.A.A. proceedings.[24] [Emphasis added.]

Campeau is further authority for the proposition that a supervising *CCAA* judge can refuse a prospective creditor, who is not part of the plan of arrangement, leave to commence proceedings and that the creditor may commence action after the stay is lifted.

32 Each of *360networks*[25], *Stelco*[26] *and Campeau*[27] *supports the proposition that while a stay of proceedings is extant, an application to lift the stay must be made to permit an action to be commenced against a debtor that is subject to a CCAA* order, regardless of whether the claim arises before or after the initial order, or whether the prospective creditor is able to take part in the plan of arrangement.

33 Prevost J. in *Ramsay Glass* points out that under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[28] (*the "BIA"*) the stay of proceedings does not extend to a claim not provable in bankruptcy. This is so, however, because of the definition of "claim provable in bankruptcy" and ss. 69.3(1) and s. 121. (See Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.*[29]) While s. 12 of the *CCAA* defines "claim" by reference to "claim provable in bankruptcy," it has not been interpreted as limiting the extent of the stay.

34 On the face of ss. 11(3) and (4) of the *CCAA*, the authority to safeguard the company is not limited to staying existing actions, but extends to "prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of ... any other action, suit or proceeding against the company." Unlike the *BIA* there are no words limiting this phrase to debts or claims in existence at the time of the initial order.

35 With respect to the wording of the Initial Order, there can be no question that it applies to post-filing creditors. The broad wording of paras. 5 and 6 of the Initial Order and the definition of "proceeding" confirm this. No distinction is made between creditors in existence at the time of the Initial Order and those who become creditors after. Paragraph 11(b) also establishes a mechanism for post-filing creditors to seek relief by obtaining an exemption from the protection afforded Bricore, which would include the prohibition of proceedings. The obvious implication is that the prohibition of proceedings applies to post-filing creditors, subject, of course, to obtaining leave of the Court to commence action.

V. Issue #2. Does s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* mean that a post-filing claimant cannot be subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order?

36 ICR argued that by the addition of s. 11.3 in 1997[30] to the *CCAA*, Parliament intended to grant a

post-filing creditor the right to sue without obtaining leave.

37 In my respectful view, s. 11.3 cannot be interpreted in the way in which ICR contends. Indeed, a more logical and internally consistent reading of s. 11.3 and the other sections of the *CCAA* is to permit the supervising judge to determine, as a matter of discretion, whether an action commenced by a post-filing creditor should be permitted to proceed.

38 Section 11.3 forms part of a comprehensive series of sections addressing the question of stays added in 1997 and 2001:[31]

> No stay, etc., in certain cases
>
> 11.1 (2) No order may be made under this Act **staying or restraining** the exercise of any right to terminate, amend or claim any accelerated payment under an eligible financial contract or preventing a member of the Canadian Payments Association established by the *Canadian Payments Act* from ceasing to act as a clearing agent or group clearer for a company in accordance with that Act and the by-laws and rules of that Association. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)
>
> No stay, etc., in certain cases
>
> 11.11 No order may be made under this Act **staying or restraining**
>
> (a) the exercise by the Minister of Finance or the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of any power, duty or function assigned to them by the *Bank Act*, the *Cooperative Credit Associations Act*, the *Insurance Companies Act* or the *Trust and Loan Companies Act;*
> (b) the exercise by the Governor in Council, the Minister of Finance or the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation of any power, duty or function assigned to them by the *Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act*; or
> (c) the exercise by the Attorney General of Canada of any power, assigned to him or her by the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*. (Added by S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 577.)
>
> No stay, etc. in certain cases
>
> 11.2 No order may be made under section 11 **staying or restraining any action, suit or proceeding** against a person, other than a debtor company in respect of which an application has been made under this Act, who is obligated under a letter of credit or guarantee in relation to the company. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)
>
> 11.3 No order made under section 11 shall have the effect of
>
> (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or
> (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)
>
> [Emphasis added.]

39 In ss. 11.1(2), 11.11 and 11.2, Parliament uses the words "staying or restraining" to describe those circumstances limiting the scope of the stay power, but these words are not repeated in s. 11.3. This application of the *expressio unius* principle supports the obvious implication that s. 11.3 does not limit the authority of the court to stay all proceedings.

40 While the debates of the House of Commons in Hansard do not comment on s. 11.3, several text book authors assist with the task of interpretation. Professor Honsberger states:

> A distinction is made between the compulsory supply of goods and services and the extension of credit by suppliers to a debtor company in CCAA proceedings.
>
> Suppliers may be enjoined from cutting off services or discontinuing the supply of goods by reason of there being arrears of payment provided the debtor commences regular payments for current deliveries.
>
> However, no order made under s. 11 of the Act has the effect of prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration after the order is made.
>
> . . .
>
> ... A court could make a similar order after the 1997 amendments provided it stipulated that the debtor company made immediate payment for "goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration after the order is made.[32]

[Footnotes omitted.]

41 Professor McLaren similarly comments in his text "Canadian Commercial Reorganization":[33]

> 3.800 ... Section 11.3 acts as an exemption to the stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA. It appears the section is meant to balance the rights of creditors with debtors. The section addresses the concern that judges had too much discretion in issuing stays. Under s. 11.3(*a*), if a person supplies goods or services or if the debtor continues to occupy or use leased or licensed property, the court will not issue a stay order with respect to the payment for such goods or services or leased or licensed property. In essence, s. 11.3(*a*) will not permit the court to prohibit these individuals from demanding payment from the debtor for goods, services or use of leased property, after a court order is made.

42 Finally, Professor Sarra in *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[34] provides this insight:

> While the court cannot compel a supplier to continue to extend credit to the debtor during a *CCAA* proceeding, the court can protect trade suppliers that choose to supply goods or credit during the stay period by granting them a charge on the assets of the debtor that will rank ahead of other claims. While section 11.3 of the *CCAA* states that no stay of proceedings can have the effect of prohibiting a person from requiring

> immediate payment for goods, services or the use of leased or licensed property, or requiring the further advance of money or credit, trade suppliers were often continuing credit only to find that they had lost further assets during the workout period because of their priority in the hierarchy of claims. Hence the practice of post-petition trade credit priority charges developed, first recognized in Alberta.[35] [Footnotes omitted.]

43 *Smith Bros. Contracting Ltd. (Re)*[36] also supports a narrow reading of s. 11.3. After citing *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*[37] and *Quintette Coal Limited. v. Nippon Steel Corporation*[38] with respect to the intention of Parliament and the object and scheme of the *CCAA*, Bauman J. in *Smith Bros.* wrote:

> 45 It is interesting that Gibbs J.A. suggested that it would be unlikely that a court would exercise its s. 11 jurisdiction:
>
> > ... where the result would be to enforce the continued supply of goods and services to the debtor company without payment for current deliveries ...
>
> 46 Parliament has now precluded that by adding s. 11.3(a) to the CCAA. It is instructive to note, however, that the subsection has been added against the backdrop of jurisprudence which has underlined the very broad scope of the court's jurisdiction to stay proceedings under s. 11.

47 To repeat the relevant portion of the section:

> 11.3 No order made under s. 11 shall have the effect of
>
> > (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for ... use of leased or licenced property ... provided after the order is made;
>
> It is noted that the remedy which is preserved for creditors is a relatively narrow one; it is the right to require immediate payment for the use of the leased property.[39]

Thus, Bauman J. interpreted s. 11.3 in accordance with Parliament's intention and the object and scheme of the C*CAA* as creating a narrow right - the right to withhold services without immediate payment.

44 I agree with Bricore's counsel. When a supplier is requested to provide goods or services on a post-filing basis to a company operating under a stay of proceedings imposed by the *CCAA*, s. 11.3 allows the supplier the right:

(a) to refuse to supply any such goods or services at all;
(b) to supply such goods or services on a "cash on demand" basis only;
(c) to negotiate with the insolvent corporation for the amendment of the *CCAA* Order to create a post-filing supplier's charge on the assets of the insolvent corporation to secure the payment by the insolvent corporation of amounts owing by it to such post-filing suppliers; or
(d) to take the risk of supplying goods or services on credit.

Where the Initial Order imposes a stay of proceedings and prohibits further proceedings, s. 11.3 does not

permit the supplier of goods or services to sue without obtaining leave of the court to do so.

VI. Issue #3: If leave is required, did the supervising *CCAA* judge commit a reviewable error in refusing ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore?

45 Having determined that the stay and prohibition of proceedings applies to ICR, notwithstanding its status as a post-filing creditor, the next issue is whether Koch J. erred in refusing to lift the stay on the basis that the claim was not tenable.

46 The claim against Bricore is presumably against Bricore both in its own right and pursuant to its indemnification agreement with the CRO. Paragraph 18 of the CRO Order requires Bricore to indemnify the CRO:

> 18. Bricore Group shall indemnify and hold harmless the CRO from and against all costs (including, without limitation, defence costs), claims, charges, expenses, liabilities and obligations of any nature whatsoever incurred by the CRO that may arise as a result of any matter directly or indirectly relating to or pertaining to any one or more of:
>
> (a) the CRO's position or involvement with Bricore Group;
> (b) the CRO's administration of the management, operations and business and financial affairs of Bricore Group;
> (c) any sale of all or part of the Property pursuant to these proceedings;
> (d) any plan or plans of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA between Bricore Group and one or more classes of its creditors; and/or
> (e) any action or proceeding to which the CRO may be made a party by reason of having taken over the management of the business of Bricore Group.[40]

47 The authority to lift the stay imposed by the Initial Order against Bricore is contained in s. 11(4) of the *CCAA*:

> 11(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,
>
> ...
>
> (c) prohibiting, **until otherwise ordered by the court**, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company. [Emphasis added.]

48 This is a discretionary power, which invokes the standard of appellate review stated as follows:

> [22] ... [T]he function of an appellate court is not to exercise an independent discretion of its own. It must defer to the judge's exercise of his discretion and must not interfere with it merely on the ground that members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently. The function of the appellate court is one of review only. It may set aside the judge's exercise of his discretion on the ground that it was based on a misunderstanding of the law or of the evidence before him or on an inference that particular facts existed or did not exist, which, although it was one that might legitimately have been drawn on the evidence that was before the judge, can be

> demonstrated to be wrong by further evidence that has become available by the time of the appeal, or on the ground that there has been a change of circumstances after the judge made his order.[41]

It is often expressed as permitting intervention where the judge acts arbitrarily, on a wrong principle, or on an erroneous view of the facts, or when the appeal court is satisfied that there is likely to be a failure of justice as a result of the refusal. See: *Martin v. Deutch.*[42]

49 With respect to discretionary decisions made under the CCAA, there is a particular reluctance to intervene. The reluctance is justified on the basis of the specialization of the judges who have carriage of complex proceedings that are often replete with compromised solutions.[43] This does not mean that the Court of Appeal can turn a blind eye or permit an injustice, but it does provide the backdrop against which *CCAA* discretionary decisions are reviewed.

50 Unlike the *BIA*,[44] the *CCAA* contains no specific statutory test to provide guidance on the circumstances in which a *CCAA* stay of proceedings is to be lifted. Some guidance, nonetheless, can be found in the statute and in the jurisprudence.

51 Subsection 11(6) of the *CCAA* states:

> 11 (6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless
>
> (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
> (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

While the reference to "order" in the opening clause "[t]he court shall not make an order under s. (3) or (4)" may very well be to the Initial Order and not to the order lifting the stay, s. 11(6) and, in particular, its legislative history, are also relevant to an application to lift the stay.

52 Subsection 11(6) was brought into effect in 1997 by Bill C-5, which enacted "An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act." When Bill C-5 received third reading on October 23, 1996, s. 11(6) took this form:

> 11 (6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless
>
> (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
> (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that:
>
> (i) the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence,
> (ii) a viable compromise or arrangement could likely be made in respect of the company, if the order being applied for were made, and
> (iii) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the order being applied for were made.

After Bill C-5 received third reading, it was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.[45] The Committee reported:

> A number of insolvency experts were of the opinion that the proposed amendment would make it virtually impossible to obtain extensions of the initial 30-day stay under the CCAA and force companies to file plans of arrangement within 30 days after the making of the initial stay order.
>
> Others suggested that some CCAA reorganizations would have turned out differently if the amendment had been in place.
>
> . . .
>
> Of the submissions received about proposed subsection 11(6), all but one condemned the provision.
>
> ...
>
> The CLHIA [Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association] argued that the amendment to the bill would be a significant improvement to the CCAA for four reasons:
>
> (a) it would give direction to the courts as to the tests that must be met before the extension order was granted;
> (b) it would more closely align the CCAA with the BIA;
> (c) the tests are well-established under the BIA and have received extensive scrutiny and study; and
> (d) the tests would direct the courts to consider how the stay would affect creditors. [Footnote omitted.]
>
> . . .
>
> The Committee shares the concerns expressed about the potential impact of proposed subsection 11(6) of the CCAA, particularly the concern that the CCAA may no longer be a sufficiently flexible vehicle for large, complex corporate reorganizations.
>
> While the Committee fully supports initiatives to align the provisions of the CCAA more closely with those of the BIA, these initiatives must be the subject of thorough discussion and analysis before [making] their way into legislation. Unfortunately, such discussion did not take place prior [to] the introduction of proposed subsection 11(6).[46]

Notwithstanding the submissions of the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, the Standing Committee recommended that Bill C-5 be amended by striking subparagraphs 11(6)(b)(ii) and (iii).

53 The House of Commons concurred in the Amendments recommended by the Senate on April 15, 1997.[47] Bill C-5, as thus amended, received Royal Assent on April 25, 1997 and was proclaimed in its present skeletal form on September 30, 1997.[48] Neither the amending legislation[49] nor the proposed Bill presently before the Senate[50] make any change to s. 11 in this regard.

54 The Senate's and Parliament's specific rejection of a limitation on the court's discretion is a strong indication of Parliamentary intention. The fact that Parliament did not see fit to limit the discretion in any significant manner, despite having been given the opportunity to do so, confirms the broad discretion given in ss. 11(3) and (4) to the supervising *CCAA* judge. Discretion is never completely unfettered, but an appellate court should be reluctant to impose rigid tests, standards or criteria where Parliament has declined to do so. Some guidance can be taken from the jurisprudence.

55 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*[51] *Paperny J. (as she then was) indicated that the obligation of the supervising CCAA* judge is to "always have regard to the particular facts" and "to balance" the interests. As Farley J. said in *Ivaco Inc., Re*,[52] the supervising *CCAA* judge must also be concerned not to permit one creditor to mount "an indirect but devastating attack on the CCAA stay" so as to give one creditor an inappropriate advantage over other unsecured creditors as well as over secured creditors with priority.

56 In *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*[53] Ground J. stated this to be the criteria to determine whether a stay should be lifted:

> 20 It appears to me that the criteria which the court must consider in determining whether to lift a stay, being whether the proposed cause of action is tenable, the balancing of interests as between the parties, the relative prejudice to the parties, and whether the proposed action would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the court process, would all be met with respect to a trial of issues to resolve interpretation of the APAs with respect to the calculation of the working capital adjustments.

Ground J. went on to confirm that finding a tenable or reasonable cause of action is not the only factor to be considered:

> 30 Even if the Statement of Claim did disclose a tenable or reasonable cause of action, there are a number of other factors which this court must consider which militate against the lifting of the stay in the circumstances of this case. The institution of the Proposed Action, even if a tight timetable is imposed, would inevitably result in considerable delay and complication with respect to the full distribution of the estate to the detriment of many small trade creditors and individual creditors as well as to pension claimants. In addition, it would appear from the evidence before this court that Heico has been aware of most of the matters alleged in the Statement of Claim for approximately 2 years and there does not appear to be any valid reason given for the delay in commencing the application to lift the stay.

57 Turning back to the case before us, Koch J.'s reasons for refusing to lift the stay were:

> [16] . . .
>
> (a) An application to lift a stay of proceedings must be addressed in the context of the broad objectives of the *CCAA* which is to promote re-organization and restructuring of companies. ....
>
> (b) The standard for determining whether to lift the stay of proceedings is not, as ICR contends, whether the action is frivolous, analogous to the standard which a defendant applicant under Rule 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* must meet to set aside a statement of claim. Rather, to obtain an order lifting the stay ad hoc to permit the suit to proceed, the proposed plaintiff must establish that the

cause of action is tenable. I interpret that to mean that the proposed plaintiff has a *prima facie* case. See *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).

(c) In determining whether to lift a stay, the Court must take into consideration the relative prejudice to the parties. See *Ivaco, Inc. (Re), supra*, para. 20; and Richard H. McLaren & Sabrina Gherbaz, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy* (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1995) at 3-18.1. ...[54]

He went on to find that the proposed action against Bricore was not "tenable."

58 On an application made by a post-filing creditor, a supervising *CCAA* judge can refuse to lift the stay on the basis that the creditor's claim is outside the *CCAA* process and the action can be commenced after the *CCAA* order is lifted. (See *360networks*[55] and *Stelco*[56]). Koch J. did not exercise this option. He was no doubt motivated in part by the fact that by the time ICR's claim could be tried, after the stay is no longer in effect, there may be no funds for it to claim as Bricore has now liquidated all of its assets and there remains, for all intents and purposes, a pool of funds only. The funds are subject to a plan of distribution, approved by the creditors, and will be distributed over this year.

59 Instead of simply rejecting the claim, Koch J. appears to have weighed the evidence to a certain extent as a means of deciding the next step. He concluded that the claim was not frivolous within the meaning of a Queen's Bench Rule 173 striking motion, but it was nonetheless an untenable claim. The question becomes whether a supervising CCAA judge can weigh a post-filing claim in this manner.

60 Professor Sarra comments on the anomalous position of liquidating *CCAA* proceedings:

> One policy issue that has not to date been fully explored is whether the *CCAA* should be used to effect an organized liquidation that should properly occur under the *BIA* or receivership proceedings. Increasingly, there are liquidating *CCAA* proceedings, whereby the debtor corporation is for all intents and purposes liquidated, but not under the supervision of a trustee in bankruptcy or in compliance with all of the requirements of the *BIA*. While creditors still must vote in support of such plans in the requisite amounts, there may be some public policy concerns regarding the use of a restructuring statute, under the broad scope of judicial discretion, to effect liquidation. ...[57]

The issue of whether the *CCAA* should be used for a liquidating, as opposed to a restructuring purpose, is not before us. In the case at bar, when the Initial Order was granted, it was thought possible that Bricore could be restructured. It was only some months after the Initial Order that it became clear that all of the assets would have to be sold. Our task at this point is to address the position of an undetermined claim arising post-filing in such a context.

61 If a claim had some reasonable prospect of success and were otherwise meritorious in the *CCAA* context, it seems inappropriate to refuse simply to lift the stay on the basis that the claim is outside the *CCAA* process knowing that, by the time the matter is heard in the ordinary course, there will be no assets remaining. On the other hand, it also seems inappropriate to delay distribution of the assets under a plan of arrangement, or make some other accommodation, for an action that is likely to fail. I should make it clear that I am not addressing the issue of whether a meritorious claimant can share in a proposed plan of distribution as a result of the liquidation of the assets. The issue before this Court is whether a post-filing creditor should be permitted to commence action, in the context of what is now a liquidating *CCAA*, and avail itself of whatever pre-judgment remedies might be available to it as a result of its claim.

62 In the face of a liquidating plan of arrangement, given the broad jurisdiction conferred by the *CCAA* on the Court, it seems appropriate that the supervising judge establish some mechanism to weigh the post-filing claim to determine the next step. The next step might entail permitting the claimant to commence action and attempt to convince a chambers judge to grant it a pre-judgment remedy in relation to the funds. It is also possible that the supervising judge may delay distribution of the funds, or some portion thereof, with or without full security for costs, or on such other terms as seems fit. Mechanisms to test the claim could include referral to a special claims officer, examination of the pertinent principal parties, or a settlement conference, or, as in this case, a preliminary examination by the supervising *CCAA* judge in chambers based on affidavit evidence.

63 In the case at bar, having determined that it was appropriate to assess ICR's claim in some way, did Koch J. err either in his statement of the appropriate test or in its application?

64 Koch J. used *prima facie* case, which he equated with tenable cause of action. "Tenable cause of action" is taken from Ground J.'s decision in *Ivaco*,[58] but Ground J. used "reasonable cause of action" or "tenable case," as comparable terms and as only one of four criteria to be considered. The use of "*prima facie* case" defined as "tenable cause of action" is not particularly helpful as the words have been used in different contexts with different purposes in mind. Even in the context of bankruptcy where specific guidelines are given, and the courts have had long experience with the application of the tests, the debate continues as to what is meant by *prima facie* case and whether it is too high of a standard to apply in determining whether an action may be commenced.[59]

65 Koch J. was clearly correct to hold that the threshold established by s. 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* is too low. On the other hand, it is also important not to decide the case. The purpose for passing on the claim is not to determine whether it will or will not succeed, but to determine whether the plan of arrangement should be delayed or further compromised to accommodate a future claim, or some other step need be taken to maintain the integrity of the *CCAA* proceeding.

66 Given the broad discretion granted to a supervisory judge under the *CCAA*, as well as the knowledge and experience he or she gains from the ongoing dealings with the parties under the proceedings, it would be contrary to the purpose of the *CCAA* for the law under it to develop in a restrictive way. Having regard for this, there ought not to be rigid requirements imposed on how a supervising *CCAA* judge must exercise his or her discretion with respect to lifting the stay.

67 Nonetheless, a broad test articulated along the lines of that in *Ma, Re*[60] *may be of assistance. The test from Ma, Re* is:

> 3 ... As stated in *Re Francisco*, [1995] O.J. No. 917, the role of the court is to ensure that there are "sound reasons, consistent with the scheme of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*" to relieve against the automatic stay. While the test is not whether there is a *prima facie* case, that does not, in our view, preclude any consideration of the merits of the proposed action where relevant to the issue of whether there are "sound reasons" for lifting the stay. For example, if it were apparent that the proposed action had little prospect of success, it would be difficult to find that there were sound reasons for lifting the stay.

While the *Ma, Re* test was developed for use under the *BIA*, a test based on sound reasons, consistent with the scheme of the *CCAA*, to relieve against the stay imposed by ss. 11(3) and (4) of the *CCAA*, may be a better way to express the task of the chambers judge faced with a liquidating *CCAA* than a test based simply on *prima facie* case. It must be kept firmly in mind that the Court is dealing with a claimant that did not avail itself of the remedy of withholding services under s. 11.3. It is also useful to

remind oneself that, in a case such as this, the *CCAA* proceeding began as a restructuring exercise with the attendant possibility of creating s. 11.3 claimants. The threshold must be a significant one, but not insurmountable.

68 In determining what constitutes "sound reasons," much is left to the discretion of the judge. However, previous decisions on this point provide some guidance as to factors that may be considered:

(a) the balance of convenience;

(b) the relative prejudice to the parties;

(c) the merits of the proposed action, where they are relevant to the issue of whether there are "sound reasons" for lifting the stay (i.e., as was said in *Ma, Re*, if the action has little chance of success, it may be harder to establish "sound reasons" for allowing it to proceed).

The supervising *CCAA* judge should also consider the good faith and due diligence of the debtor company as referenced in s. 11(6). Ultimately, it is in the discretion of the supervising *CCAA* judge as to whether the proposed action ought to be allowed to proceed in the face of the stay.

69 While Koch J. did not state the test as broadly as I have, I agree that ICR does not reach the necessary threshold. ICR did not structure its affairs or establish a claim with the specificity that justifies the development of a remedy to allow it to participate in the liquidation of the Bricore assets. There is also no aspect of the liquidation that requires the Court in this case to be concerned. In particular, the stay need not be lifted, and no other step need be taken in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings in light of these facts:

1. as of January 30, 2006, the Building was subject to an exclusive Selling Officer Agreement that provided CMN Calgary with the exclusive right to sell the property and to earn a commission of 1.25% of the purchase price,[61] which is significantly less than that being claimed by ICR at a 5% commission;
2. the sale to the Proposed Purchaser was a sale of six of the seven Bricore properties;
3. the trial judge received a report dated September 25, 2006 from the CRO recommending approval of the sale, which is two days before the alleged contract with ICR was proposed;[62]
4. in the September 25 report, the CRO advised the Court that "the total aggregate purchase price for the Bricore Properties obtained by Bricore in the Accepted Offer to Purchase represented the greatest value which it would be possible to obtain for all of the Bricore Properties;"[63]
5. the September 27, 2006 letter from ICR to Bricore, states "we are aware that the properties are under contract to sell ..."; and,
6. there was no sale from Bricore to the City of Regina.

70 While ICR denies knowledge of the sale, it is important to come back to the September 27th letter from ICR to Mr. Ruf. It states:

> **We are aware that the properties are under contract to sell** and request that ICR be protected in the specific situations as outlined.[64] [Emphasis added]

The addition by the CRO of these words, "Date of closing of **a sale** or December 31, 2006 whichever is

earlier," to that letter adds further support to the veracity of the CRO's report to the effect that the CRO entered into discussions with ICR to provide for the eventuality of a failed sale to the purchaser with whom Bricore already had a contractual relationship.

71 Finally, in assessing Koch J.'s decision, and in determining the deference that is owed to it, I am not unmindful that he issued some 20 orders in 2006, pertaining to the Bricore restructuring, at least five of which dealt substantively with the Building and its prospective sale to the Proposed Purchaser.

72 Thus, applying the standard of review previously articulated, I cannot say that Koch J. acted arbitrarily, on a wrong principle, or on an erroneous view of the facts, or that a failure of justice is likely to result from the exercise of his discretion in the manner he did.

VII. Issue #4. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge make a reviewable error in refusing leave to commence an action against the CRO?

73 In addition to the indemnification provided by para. 18 of the CRO Order quoted above, the Order goes on to indicate the only circumstances in which the CRO can be sued personally:

> 20. For greater clarity, the CRO [*sic*]:
>
> ...
>
> (c) the CRO shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of his appointment or as a result of the fulfillment of his powers and duties as CRO, except as a result of instances of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct on his part; and
>
> (d) no Proceeding shall be commenced against the CRO as a result of or relating in any way to his appointment or to the fulfillment of his powers and duties as CRO, without prior leave of the Court on at least seven days' notice to Bricore Group, the CRO and legal counsel to Bricore Group.
>
> 21. Subject to paragraph 20 hereof, nothing in this Order shall restrict an action against the CRO for acts of gross negligence, bad faith or wilful misconduct committed by him.

Setting aside the obvious ambiguity in this Order, it can be taken that to assert a claim against the CRO personally, ICR had to claim "fraud, gross negligence, wilful misconduct or bad faith." ICR claimed "bad faith."

74 Based on para. 20(d) of the Initial Order, there is no question that ICR was required to obtain prior leave of the court. The issue thus becomes whether the supervising *CCAA* judge erred in exercising his discretion in refusing to lift the stay.

75 Koch J.'s reasons for refusing to lift the stay are these:

> [18] Neither is there any basis upon which to lift the stay with respect to the proposed action against Maurice Duval, the Chief Restructuring Officer. Considerations applicable to Bricore under s. 11.3 do not apply to a court-appointed restructuring officer. Maurice Duval, as an officer of the Court, has explained his position in a cogent way. I accept his explanation. He did not sell the Department of Education Building to the City of Regina. He was not aware at the relevant time that the purchaser was going to resell. Indeed, his efforts were directed toward closing a single transaction involving all six Bricore properties. Although the proposed

> pleading accuses Mr. Duval of acting in "bad faith", it is not suggested on behalf of ICR that Mr. Duval has been guilty of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct; that is, any of the limitations or exceptions expressly listed in paragraph 20(c) of the order of May 23, 2006.
>
> [19] As stated previously, the overriding purpose of the *CCAA* must also be considered. That applies in the Duval situation too. The statute is intended to facilitate restructuring to serve the public interest. In many cases such as the present it is necessary for the Court to appoint officers whose expertise is required to fulfill its mandate. It is clearly in the public interest that capable people be willing to accept such assignments. It is to be expected that such acceptance be contingent on protective provisions such as are included in the order of May 23, 2006, appointing Mr. Duval. It is important that the Court exercise caution in removing such restrictions; otherwise, the ability of the Court to obtain the assistance of needed experts will necessarily be impaired. Qualified professionals will be less willing to accept assignments absent the protection provisions in the appointing order.[65]

76 Again, Koch J. employed the same mechanism that he used to assess the claim against Bricore. He considered the status of the CRO as an officer of the court, noted the ambiguity in the Order and weighed the evidence to a certain extent. The question he was answering was the sufficiency of the claim to permit an action to be commenced against the Court's officer.

77 Again, applying the standard of review with respect to discretionary orders, there is no basis upon which the Court can intervene with Koch J.'s refusal to lift the stay so as to permit an action against the CRO in his personal capacity.

> VIII. Issue #5. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis?

78 Koch J. awarded substantial indemnity costs for this reason:

> [6] In my view, allegations of misconduct against a court officer are rare and exceptional. Therefore costs on this motion should be imposed on a substantial indemnity scale, although not on the full solicitor and client basis sought. Bricore is entitled to costs on the motion of $2,000.00, and Maurice Duval is entitled to costs of $1,000.00, payable in each instance by the applicant, ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd.[66]

79 I note that Newbury J.A. in *New Skeena Forest Products Inc., Re*[67] dismissed a challenge to a costs award, holding that "these are the kinds of considerations which the [*CCAA*] Chambers judge ... was especially qualified to make." And, of course, all costs orders are discretionary orders.

80 Nonetheless in this case, it would appear that the supervising *CCAA* judge erred. There is no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs with respect to the application to lift the stay in relation to Bricore. Bad faith was not alleged on its part. With respect to the CRO, the only basis upon which the stay could be lifted was to make an allegation of "bad faith." In the absence of some other factor, ICR cannot be faulted for making the very allegation that it was required to make in order to bring its application within the ambit of the stay of proceedings that had been granted.

81 In addition, while Koch J. indicated he was not awarding solicitor-and- client costs, there is not a sufficient distinction between substantial indemnity costs and solicitor-and-client costs. An award

approaching solicitor-and- client costs is still a punitive order and, as there is no authority for the awarding of substantial indemnity costs, relies upon the same jurisprudential base as solicitor-and-client costs. As such, the award does not seem to meet the test established in *Siemens v. Bawolin*[68] and *Hashemian v. Wilde*[69] wherein it is stated that solicitor-and-client costs are generally awarded where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or egregious conduct on the part of one of the parties in the context of the litigation.

82 If the parties are unable to agree with respect to costs in the Court of Queen's Bench and in this Court, they may speak to the Registrar to fix a time for a conference call hearing regarding costs.

cp/e/qlrds/qlmxt/qltxp/qlcas

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

2 Appeal Book, pp. 17a and 22a [Affidavit of Paul Mehlsen].

3 *Ibid.* at pp. 27a and 32a.

4 Order (Appointment of Chief Restructuring Officer, Extension of Stay of Proceedings; Additional DIP Financing) made May 23, 2006.

5 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings) made August 1, 2006.

6 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings) made August 18, 2006.

7 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings, Extension of Appointment of CRO and Increase in Maximum CRO Remuneration; Increase to Administrative Charge) made September 25, 2006.

8 Order (Approving Sale; Extending Stay of Proceedings; Extending Appointment of CRO) made October 10, 2006.

9 Appeal Book, p. 7a-8a.

10 *Ibid.* at p. 12a.

11 *Ibid.* at pp. 14a-15a.

12 *Ibid.* at p. 46a.

13 *Ibid.* at pp. 38a-39a.

14 *Ibid.* at p. 51a-52a.

15 *ICR v. Bricore*, [2007] S.J. No. 154, 2007 SKQB 121.

16 John D. Honsberger, *Debt Restructuring: Principles and Practice*, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.:

Canada Law Book, 2007) at p. 9.61.

17 (1954) 34 C.B.R. 82 (Que. S.C.). There are no cases referring to Ramsay Glass on the point that Prof. Honsberger raises in his text. (*Ptarmigan Airways Ltd. v. Federated Mining Corp.*, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 723 (N.T.S.C.) mentions *Ramsay Glass* but not in reference to the point made here.)

18 *Ibid.* at p. 83.

19 (2003), 45 C.B.R. (4th) 151 (B.C.S.C.), appeal dismissed (2007), 27 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (B.C.C.A.).

20 (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 283 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

21 (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).

22 *360networks, supra* note 19.

23 *Stelco, supra* note 20 at para. 11.

24 *Campeau, supra* note 21.

25 *360networks, supra* note 19.

26 *Stelco, supra* note 20.

27 *Campeau, supra* note 21.

28 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

29 Lloyd W. Houlden & Geoffrey B. Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at pp. 562 and 789.

30 *An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act*, S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124.

31 *Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act*, S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 577.

32 *Debt Restructuring Principles and Practice, supra* note 16 at p. 9-88.1.

33 Richard H. McLaren, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy,* looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2007) at p. 3-17.

34 Janis Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007).

35 *Ibid.* at pp. 110-11.

36 (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 264 (B.C.S.C.). See also *Air Canada, Re*, (2004), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 182 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), and *Mosaic Group Inc., Re*. (2004), 3 C.B.R. (5th) 40 (Ont. S.C.J.).

37 [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C.C.A.).

38 (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.).

39 *Smith Bros., supra* note 36.

40 Order (Appointment of Chief Restructuring Officer; Extension of Stay of Proceedings; Additional DIP Financing) made May 23, 2006.

41 Bayda C.J.S., for the majority, in *Smart v. South Saskatchewan Hospital Centre* (1989), 75 Sask.R. 34 (C.A.), paraphrasing Lord Diplock in *Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton*, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042 at 1046.

42 [1943] O.R. 683 at 698.

43 *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, supra* note 34 at pp. 88-92.

44 *Supra* note 28.

45 Twelfth Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, February 1997, unnumbered p. 3 of the Chairman's Report, and p. 18.

46 *Ibid.* at pp. 17-18.

47 Canada Legislative Index, 2nd Session, 35th Parliament, Bill C-5, S.C. 1997, c. 12, pp. 1 & 2.

48 *Ibid.*

49 *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,* S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

50 Bill C-62, *An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada*, 2005, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006-2007.

51 (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 15.

52 (2003), 1 C.B.R. (5th) 204 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial]) at para 3.

53 [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).

54 *ICR v. Bricore, supra* note 15.

55 *360networks, supra* note 19.

56 *Stelco, supra* note 20.

57 *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act, supra* note 34 at p. 82.

58 *Ivaco, supra* note 53.

59 *Ma, Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 68 (Ont. C.A.). See Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, supra note 29 at p. 403.

60 Ibid.

61 Order (Extension of Stay, DIP Financing, Sale Process & Shareholder Proceedings) of Koch J. in Chambers dated February 13, 2006.

62 Order made September 25, 2006, *supra* note 7.

63 Appeal Book, p. 37a, para. 3.

64 *Supra* note 11.

65 *ICR v. Bricore, supra* note 15.

66 *ICR v. Bricore,* [2007] S.J. No. 253, 2007 SKQB 144.

67 [2005] 8 W.W.R. 224 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 23.

68 2002 SKCA 84, [2002] 11 W.W.R. 246.

69 2006 SKCA 126, [2007] 2 W.W.R. 52.

TAB 3

Case Name:

Reference re: Constitutional Creditor Arrangement Act (Canada)

IN THE MATTER OF A Reference concerning the Constitutional validity of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

[1934] S.C.J. No. 46

[1934] S.C.R. 659

[1934] 4 D.L.R. 75

16 C.B.R. 1

Supreme Court of Canada

1934: March 27, 28, 29 / 1934: June 6.

Present: Duff C.J. and Rinfret, Lamont, Cannon, Crocket and Hughes JJ.

Constitutional law -- The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 23-24 Geo. V, c. 36 (Dom.) -- Constitutional validity -- "Bankruptcy and Insolvency" (B.N.A. Act, s. 91(21)).

The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 23-24 Geo. V, c. 36, is intra vires of the Parliament of Canada. The matters dealt with come within the domain of "bankruptcy and insolvency" within the intendment of s. 91(21) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Act discussed with regard to its aim, its features, its comparison with existing bankruptcy or insolvency legislation, and the history of bankruptcy and insolvency law.

REFERENCE to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and consideration pursuant to the authority of s. 55 of the Supreme Court Act (R.S.C., 1927, c. 35) of the following question:

Is The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 23-24 Geo. V, chapter 36, ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada, either in whole or in part, and, if so, in what particular or particulars, or to what extent?

L.E. Beaulieu K.C. and F.P. Varcoe K.C., for the Attorney-General for Canada.
C. Lanctôt K.C. and L. St. Laurent K.C., for the Attorney-General for Quebec.
I.A. Humphries K.C., for the Attorney-General for Ontario.

Solicitor for the Attorney-General of Canada: W. Stuart Edwards.
Solicitor for the Attorney-General of Quebec: Charles Lanctôt.
Solicitor for the Attorney-General of Ontario: I.A. Humphries.

The judgment of Duff C.J. and Rinfret, Crocket and Hughes JJ. was delivered by

DUFF C.J.:-- The history of the law seems to show clearly enough that legislation in respect of compositions and arrangements is a natural and ordinary component of a system of bankruptcy and insolvency law.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, as it now exists, proposals for compositions and arrangements cannot be dealt with before a receiving order or assignment has been made. This, however, was not always the case. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1919, a proposal for composition or arrangement could be made prior to an assignment or receiving order.

The Winding-up Act contains brief provisions, in sections 65 and 66, which, in substance, differ very little indeed from the legislation now before us; although this, no doubt, is subject to the important qualification, that the provisions of the Winding-up Act apply only in the case of a company which is in course of being wound up. Similar provisions affecting the subject matter of this legislation are to be found in Canadian legislation before and after Confederation.

The powers conferred upon the court under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, come into operation when a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a "company which is bankrupt or insolvent or which has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act or which is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the Winding-up Act," and its "unsecured creditors or any class of them." The important difference, as already observed, between the provisions of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and those of the Bankruptcy Act itself in relation to compromises and arrangements is that the powers of the first named Act may be exercised notwithstanding the fact that no proceedings have been taken under the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-up Act. The Act, however, creates powers, which can be exercised in case, and only in case, of insolvency.

Furthermore, the aim of the Act is to deal with the existing condition of insolvency, in itself, to enable arrangements to be made, in view of the insolvent condition of the company, under judicial authority which, otherwise, might not be valid prior to the initiation of proceedings in bankruptcy. Ex facie it would appear that such a scheme in principle does not radically depart from the normal character of bankruptcy legislation. As Lord Cave impliedly states in Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue [[1928] A.C. 187], "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament."

Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme, but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

The argument mainly pressed upon us in opposition to the validity of the legislation was that

> It does not endeavour to treat equally all contracts of debts between the debtor and his creditors but allows the interest of some of them to be sacrificed in the interest of the company and of other classes of creditors.

We think an adequate answer to this objection is put forward in the argument on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Dominion. Apart altogether from the judicial control over the proceedings, there is the

circumstance that the legislation applies to insolvent companies only; and, consequently, that it is within the power of any creditor to apply for a winding-up order or a receiving order. It seems difficult, therefore, to suppose that the purpose of the legislation is to give sanction to arrangements in the exclusive interests of a single creditor or of a single class of creditors and having no relation to the benefit of the creditors as a whole. The ultimate purpose would appear to be enable the court to sanction a compromise which, although binding upon a class of creditors only, would be beneficial to the general body of creditors as well as to the shareholders. We think it is not unimportant to note the circumstance to which our attention was called by counsel for the Attorney-General for the Dominion that the court may order shareholders to be summoned although they are not authorized to vote.

The judgment of Lamont and Cannon JJ. was delivered by

CANNON J.:-- This is a reference by the Governor General in Council submitting for hearing and consideration of this Court the following question:

> Is The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 23-24 Geo. V, chapter 36, ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada, either in whole or in part, and, if so, in what particular or particulars, or to what extent?

This Act is designed to apply to insolvent or bankrupt companies; and it is contended on behalf of the Dominion that Parliament could pass this legislation under section 91, par. 21, which gives it paramount jurisdiction to make laws concerning bankruptcy and insolvency. The provinces represent that in enacting it Parliament disregarded their exclusive jurisdiction under section 92, par. 13, in relation to property and civil rights in the province.

The whole argument before us was finally directed to one point: Are the proceedings contemplated by the Act, in pith and substance, bankruptcy or insolvency enactments within the fair and ordinary meaning of these words? One of the features which distinguishes this Act from the Bankruptcy Act now in force is that, under the latter, a composition or arrangement cannot be proceeded with before a receiving order or assignment has been made. Another difference is that under the Bankruptcy Act the secured creditor is dealt with on the footing that he may realize his security or value or surrender the same; it is only in respect of what he claims apart from the security that he is affected by the composition or arrangement. It was pointed out also that similar provisions giving binding effect to this approval by a certain majority of creditors are found in our legislation before and after Confederation.

The Insolvent Act of 1864, 27-28 Vict., ch. 17, sec. 9;

The Insolvent Act of 1869, Canada, 32-33 Vict., ch. 16, secs. 94 et seq.;

The Insolvent Act of 1875, Canada, 38 Vict., c. 16, secs. 54 et seq.

As far as Lower Canada is concerned, it may be of interest to note that chapter 87 of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, 1859, allowed the issue of a capias if the debtor "had refused to compromise or arrange with his creditors, or to make a cession de biens," and provides that the debtor may be discharged if, when the affidavit for capias was made, he had "not refused to compromise or arrange with his creditors."

Moreover, I find that, before and since Confederation, arrangements with the creditors have always been of the very essence of any system of bankruptcy or insolvency legislation. Civil rights and the sanctity of contracts are certainly affected by clause 5 under which a minority of creditors would be bound by the vote of a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of creditors present and voting, either in person or by proxy, if the agreement or compromise to which they agreed be sanctioned

by the court. I find that this feature existed long before Confederation and was at that time generally accepted.

Pardessus, Droit Commercial, vol. 3,]d. 1843, p. 92, no. 1232, says:

> 1232. Les créanciers d'un failli ont presque toujours intérêt à faire avec lui un arrangement quelconque, plutôt que d'éprouver les lenteurs et les embarrass d'une union qui finit souvent par consumer la fortune du débiteur. Mais, comme rarement tous sont d'accord, et qu'il est naturel de présumer qu'un grand nombre prendra les arrangements les plus convenables a l'intérêt commun, on a cru devoir faire céder la volonté de la minorité à celle de la majorité; les créanciers présents ont donc été admis à décider pour les absents.
>
> Cette minorité, ces absents, doivent au moins avoir l'assurance que de mûres réflexions ont dirigé ceux dont le voeu doit devenir une loi pour eux. Tel est l'objet des règles prescrites pour la validité du concordat.

Under number 1236, classes or categories having different interests are already recognized by this author, and he adds (No. 1237):

> Le concordat est valablement consenti par la majorité des créanciers présents, pourvu que les sommes dues aux personnes qui forment cette majorité égalent les trois quarts de la totalité des créances vérifiées et affirmées, ou admises par provision, dues à des créanciers ayant droit de prendre part à la délibération du concordat.

Therefore, the very clause objected to in our Act of 1933 seems to be copied from the law of bankruptcy as it existed in France in 1843, when this work was published.

Under our system and the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914, bankruptcy legislation deals with the proceedings necessary for the distribution, under judicial authority, of the property of an insolvent person among his creditors. It assumes the commission of an "act of bankruptcy" followed by a petition to the court for a receiving order for the protection of the estate. The property of the debtor then vests in an official receiver. The debtor must submit a statement of affairs to the official receiver who calls a meeting of the creditors. The debtor is examined; and if no composition or scheme of arrangement is approved, he is adjudged bankrupt; and his property becomes divisible among his creditors and vests in a trustee.

Therefore, if the proceedings under this new Act of 1933 are not, strictly speaking, "bankruptcy" proceedings, because they had not for object the sale and division of the assets of the debtor, they may, however, be considered as "insolvency proceedings" with the object of preventing a declaration of bankruptcy and the sale of these assets, if the creditors directly interested for the time being reach the conclusion that an opportune arrangement to avoid such sale would better protect their interest, as a whole or in part. Provisions for the settlement of the liabilities of the insolvent are an essential element of any insolvency legislation and were incorporated in our Insolvent Act of 1864; and such a deed of composition and discharge could be validly made either before, pending or after proceedings upon an assignment, or for the compulsory liquidation of the estate of the insolvent. What was considered as being within the scope of the word "insolvency" when it was used in section 91 of the B.N.A. Act is to be found in the preamble of the 1864 Insolvency Act, which reads:

> Whereas it is expedient that provision be made for the settlement of the estates of insolvent debtors, for giving effect to arrangements between them and their

creditors, and for the punishment of fraud.

See also: Cushing v. Dupuy [(1880) 5 App. Cas. 409]; Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue [[1928] A.C. 187].

I therefore reach the conclusion that arrangements as provided for by this Act are and have been, before and since Confederation, an essential component part of any system devised to protect the creditors of insolvents and, at the same time, help the honest debtor to rehabilitate himself and obtain a discharge.

I would, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative.

The question submitted is answered in the negative.

TAB 4

Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)

92 O.R. (3d) 513

Court of Appeal for Ontario,

Laskin, Cronk and Blair JJ.A.

August 18, 2008

Debtor and creditor -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act permitting inclusion of third-party releases in plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by court where those releases are reasonably connected to proposed restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

In response to a liquidity crisis which threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"), a creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement was crafted. The Plan called for the release of third parties from any liability associated with ABCP, including, with certain narrow exceptions, liability for claims relating to fraud. The "double majority" required by s. 6 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") approved the Plan. The respondents sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The application judge made the following findings: (a) the parties to be released were necessary and essential to the restructuring; (b) the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it; (c) the Plan could not succeed without the releases; (d) the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and (e) the Plan would benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor noteholders generally. The application judge sanctioned the Plan. The appellants were holders of ABCP notes who opposed the Plan. On appeal, they argued that the CCAA does not permit a release of claims against third parties and that the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

On a proper interpretation, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. That conclusion is supported by (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself; (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the CCAA; and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the CCAA in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties [page514] affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity to fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

While the principle that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -- in the absence of a clear

indication of legislative intention to that effect is an important one, Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself.

Interpreting the CCAA as permitting the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement is not unconstitutional under the division-of-powers doctrine and does not contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. The CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power, and the power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. To the extent that the provisions of the CCAA are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount.

The application judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence. His conclusion that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole and to the debtor companies outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases was reasonable.

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Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re), [2000] A.J. No. 771, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 265 A.R. 201, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334 (Q.B.); NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514, [1999] O.J. No. 4749, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 127 O.A.C. 338, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 67, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 391 (C.A.); Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580, 2001 BCSC 1721, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286, 110 A.C.W.S. (3d) 259 (S.C.); Stelco Inc. (Re) (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241, [2005] O.J. No. 4883, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 204 O.A.C. 205, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 15 (C.A.); Stelco Inc. (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623 (S.C.J.); Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 1996, 210 O.A.C. 129, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157, 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 193 (C.A.); consd

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No. 2180, 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1192 (C.A.); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, [1976] S.C.J. No. 114, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 63, 14 N.R. 503, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 84, [1977] 1 A.C.W.S. 562; Fotini's Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd., [1998] B.C.J. No. 598, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251, 78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 256 (S.C.); Guardian Assurance Co. (Re), [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (C.A.); Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16 (S.C.J.); Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 38 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1149 (Gen. Div.); Ravelston Corp. (Re), [2007] O.J. No. 1389, 2007 ONCA 268, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 824, 159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 541; Reference re: Constitutional Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] S.C.J. No. 46, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, 16 C.B.R. 1; Reference re Timber Regulations, [1935] A.C. 184, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 607 (P.C.), affg [1933] S.C.R. 616, [1933] S.C.J. No. 53, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 43; Resurgence Asset Management LLC v. Canadian Airlines Corp., [2000] A.J. No. 1028, 2000 ABCA 238, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 266 A.R. 131, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 99 A.C.W.S. (3d) 533 (C.A.)[Leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60, 293 A.R. 351]; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 221 N.R. 241, J.E. 98-201, 106 O.A.C. 1, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 98 CLLC Â210-006; Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [1928] A.C. 187 (J.C.P.C.); Skydome Corp. v. Ontario, [1998] O.J. No. 6548, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Gen. Div.); Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688, [2000] O.J. No. 3993, 137 O.A.C. 74, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160, 100 A.C.W.S. (3d) 530 (C.A.); T&N Ltd. and Others (No. 3) (Re), [2006] E.W.H.C. 1447, [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2007] 1 B.C.L.C. 563, [2006] B.P.I.R. 1283, [2006] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 817 (Ch.)

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House of Commons Debates (Hansard), (20 April 1933) at 4091 (Hon. C.H. Cahan)

APPEAL from the sanction order of C.L. Campbell J., [2008] O.J. No. 2265, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (S.C.J.) under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

See Schedule "C" -- Counsel for list of counsel.

The judgment of the court was delivered by

BLAIR J.A.: --

A. Introduction

[1] In August 2007, a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

[2] By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the $32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007, pending an attempt to resolve the crisis through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

[3] Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("CCAA"): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the [page517] application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to appeal

[4] Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument, we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

[5] The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and -- given the expedited timetable -- the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as Cineplex Odeon Corp. (Re) (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.) and Re Country Style Food Services, [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.) are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

[6] For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The parties

[7] The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third-party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a pharmaceuticals retailer and several holding companies and energy companies.

[8] Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP -- in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants -- slightly over $1 billion -- represent only a small fraction of the more than $32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

[9] The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways. [page518]

The ABCP market

[10] Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment -- usually 30 to 90 days -- typically with a low-interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be "asset backed" because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

[11] ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

[12] The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over $116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately $32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP, the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

[13] As I understand it, prior to August 2007, when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

[14] Various corporations (the "Sponsors") would arrange for entities they control ("Conduits") to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through "Dealers" (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

[15] The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits ("Issuer Trustees") and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as "Asset Providers". To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, "Liquidity Providers" agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes ("Noteholders"). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

[16] When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP [page519] Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The liquidity crisis

[17] The types of assets and asset interests acquired to "back" the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature, there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP Notes.

[18] When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the "liquidity crisis" in the ABCP market.

[19] The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes -- partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

[20] The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze -- the

result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement -- known as the Montreal Protocol -- the parties committed [page520] to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

[21] The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two-thirds of the $32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

[22] Mr. Crawford was named the Committee's chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge's understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

[23] Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian ABCP market.

The Plan

(a) Plan overview

[24] Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution". The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper -- which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months -- into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

[25] The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan [page521] adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

[26] Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

[27] The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than $1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the $1 million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to

releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

(b) The releases

[28] This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in art. 10.

[29] The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers and other market participants -- in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" -- from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

[30] The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

[31] The releases, in effect, are part of a quid pro quo. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in [page522] the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

(a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are designed to make the notes more secure;
(b) Sponsors -- who in addition have co-operated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including by sharing certain proprietary information -- give up their existing contracts;
(c) the Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility; and
(d) other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

[32] According to Mr. Crawford's affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation".

The CCAA proceedings to date

[33] On March 17, 2008, the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan -- 96 per cent of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors' Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan -- 99 per cent of those connected with the

development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80 per cent of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

[34] The vote thus provided the Plan with the "double majority" approval -- a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims -- required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

[35] Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 [page523] and 13. On May 16, the application judge issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan's failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

[36] The result of this renegotiation was a "fraud carve-out" -- an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan's releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

[37] A second sanction hearing -- this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) -- was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

[38] The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

[39] There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

(1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its directors?
(2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it? [page524]

(1) Legal authority for the releases

[40] The standard of review on this first issue -- whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases -- is correctness.

[41] The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company.1 The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:

(a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;

(b) the court is not entitled to "fill in the gaps" in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
(c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;
(d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
(e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

[42] I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, "gap filling" and inherent jurisdiction

[43] On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including [page525] those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

[44] The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: Canadian Red Cross Society (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Gen. Div.). As Farley J. noted in Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.), at p. 111 C.B.R., "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation".

[45] Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

[46] These issues have recently been canvassed by the Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters",2 and there was considerable argument on these issues before the application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors' suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools -- statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction [page526] -- it is not necessary, in my view, to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the

language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no "gap-filling" to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

[47] The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally -- and in the insolvency context particularly -- that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger's modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, at para. 26.

[48] More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes -- particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature -- is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, supra, at p. 56:

> The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in Québec as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.
>
> [49] I adopt these principles. [page527]

[50] The remedial purpose of the CCAA -- as its title affirms -- is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.), at p. 318 C.B.R., Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

> Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

[51] The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary -- as the then secretary of state noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading-- "because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression"

and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, House of Commons Debates (Hansard) (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as "the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment". Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, [1990] O.J. No. 2180 (C.A.), per Doherty J.A. in dissent; Skydome Corp. v. Ontario, [1998] O.J. No. 6548, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Gen. Div.); Anvil Range Mining Corp. (Re) (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[52] In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in Elan, supra, at pp. 306-307 O.R.:

> [T]he Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees".3 Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest.

(Emphasis added)

Application of the principles of interpretation

[53] An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the [page528] application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself.

[54] The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

[55] This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP Dealers, the releasee financial institutions are "third-parties" to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as Asset Providers and Liquidity Providers, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore -- as the application judge found -- in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by "foregoing immediate rights to assets and . . . providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes" (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge's remark, at para. 50, that the restructuring "involves the commitment and participation of all parties" in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments, at paras. 48-49:

> Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.
>
> In these circumstances, it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party

> creditors, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring.

(Emphasis added)

[56] The application judge did observe that "[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper . . ." (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring as between debtor [page529] and creditors. His focus was on the effect of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible perspective given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that "what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada" (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated, at para. 142: "Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal".

[57] I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The statutory wording

[58] Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:

(a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;
(b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
(c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

[59] Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

> 4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs. [page530]
>
> . . . . .
>
> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the

meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or arrangement

[60] While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, looseleaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 10A-12.2, N10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": Reference re Timber Regulations, [1935] A.C. 184, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at p. 197 A.C., affg [1933] S.C.R. 616, [1933] S.C.J. No. 53. See also Guardian Assurance Co. (Re), [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (C.A.), at pp. 448, 450 Ch.; T&N Ltd. and Others (No. 3) (Re), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2006] E.W.H.C. 1447 (Ch.).

[61] The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement". I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

[62] A proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, [1976] S.C.J. No. 114, at p. 239 S.C.R.; [page531] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688, [2000] O.J. No. 3993 (C.A.), at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes and, therefore, is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See Air Canada (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1909, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (S.C.J.), at para. 6; Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Gen. Div.), at p. 518 O.R.

[63] There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan -- including the provision for releases -- becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

[64] T&N Ltd. and Others (Re), supra, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court

focusing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T& N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. Companies Act 1985, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA -- including the concepts of compromise or arrangement.4

[65] T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the EL claimants) would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the EL claimants) agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of [page532] compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

[66] Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence -- cited earlier in these reasons -- to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example.5 Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

> In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many years to give the term its widest meaning. Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party.

(Emphasis added)

[67] I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in T&N were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial [page533] third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The binding mechanism

[68] Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind all creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes6 and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The required nexus

[69] In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

[70] The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third-party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

[71] In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

(a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor; [page534]
(b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
(c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
(d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and
(e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

[72] Here, then -- as was the case in T&N -- there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77, he said:

> I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among

> creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.
>
> This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

[73] I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA -- construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation -- supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The jurisprudence

[74] Third-party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's [page535] Bench in Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re), [2000] A.J. No. 771, 265 A.R. 201 (Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by Resurgence Asset Management LLC v. Canadian Airlines Corp., [2000] A.J. No. 1028, 266 A.R. 131 (C.A.), and [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60, 293 A.R. 351. In Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (S.C.J.), Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

> [It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

[75] We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of Canadian Airlines (Re), however, the releases in those restructurings -- including Muscletech -- were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

[76] In Canadian Airlines (Re) the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the wellspring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

[77] Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation, at para. 87, that "[p] rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company". It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Michaud v. Steinberg,7 of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument -- dealt with later in these reasons -- that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92). [page536]

[78] Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court-sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

[79] The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are Michaud v. Steinberg, supra; NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514, [1999] O.J. No. 4749 (C.A.); Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (S.C.); and Stelco Inc. (Re) (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241, [2005] O.J. No. 4883 (C.A.) ("Stelco I"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of Steinberg, they do not involve third-party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that Steinberg does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

[80] In Pacific Coastal Airlines, Tysoe J. made the following comment, at para. 24:

> [The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

[81] This statement must be understood in its context, however. Pacific Coastal Airlines had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question, it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of res judicata or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

[82] The facts in Pacific Coastal are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal's separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian -- at a contractual level -- may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. [page537] Here, however, the disputes that are the subject matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

[83] Nor is the decision of this court in the NBD Bank case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors". Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the bank. On appeal, he argued that since the bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process -- in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

[84] Rosenberg J.A., writing for this court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations, at paras. 53-54:

> In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at p. 297, . . . the CCAA is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.
>
> In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may [page538] not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement.

(Footnote omitted)

[85] Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third-party releases was not under consideration at all. What the court was determining in NBD Bank was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in NBD to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in NBD Bank the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release -- as is the situation here. Thus, NBD Bank is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third-party releases.

[86] The appellants also rely upon the decision of this court in Stelco I. There, the court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement, one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to

another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

> [Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company.

(Citations omitted; emphasis added)

See Stelco Inc. (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (S.C.J.), at para. 7.

[87] This court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the [page539] need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

[88] Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third-party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and, therefore, that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 1996, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (C.A.) ("Stelco II"). The court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The court said (para. 11):

> In [Stelco I] -- the classification case -- the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company . . . [H]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process.

(Emphasis added)

[89] The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third-party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

[90] Some of the appellants -- particularly those represented by Mr. Woods -- rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Michaud v. Steinberg, supra. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In Steinberg, the court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 -- English translation):

> Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.

. . . . .

> The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with is creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.
>
> . . . . . [page540]
>
> The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

[91] Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third-party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

> In short, the Act will have become the Companies' and Their Officers and Employees Creditors Arrangement Act -- an awful mess -- and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of its creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

[92] Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature -- they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company -- rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para., 90 he said:

> The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself . . .

(Emphasis added)

[93] The decision of the court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself", however. On occasion, such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in Steinberg, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision [page541] appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analyzing the Act -- an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

[94] Finally, the majority in Steinberg seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot

interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases -- as I have concluded it does -- the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

[95] Accordingly, to the extent Steinberg stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in Steinberg considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 amendments

[96] Steinberg led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

> 5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> Exception
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> Powers of court
>
> (3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances. [page542]
>
> Resignation or removal of directors
>
> (4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

[97] Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third-party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the

exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

[98] The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there may be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted:8

> Far from being a rule, [the maxim expressio unius] is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes its does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

[99] As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Steinberg. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden and Morawetz, vol. 1, supra, at 2-144, E11A; Dans l'affaire de la proposition de: Le Royal Penfield inc. et Groupe Thibault Van Houtte et Associés ltée), [2003] J.Q. no. 9223, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S.), at paras. 44-46.

[100] Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the [page543] BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third-party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The deprivation of proprietary rights

[101] Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -- in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44(1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., supra, at 183; E.A. Driedger and Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed., (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The division of powers and paramountcy

[102] Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the

compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the Constitution Act, 1867, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. [page544]

[103] I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: Reference re: Constitutional Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] S.C.J. No. 46. As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p. 661 S.C.R.), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [1928] A.C. 187 (J.C.P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament". Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

> Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

[104] That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action -- normally a matter of provincial concern -- or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion with respect to legal authority

[105] For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "fair and reasonable"

[106] The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

[107] Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In [page545] the absence of a demonstrable error, an appellate court will not interfere: see Ravelston Corp. Ltd. (Re), [2007] O.J. No. 1389, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (C.A.).

[108] I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties -- including leading Canadian financial institutions -- that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end, he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies,

outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

[109] The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

[110] The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers; (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example); (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order; and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

[111] The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is, therefore, some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: Fotini's Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd., [1998] B.C.J. No. 598, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (S.C.), at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings -- the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud -- and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

[112] The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, [page546] that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that . . . would result if a broader aecarve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

[113] At para. 71, above, I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here -- with two additional findings -- because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

(a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
(b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
(c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
(d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
(e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
(f) the voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
(g) the releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

[114] These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

[115] The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they -- as individual creditors -- make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, [page547] Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

[116] All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

[117] In insolvency restructuring proceedings, almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices", inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

[118] Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than $32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of all Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3 per cent of that total. That is what he did.

[119] The application judge noted, at para. 126, that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out [page548] specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized, at para. 134, that:

> No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

[120] In my view, we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

[121] For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

SCHEDULE "A" -- CONDUITS

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

SCHEDULE "B" -- APPLICANTS

ATB Financial

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Canaccord Capital Corporation [page549]

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan

Desjardins Group

Magna International Inc.

National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.

NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.

Public Sector Pension Investment Board

The Governors of the University of Alberta

SCHEDULE "C" -- COUNSEL

(1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers, for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
(2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman, for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.
(3) Peter F.C. Howard, and Samaneh Hosseini, for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
(4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, and Max Starnino, for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
(5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos, for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
(6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin, for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
(7) Mario J. Forte, for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec

(8) John B. Laskin, for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada [page550]
(9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques, for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al.)
(10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
(11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank
(12) Jeffrey S. Leon, for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees
(13) Usman Sheikh, for Coventree Capital Inc.
(14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso, for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
(15) Neil C. Saxe, for Dominion Bond Rating Service
(16) James A. Woods, Sébastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette, for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP
(17) Scott A. Turner, for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
(18) R. Graham Phoenix, for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

TAB 5

Indexed as:

Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. v. Sun Life Trust Co.

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36
IN THE MATTER OF the Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.59
Between
In the Matter of Pacific National Lease Holding Corporation, Pacific National Finance Corporation, Pacific National Leasing Corporation, Pacific National Vehicle Leasing Corporation, Southborough Holdings Inc. and Pacnat Equities Corporation, Petitioners (Respondents), and
Sun Life Trust Company, Respondent (Appellant), and
Mutual Life Assurance Company of Canada, Respondent (Appellant), and
Ferguson Gifford, Respondent

[1995] B.C.J. No. 1535

[1995] 10 W.W.R. 714

62 B.C.A.C. 151

10 B.C.L.R. (3d) 62

34 C.B.R. (3d) 4

56 A.C.W.S. (3d) 843

Vancouver Registry No. CA017927/CA017929

British Columbia Court of Appeal
Vancouver, British Columbia

Cumming, Hollinrake and Rowles JJ.A.

Heard: June 23, 1995.
Judgment: July 10, 1995.

(20 pp.)

Creditors and debtors -- Debtors' relief legislation -- Companies' creditors arrangement legislation -- Terms, order for actual costs related to taxation -- Appeals.

Appeal by the defendant Sun Life against an order made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) for costs for actual costs in any way related to or the result of the taxation ordered in the

proceedings between the parties. The appeal was based on the allegation that the judge did not have the jurisdiction to so order. The taxation was expected to take nine to 10 days with an estimated cost of $60,000. These costs were treated as restructuring costs to be borne by the petitioner under the CCAA.

HELD: Appeal dismissed. The CCAA was to be interpreted broadly so as to give the justice a good deal of power and flexibility. As well, the CCAA prevailed where it was in conflict with another statute. The order under review did not call for one party to pay costs of the opponent. Rather, it dealt with the expenses incurred on taxation and time costs. These amounts were not to be paid but were deemed restructuring costs to be dealt with as per the terms of the Stay order and the ultimate Transition order. As such, the fact that the CCAA did not speak to costs was irrelevant as these were costs of reorganization properly within the jurisdiction of the judge under the CCAA. The fact that the companies had gone into bankruptcy before the order was made had no impact on the applicability of the CCAA. The judge was dealing with a matter that was before him prior to the bankruptcy and his ongoing supervisory role gave him jurisdiction to make the challenged order.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C36. Legal Profession Act, s. 71(5).

Counsel for the Appellant (Sun Life): G. Turriff.
Counsel for the Appellant (Mutual Life): M. Carroll.
Counsel for the Respondent (Ferguson Gifford): H.C.R. Clark and M. Palleson.

Reasons for judgment were delivered by Cumming J.A.

1 **CUMMING J.A.**:-- This is an appeal pursuant to leave granted by a justice of this Court against an order made by Brenner J. on 4 October 1993 and confirmed the next day. The order, which was made under the Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("C.C.A.A.") as part of an ongoing C.C.A.A. proceeding, reads:

> THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the actual costs, including time costs, experts fees and disbursements of Ferguson Gifford in any way connected to, related to, incurred as a result of or as part of, the taxation (the "Taxation") ordered in these proceedings and set out in paragraph 16(h) of the Order of July 31, 1992 (the "Stay Order") made in this proceeding and paragraph 8 of the Order of December 17, 1992 (the "Transition Order") made in this proceeding, be and are "Restructuring Costs";

2 The principal ground of appeal advanced is that the learned judge below did not have jurisdiction to make the order he did.

FACTS

3 The PNL Group consisted of six interrelated companies that operated a leasing financing business under the financial and corporate administration of Pacific National Financial Corporation ("PNFC"), the parent company. The employees of the PNL Group, 230 as of 31 July 1992, were hired and paid by PNFC. PNFC was listed on the Toronto and Alberta Stock Exchanges. Its shares were held by a principal of the PNL Group, Arnold Jeffrey, and his family through a holding company, Southborough Holdings Ltd., and by other shareholders. As of July 1992, the PNL Group had fifteen offices across

Canada and, in addition, through subsidiary companies held holdings in the United States, including the U.S. Foothill Bank.

4 Pacific National Equity Corporation ("PacNat") was a holding company, and its shares were held 90 percent by PNFC and 10 percent by the Jeffrey family. PacNat held non-financial assets of the group, such as Zippy Print Enterprises Ltd. and real estate in Vancouver and Whistler, British Columbia.

5 PNFC's financial or lease assets in Canada were held by three wholly owned subsidiaries, Pacific National Leasing Corporation ("PNLC"), Pacific National Lease Holding Corporation ("PNLHC"), and Pacific National Vehicle Leasing Corporation ("PNVLC"). Historically, PNLC was the primary generator of lease business for the group. In the normal course, PNLC purchased equipment and then entered into leases with third party lessees for such office and computer equipment. These leases were then packaged into portfolios and "sold" to third party financial institutions called "Funders", with ongoing administration of the leases, including collection of monthly lease payments remaining with PNLC.

6 Profit from the transactions was generated by the increase in the sale price PNLC charged to Funders, over and above the amount paid to the equipment vendors and by residual revenues ("residuals") paid to PNLC as a result of customers buying or releasing the equipment after the initial term. Historically, the value of residuals had been roughly 17 percent of the gross value of the original equipment purchase price. As of July 1992, the gross value of PNL Group's total lease portfolio was $362,000,000, yielding estimated residuals of $61,000,000. This $61,000,000 "asset" of the PNL Group was a critical component of the PNL Group's reorganization plan and the C.C.A.A. proceedings.

7 A key issue in the C.C.A.A. proceedings therefore became who had ownership of the residuals, the PNL group or the particular Funders? This tied into the general question of the nature of the relationship between the PNL Group and the Funders. Each Funder had one or more written arrangements with the PNL Group. Several Funders asserted that they owned the equipment and leases in question and that when lease revenue flowed into the PNL Group such revenue was held in trust for the benefit of the Funders. The Funders argued that they were not creditors and neither they nor their leases should be subject to the C.C.A.A. On the other hand, the PNL Group maintained that ownership of the equipment and lease stream revenues remained with the PNL Group (as did the rights to any residuals) and although the PNL Group was obligated as matter of contract to pay certain monies to the various Funders, a trust relationship did not exist. The PNL Group's position was that the relationship was one of debtor-creditor.

8 This "trust issue" wove its way through the C.C.A.A. proceedings. It was on the basis of the trust argument that the Funders asserted that the funds used by the PNL Group to carry on its business, including payment of Ferguson Gifford's accounts, belonged to the Funders.

9 Difficulties were experienced in the operation of the petitioners' business and insolvency loomed. Protracted efforts were made to resolve matters by way of a new investor and, when that failed, by way of a standstill agreement. When it became apparent that a standstill agreement could not be reached, PNL Group sought and obtained the ex parte stay order of 23 July 1992.

10 Ferguson Gifford were solicitors for the petitioners (the "PNL Group") in the C.C.A.A. action.

11 The original stay order did not include a concept of "restructuring costs". "Restructuring costs" first appeared in the Stay Order of 31 July 1992. It was the concept of restructuring costs which led to the provision in the Stay Order which gave "any interested party" the right to tax Ferguson Gifford's fees. This provision reflected a balancing of the competing interests of the "Funders" (of whom the appellants are two) on the one hand and the PNL Group on the other, in light of the unresolved trust

issue. The provisions in the Stay Order were then carried forward, with some modification, into the Transition Order.

12 Paragraph 16(h) of the Stay Order of 31 July 1992 reads:

> 16. THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
>
> (h) the normal costs of the Petitioners incurred in carrying on the business of the Petitioners in the ordinary course of business, to carry out and fulfill the terms of this Order (the "Restructuring Costs") including, without restriction, rent, utilities, and current wages, and the fees and disbursements ments of Deloitte and Touche Inc. as Monitor and Deloitte and Touche in respect of its forensic investigations, and the fees and disbursements of the solicitors acting for the Petitioners incurred in connection with the drafting, preparation and presentation of the plan of arrangement, (which said solicitor's fees and disbursements shall be paid firstly from any monies previously provided to the solicitors by the Petitioners and, which said fees and disbursements shall be subject to the taxation thereof by any interested party, but the payment of which may be made by the Petitioners prior to the taxation thereof)..." (Emphasis added.)

13 By a later order of Brenner J., pronounced 17 December 1992 in the C.C.A.A. action ("the Transition Order"), Price Waterhouse Limited was appointed receiver and manager of the PNL Group and its assets, properties and undertakings. Ferguson Gifford was ordered to "tax their accounts incurred as Restructuring Costs pursuant to the Stay Order before the Registrar of this Honourable Court" and the Funders, including the respondents, were given the right to notice of the taxation and the right to participate in it.

14 The Transition Order defined restructuring costs as follows:

> "Restructuring Costs" means the normal costs of the Petitioners incurred in carrying on the business of the Petitioners in the ordinary course of business, to carry out and fulfill the terms of the Stay Order including, without restriction, rent, utilities, and current wages, and the fees and disbursements of Deloitte and Touche Inc. as Monitor and Deloitte and Touche in respect of its forensic investigations, and the fees and disbursements of the solicitors acting for the Petitioners incurred in connection with the drafting, preparation and presentation of the Plan. (Emphasis added)

15 On 11 March 1993, Ferguson Gifford obtained the first of a series of appointments for the taxation of some or some parts of various of its accounts rendered to the petitioners for professional legal services performed in connection with the drafting, preparation and presentation of the plan of arrangement. By the first appointment, headed "Pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, Section 70", 9 days beginning 1 November 1993 were scheduled for the hearing of the taxation. The taxation began as scheduled on 1 November 1993, continued for 8 more days and has not been completed. Master Barber, who is presiding over the taxation, has directed that fifteen further days of hearing should be booked.

16 On 16 September 1993, Ferguson Gifford filed a notice of motion returnable 4 October 1994, before Brenner J., "... for directions with respect to the taxation of [its] accounts ... ordered by Mr. Justice Brenner in the Stay Order ... ."

17 By letter dated and delivered to counsel for the appellant on 1 October 1993, Ferguson Gifford

stated its position that its costs of the taxation might be restructuring costs. In the letter Ferguson Gifford said that it intended, on the hearing of its application, "... to seek clarification of the phrase 'restructuring costs' used by [Mr. Justice Brenner in the Stay Order and Transition Order] ... including whether the costs of Ferguson Gifford incurred with respect to the taxation of its accounts can be considered 'restructuring costs'."

18 In his reasons for judgment for the order made 4 October 1993, Brenner J. said:

> Counsel for the petitioners comes before the court today seeking directions as to whether or not its costs in attending the costs taxation requested by the funders are Restructuring Costs under the terms of the Orders. The taxation is currently set for some 9 to 10 days and counsel for the petitioner advises that they are facing an estimated cost of some $60,000.00 to attend this taxation when counsel fees, together with expert witness fees, are taken into account.
>
> In reply, Mr. Turriff for the funders, Sun Life and Mutual Life, takes the position that this taxation is like any other taxation and that counsel for the petitioners should be obliged to attend and defend its accounts on the taxation and that the normal costs procedure followed by the registrar ought to apply.
>
> In my view, this case has to be determined in the context of the orders that were made in respect of the provision that the petitioners' normal costs incurred in carrying on its business, and the cost of carrying out and fulfilling the terms of the July 31 order, and the fees and disbursements of the solicitors acting for the petitioners incurred in connection with the drafting, preparation and presentation of the plan of arrangement, have to be considered.
>
> All parties to this litigation participated in the drafting of the July 31, 1992 order and hence all participated in the language that was used and, in particular, the concepts which were embodied in the order. In my view, that distinguishes it from what might be termed a taxation in the more ordinary course.
>
> Accordingly, I am of the view that it is appropriate that the costs to be incurred by the petitioners' counsel, Ferguson Gifford, be treated as restructuring costs under the terms of the order. (Emphasis added)

19 On the following day, Brenner J., in dismissing the applications of Sun Life to set aside the order and re-open the hearing, said:

> The application to reconsider is dismissed. Yesterday, on motion, I was asked to interpret earlier orders made and I believe that is what I did.

20 In his reasons of 5 November 1993, granting an extension of time to Sun Life and Mutual to appeal, Brenner J. stated at 1-2:

> On October 4, 1993, Ferguson Gifford, Counsel for Pacific National Leasing, applied for directions with respect to the taxation of its accounts for which provisions were made in the orders I made in this action on July 31, 1992 and December 17, 1992 (the "orders"). Following argument, I interpreted my earlier orders in the context of this case and ruled that the expenses incurred by Ferguson Gifford with respect to the taxation of the accounts were to be treated as restructuring costs as defined in those

orders. (Emphasis added)

21 On 23 November 1993, counsel for the appellant Sun Life and counsel for Ferguson Gifford appeared before Brenner J. to settle the terms of the 4 October 1993 order. Brenner J. explained that his intention on 4 October 1993 "... was that Ferguson Gifford recover its actual legal fees and disbursements incurred in connection with the taxation".

22 In his reasons for judgment delivered that day, Brenner J. said:

> ... on motion by Messrs. Ferguson Gifford for directions with respect to the costs to be incurred by Messrs. Ferguson Gifford in connection with a taxation in this matter, I ordered that the costs of Ferguson Gifford in attending the taxation are to be restructuring costs within the definition of the July 31, 1992 order in this matter.
>
> The issue that has arisen is whether the phrase, "costs", is to be taken as meaning costs in the legal sense or actual costs or indemnity. Subsequent to the motion on the 4th of October, counsel for the parties attended before me at which time counsel for Sun Life sought an extension of the time in which to appeal that order. After hearing Sun Life's application, I extended the time for such an appeal. On that hearing, there was a discussion between counsel and the court in which the concept embodied in my order of the 4th of October of indemnity for Ferguson Gifford was discussed.
>
> Counsel for Sun Life on the motion today takes the position that costs is a term with a legal meaning in that it would be inappropriate for me to vary what I said on the 4th of October in the face of a matter which is currently under appeal. If I were to attempt to do that, I would concur completely with that view. However, I think it is important that I make clear what I intended on the 4th of October and my intention at that time was that Ferguson Gifford recover its actual legal fees and disbursements incurred in connection with the taxation. In those reasons I hope I explained by rationale for this deviation from what might be viewed as the normal course of events in this particular action. With the matter going to the Court of Appeal, that court will have an opportunity to consider my decision and reasons in this case and make an appropriate disposition.
>
> However, I think it is important that I make my order clear and accordingly, would settle the order in the terms proposed by Ferguson Gifford, that is to say its actual costs that are incurred in connection with the taxation are to be considered restructuring costs and, as I say, that matter can be dealt with by the Court of Appeal.

23 On 7 March 1994, at a further hearing arranged to settle the terms of the 4 and 5 October 1993 orders, Brenner J. decided that the order to be entered should provide that the "actual costs" of Ferguson Gifford that were restructuring costs include its "time costs, experts fees and disbursements".

24 Ferguson Gifford has been paid in full for all the work described in all the accounts that are the subject of the ordered taxation.

DISCUSSION

25 I turn now to the principal issue on this appeal, namely, whether Brenner J. had jurisdiction to make the order.

26 The jurisprudence which deals with the C.C.A.A. establishes two propositions: (a) first, this legislation is to be broadly interpreted so as to give a Supreme Court justice exercising jurisdiction a good deal of power and flexibility; and, (b) the C.C.A.A. will prevail should a conflict arise between this statute and another federal or provincial statute.

27 In Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, the court, in deciding upon the scope of the power to stay proceedings brought by creditors pursuant to the C.C.A.A., stated at 320 [C.B.R.]:

> In the exercise of their functions under the C.C.A.A. Canadian courts have shown themselves partial to a standard of liberal construction which will further the policy objectives ... The trend demonstrated by these cases is entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the C.C.A.A.
>
> The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s.178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. 'prevails. (Emphasis added.)

28 In Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (1992), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 368, this Court did not grant leave to the PNL Group to appeal a decision of Brenner J. dismissing an application to allow statutory severance payments to be made to terminated employees. It was argued that Brenner J. used the jurisdiction under the C.C.A.A. to order the appellants to breach the Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 10. Macfarlane J.A. stated at 374:

> This case is not so much about the rights of employees as creditors, but the right of the court under the C.C.A.A. to serve not the special interests of the directors and officers of the company but the broader constituency referred to in the Chef Ready Foods Ltd., supra. Such a decision may inevitably conflict with provincial legislation, but the broad purposes of the C.C.A.A. must be served.

29 In addition to the provisions of the C.C.A.A. itself, courts have exercised power based on ancillary inherent jurisdiction to supplement this statute. In Re Westar Mining Ltd. (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (S.C.), the court created a charge over the assets of the petitioner in favour of certain suppliers. Macdonald J. stated at 12:

> The issue is whether or not those suppliers who are prepared (or have been compelled, between May 14 and June 10) to extend the credit, which will hopefully keep the company operating during the period of the stay, should be secured. I have concluded that "justice dictates" they should, and that the circumstances call for the exercise of this court's inherent jurisdiction to achieve that end: see Winnipeg Supply & Fuel Co. v. Genevieve Mortgage Corp., [1972] 1 W.W.R. 651, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (Man. C.A.), at p.657 [W.W.R.].
>
> The circumstances in which this court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction are not the subject of an exhaustive list. The power is defined by Halsbury's (4th ed., vol. 37, para. 14) as:
>
> ...the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court

> may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so...
>
> Proceedings under the C.C.A.A. are a prime example of the kind of situations where the court must draw upon such powers to "flesh out" the bare bones of an inadequate and incomplete statutory provision in order to give effect to its objects.

30 Sun Life's submission with respect to jurisdiction is based primarily on the proposition that Part 10 of the Legal Professions Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 25 is a "complete code" on solicitor/client accounts such that there is no jurisdiction or court to deal with the taxation of solicitor's accounts outside of Part 10.

31 Mr. Turriff relied on the provisions of s. 71 of the Legal Professions Act and particularly, s. 71 (11), which provides:

> (11) Unless the registrar, due to special circum-stances, otherwise orders,
>
> (a) a member whose bill is reviewed shall pay the costs of the review if 1/6 or more of the total amount of the bill is subtracted from it, and
> (b) the person by whom payment is to be made shall pay the costs of the review if less than 1/6 of the total amount of the bill is subtracted from it.

32 In response, Mr. Clark pointed out that it was Sun Life who sought and obtained provisions in the Stay Order and Transition Order calling for the taxation of Ferguson Gifford's accounts. Having been granted this extraordinary right, Sun Life now takes the position that Brenner J. can have no jurisdiction with respect to such matters because of the Legal Professions Act. It suited Sun Life's purposes to regard Brenner J.'s jurisdiction as broad enough to enable him to order a taxation of Ferguson Gifford's accounts, but now, when further directions are sought with respect to such taxation, Sun Life firmly takes the opposite view of the C.C.A.A.

33 Having ordered a review of Ferguson Gifford's accounts, Mr. Clark submitted that Brenner J. must have continuing jurisdiction over this matter.

34 Mr. Clark agreed that Master Barber, who is reviewing Ferguson Gifford's accounts, remains free to make an order as to costs. If 1/6th or more of Ferguson Gifford's accounts are taxed off, Ferguson Gifford may have to pay Sun Life the costs of the review. If less than 1/6th of the total accounts are subtracted, there may be an order that Sun Life pay Ferguson Gifford's costs. If those costs are recovered by Ferguson Gifford pursuant to the order of 4 October 1993, Ferguson Gifford will not be entitled to double recovery.

35 Mr. Turriff contends that what has been described as the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of British Columbia over lawyers' accounts no longer exists because of Part 10 of the Legal Professions Act. With respect, I think this submission is beside the mark in this case.

36 Brenner J.'s jurisdiction was found pursuant to the C.C.A.A., not in the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court over lawyers' accounts. In the case at bar the "relationship" at issue was not one of lawyer/client, but rather one of an insolvent company's lawyer and the creditors of that company. Such a matter is not be dealt with by any inherent jurisdiction over the lawyer/client relationship or under the Legal Profession Act but, rather, by insolvency legislation.

37 The order under review in the case at bar does not call for one party to pay the costs of an opponent. The order deals not only with Ferguson Gifford's expenses and disbursements in carrying out the taxation, but also with Ferguson Gifford's time costs: not only the value of the time required of

Ferguson Gifford personnel, including counsel, by the taxation, but also witness preparation and appearance time. As well, the order does not order Sun Life to pay such amounts, but rather declares such amounts to be restructuring costs to be dealt with as per the terms of the Stay Order and Transition Order.

38 Mr. Turriff stated that the order confirmed what he said was the pre-existing right of the Funders to "tax the petitioners' solicitors' charges" under the Legal Profession Act. I am unable to accept this submission. This may have been so but was not necessarily so. This is because we were advised by counsel for Ferguson Gifford at the hearing that the Funders may not be the ones bearing the burden of these costs but rather they could fall on the ordinary creditors. Ferguson Gifford as solicitors for the petitioners, made fee arrangements with PNL Group, rendered accounts and was paid by its client. The Funders did not necessarily have a pre-existing right to tax Ferguson Gifford's accounts and, as they have been paid long since, may not, but for the provisions of the Stay Order and the Transition Order, which gave them as a third party the right to tax, have any such right. See Legal Profession Act, s. 71(5).

39 In addition to the above submission, the appellants asserted that inasmuch as the companies had gone into bankruptcy before Brenner J. made his final order with respect to these costs his jurisdiction under the C.C.A.A. was spent. With respect, I cannot agree. Brenner J. in making the order he did was dealing with a matter that was before him prior to the bankruptcy and I think his ongoing supervisory role left him with jurisdiction to make the order now challenged.

40 Then the appellants submit that as there is no mention of costs in the C.C.A.A. this is a matter that must be dealt with under the Legal Profession Act. Again, with respect I cannot agree. I think the costs attendant on a reorganization, be they solicitor and client costs or whatever, ever, are properly within the jurisdiction of the judge under the C.C.A.A. As I see it, these costs are part and parcel of the costs attendant on the reorganization sought under the Act and, that being so, are within the jurisdiction of the C.C.A.A. judge.

41 In my opinion, the learned judge below had jurisdiction to make the order he did and I would, accordingly, reject the main ground of appeal.

42 This Court has said that it should exercise its appeal power sparingly when asked to intervene with the exercise of discretion pursuant to the C.C.A.A. In Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corporation, supra, Macfarlane J.A. at 375 stated:

> Despite what I have said, there may be an arguable case for the petitioners to present to a panel of this court on discreet questions of law. But I am of the view that this court should exercise its power sparingly when it is asked to intervene with respect to questions which arise under the C.C.A.A.. The process of management which the Act has assigned to the trial court is an ongoing one. In this case a number of orders have been made. Some, includding the one under appeal, have not been settled or entered. Other applications are pending. The process contemplated by the Act is continuing.
>
> * * *
>
> In supervising a proceeding under the C.C.A.A. orders are made, and orders are varied as changing circumstances require. Orders depend upon a careful and delicate balancing of a variety of interests and of problems. In that context appellate proceedings may well upset the balance, and delay or frustrate the process under the C.C.A.A..

43 In my opinion, the order of 4 October 1993 is supportable pursuant to Brenner J.'s continuing

jurisdiction over C.C.A.A. matters and his jurisdiction to interpret or to supplement his earlier orders.

44 Having reached this conclusion, I do not find it necessary to deal further with the other grounds of appeal.

45 I would dismiss the appeal.

CUMMING J.A.

HOLLINRAKE J.A.:-- I agree.
ROWLES J.A.:-- I agree.

cp/d/mrz/DRS/DRS/DRS/DRS/qlhjk

TAB 6

Case Name:

Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation, Applicants
APPLICATION UNDER the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

[2009] O.J. No. 2558

Court File No. 09-CL-7950

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: April 21, 2009.
Judgment: June 18, 2009.

(89 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Creditors and claims -- Claims -- Priorities -- Unsecured claims -- Motions by unionized and non-unionized former employees for orders requiring Nortel to restore payments to the employees dismissed -- Nortel was granted protection under the Company's Creditors Arrangement Act and was under financial pressure -- The employee claims were unsecured claims and therefore did not have any statutory priority -- Furthermore, the claims were based mostly on services that were provided pre-filing -- There was no reason to treat the unionized or non-unionized employees any differently than other unsecured creditors -- Nortel's resources were to be used to attempt restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, s. 11.

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Motions by unionized and non-unionized former employees for orders requiring Nortel to restore payments to the employees dismissed -- Nortel was granted protection under the Company's Creditors Arrangement Act and was under financial pressure -- The employee claims were unsecured claims and therefore did not have any statutory priority -- Furthermore, the claims were based mostly on services that were provided pre-filing -- There was no reason to treat the unionized or non-unionized employees any differently than other unsecured creditors -- Nortel's resources were to be used to attempt restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, s. 11.

Motion by the union for an order requiring Nortel to recommence payments that was obligated to make

under the collective agreement. Motion by former employees for an order requiring Nortel to pay termination pay, severance pay and other benefits. Nortel was granted protection under the Company's Creditors Arrangement Act in January 2009. At that time, Nortel ceased making payments of amounts that constituted unsecured claims, including termination and severance payments. The union took the position that Nortel was obligated to make the payments under the collective agreement. The former employees took the position that it would be inequitable to restore payments to unionized former employees and not non-unionized former employees. However, Nortel took the position that its financial pressure precluded it from paying all of the outstanding obligations.

HELD: Motions dismissed. The employee claims were unsecured claims and therefore did not have any statutory priority. Furthermore, the claims were based mostly on services that were provided pre-filing. As a result, there was no reason to treat the unionized or non-unionized employees any differently than other unsecured creditors and Nortel's resources were to be used to attempt restructuring.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11, s. 11.3

Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 5

Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Schedule A,

Counsel:

Barry Wadsworth, for the CAW and George Borosh et al.

Susan Philpott and Mark Zigler, for the Nortel Networks Former Employees.

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Nortel Networks Board of Directors.

Alan Mersky and Mario Forte, for Nortel Networks et al.

Gavin H. Finlayson, for the Informal Nortel Noteholders Group.

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Joseph Pasquariello and Chris Armstrong, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor.

Janice Payne, for Recently Severed Canadian Nortel Employees ("RSCNE").

Gail Misra, for the CEP Union.

J. Davis-Sydor, for Brookfield Lepage Johnson Controls Facility Management Services.

Henry Juroviesky, for the Nortel Terminated Canadian Employees Steering Committee.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee.

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services.

ENDORSEMENT

1 **G.B. MORAWETZ J.**:-- The process by which claims of employees, both unionized and non-unionized, have been addressed in restructurings initiated under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") has been the subject of debate for a number of years. There is uncertainty and strong divergent views have been expressed. Notwithstanding that employee claims are ultimately addressed in many CCAA proceedings, there are few reported decisions which address a number of the issues being raised in these two motions. This lack of jurisprudence may reflect that the issues, for the most part, have been resolved through negotiation, as opposed to being determined by the court in the CCAA process - which includes motions for directions, the classification of creditors' claims, the holding and conduct of creditors' meetings and motions to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement.

2 In this case, both unionized and non-unionized employee groups have brought motions for directions. This endorsement addresses both motions.

Union Motion

3 The first motion is brought by the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) and its Locals 27, 1525, 1530, 1535, 1837, 1839, 1905, and/or 1915 (the "Union") and by George Borosh on his own behalf and on behalf of all retirees of the Applicants who were formerly represented by the Union.

4 The Union requests an order directing the Applicants (also referred to as "Nortel") to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments which the Applicants, or any of them, are obligated to make pursuant to the CAW collective agreement (the "Collective Agreement"). The Union also seeks an order requiring the Applicants to pay to those entitled persons the payments which should have been made to them under the Collective Agreement since January 14, 2009, the date of the CCAA filing and the date of the Initial Order.

5 The Union seeks continued payment of certain of these benefits including:

(a) retirement allowance payments ("RAP");
(b) voluntary retirement options ("VRO"); and
(c) termination and severance payments.

6 The amounts claimed by the Union are contractual entitlements under the Collective Agreement, which the Union submits are payable only after an individual's employment with the Applicants has ceased.

7 There are approximately 101 former Union members with claims to RAP. The current value of these RAP is approximately $2.3 million. There are approximately 180 former unionized retirees who claim similar benefits under other collective agreements.

8 There are approximately 7 persons who may assert claims to VRO as of the date of the Initial Order. These claims amount to approximately $202,000.

9 There are also approximately 600 persons who may claim termination and severance pay amounts. Five of those persons are former union members.

Former Employee Motion

10 The second motion is brought by Mr. Donald Sproule, Mr. David Archibald and Mr. Michael Campbell (collectively, the "Representatives") on behalf of former employees, including pensioners, of the Applicants or any person claiming an interest under or on behalf of such former employees or pensioners and surviving spouses in receipt of a Nortel pension, or group or class of them (collectively, the "Former Employees"). The Representatives seek an order varying the Initial Order by requiring the Applicants to pay termination pay, severance pay, vacation pay and an amount equivalent to the continuation of the benefit plans during the notice period, which are required to be paid to affected Former Employees in accordance with the *Employment Standards Act, 2000* S.O. 2000 c. 41 ("ESA") or any other relevant provincial employment legislation. The Representatives also seek an order varying the Initial Order by requiring the Applicants to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments and to make payment of all periodic and lump sum payments which should have been paid since the Initial Order, which the Applicants are obligated to pay Former Employees in accordance with the statutory and contractual obligations entered into by Nortel and affected Former Employees, including the Transitional Retirement Allowance ("TRA") and any pension benefit payments Former Employees are entitled to receive in excess of the Nortel Networks Limited Managerial and Non-negotiated Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan"). TRA is similar to RAP, but is for non-unionized retirees. There are approximately 442 individuals who may claim the TRA. The current value of TRA obligations is approximately $18 million.

11 The TRA and the RAP are both unregistered benefits that run concurrently with other pension entitlements and operate as time-limited supplements.

12 In many respects, the motion of the Former Employees is not dissimilar to the CAW motion, such that the motion of the Former Employees can almost be described as a "Me too motion".

Background

13 On January 14, 2009, the Applicants were granted protection under the CCAA, pursuant to the Initial Order.

14 Upon commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the Applicants ceased making payments of amounts that constituted or would constitute unsecured claims against the Applicants. Included were payments for termination and severance, as well as amounts under various retirement and retirement transitioning programs.

15 The Initial Order provides:

(a) that Nortel is entitled but not required to pay, among other things, outstanding and future wages, salaries, vacation pay, employee benefits and pension plan payments;
(b) that Nortel is entitled to terminate the employment of or lay off any of its employees and deal with the consequences under a future plan of arrangement;
(c) that Nortel is entitled to vacate, abandon or quit the whole but not part of any lease agreement and repudiate agreements relating to leased properties (paragraph 11);
(d) for a stay of proceedings against Nortel;
(e) for a suspension of rights and remedies vis-à-vis Nortel;
(f) that during the stay period no person shall discontinue, repudiate, cease to perform any contract, agreement held by the company (paragraph 16);
(g) that those having agreements with Nortel for the supply of goods and/or

services are restrained from, among other things, discontinuing, altering or terminating the supply of such goods or services. The proviso is that the goods or services supplied are to be paid for by Nortel in accordance with the normal payment practices.

Position of Union

16 The position of the CAW is that the Applicants' obligations to make the payments is to the CAW pursuant to the Collective Agreement. The obligation is not to the individual beneficiaries.

17 The Union also submits that the difference between the moving parties is that RAP, VRO and other payments are made pursuant to the Collective Agreement as between the Union and the Applicants and not as an outstanding debt payable to former employees.

18 The Union further submits that the Applicants are obligated to maintain the full measure of compensation under the Collective Agreement in exchange for the provision of services provided by the Union's members subsequent to the issuance of the Initial Order. As such, the failure to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Union submits, runs directly contrary to Section 11.3 of the CCAA as compensation paid to employees under a collective agreement can reasonably be interpreted as being payment for services within the meaning of this section.

19 Section 11.3 of the CCAA provides:

> No order made under section 11 shall have the effect of
>
> (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or
> (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

20 In order to fit within Section 11.3, services have to be provided after the date of the Initial Order.

21 The Union submits that persons owed severance pay are post-petition trade creditors in a bankruptcy, albeit in relation to specific circumstances. Thus, by analogy, persons owed severance pay are post-petition trade creditors in a CCAA proceeding. The Union relies on *Smokey River Coal Ltd. (Re)* 2001 ABCA 209 to support its proposition.

22 The Union further submits that when interpreting "compensation" for services performed under the Collective Agreement, it must include all of the monetary aspects of the Collective Agreement and not those specifically made to those actively employed on any particular given day.

23 The Union takes the position that Section 11.3 of the CCAA specifically contemplates that a supplier is entitled to payment for post-filing goods and services provided, and would undoubtedly refuse to continue supply in the event of receiving only partial payment. However, the Union contends that it does not have the ability to cease providing services due to the *Labour Relations Act, 1995*, S.O. 1995, c. 1. As such, the only alternative open to the Union is to seek an order to recommence the payments halted by the Initial Order.

24 The Union contends that Section 11.3 of the CCAA precludes the court from authorizing the Applicants to make selective determinations as to which parts of the Collective Agreement it will abide by. By failing to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Union contends that the Applicants have acted as if the contract has been amended to the extent that it is no longer bound by all of its terms

and need merely address any loss through the plan of arrangement.

25 The Union submits that, with the exception of rectification to clarify the intent of the parties, the court has no jurisdiction at common law or in equity to alter the terms of the contract between parties and as the court cannot amend the terms of the Collective Agreement, the employer should not be allowed to act as though it had done so.

26 The Union submits that no other supplier of services would countenance, and the court does not have the jurisdiction to authorize, the recipient party to a contract unilaterally determining which provisions of the agreement it will or will not abide by while the contract is in operation.

27 The Union concludes that the Applicants must pay for the full measure of its bargain with the Union while the Collective Agreement remains in force and the court should direct the recommencement and repayment of those benefits that arise out of the Collective Agreement and which were suspended subsequently to the filing of the CCAA application on January 14, 2009.

Position of the Former Employees

28 Counsel to the Former Employees submits that the court has the discretion pursuant to Section 11 of the CCAA to order Nortel to recommence periodic and lump-sum payments to Former Employees in accordance with Nortel's statutory and contractual obligations. Further, the RAP payments which the Union seeks to enforce are not meaningfully different from those RAP benefits payable to other unionized retirees who belong to other unions nor from the TRA payable to non-unionized former employees. Accordingly, counsel submits that it would be inequitable to restore payments to one group of retirees and not others. Hence, the reference to the "Me too motion".

29 Counsel further submits that all employers and employees are bound by the minimum standards in the ESA and other applicable provincial employment legislation. Section 5 of the ESA expressly states that no employer can contract out or waive an employment standard in the ESA and that any such contracting out or waiver is void.

30 Counsel submits that each province has minimum standards employment legislation and regulations which govern employment relationships at the provincial level and that provincial laws such as the ESA continue to apply during CCAA proceedings.

31 Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that provincial laws in federally-regulated bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings continue to apply so long as the doctrine of paramountcy is not triggered: See *Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd.*, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 60.

32 In this case, counsel further submits that there is no conflict between the provisions of the ESA and the CCAA and that paramountcy is not triggered and it follows that the ESA and other applicable employment legislation continues to apply during the Applicants' CCAA proceedings. As a result counsel submits that the Applicants are required to make payment to Former Employees for monies owing pursuant to the minimum employment standards as outlined in the ESA and other applicable provincial legislation.

Position of the Applicants

33 Counsel to the Applicants sets out the central purpose of the CCAA as being: "to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business". (*Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re)*, (1992) B.C.J. No. 3070, aff'd by 1992, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265), and that the stay is the primary procedural

instrument used to achieve the purpose of the CCAA:

> ... if the attempt at a compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay. Hence the powers vested in the court under Section 11 (*Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re), supra*).

34 The Applicants go on to submit that the powers vested in the court under Section 11 to achieve these goals of the CCAA include:

(a) the ability to stay past debts; and
(b) the ability to require the continuance of present obligations to the debtor.

35 The corresponding protection extended to persons doing business with the debtor is that such persons (including employees) are not required to extend credit to the debtor corporation in the course of the CCAA proceedings. The protection afforded by Section 11.3 extends only to services provided after the Initial Order. Post-filing payments are only made for the purpose of ensuring the continued supply of services and that obligations in connection with past services are stayed. (See *Mirant Canada Energy Marketing Ltd. (Re)* [2004], A.J. No. 331).

36 Furthermore, counsel to the Applicants submits that contractual obligations respecting post employment are obligations in respect of past services and are accordingly stayed.

37 Counsel to the Applicants also relies on the following statement from *Mirant, supra*, at paragraph 28:

> Thus, for me to find the decision of the Court of Appeal in Smokey River Coal analogous to Schaefer's situation, I would need to find that the obligation to pay severance pay to Schaefer was a clear contractual obligation that was necessary for Schaefer to continue his employment and not an obligation that arose from the cessation or termination of services. In my view, to find it to be the former would be to stretch the meaning of the obligation in the Letter Agreement to pay severance pay. It is an obligation that arises on the termination of services. It does not fall within a commercially reasonable contractual obligation essential for the continued supply of services. Only is his salary which he has been paid falls within that definition.

38 Counsel to the Applicants states that post-employment benefits have been consistently stayed under the CCAA and that post-employment benefits are properly regarded as pre-filing debts, which receive the same treatment as other unsecured creditors. The Applicants rely on *Syndicat nationale de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. v. Jeffrey Mines Inc.* [2003] Q.J. No. 264 (C.A.) ("*Jeffrey Mine*") for the proposition that "the fact that these benefits are provided for in the collective agreement changes nothing".

39 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the Union seeks an order directing the Applicants to make payment of various post-employment benefits to former Nortel employees and that the Former Employees claim entitlement to similar treatment for all post-employment benefits, under the Collective Agreement or otherwise.

40 The Applicants take the position the Union's continuing collective representation role does not clothe unpaid benefits with any higher status, relying on the following from *Jeffrey Mine* at paras. 57 - 58:

> Within the framework of the restructuring plan, arrangements can be made respecting

> the amounts owing in this regard.
>
> The same is true in the case of the loss of certain fringe benefits sustained by persons who have not provided services to the debtor since the initial order. These persons became creditors of the debtor for the monetary value of the benefits lost further to Jeffrey Mines Inc.'s having ceased to pay premiums. The fact that these benefits are provided for in the collective agreements changes nothing.

41 In addition, the Applicants point to the following statement of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Syndicat des employées et employés de CFAP-TV (TQS-Quebec), section locale 3946 du Syndicat canadien de la function publique c. TQS inc.*, 2008 QCCA 1429 at paras. 26-27:

> [Unofficial translation] Employees' rights are defined by the collective agreement that governs them and by certain legislative provisions. However, the resulting claims are just as much [at] risk as those of other creditors, in this case suppliers whose livelihood is also threatened by the financial precariousness of their debtor.
>
> The arguments of counsel for the Applicants are based on the erroneous premise that the employees are entitled to a privileged status. That is not what the CCAA provides nor is it what this court decided in *Syndicat national de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. c. Mine Jeffrey inc.*

42 Collectively, RAP payment and TRA payments entail obligations of over $22 million. Counsel to the Applicants submits that there is no basis in principle to treat them differently. They are all stayed and there is no basis to treat any of these two unsecured obligations differently. The Applicants are attempting to restructure for the final benefit of all stakeholders and counsel submits that its collective resources must be used for such purposes.

Report of the Monitor

43 In its Seventh Report, the Monitor notes that at the time of the Initial Order, the Applicants employed approximately 6,000 employees and had approximately 11,700 retirees or their survivors receiving pension and/or benefits from retirement plans sponsored by the Applicants.

44 The Monitor goes on to report that the Applicants have continued to honour substantially all of the obligations to active employees. The Applicants have continued to make current service and special funding payments to their registered pension plans. All the health and welfare benefits for both active employees and retirees have been continued to be paid since the commencement of the CCAA proceedings.

45 The Monitor further reports that at the filing date, payments to former employees for termination and severance as well as the provisions of the health and dental benefits ceased. In addition, non-registered and unfunded retirement plan payments ceased.

46 More importantly, the Monitor reports that, as noted in previous Monitor's Reports, the Applicants' financial position is under pressure.

Discussion and Analysis

47 The acknowledged purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. (See *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re),* [1992] B.C.J. No. 3070, aff'd

by (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265, at para. 18 citing *Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* v. *Hongkong Bank of Canada* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A.) at 315). The primary procedural instrument used to achieve that goal is the ability of the court to issue a broad stay of proceedings under Section 11 of the CCAA.

48 The powers vested in the court under Section 11 of the CCAA to achieve these goals include the ability to stay past debts; and the ability to require the continuance of present obligations to the debtor. (*Woodwards Limited (Re)*, (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (S.C.).

49 The Applicants acknowledged that they were insolvent in affidavit material filed on the Initial Hearing. This position was accepted and is referenced in my endorsement of January 14, 2009. The Applicants are in the process of restructuring but no plan of compromise or arrangement has yet to be put forward.

50 The Monitor has reported that the Applicants are under financial pressure. Previous reports filed by the Monitor have provided considerable detail as to how the Applicants carry on operations and have provided specific information as to the interdependent relationship between Nortel entities in Canada, the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

51 In my view, in considering the impact of these motions, it is both necessary and appropriate to take into account the overall financial position of the Applicants. There are several reasons for doing so:

(a) The Applicants are not in a position to honour their obligations to all creditors.
(b) The Applicants are in default of contractual obligations to a number of creditors, including with respect to significant bond issues. The obligations owed to bondholders are unsecured.
(c) The Applicants are in default of certain obligations under the Collective Agreements.
(d) The Applicants are in default of certain obligations owed to the Former Employees.

52 It is also necessary to take into account that these motions have been brought prior to any determination of any creditor classifications. No claims procedure has been proposed. No meeting of creditors has been called and no plan of arrangement has been presented to the creditors for their consideration.

53 There is no doubt that the views of the Union and the Former Employees differ from that of the Applicants. The Union insists that the Applicants honour the Collective Agreement. The Former Employees want treatment that is consistent with that being provided to the Union. The record also establishes that the financial predicament faced by retirees and Former Employees is, in many cases, serious. The record references examples where individuals are largely dependent upon the employee benefits that, until recently, they were receiving.

54 However, the Applicants contend that since all of the employee obligations are unsecured it is improper to prefer retirees and the Former Employees over the other unsecured creditors of the Applicants and furthermore, the financial pressure facing the Applicants precludes them from paying all of these outstanding obligations.

55 Counsel to the Union contends that the Applicants must pay for the full measure of its bargain with the Union while the Collective Agreement remains in force and further that the court does not have the jurisdiction to authorize a party, in this case the Applicants, to unilaterally determine which provisions of the Collective Agreement they will abide by while the contract is in operation. Counsel further contends that Section 11.3 of the CCAA precludes the court from authorizing the Applicants to make

selective determinations as to which parts of the Collective Agreement they will abide by and that by failing to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Applicants acted as if the Collective Agreement between themselves and the Union has been amended to the extent that the Applicants are no longer bound by all of its terms and need merely address any loss through the plan of arrangement.

56 The Union specifically contends that the court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms of the Collective Agreement.

57 In addressing these points, it is necessary to keep in mind that these CCAA proceedings are at a relatively early stage. It also must be kept in mind that the economic circumstances at Nortel are such that it cannot be considered to be carrying on "business as usual". As a result of the Applicants' insolvency, difficult choices will have to be made. These choices have to be made by all stakeholders.

58 The Applicants have breached the Collective Agreement and, as a consequence, the Union has certain claims.

59 However, the Applicants have also breached contractual agreements they have with Former Employees and other parties. These parties will also have claims as against the Applicants.

60 An overriding consideration is that the employee claims whether put forth by the Union or the Former Employees, are unsecured claims. These claims do not have any statutory priority.

61 In addition, there is nothing on the record which addresses the issue of how the claims of various parties will be treated in any plan of arrangement, nor is there any indication as to how the creditors will be classified. These issues are not before the court at this time.

62 What is before the court is whether the Applicants should be directed to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments that they are obligated to make under the Collective Agreement as well as similar or equivalent payments to Former Employees.

63 It is necessary to consider the meaning of Section 11.3 and, in particular, whether the Section should be interpreted in the manner suggested by the Union.

64 Counsel to the Union submits that the ordinary meaning of "services" in section 11.3 includes work performed by employees subject to a collective agreement. Further, even if the ordinary meaning is plain, courts must consider the purpose and scheme of the legislation, and relevant legal norms. Counsel submits that the courts must consider the entire context. As a result, when interpreting "compensation" for services performed under a collective agreement, counsel to the Union submits it must include all of the monetary aspects of the agreement and not those made specifically to those actively employed on any particular given day.

65 No cases were cited in support of this interpretation.

66 I am unable to agree with the Union's argument. In my view, section 11.3 is an exception to the general stay provision authorized by section 11 provided for in the Initial Order. As such, it seems to me that section 11.3 should be narrowly construed. (See Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes*, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) at 483-485.) Section 11.3 applies to services provided after the date of the Initial Order. The ordinary meaning of "services" must be considered in the context of the phrase "services, ... provided after the order is made". On a plain reading, it contemplates, in my view, some activity on behalf of the service provider which is performed after the date of the Initial Order. The CCAA contemplates that during the reorganization process, pre-filing debts are not paid, absent exceptional circumstances and services provided after the date of the

Initial Order will be paid for the purpose of ensuring the continued supply of services.

67 The flaw in the argument of the Union is that it equates the crystallization of a payment obligation under the Collective Agreement to a provision of a service within the meaning of s. 11.3. The triggering of the payment obligation may have arisen after the Initial Order but it does not follow that a service has been provided after the Initial Order. Section 11.3 contemplates, in my view, some current activity by a service provider post-filing that gives rise to a payment obligation post-filing. The distinction being that the claims of the Union for termination and severance pay are based, for the most part, on services that were provided pre-filing. Likewise, obligations for benefits arising from RAP and VRO are again based, for the most part, on services provided pre-filing. The exact time of when the payment obligation crystallized is not, in my view, the determining factor under section 11.3. Rather, the key factor is whether the employee performed services after the date of the Initial Order. If so, he or she is entitled to compensation benefits for such current service.

68 The interpretation urged by counsel to the Union with respect to this section is not warranted. In my view, section 11.3 does not require the Applicants to make payment, at this time, of the outstanding obligations under the Collective Agreement.

69 The Union also raised the issue as to whether the court has the jurisdiction to order a stay of the outstanding obligations under Section 11 of the CCAA.

70 The Union takes the position that, with the exception of rectification to clarify the intent of the parties, the court has no jurisdiction at common law or in equity to alter the terms of a contract between parties. The Union relies on *Bilodeau et al v. McLean*, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 410 (Man. C.A.); *Desener v. Myles,* [1963] S.J. No. 31 (Q.B.); *Hiesinger v. Bonice* [1984] A.J. No. 281; *Werchola v. KC5 Amusement Holdings Ltd.* 2002 SKQB 339 to support its position.

71 The Union extends this argument and submits that as the court cannot amend the terms of a collective agreement, the employer should not be allowed to act as though it had been.

72 As a general rule, counsel to the Union submits, there is in place a comprehensive regime for the regulation of labour relations with specialized labour-relations tribunals having exclusive jurisdiction to deal with legal and factual matters arising under labour legislation and no court should restrain any tribunal from proceeding to deal with such matters.

73 However, as is clear from the context, these cases referenced at [70] are dealing with the ordinary situation in which there is no issue of insolvency. In this case, we are dealing with a group of companies which are insolvent and which have been accorded the protection of the CCAA. In my view, this insolvency context is an important distinguishing factor. The insolvency context requires that the stay provisions provided in the CCAA and the Initial Order must be given meaningful interpretation.

74 There is authority for the proposition that, when exercising their authority under insolvency legislation, the courts may make, at the initial stage of a CCAA proceeding, orders regarding matters, but for the insolvent condition of the employer, would be dealt with pursuant to provincial labour legislation, and in most circumstances, by labour tribunals. In *Re: Pacific National Lease Holding Corp.* (1992) 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C.C.A.), the issue involved the question whether a CCAA debtor company had to make statutory severance payments as was mandatory under the provincial employment standards legislation. MacFarlane J.A. stated at pp. 271-2:

> It appears to me that an order which treats creditors alike is in accord with the purpose of the CCAA. Without the provisions of that statute the petitioner companies might soon be in bankruptcy, and the priority which the employees now have would

> be lost. The process provided by the CCAA is an interim one. Generally, it suspends but does not determine the ultimate rights of any creditor. In the end it may result in the rights of employees being protected, but in the meantime it preserves the status quo and protects all creditors while a reorganization is being attempted.
>
> ...
>
> This case is not so much about the rights of employees as creditors, but the right of the court under the CCAA to serve not only the special interests of the directors and officers of the company but the broader constituency referred to in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd., supra*. Such a decision may invariably conflict with provincial legislation, but the broad purpose of the CCAA must be served.

75 The *Jeffrey Mine* decision is also relevant. In my view, the *Jeffrey Mine* case does not appear to support the argument that the Collective Agreement is to be treated as being completely unaffected by CCAA proceedings. It seems to me that it is contemplated that rights under a collective agreement may be suspended during the CCAA proceedings. At paragraphs 60-62, the court said under the heading Recapitulation (in translation):

> The collective agreements continue to apply like any contract of successive performance not modified by mutual agreement after the initial order or not disclaimed (assuming that to be possible in the case of collective agreements). Neither the monitor nor the court can amend them unilaterally. That said, distinctions need to be made with regard to the prospect of the resulting debts.
>
> Thus, unionized employees kept on or recalled are entitled to be paid immediately by the monitor for any service provided after the date of the order (s. 11.3), in accordance with the terms of the original version of the applicable collective agreement by the union concerned. However, the obligations not honoured by Jeffrey Mine Inc. with regard to services provided prior to the order constitute debts of Jeffrey Mine Inc. for which the monitor cannot be held liable (s. 11.8 CCAA) and which the employees cannot demand to be paid immediately (s. 11.3 CCAA).
>
> Obligations that have not been met with regard to employees who were laid off permanently on October 7, 2002, or with regard to persons who were former employees of Jeffrey Mine Inc. on that date and that stem from the collective agreements or other commitments constitute debts of the debtor to be disposed of in the restructuring plan or, failing that, upon the bankruptcy of Jeffrey Mine Inc.

76 The issue of severance pay benefits was also referenced in *Communications, Energy, Paperworks, Local 721G v. Printwest Communications Ltd.* 2005 SKQB 331 at paras. 11 and 15. The application of the Union was rejected:

> ... The claims for severance pay arise from the collective bargaining agreement. But severance pay does not fall into the category of essential services provided during the organization period in order to enable Printwest to function.
>
> ...
>
> If the Union's request should be accepted, with the result that the claims for severance pay be dealt with outside the plan of compromise - and thereby be paid in full - such a

result could not possibly be viewed as fair and reasonable with respect to other unsecured creditors, who will possibly receive only a small fraction of the amounts owing to them for goods and services provided to Printwest in good faith. Thus, the application of the Union in this respect must be rejected.

Disposition

77 At the commencement of an insolvency process, the situation is oftentimes fluid. An insolvent debtor is faced with many uncertainties. The statute is aimed at facilitating a plan of compromise or arrangement. This may require adjustments to the operations in a number of areas, one of which may be a downsizing of operations which may involve a reduction in the workforce. These adjustments may be painful but at the same time may be unavoidable. The alternative could very well be a bankruptcy which would leave former employees, both unionized and non-unionized, in the position of having unsecured claims against a bankrupt debtor. Depending on the status of secured claims, these unsecured claims may, subject to benefits arising from the recently enacted *Wage Earner Protection Program Act*, be worth next to nothing.

78 In the days ahead, the Applicants, former employees, both unionized and non-unionized may very well have arguments to make on issues involving claims processes (including the ability of the Applicants to compromise claims), classification, meeting of creditors and plan sanction. Nothing in this endorsement is intended to restrict the rights of any party to raise these issues.

79 The reorganization process under the CCAA can be both long and painful. Ultimately, however, for a plan to be sanctioned by the court, the application must meet the following three tests:

(i) there has to be strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;
(ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA;
(iii) the plan is fair and reasonable. *Re: Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

80 At this stage of the Applicants' CCAA process, I see no basis in principle to treat either unionized or non-unionized employees differently than other unsecured creditors of the Applicants. Their claims are all stayed. The Applicants are attempting to restructure for the benefit of all stakeholders and their resources should be used for such a purpose.

81 It follows that the motion of the Union is dismissed.

82 The Applicants also raised the issue that the Union consistently requested the right to bargain on behalf of retirees who were once part of the Union and that the concession had not been granted. Consequently, the retirees' substantive rights are not part of the bargain between the unionized employees and the employer. Counsel to the Applicants submitted that the union may collectively alter the existing rights of any employee but it cannot negatively do so with respect to retirees' rights.

83 The Union countered that the rights gained by a member of the bargaining unit vest upon retirement, despite the fact that a collective agreement expires, and are enforceable through the grievance procedure.

84 Both parties cited *Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada)* [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230 in support of their respective positions.

85 In view of the fact that this motion has been dismissed for other reasons, it is not necessary for me to determine this specific issue arising out of the *Dayco* decision.

86 The motion of the Former Employees was characterized, as noted above, as a "Me too motion". It was based on the premise that, if the Union's motion was successful, it would only be equitable if the Former Employees also received benefits. The Former Employees do not have the benefit of any enhanced argument based on the Collective Agreement. Rather, the argument of the Former Employees is based on the position that the Applicants cannot contract out of the ESA or any other provincial equivalent. In my view, this is not a case of contracting out of the ESA. Rather, it is a case of whether immediate payout resulting from a breach of the ESA is required to be made. In my view, the analysis is not dissimilar from the Collective Agreement scenario. There is an acknowledgment of the applicability of the ESA, but during the stay period, the Former Employees cannot enforce the payment obligation. In the result, it follows that the motion of the Former Employees is also dismissed.

87 However, I am also mindful that the record, as I have previously noted, makes reference to a number of individuals that are severely impacted by the cessation of payments. There are no significant secured creditors of the Applicants, outside of certain charges provided for in the CCAA proceedings, and in view of the Applicants' declared assets, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a meaningful distribution to unsecured creditors, including retirees and Former Employees. The timing of such distribution may be extremely important to a number of retirees and Former Employees who have been severely impacted by the cessation of payments. In my view, it would be both helpful and equitable if a partial distribution could be made to affected employees on a timely basis.

88 In recognition of the circumstances that face certain retirees and Former Employees, the Monitor is directed to review the current financial circumstances of the Applicants and report back as to whether it is feasible to establish a process by which certain creditors, upon demonstrating hardship, could qualify for an unspecified partial distribution in advance of a general distribution to creditors. I would ask that the Monitor consider and report back to this court on this issue within 30 days.

89 This decision may very well have an incidental effect on the Collective Agreement and the provisions of the ESA, but it is one which arises from the stay. It does not, in my view, result from a repudiation of the Collective Agreement or a contracting out of the ESA. The stay which is being recognized is, in my view, necessary in the circumstances. To hold otherwise, would have the effect of frustrating the objectives of the CCAA to the detriment of all stakeholders.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qllxr/qlpxm

TAB 7

SUPERIOR COURT

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

No : 500-11-036133-094

DATE : **MAY 4, 2009**

PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CLÉMENT GASCON, J.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF :

ABITIBIBOWATER INC.
And
ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.
And
BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.
And
The other Debtors listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C"
Debtors
And
Ernst & Young Inc.
Monitor
And
COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY AND PAPERWORKERS UNION OF CANADA AND ITS LOCAL SECTIONS 59-N, 63, 84, 84-35, 88, 90, 92, 101, 109, 132, 138, 139, 161, 209, 227, 238, 253, 306, 352, 375, 1256 and 1455
Petitioners

REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED ON THE BENCH ON A MOTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT (#30)

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INTRODUCTION

[1] In the context of the restructuring process initiated by Abitibibowater Inc. under the *CCAA*[1], the CEP[2] presents a motion[3] aiming to have declared null and illegal Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.'s decision to suspend, commencing May 1st, 2009:

a) the right to early retirement without actuarial reduction of its employees aged 57 and counting 20 years of continuous service; and

b) the increase in the pension formula applicable to the active employees from 1,70% to 1,75%.

[2] The context is as follows.

THE CONTEXT

A) THE *CCAA*

[3] On April 17, 2009, the Court pronounced an initial order placing AbitiBowater under the protection of the *CCAA*.

[4] Although each of the numerous intervenor's familiarity with the process varies largely, the objective of this law is well known. The *CCAA* aims at allowing AbitibiBowater to restructure its business, operations and debt.

[5] The means the law gives AbitibiBowater is the development, negotiation, and implementation of a reasonable and fair plan of arrangement with its creditors on which they will vote.

[6] This process is above all the debtors' and creditors' affair. The Court's role is one of supervision. The ultimate goal is the conclusion of a successful plan of arrangement with a perspective of continuity of the operations and survival of the company. At stake is the interest of all the intervenors and that of society as a whole according to some. To paraphrase Judge Blair in *Metcalfe*[4], the *CCAA* has a "*broader social economic purpose*" and a "*wider public interest*".

[7] To achieve this objective, the *CCAA* gives the Court an important statutory discretion coupled with a certain inherent jurisdiction. These powers must be exercised in accordance with the fundamental objective of the law, which is to facilitate the conclusion of possible plan of arrangement between the debtors and their creditors.

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[1] *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
[2] Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada.
[3] Motion for a declaratory judgement aiming at maintaining in effect collective agreements existing until the conclusion of a new agreement between the parties.
[4] *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, (Re), 2008 ONCA 587 (CanLII), paragraph. 52 and 53.

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[8] In this perspective, maintaining a certain status quo during the process is essential. As of its pronouncement, an initial order, like the one rendered in the case at bar, suspends for all creditors all rights and remedies pending against the debtors and their assets. The same applies to the payment of debts arising from these rights and remedies.

[9] However, even if the Court has to be certain that the pursuit of the *CCAA*'s objective is done at the best cost and at the best possible conditions for the creditors, an inevitable finding remains. This process cannot be conducted without hurt and sacrifice. At the end of the line, the creditors or certain classes of creditors will unavoidably pay a price.

[10] Indeed, it must be stressed that in a restructuring process where the company is insolvent from the start, it would be unrealistic to think that the process would result in an absence of sacrifice or concessions from the concerned creditors. The perspective of continuity of the operations and of survival that the law favors cannot be realized without paying a certain price.

[11] Thus, with regards to the concerned creditors, it is altogether rare that the claims of certain creditors shall not have precedence over the claims of other creditors. The supervisory role of the Court then takes all its meaning. In the search of the optimal avenue leading to a successful restructuring, the Court must be conscious of the necessity of maintaining an equilibrium, that may be fragile and is often painful, between the rights of all.

[12] AbitibiBowater's situation is no different. The company is insolvent. It claims it faces a serious liquidity crisis in a market undergoing important changes in the context of a financial and economical crisis.

[13] The importance of its debt is undeniable. It approaches US$ 6 billion for Abitibi and is around US$ 3 billion for Bowater[5].

[14] Not surprisingly, the impacts of the process are significant. They affect a wide and disparate scope of creditors, whether guaranteed or not, who may be lenders, holders of debentures or other debt securities, suppliers or employees.

B) THE LITIGATION

[15] For the time being, in the present case, the litigation only concerns Abitibi's side of the process. It is also limited to a question that is only related to the collective agreements of its unionized employees members of the CEP. However, it would be false to think that it only impacts Abitibi and Abitibi's unionized employees members of the CEP.

[5] See paragraphs 165 and 205 of AbitibiBowater's initial claim dated April 17, 2009.

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[16] The issue arises from a Memorandum of Agreement[6] signed by the CEP and Abitibi in July of 2004. This memorandum has an impact on no less than 18 collective agreements negotiated by the CEP for its members[7]. It is admitted that this memorandum is part of the collective agreements and that all the collective agreements are in full force.

[17] At its page 4, the Memorandum of Agreement states the following with respect to the pension plans:

> As of May 1, 2009, the rules of the pension plan will be modified so that the pension and bridge benefit of an active employee 57 years old and counting at least 20 years of continuous service at the time of his early retirement will be payable without reduction, [...].

[18] At the same page, the Memorandum states that an adjustment of the pension formula of active employees from 1,70 to 1,75 % is to take place as of May 1st, 2009. There is also an increase in the contribution of the employees to pension plans from 7 to 7,5 % as of the same date.

[19] No one doubts the validity and legality of these clauses that, of course, improve the pension plans to the benefit of the active employees of Abitibi as of May 1st, 2009.

[20] However, by e-mail and letter sent April 27th, 2009[8], Abitibi notified the CEP of the changes. Firstly, in the e-mail, it says inter alia:

> Tried now just to call you to inform you that we are suspending the pension benefit improvements scheduled for May 1st, 2009.

[21] Furthermore, in the letter, it sets forth the following:

> [...], the Company is no longer in a position to process amendments to its pension plans which have the effects of increasing liabilities, including the increase in the pension formula and the changes in the eligibility criteria for early unreduced retirement benefits scheduled to come into effect on May 1st, 2009 and resulting from a Memorandum of Agreement between the Company and the unions. [...]

[22] Hence, Abitibi's decision is to suspend, commencing May 1st 2009:

a) the right to early retirement without actuarial reduction of its employees aged 57 and counting 20 years of continuous service; and

b) the increase in the pension formula applicable to its active employees.

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[6] Exhibit S-1.
[7] See pertinent extract, exhibit S-3.
[8] Exhibit S-2 and S-3.

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[23] However, it is admitted that Abitibi does not suspend the application of the negotiated corollary, i.e. the increase in the contribution of the employees to the pension plans from 7 to 7,5 %.

[24] It is granted that Abitibi's actions are unilateral, without any preliminary discussions with the CEP and without its consent.

[25] Abitibi's alleges two reasons for acting in this way:

- Firstly, the impossibility of bearing the cost with respect to the financing of these improvements to the pension plans;

- Secondly, the impossibility of amending the plans because of the anticipated refusal of the *Régie des rentes* taking into account the financial consequences of such modifications.

[26] Abitibi alleges[9] that the improvements would increase the already existing 960 million dollar[10] actuarial deficit of the benefit based plans by 68 million dollars.

CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES

[27] The CEP considers Abitibi's decision illegal because it would amount to a repudiation of the collective agreement's negotiated terms which are in force and apply to the active employees.

[28] Abitibi replies that it does not have the capacity to respect its commitments and that the *CCAA* authorizes it to act as it did with respect to these benefits since the costs related to such benefits relate, for the most part, to the value of services rendered before the initial order was delivered.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

[29] With respect for the contrary opinion, the Court's view is that the CEP is right. Abitibi's decision is illegal and therefore null and without effect.

[30] Following the Court of Appeal's teachings on the subject, the Court considers that Abitibi cannot unilaterally modify the terms of a collective agreement applicable to its active employees in order to deprive them of certain rights, like the ones under the clauses discussed hereinabove.

[31] Neither the *CCAA*, nor the initial order authorize it to act in such a way.

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[9] Exhibit I-1.

[10] Paragraph 222 of AbitibiBowater's initial claim dated April 17, 2009.

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[32] The reasons alleged by Abitibi to act as it did do not hold up. They result from an erroneous confusion on its part between the rights these collective agreements confer and the execution or enforceability of the potential claims in which they could result.

[33] Certain explanations to the benefit of all are appropriate.

a) The Court of Appeal's Teachings

[34] The Court's answer to the question in dispute resides in the reasons of three decisions of the Court of Appeal of Quebec of the last years, each in the context of restructuring under the *CCAA*. Abitibi should have taken these into account. It didn't.

[35] Firstly, in *Mine Jeffrey*[11] pronounced in 2003, the Court of Appeal states the following:

> [50] [...], nothing in the *CCAA* authorizes the monitor or the court to unilaterally suspend the consideration payable to the party supplying a good or service to the debtor. Furthermore, this consideration must be agreed upon with the supplier before the delivery or before the initial order, as for example in a contract involving sequential performance, or the consideration could also be provided in the law, in a by-law, a tariff or in other market rules. [...]
>
> [51] In this case, given that the accreditations are not concerned by the orders rendered, that the lay-off of all the salaried unionized workers does not terminate the accreditations and that individuals are called back the following day or later to exercise positions concerned by accreditations, the consideration to be paid to these individuals must be the consideration provided by the collective agreements or any amendment thereto negotiated with the concerned union. This consideration includes the salary and any other benefit related to the services rendered following the initial order. In addition, like any other supplier, they may not require the supplemental payment of any other amount due when the initial order is delivered (s. 11.3, paragraph a) *in fine*); as regards these amounts, they will be creditors under the *CCAA*, to whom the debtor will possibly present an arrangement.
>
> [52] The defendant underlines that the impugned order only suspends temporarily the collective agreements and that this is possible under the staying powers of the court. I believe such a suspension to be illegal when its effect is to unilaterally set aside the clauses of the collective agreements relating to the consideration payable to the employees called back and concerned by the accreditations. [...] It is not a suspension but a modification of the working conditions imposed unilaterally by the monitor and therefore does not respect the rights of the appellants resulting from the accreditations.
>
> (emphasis added)

[11] *Syndicat national de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. v. Mine Jeffrey inc.*, [2003] R.J.Q. 420 (C.A.).

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[36] The Court of Appeal concludes by saying:

> [60] The collective agreements continue to be in force like any contract involving sequential performance not modified by mutual agreement after the initial order or not terminated (assuming this is possible for collective agreements). The monitor or the court cannot unilaterally amend them. This being said, a distinction is to be made regarding the payment of claims resulting from collective agreements.
>
> [61] Hence, the unionized employees who continued to provide services, or were called back to do so, have the right to be paid immediately by the monitor for any service provided after the date of the order (s. 11.3) according to the terms of the applicable collective agreement in its original version or as amended with the consent of the concerned union. However for the services provided earlier, the obligations not performed by Mine Jeffrey inc. result in claims against Mine Jeffrey inc. for which the monitor cannot be held liable (s. 11.8 *CCAA*) and for which the employees may not require immediate payment (s. 11.3 *CCAA*).
>
> (emphasis added)

[37] Secondly, in *Uniforêt*,[12] delivered the same year, the Court of Appeal adopts the same perspective in the following terms:

> [22] [...], even though it is not part of the collective agreement, the Participation Plan sets in a large part the working conditions of the employees [...]. Under section 11.3 of the *CCAA* as interpreted in *Mine Jeffrey*, these working conditions could not be unilaterally modified or terminated by the appellants. Admitting they could do so would mean that, notwithstanding what our Court has decided in this judgment, an employer could "terminate" unilaterally any part of the existing working conditions, whether or not they are covered by a collective agreement. He would actually be able to modify them at will in the future. On the contrary, on a going-forward basis, he must accept the existing conditions, end the supply of merchandise or services or negotiate with the supplier of goods and services. In this case with regards to Uniforêt's workers [...], it should have first negotiated and reached an agreement with the defendant union if it chose to suspend the Participation Plan while maintaining the workers in their position.
>
> (emphasis added)

[38] Thirdly, in a judgment from August 1st, 2008, Judge Rayle of the Court of Appeal discusses the status of the claims of unionized workers under the plan of arrangement filed in the context of the restructuring of TQS[13]. In this file, the union wanted the claims under the collective agreement to have a distinct status so that they would not be affected by the proposed transaction and thereby be wholly payable.

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[12] *Uniforêt inc. v. 9027-1875 Québec inc.*, [2003] R.J.Q. 2073 (C.A.).

[13] *Syndicat des employés de CFAP-TV (TQS-Québec), section locale 3946 du Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique c. TQS inc.*, J.E. 2008-1578 (C.A.), 2008 QCCA 1429.

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[39] Judge Rayle replied that claims under a collective agreement do not benefit from any priority over the other unsecured claims (paragraph 23). She adds that while a debtor cannot exclude under the *CCAA* the conditions imposed by the negotiated collective agreement binding it, this does not mean that the employees' claims previous to the initial order must be wholly paid (paragraph 25).

[40] She is of the opinion that unionized workers do not have a priority or guaranteed status. She states that:

> [27] The representations of the appellant's lawyer are based on the erroneous premise that the workers have the right to a preferential status. [...]

[41] The Court believes these teachings to be clear.

[42] On one part, Abitibi, as debtor, cannot, with regards to its active employees, terminate or suspend unilaterally the clauses of the collective agreements binding it, including the clauses of the Memorandum of Agreement which are an integral part of the collective agreements. By doing so, Abitibi would act illegally, breaching the rights of the CEP and its members.

[43] To set aside these clauses, it must negotiate and reach an agreement with the CEP. In fact, in a *CCAA* context, negotiation and discussion are often the parties greatest ally.

[44] However, on the other hand, with respect to Abitibi's liability for the services rendered before the initial order, the resulting claims, even if they are based on the collective agreements, do not benefit from a particular status, priority, privilege or guarantee.

[45] As a result, theses claims remain subject to the conditions of section 11.3 of the *CCAA* with regards their immediate payment right. According to this section, payment shall be due for the supply of services or valuable consideration provided after the initial order.

[46] Using Judge Journet's comments in TQS which were cited by Judge Rayle in her judgement from August 1st, 2008, the recognition of a right included in a collective agreement is different from the right to receive payment resulting from the former right. The recognition of a right differs from its execution.

[47] In the context of the *CCAA* and section 11.3, this distinction may have important consequences.

b) The Application to this Case

[48] Applied to the circumstances if this case, these teachings lead us to the following findings.

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[49] The clauses at stake benefit Abitibi's active employees, i.e. those who have supplied services after the initial order. Commencing on May 1st, 2009, if they have at least 20 year of continuous service, the clauses give them the right to early retirement at 57 years of age, without any actuarial reduction. For some, this right may be exercised immediately. For others, this will occur in one, two, three or even many years.

[50] These clauses also modify the pension formula benefiting the active employees as of May 1st, 2009. The multiplier used to calculate the pension is increased from 1,70% to 1,75%. Again, the active employees who wish to benefit immediately from this increase may do so if they are eligible, others may do so at a later date.

[51] To the Court's understanding, the financial impact of these measures for Abitibi is twofold.

[52] Firstly, the improvements that these clauses bring would increase the actuarial deficit of the plans by about 68 million dollars[14]. However, the impact this will have on the amortization payments ("special payments" or "past service contributions") is unknown, as no evidence was presented, but such impact seems highly probable.

[53] At this time, according to Abitibi's allegation in its initial claim, the existing actuarial deficit of the benefit plans is of about 960 million dollar[15]. This deficit results in monthly amortization payments of about 8,5 million dollars according to paragraph 57 of the third report of the monitor. In all given proportions, the anticipated impact of the improvement clauses on the amortization payments in the present circumstances should be quite relative.

[54] Secondly, the modifications to the pension plans these clauses result in will also probably cause an increase in the employer's current service contributions, be it only because of the number of active employees who become eligible for these additional benefits.

[55] This being said, the pension plans, and not Abitibi, are the ones who pay the pensions or the bridge benefits to the eligible employees. Therefore the impact of the improvement clauses is on the plans themselves. Of course, Abitibi's contributions are directly affected, either because of the amortizations payments or because of the employer's current service contributions.

[56] To justify its decision to suspend the rights conferred by the clauses, Abitibi alleges its incapacity to finance the consequences of the application of the clauses. In doing so Abitibi confuses the costs relating to the performance of the rights the clauses confer and the rights themselves.

[57] On one hand, Abitibi cannot terminate unilaterally these rights conferred to the active employees, particularly given the fact that whatever the situation, these rights

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[14] Exhibit I-1.
[15] Paragraph 222 of AbitibiBowater's initial claim dated April 17, 2009.

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have a value, whether payable or not, which cannot be discarded without the consent of the CEP.

[58] On the other hand, it is not correct to allege that the costs related to the execution of the rights conferred by the clauses are necessarily what Abitibi calls amortization payments, special payments or payments relative to obligations or services previous to the initial order. It all depends on the situation.

[59] Two examples can illustrate this.

[60] Firstly, take an active employee of 54 years of age as of May 1st, 2009 who has 17 years of continuous service. The unilateral suspension of the clauses imposed by Abitibi deprives him of a right which gives rise to costs pertaining in part to services to be provided after the initial order and covered at minimum by the increase in the employer's current service contributions. Abitibi's argument based on related costs simply does not hold in such a case.

[61] Secondly, take an active employee of 57 years of age as of May 1st, 2009 who has 20 years of continuous service. The exercise of his right to an immediate early retirement without any actuarial reduction confers him a right to a pension increased by a certain amount and therefore a claim. Even in the case where Abitibi would be able to justify that in such a situation the better part of the costs related to the additional value of this pension were for services provided before the order, Abitibi's decision still deprives the employee at a minimum of his right to a pension increased by this amount. If such a right is valid and recognized but for whatever reason the additional value of the pension is not paid to the employee, this additional value can nonetheless be part of the possible global arrangement proposed to the creditors like any other claim.

[62] Again, Abitibi's decision penalizes without justification such an employee with regards to this right even in the case where the execution of this right would not be possible because, for example, of an impossibility to pay by the debtors or because of the non-application of section 11.3 of the *CCAA*.

[63] The Court considers that this is the unfair impact of Abitibi's illegal decision resulting from Abitibi's confusion between the respect of the right and the potential enforceability of the resulting claims.

[64] Abitibi's decision is even more unjustified given that the pensions are paid by the pension plans and not by itself. For the moment, it is unknown when, how and by whom will be felt the consequences of Abitibi's difficulty to pay amortization contributions or other special payments of the sort.

[65] It may also be added that Abitibi's decision is rather unfair in its application and quite clumsy. Although it alleges not to have the means to respect its commitments, Abitibi still maintains the counterpart payable by its active employees, namely the increase of their payments from 7 to 7,5 %.

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[66] In other words, Abitibi is of the view that its unionized workers have the means to honor negotiated commitments which it considers valid and effective, but that Abitibi does not. It seems as if Abitibi is applying a double standard here.

[67] In this regard, the submission of Abitibi's lawyer on postfiling claims and prefiling claims is not relevant to the impugned decision.

[68] At issue here is a completely unilateral suspension of the exercise of a right of the active employees. The impact of this right on the resulting claims is another distinct issue. It arises, according to Abitibi, in particular with respect to amortization payments or special payments. This is another debate.

[69] Similarly the other submission presented by Abitibi's lawyer on the distinction between a "benefit at large" and a "specific work-related benefit" is not relevant at this stage.

[70] The ability to potentially limit the payment of claims that are said to be related to services rendered before the initial order cannot justify the termination, even on a temporary basis, of the right from which the claims arise.

[71] In this perspective, Abitibi's reading of paragraphs 57 and 58 of *Mine Jeffrey* is erroneous. It is not important that its obligations with respect to the benefits paid under the collective agreements do not create a priority status. This does not in any way authorize Abitibi to temporarily and unilaterally suspend the clauses from which the right to these benefits arise.

[72] Finally, Abitibi's last submission that the *Régie des rentes* would likely refuse the modifications the clauses set out because of their impact on the accumulated actuarial deficit of the plans is far from convincing.

[73] This unrealized contingency is not a reason for Abitibi to duck its obligations. This submission sounds more like a false pretence. Abitibi has on the contrary the duty to act diligently and in good faith in the realization of the commitments it has taken up and agreed upon.

[74] In a nutshell, none of Abitibi's arguments can justify the legality of its actions.

c) Summary

[75] It is pertinent to summarize at this point.

[76] The suspension of the right of active employees of 57 years of age and who have 20 years of continuous service to an early retirement without any actuarial reduction as of May 1st, 2009 is illegal.

[77] The same applies to the suspension of the increase in the pension formula applicable to the active employees from 1,70% to 1,75% as of the same date.

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[78] However, it must be understood that the illegality of this action and the recognition of the validity of the rights arising from the clauses are not necessarily synonymous of the corollary recognition of the right to the immediate total or partial enforceability of the claims arising from such clauses.

[79] Such a question is not presently at issue before this Court. It may be, at least in part, included in the upcoming debate on the suspension of the amortization payments. This other debate is on different matters and requires an analysis of different questions. Therefore, the Court does not presently take position on these matters.

[80] The second conclusion sought by the CEP is therefore well founded.

[81] The Court deems the first conclusion useless. The debate is not about the fact that the collective agreements are in force or that the debtors must respect them for services provided since the order. This seems granted on each part. The question at stake is rather about a decision alleged to be illegal.

[82] Finally, since the clauses come into force on May 1st, 2009, the exceptional urgency justifies the award of provisional execution. In fact, since provisional execution notwithstanding appeal was ordered by the initial order, subsequent judgments that correct its illegal applications should logically benefit from this as well.

FOR THESE REASONS GIVEN ORALLY AND RECORDED, THE COURT:

[83] **DECLARES** null and illegal the debtor's decision to suspend the right of the active employees who have at least 20 years of continuous service to early retirement at 57 years of age without actuarial reduction as of May 1st, 2009 as well as the increase in the pension formula from 1,70% to 1,75% as of May 1st, 2009, the whole as set out in the collective agreements and in the Memorandum of Agreement (exhibit S-1), and applying to the workers represented by the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) and its local sections 59-N, 63, 84, 84-35, 88, 90, 92, 101, 109, 132, 138, 139, 161, 209, 227, 238, 253, 306, 352, 375, 1256 and 1455;

[84] **ORDERS** the provisional execution of this judgment, notwithstanding appeal and without the need to provide security;

[85] **WITH COSTS.**

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Date of hearing April 30, May 1st, and May 4th 2009
Revision and transcript of the reasons May 5th, 2009

UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION

IN THE MATTER OF the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc. and the other Applicants listed on Schedule "A"

Court File No. CV-09-7966-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

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