Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "**Applicants**")

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(Motion to Accept Filing of the Plan and Authorize Creditors' Meeting)

August 26, 2015

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TAB 1

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	THURSDAY, THE 12th
JUSTICE NEWBOULD	)	DAY OF JANUARY, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF VALLE FOAM INDUSTRIES (1995) INC., DOMFOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

INITIAL ORDER

THIS APPLICATION, made by Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc., Domfoam International Inc., and A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd. (hereinafter, collectively referred to as the "Applicants"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA") was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Tony Vallecoccia sworn January 11, 2012 and the exhibits thereto (the "Vallecoccia Affidavit"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Victoria Stewart sworn January

11, 2012, and on reading the consent of Deloitte & Touche Inc. to act as the Monitor,

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Application and the Application Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

APPLICATION

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicants are companies to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that one or more of the Applicants, individually or collectively, shall have the sole authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of their current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (collectively, the "Property"). Subject to further Order of this Court, the Applicants shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of their respective businesses (collectively, the "Business") and

Property. The Applicants shall each be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, agents, experts, appraisers, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively, "Assistants") currently retained or employed by them, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as they deem reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to, on or after the date of this Order:

(a) all outstanding and future wages, compensation, salaries, employee and pension benefits, vacation pay and expenses (including, but not limited to, employee medical, dental, disability, life insurance and similar benefit plans or arrangements, incentive plans, share compensation plans, and employee assistance programs and employee or employer contributions in respect of pension and other benefits), and similar pension and/or retirement benefit payments, commissions, bonuses and other incentive payments, payments under collective bargaining agreements, and employee and director expenses and reimbursements, payable on or after the date of this Order, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements;

(b) compensation to employees in respect of any payments made to employees prior to the date of this Order by way of the issuance of cheques or electronic transfers are subsequently dishonoured due to the commencement of these proceedings; and

(c) the reasonable fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicants in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges, including any payments made to Assistants prior to the date of this Order by way of the issuance of cheques or electronic transfers that are subsequently dishonoured due to the commencement of these proceedings; and

(d) amounts owing for goods and services actually supplied to the Applicants, or to obtain the release of goods contracted for prior to the date of this Order by other suppliers, solely where such goods were ordered by the Applicants or any of them after November 30, 2011 on the express understanding that such goods or services were to be paid for on a cash on delivery basis and in respect of which such payment has not been made by the Applicants or any of them.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicants in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after the date of this Order, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:

(a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance), maintenance and security services; and

(b) payment, including the posting of letters of credit, for goods or services actually supplied or to be supplied to the Applicants following the date of this Order;

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Quebec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes;

(b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "Sales Taxes") required to be remitted by the Applicants in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicants, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order, and

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicants.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until a real property lease is disclaimed, terminated, repudiated or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicants

shall pay all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under their respective real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord under the lease) or as otherwise may be negotiated between the Applicants and the landlord from time to time ("Rent"), for the period commencing from and including the date of this Order, twice-monthly in equal payments on the first and fifteenth day of each month, in advance (but not in arrears). On the date of the first of such payments, any Rent relating to the period commencing from and including the date of this Order shall also be paid.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Applicants are hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicants to any of their creditors as of this date; (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of its Property; and (c) to not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business.

RESTRUCTURING

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA have the right to:

(a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their respective businesses or operations, and to dispose of non-profitable, redundant or non-material assets and operations, and to dispose and sell such assets or operations not exceeding $100,000.00 in any one transaction or $1 million in the aggregate;

(b) terminate the employment of such of their employees or lay off or temporarily or indefinitely lay off such of their employees as the relevant Applicant deems appropriate on such terms as may be agreed upon between the relevant Applicant and such employee, or failing such agreement, to deal with the consequences thereof in the Plan

(c) in accordance with paragraphs 10 (a) and (d), vacate, abandon, resiliate, or quit any leased premises and/or disclaim, cancel, terminate or repudiate any real property lease and any ancillary agreements relating to any leased premises, on not less than seven (7) days notice in writing to the relevant landlord on such terms as may be agreed upon between the Applicants and such landlord, or failing such agreement, to deal with the consequences thereof in the Plan;

(d) disclaim, terminate, repudiate or resiliate, in whole or in part, with the prior consent of the Monitor or further Order of the Court, such of their arrangements, agreements or contracts of any nature whatsoever with whomsoever, whether oral or written, as the Applicants deem appropriate, in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, with such disclaimers, repudiation, termination, or resiliations to be on such terms as may be agreed upon between the relevant Applicants and such counter-parties, or failing such agreements, to deal with the consequences thereof in the Plan; and

(e) pursue all avenues of refinancing of the Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing;

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicants to proceed with an orderly restructuring or winding down of some or all of the respective Business (the "Restructuring").

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall each provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the relevant Applicant's intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal and, if the landlord disputes the Applicant's entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the relevant Applicant, or by further Order of this Court upon application by the relevant Applicant on at least two (2) days notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If an Applicant disclaims, resiliates, repudiates or terminates the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in Section 32(5) of the CCAA), and the disclaimer, termination or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicant's claim to the fixtures in dispute.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a lease is repudiated or if a notice of disclaimer or termination or resiliation is delivered pursuant to Section 32 of the CCAA, then (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer, termination, repudiation or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the relevant Applicant's and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice, and

(b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or termination or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicants in respect of such lease or leased premises and such landlord shall be entitled to notify the Applicants of the basis on which it is taking possession and to gain possession of and re-lease such leased premises to any third party or parties on such terms as such landlord considers advisable, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS OR THE PROPERTY

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until and including February 10, 2012, or such later date as this Court may order (the "Stay Period"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "Proceeding") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicants or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "Persons" and each being a "Person") against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the

Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (i) empower the Applicants to carry on any business which the Applicants are not lawfully entitled to carry on, (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (iii) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, or (iv) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, authorization, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicants, except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicants or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all waste disposal service providers, all computer software, information technology services, communication and other data services, programming supply, computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicants, are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicants, and that the Applicants shall be

entitled to the continued use of their current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Applicants in accordance with normal payment practices of the Applicants or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicants and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.

NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring payment for goods, services, use of lease or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the date of this Order, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers (or their estates) of the Applicants with respect to any claim against such directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligations of the Applicants whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment, performance or breach of such obligations, acts, or actions until a compromise or arrangement in respect of

the Applicants, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicants or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall jointly indemnify their directors and officers from and against all claims, costs, charges, expenses, obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Applicants, after the date hereof except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, such claim, cost, charge, expense, obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the directors and officers of the Applicants shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Directors' Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $1 million as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 19 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraph 32 herein.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary, (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge, and (b) the Applicants' directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 19 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Deloitte & Touche Inc. is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Applicants with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicants and their shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicants pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) monitor the Applicants' receipts and disbursements;

(b) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(c) assist and advise the Applicants in their development of the Plan or winding down, downsizing and any amendments to the Plan, any restructuring steps taken pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 10 hereof, and the implementation of the Plan;

(d) advise the Applicants in the preparation of their cash flow statements;

(e) assist and advise the Applicants, to the extent required by the Applicants, with the negotiations with creditors and the holding and administering of creditors' (or shareholders' meetings) for voting on the Plan;

(f) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Applicants, to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicants' business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;

(g) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order;

(h) consider, and if deemed advisable by the Monitor, prepare a report as an assessment of the Plan;

(i) assist the Applicants with their continuing restructuring activities, including the assessment and analysis of any proposed sale of assets or closure of facilities;

(j) advise and assist the Applicants, as requested, in their negotiations with suppliers, customers and other stakeholders; and

(k) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder,

be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or collectively, "Possession") of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Environmental Protection Act*, the *Ontario Water Resources Act*, or the Ontario *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and regulations thereunder (the "Environmental Legislation"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicants with information provided by the Applicants in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicants is confidential,

the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicants may agree.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, by the Applicants as part of the costs of these proceedings, including completing and implementation of the settlements with the class action plaintiffs. The Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel for the Monitor and counsel for the Applicants on an hourly basis and, in addition, the Applicants are hereby authorized to pay to the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and counsel to the Applicants, retainers in the amounts of $150,000.00 and $50,000.00, respectively, to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, if any, and the Applicants' counsel shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Administration Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $500,000.00, as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at the standard rates and charges of the Monitor and such counsel, both before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings, including completing the settlements with the class action plaintiffs. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraph 32 hereof.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc. ("Valle Foam") shall be authorized to advance funds up to, but not exceeding $1 million to either of A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd. ("A-Z") or Domfoam International Inc. ("Domfoam") to be used for operating purposes of Domfoam or A-Z, as the case may be, provided that i) no such loan shall be advanced without the prior written consent of the Monitor, ii) that any such loan shall be properly documented and subject to such terms, including rates of interest, if any, which the Monitor deems reasonable it the circumstances, and iii) that any such loan shall be secured by way of a general security agreement which shall provide a first in priority charge on the assets of Domfoam subject only to the priority of the charges granted hereunder. The Applicants may, prior to the advance of any funds, attend to seek a further order of this court to grant a specific charge if the Applicants or the Monitor deem it appropriate or necessary to do so.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Directors' Charge and the Administration Charge as among them, shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of ~~$●~~ $500,000);

Second – Directors' Charge (to the maximum amount of $1,000,000).

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Directors' Charge or the Administration Charge, (collectively, the "Charges") shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Directors' Charge or the Administration Charge, (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "Encumbrances") in favour of any Person.

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicants shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Directors' Charge or Administration Charge, unless the Applicants also obtains the prior written consent of the Monitor, and the beneficiaries of the Directors' Charge and the Administration Charge, or further Order of this Court.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Directors' Charge and the Administration Charge shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "Chargees") shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s)

for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "Agreement") which binds any of the Applicants, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) the creation of the Charges shall not be deemed to constitute a breach by any of the Applicants of any Agreement to which it is a party;

(b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of the creation of the Charges; and

(c) the payments made by the Applicants pursuant to this Order, and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers, settlements at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or void or voidable transactions or reviewable transactions under any applicable law.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicants' interest in such real property leases.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in ~~[newspapers specified by the Court]~~ the Globe and Mail a notice containing the information

prescribed under the CCAA, (ii) within five days after the date of this Order, (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicants of more than $1000, and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty to serve this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to the Applicants' creditors or other interested parties at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicants and that any such service or notice by courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, the Monitor, and any party who has filed a Notice of Appearance may serve any court materials in these proceedings by e-mailing a PDF or other electronic copy of such materials to counsels' email addresses as recorded on the Service List from time to time, and the Monitor may post a copy of any or all such materials on its website at www.deloitte.com/ca/vallefoam.

GENERAL

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicants, the Business or the Property.

43. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is hereby authorized, as the foreign representative of the Applicants, to apply for recognition of these proceedings as "Foreign Main Proceedings" in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15 of the *U.S. Bankruptcy Code*.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this

Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicants and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

#1832803 | 4079509

JAN 12 2012

PER/PAR: MB

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF VALLE FOAM INDUSTRIES (1995) INC., DOMFOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at TORONTO

INITIAL ORDER

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Lawyers for the Applicants

TAB 2

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	FRIDAY, THE 15th DAY
	)	
JUSTICE BROWN	)	OF JUNE, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

ORDER
(Claims Solicitation Procedure)

THIS MOTION, made by 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.), 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly Domfoam International Inc.) and A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd. (collectively, the "**Applicants**") for an order approving a procedure for the solicitation of claims against any or all of the Applicants, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Tony Vallecoccia sworn June 12, 2012, and the Fourth Report of Deloitte & Touche Inc., the Court-appointed monitor (the "**Monitor**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel to the Applicants, the Monitor, no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of service, filed:

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and Motion Record herein be and is hereby abridged and validated so that this motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that for purposes of this Order, in addition to the terms defined elsewhere herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) **"Applicants"** means 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.), 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly Domfoam International Inc.) and A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd.;

(b) **"Business Day"** means a day, other than a Saturday, Sunday or a statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario;

(c) **"CCAA"** means the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;

(d) **"CCAA Proceeding"** means the proceeding commenced by the Applicants in the Court at Toronto under Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL;

(e) **"Claim"** means any Prefiling Claim or Postfiling Claim;

(f) **"Claims Bar Date"** means 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard time) on August 31, 2012, or any later date ordered by the Court;

(g) **"Claims Solicitation Procedure"** means the procedures outlined in this Order, as they may be amended by further order of the Court, including the Schedules hereto;

(h) **"Court"** means the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List);

(i) **"Creditor"** means any Person asserting a Claim or a D&O Claim;

(j) "**D&O Claim**" means any right of any Person against one or more of the Directors and Officers (as defined below) which arose as a result of their position, supervision, management or involvement as Director and Officer, where such right arose on or before June 15, 2012, and whether enforceable in any civil, administrative or criminal proceedings;

(k) "**DIP Loan**" means the loan by 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.) to either A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd. or 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Domfoam International Inc.) in an amount not exceeding $1,000,000 as authorized by the Court in the CCAA Proceeding;

(l) **"Directors and Officers"** means

(i) the current and former directors of any of the Applicants; and

(ii) the current and former officers of any of the Applicants;

(m) "**Distribution**" means any distribution within the CCAA Proceeding of the proceeds of the Applicants' assets;

(n) **"Excluded Claim"** means (i) any claim secured by any of the Charges as defined in the Initial Order (as defined below); (ii) the DIP Loan; and (iii) any Intercompany Claim (as defined below);

(o) **"Filing Date"** means January 12, 2012;

(p) **"Initial Order"** means the Initial Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Newbould dated January 12, 2012 in the CCAA Proceeding;

(q) **"Intercompany Claim"** means any claim by any of the Applicants against one or more of the Applicants, whether secured or unsecured but not including the DIP Loan;

(r) "**Known Creditor**" means any Person, based on the financial or other records of an Applicant as of the Filing Date, who had or may be entitled to assert, a Claim, where monies in respect of such Claim remain unpaid in full or in part, without acknowledging in any respect the validity or existence of any such Claim;

(s) **"Monitor's Website"** means http://www.deloitte.com/ca/vallefoam;

(t) **"Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date"** means the notice for publication substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A";

(u) **"Notice of Dispute"** means a form substantially in accordance with the form attached as Schedule "E";

(v) **"Notice of Revision or Disallowance"** means a form substantially in accordance with the form attached as Schedule "D";

(w) **"Person"** means any individual, partnership, firm, joint venture, trust, entity, corporation, unincorporated organization, trade union, pension

plan administrator, pension plan regulator, governmental authority or agency, employee or other association, or similar entity, howsoever designated or constituted;

(x) "**Postfiling Claim**" means any right or claim of any Person, or class of Persons or representative Person, against one or more of the Applicants whether or not asserted, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever of one or more of the Applicants which came into existence after the Filing Date but before the Claims Bar Date, any accrued interest thereon and costs payable in respect thereof, whether or not such right or claim is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, perfected, unperfected, present, future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature;

(y) "**Prefiling Claim**" means any right or claim of any Person, or class of Persons or representative Person, against one or more of the Applicants whether or not asserted, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever of one or more of the Applicants in existence on the Filing Date, any accrued interest thereon and costs payable in respect thereof to and including the Filing Date, whether or not such right or claim is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, perfected, unperfected, present, future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is

executory or anticipatory in nature, and includes any other claims that would have been claims provable in bankruptcy had the Applicants become bankrupt on the Filing Date;

(z) **"Proof of Claim"** means the aggregate of the documentation submitted by a Creditor pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure to evidence its Claim which shall include the Proof of Claim form attached hereto as Schedule "B";

(aa) **"Proof of D&O Claim"** means the aggregate of the documentation submitted by a Creditor pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure to evidence its D&O Claim which shall include the Proof of D&O Claim form attached hereto as Schedule "C";

(bb) **"Proven Claim"** means a Claim filed by the Claims Bar Date in respect of which the Monitor has not sent a Notice of Revision or Disallowance to the Creditor asserting the Claim and which the Monitor accepts or is deemed to accept for distribution purposes pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure;

(cc) **"Surviving Claim"** means a Claim to which CCAA subsection 19(2) applies; and

(dd) **"Surviving D&O Claim"** means a D&O Claim to which CCAA subsection 5.1(2) applies.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CLAIMS SOLICITATION PROCEDURE

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Claims Solicitation Procedure shall govern the solicitation of Claims against the Applicants and the D&O Claims against the Directors and Officers of the Applicants and shall be conducted and

administered by the Monitor with the assistance of the Applicants except as otherwise provided for in this Order. No Creditor may participate in the Distribution if such Claim has not been reviewed, accepted and valued in accordance with this Claims Solicitation Process, subject to any further Order of this Court.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA and under the Initial Order, is hereby directed and empowered to administer and implement the Claims Solicitation Procedure on the terms set out in this Order and the Monitor may take any steps and fulfill such other roles as are contemplated by this Order or which it believes are incidental or necessary for the implementation of the Claims Solicitation Procedure. The Monitor may seek advice and directions from the Court in respect of any aspect of the Claims Solicitation Procedure, including any of the Monitor's obligations provided for in this Order.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is authorized and directed to use reasonable discretion as to adequacy of compliance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure and the terms of this Order including, without limitation, with respect to the manner in which a Proof of Claim, Proof of D&O Claim, Notice of Dispute or any other notices or documents are completed and executed and may, where it is satisfied that a Claim or D&O Claim has been adequately filed or, in the case of a Claim, proven, waive strict compliance with the requirements of this Order as to completion, execution and delivery of Proofs of Claim, Proofs of D&O Claim, Notices of Dispute or any other notice or document contemplated by the Claims Solicitation Procedure and request any further documentation the Monitor may require in order to enable it to determine the validity of a Claim; provided that nothing in this Order shall confer upon the Monitor or the Applicants the discretion

or authority to amend or to extend the Claims Bar Date without a further Order of this Court.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to any information, confidential or otherwise, including without limitation, a Proof of Claim, a Proof of D&O Claim, a Notice of Dispute or otherwise, distributed, circulated, or released, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by the Monitor relating to the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations under this Order. The Monitor shall be entitled to rely upon the Applicants' advice and the Applicants' books and records for all purposes including establishing the names and addresses of Known Creditors. In addition to the rights and protections afforded to the Monitor under the CCAA and the Initial Order or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the fulfillment of its duties in the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall advise the Monitor of all Known Creditors, including the amounts owed to all Known Creditors and their last known address pursuant to the Applicants' books and records, and that the Monitor shall be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by the Applicants regarding the Known Creditors. For greater certainty, the Monitor shall have no liability in respect of the information provided to it regarding the Known Creditors and shall not be required to conduct any independent inquiry and/or investigation with respect to such information.

SOLICITATION OF CLAIMS

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that:

(a) the Monitor shall cause the Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date to be published in each of The Globe and Mail (national edition) and La Presse as soon as practicable after the date of this Order;

(b) the Monitor shall cause the Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date to be posted on the Monitor's Website as soon as practicable after the date of this Order and cause it to remain posted until its discharge as Monitor of the Applicants;

(c) the Monitor shall, as soon as practicable after the date of this Order, mail to all Known Creditors at the last known address for such Known Creditor on the Applicants' books and records a Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date, a Proof of Claim form, a Proof of D&O Claim form substantially in the form attached as Schedules "B" and "C" to this Order and an instruction letter regarding the completion of the Proof of Claim and Proof of D&O Claim forms by a Creditor; and

(d) the Monitor shall, as soon as practicable following receipt of a request therefor and provided such request is received prior to the Claims Bar Date, deliver a copy of the Proof of Claim or Proof of D&O Claim form as applicable to any Person claiming to be a Creditor and requesting such material, or in the alternative, notify such Person that it may obtain an electronic copy of the Proof of Claim and Proof of D&O Claim forms on the Monitor's Website.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that service and delivery of the Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date, Proof of Claim form, Proof of D&O Claim form, the Dispute Notice and any other correspondence or document from the Monitor to any Creditor or any other Person pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure shall be by ordinary mail, prepaid registered mail, courier, personal delivery, electronic communication or facsimile transmission. Any such service and delivery by the Monitor for all purposes under this Order shall be deemed to have been received: (i) if sent by ordinary mail, on the third Business Day after mailing within Ontario, the fifth Business Day after mailing within Canada (other than within Ontario), and the tenth Business Day after mailing internationally; (ii) if sent by prepaid registered mail, on the third Business Day after mailing within Ontario, the fifth Business Day after mailing within Canada (other than within Ontario), and the tenth Business Day after mailing internationally; (iii) if by courier, on the next following Business Day for courier deliveries within Canada, and on the third following Business Day for courier deliveries outside of Canada; (iv) if sent by personal delivery, on the same date as delivery; (v) if sent by electronic communication, on the same date as the electronic communication is sent or, if sent on a day that is not a Business Day or after 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on a Business Day, the following Business Day; and (vi) if sent by fax, on the date on which the Monitor receives a successful facsimile transmission report or, if sent on a day that is not a Business Day or after 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on a Business Day, the following Business Day

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that service by the Monitor of the Proof of Claim and Proof of D&O Claim forms on Creditors and publication of the Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date in the manner set forth in this Order shall constitute good and sufficient service upon the Creditors of notice of this proceeding, this Order, the Claims Bar Date and the related deadlines and procedures set forth

herein and that no other form of service or notice need be made by the Applicants or the Monitor to any Person, and no other document or material need be served on any Person in respect of the Claims Solicitation Procedure.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the form and substance of each of the Notice to Creditors of Claims Bar Date, Proof of Claim, Proof of D&O Claim, Notice of Revision or Disallowance and Notice of Dispute, substantially in the forms attached as schedules hereto, are hereby approved. Despite the foregoing, the Applicants and the Monitor may, from time to time, make minor changes to such forms as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Person asserting a Claim against one or more of the Applicants or a D&O Claim against one or more of the Directors or Officers shall file a Proof of Claim or a Proof of D&O Claim, as applicable (including all supporting documentation), with the Monitor by no later than the Claims Bar Date.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Creditor with a Claim or a D&O Claim who does not deliver a completed Proof of Claim or Proof of D&O Claim, as applicable, to the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure by the Claims Bar Date, or such later date as this Court may otherwise order:

(a) shall be forever barred from asserting or enforcing any Claim (other than a Surviving Claim) against any of the Applicants or a D&O Claim (other than a Surviving D&O Claim) against any of the Director or Officers, and the Applicants or any of them, and the Directors and Officers, or any of them, shall not have any liability whatsoever in respect of such Claim (other than a Surviving Claim) or D&O Claim (other than a Surviving D&O Claim), and any such

Claim (other than a Surviving Claim) or D&O Claim (other than a Surviving D&O Claim) shall be forever barred and extinguished;

(b) shall not be entitled to any further notice of any Orders made or steps taken in the CCAA Proceeding; and

(c) shall not be entitled to participate as a Creditor in the CCAA Proceeding and shall not be entitled to receive any funds pursuant to the Distribution.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Creditors with Excluded Claims shall not be required to file a Proof of Claim in this process, unless required to do so by further Order of this Court.

ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that there shall be no adjudication of the D&O Claims by the Applicants or the Monitor, pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order, pending a further Order of this Court.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** the Monitor shall, with the assistance of the Applicants, review all Proofs of Claim (but not any Proofs of D&O Claim) delivered to the Monitor by the Claims Bar Date and shall accept, revise or reject each Claim as submitted therein. If the Monitor disputes a Claim in whole or in part, the Monitor shall by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on September 21, 2012, send to the Creditor who has submitted the disputed Claim a Notice of Revision or Disallowance indicating the reasons for the revision or disallowance.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor may attempt to resolve any disputed Claim with the Creditor prior to accepting, revising or disallowing such Claim.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Claim received by the Claims Bar Date in respect of which the Monitor does not send a Notice of Revision or Disallowance by the deadline date referenced above shall be deemed a Proven Claim.

DISPUTE NOTICES

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Creditor who receives a Notice of Revision or Disallowance and who objects to the amount of the Claim set out in or any other provision of the Notice of Revision or Disallowance shall deliver to the Monitor on or before 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on October 5, 2012 a Notice of Dispute by registered mail, courier service or facsimile.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a Creditor receives a Notice of Revision or Disallowance and does not file a Notice of Dispute by the time set out in paragraph 18 above, then the value of such Creditor's Claim shall be deemed to be as set out in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Creditor who delivers a Notice of Dispute to the Monitor by the time set out in paragraph 18 above shall, unless otherwise agreed by the Monitor in writing, thereafter serve on the Monitor and the Applicants a notice of motion in the Court returnable not less 30 days after the service of the Notice of Dispute for determination of the Claim in dispute, failing which the value of such Creditor's Claim shall be deemed to be as set out in the applicable Notice of Revision or Disallowance.

SET-OFF

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants may set-off (whether by way of legal, equitable or contractual set-off) against payments or other distributions to be made to any Creditor in respect of its Proven Claim, any claims of any nature whatsoever that any of the Applicants may have against such Creditor, however, neither the failure to do so nor the allowance of any Claim as a Proven Claim hereunder shall constitute a waiver or release by the Applicants of any such claim that the Applicants may have against such Creditor.

DISTRIBUTIONS

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and the Applicants shall not distribute any funds to Creditors holding Proven Claims prior to the approval by this Court of a distribution methodology to be proposed by the Monitor and/or the Applicants in a subsequent motion to this Court.

NOTICE OF TRANSFEREES

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if, after the Filing Date, the holder of a Claim or D&O Claim transfers or assigns the whole of such Claim or D&O Claim to another Person, neither the Monitor nor the relevant Applicant shall be obligated to give notice or otherwise deal with the transferee or assignee of such Claim or D&O Claim in respect thereof unless and until actual notice of transfer or assignment, together with satisfactory evidence of such transfer or assignment, shall have been received and acknowledged by the relevant Applicant and the Monitor in writing and thereafter such transferee or assignee shall for the purposes hereof constitute the "Creditor" in respect of such Claim or D&O Claim. Any such transferee or assignee of a Claim or D&O Claim shall be bound by any notices given or steps taken in respect of such Claim or D&O Claim in accordance with

this Order prior to receipt and acknowledgment by the relevant Applicant and the Monitor of satisfactory evidence of such transfer or assignment. A transferee or assignee of a Claim or D&O Claim takes the Claim or D&O Claim subject to any rights of set-off to which the Applicants or the Directors and Officers may be entitled with respect to such Claim or D&O Claim respectively. For greater certainty, a transferee or assignee of a Claim or D&O Claim is not entitled to set-off, apply, merge, consolidate or combine any Claims or D&O Claims assigned or transferred to it against or on account or in reduction of any amounts owing by such Person to any of the Applicants or the Directors and Officers. Reference to transfer in this Order includes a transfer or assignment whether absolute or intended as security.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Creditor who submits a Proof of Claim or Proof of D&O Claim authorizes the Monitor to post the information contained therein to the Monitor's Website and that the Monitor shall have no liability for the information submitted other than as a result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that for the purposes of the Claims Solicitation Procedure, all Claims or D&O Claims which are denominated in United States dollars shall (i) in the case of Prefiling Claims or D&O Claims, be converted to Canadian dollars at the rate of 1.0198%, being the Bank of Canada noon spot rate of exchange for exchanging US dollars to Canadian dollars on the Filing Date; and (ii) in the case of Postfiling Claims, be converted to Canadian dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate of exchange for exchanging US dollars to Canadian dollars on the date of the applicable Proof of Claim.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any document, notice or communication required to be filed with the Monitor by a Creditor pursuant to the terms of this Order must be delivered by facsimile, email or electronic transmission, personal delivery, courier or prepaid mail to:

Deloitte & Touche Inc.
181 Bay Street West
Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
M5J 2V1

Attention: Catherine Hristow
Telephone: (416) 775-8831
Facsimile: (416) 601-6690
E-mail: christow@deloitte.ca

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in the event that the day on which any notice or communication required to be delivered pursuant to the Claims Solicitation Procedure is not a Business Day then such notice or communication shall be required to be delivered on the next Business Day.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that references to the singular include the plural and to the plural include the singular.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in the event of any strike, lock-out or other event which interrupts postal service in any part of Canada, all notices and communications during such interruption may only be delivered by email, facsimile transmission, personal delivery or courier and any notice or other communication given or made by prepaid mail within the seven (7) Business Day period immediately preceding the commencement of such interruption, unless actually received, shall be deemed not to have been delivered. All such notices and communications shall be deemed to have been received, in the case of notice

by email, facsimile transmission, personal delivery or courier prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern standard Time) on a Business Day, when received, if received after 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on a Business Day or at any time on a non-Business Day, on the next following Business Day, and in the case of a notice mailed as aforesaid, on the fourth Business Day following the date on which such notice or other communication is mailed.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body in any province or territory of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada and any judicial, regulatory or administrative tribunal or other court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body of the United States and the States or other subdivisions of the United Sates and of any notion or state to act in aid of and be complimentary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Claims Solicitation Procedure Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

JUN 15 2012

#1900657

SCHEDULE "A"

Court File No.: CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

NOTICE OF CLAIMS SOLICITATION PROCEDURE AND

CLAIMS BAR DATE REGARDING:

3113736 CANADA LTD. (FORMERLY VALLE FOAM INDUSTRIES (1995) INC., 4362063 CANADA LTD. (FORMERLY DOMFOAM INTERNATIONAL INC.) AND A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

By Order of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") dated January 12, 2012 (the "**Initial Order**"), the Applicants listed above filed for and obtained relief from their creditors under the *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act* (the "**CCAA**"). Pursuant to the Initial Order, Deloitte & Touche Inc. was appointed by the Court as monitor in the Applicants' CCAA proceeding (the "**Monitor**").

By Order of the Court dated June 15, 2012 (the **"Claims Solicitation Procedure Order"**), a process was established for creditors to prove claims against the Applicants in existence as at the date of the Initial Order or with respect to Postfiling Claims (as defined below) or with respect to claims against the current or former Directors and Officers of the Applicants which arose on or before June 15, 2012. Capitalized terms in this notice are as defined in the Claims Solicitation

Procedure Order, a copy of which can be found on the Monitor's Website: http://www.deloitte.com/ca/vallefoam.

In accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order, the Monitor shall mail to all known creditors ("**Known Creditors**") of the Applicants a Proof of Claim form together with this notice. Any Creditor who does not receive a Proof of Claim form may obtain this form on the Monitor's Website, http://www.deloitte.com/ca/vallefoam or by contacting the Monitor directly as follows: (i) by email: christow@deloitte.ca; (ii) by mail at Deloitte & Touche Inc., 181 Bay Street West, Suite 1400, Toronto, Ontario, M5J 2V1, attention: Catherine Hristow; or (iii) by facsimile at (416) 601-6690.

In accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order, any Person or representative class of Persons who wishes to assert a claim against one of more of the Applicants (each, a "**Claim**") which arose (i) at any time up to January 12, 2012; (ii) at any time after January 12, 2012 (a "**Postfiling Claim**") must complete and deliver the Proof of Claim form to the Monitor by mail, fax, e-mail, courier or hand delivery by **no later than 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on August 31, 2012** or such other date as ordered by the Court (the **"Claims Bar Date"**).

In accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure, any Person or representative class of Persons who wishes to assert a claim against one of more of the current or former Directors and Officers of the Applicants which arose on or before June 15, 2012 (each, a "**D&O Claim**") must complete and deliver the Proof of D&O Claim form to the Monitor by mail, fax, e-mail, courier or hand delivery by **no later than the Claims Bar Date.**

IF YOUR PROOF OF CLAIM OR PROOF OF D&O CLAIM IS NOT RECEIVED BY THE MONITOR BY THE CLAIMS BAR DATE, YOUR CLAIM AGAINST THE APPLICANTS OR THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS WILL BE BARRED AND EXTINGUISHED FOREVER.

A Proof of Claim which is disputed by the Monitor will be addressed in the manner set out in the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order.

Address of the Monitor:

Deloitte & Touche Inc.
181 Bay Street West
Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
M5J 2V1

Attention: Catherine Hristow
Telephone: (416) 775-8831
Facsimile: (416) 601-6690
E-mail: christow@deloitte.ca

Dated at _____ this _____ day of _____, 2012.

#1900657

SCHEDULE "B"

DELOITTE & TOUCHE INC., solely in its capacity as the Court-appointed Monitor of the Applicants, and without personal or corporate liability • • • Telephone: (416) 775-8831 Telecopier: (416) 601-6690 Email: christow@deloitte.ca		OFFICE USE ONLY _____ _____ Date Received _____

Court File No.: CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

PROOF OF CLAIM

I. DESCRIPTION OF DEBTOR, CREDITOR AND NATURE OF CLAIM

Name of entity against which claim is being made: *(Check appropriate box in following list. If claims are being made against more than one entity, use a separate Proof of Claim form for each entity.)*

- □ 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.)
- □ 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Domfoam International Inc.)
- □ A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd.

(hereinafter the "**Debtor**")

Name of person asserting a claim against the Debtor: _____
(hereinafter the "**Creditor**")

Individual: □ Corporation: □ Other: □ Specify: _____

If individual, Creditor's Social Insurance Number: _____

If corporation, Business Identification Number: _____

Address of Creditor: _____

_____

_____

Telephone number of Creditor: _____

E-mail address of Creditor: _____

Fax number of Creditor: _____

I, _____, of _____, do hereby certify:

(Name) *(City and province)*

1. That I am a Creditor of the Debtor

   or that I am _____ of _____

   (State position or title) *(Name of Creditor)*

   a Creditor of the Debtor.

2. That I have knowledge of all the circumstances connected with the claim referred to in this form.

3. (*Check and complete appropriate category:*)

□ That, as at January 12, 2012, the Creditor had and still has an **unsecured claim** against the Debtor in the sum of CAD$_____, as shown by the statement (*or* affidavit *or* solemn declaration) attached hereto and marked **Annex "A"**, after deducting any counterclaims to which the Debtor may be entitled. *(Claims in US dollars should be converted to Canadian dollars at the rate of **[insert]**, being the Bank of Canada noon spot rate of exchange for exchanging US dollars to Canadian dollars on January 12, 2012. The attached statement, affidavit or solemn declaration must specify and attach the evidence in support of the claim.) (Give full particulars of the claim with all necessary supporting documentation.)*

□ That, as at the date hereof, the Creditor has an **unsecured claim** against the Debtor which arose after January 12, 2012 in the sum of CAD$_____, as shown by the statement (*or* affidavit *or* solemn declaration) attached hereto and marked **Annex "A"**, after deducting any counterclaims to which the Debtor may be entitled. *(Claims in US dollars should be converted to Canadian dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate of exchange for exchanging US dollars to Canadian dollars as of the date hereof. The attached statement, affidavit or solemn declaration must specify and attach the evidence in support of the claim.) (Give full particulars of the claim with all necessary supporting documentation.)*

-or-

□ That, as at January 12, 2012, the Creditor had and still has a **secured claim** against the Debtor in the sum of CAD$_____, as shown by the statement (*or* affidavit *or* solemn

declaration) attached hereto and marked **Annex "A"**, after deducting any counterclaims to which the Debtor may be entitled. *(The attached statement, affidavit or solemn declaration must specify and attach the evidence in support of the claim and the security held in respect of the claim, including copies of all security.) (Give full particulars of the claim and security with all necessary supporting documentation.)*

4. That to the best of my knowledge and belief, I am (*or* the above-named Creditor is) (*or* am not *or* is not) related to the Debtor within the meaning of section 4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.*

II. ATTESTATION

I hereby attest that, to the best of my knowledge, the information in this document is and any and all annexes hereto are truthful and accurate in all material respects.

SIGNED this _____ day of _____, 2012.

_____
(*Signature of Creditor*)

_____
(*Name of Creditor in block letters*)

_____
(*Signature of witness)*

_____
(*Name of witness in block letters)*

_____

_____

_____
(*Address of witness in block letters)*

ANNEX "A"

DETAILS OF CLAIM

SCHEDULE "C"

DELOITTE & TOUCHE INC., solely in its capacity as the Court-appointed Monitor of the Applicants, and without personal or corporate liability • • • Telephone: (416) 775-8831 Telecopier: (416) 601-6690 Email: christow@deloitte.ca		OFFICE USE ONLY _____ _____ Date Received _____

Court File No.: CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

PROOF OF D&O CLAIM

III. DESCRIPTION OF DEBTOR, CREDITOR AND NATURE OF D&O CLAIM

Name of entity against which claim is being made: (*Check appropriate box in following list. If claims are being made against more than one entity, use a separate Proof of Claim form for each entity.)*

- □ Director or Officer of 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.)
- □ Director or Officer of 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly known as Domfoam International Inc.)
- □ Director or Officer of A-Z Sponge & Foam Products Ltd.

(hereinafter the "**Debtor**")

Name of person asserting a claim against the Debtor: _____
(hereinafter the "**Creditor**")

Individual: □ Corporation: □ Other: □ Specify: _____

If individual, Creditor's Social Insurance Number: _____

If corporation, Business Identification Number: _____

Address of Creditor: _____

Telephone number of Creditor: _____

E-mail address of Creditor: _____

Fax number of Creditor: _____

I, _____, of _____, do hereby certify:

(Name) *(City and province)*

1. That I am a Creditor of the Debtor

   or that I am _____ of _____

   (State position or title) *(Name of Creditor)*

   a Creditor of the Debtor.

2. That I have knowledge of all the circumstances connected with the claim referred to in this form.

3. (*Check and complete appropriate category:*)

☐ That, as at June 15, 2012, the Creditor had and still has an **unsecured claim** against the Debtor in the sum of CAD$_____, as shown by the statement (*or* affidavit *or* solemn declaration) attached hereto and marked **Annex "A"**, after deducting any counterclaims to which the Debtor may be entitled. *(Claims in US dollars should be converted to Canadian dollars at the rate of 1.0198%, being the Bank of Canada noon spot rate of exchange for exchanging US dollars to Canadian dollars on January 12, 2012. The attached statement, affidavit or solemn declaration must specify and attach the evidence in support of the claim.) (Give full particulars of the claim with all necessary supporting documentation.)*

4. That to the best of my knowledge and belief, I am (*or* the above-named Creditor is) (*or* am not *or* is not) related to the Debtor within the meaning of section 4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.*

IV. ATTESTATION

I hereby attest that, to the best of my knowledge, the information in this document is and any and all annexes hereto are truthful and accurate in all material respects.

SIGNED this _____ day of _____, 2012.

_____
(Signature of Creditor)

_____
(Name of Creditor in block letters)

_____
(Signature of witness)

_____
(Name of witness in block letters)

_____

_____

_____
(Address of witness in block letters)

ANNEX "A"

DETAILS OF CLAIM

SCHEDULE "D"

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

NOTICE OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE

TO: **[INSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR]**

The Monitor has disallowed in full or in part your Claim as set out in your Proof of Claim, as set out below:

Prefiling Claim:

Claim Against	Claim per Proof of Claim	Allowed Amount	Disallowed Amount
	$	$	$
Total	$	$	$

Postfiling Claim:

Claim Against	Claim per Proof of Claim	Allowed Amount	Disallowed Amount
	$	$	$
Total	$	$	$

REASONS FOR DISALLOWANCE:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

IF YOU INTEND TO DISPUTE THIS NOTICE OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE:

You must, no later than **5:00 p.m. (Toronto Time)** on **September 21, 2012,** deliver to the Monitor a Notice of Dispute of Revision or Disallowance (a copy of which can be found on the Monitor's Website at http://www.deloitte.com/ca/vallefoam) in accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order to the following address, email, or facsimile:

Deloitte & Touche Inc.
181 Bay Street West
Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
M5J 2V1

Attention: Catherine Hristow
Telephone: (416) 775-8831
Facsimile: (416) 601-6690
E-mail: christow@deloitte.ca

DATE:

#1900657

SCHEDULE "E"

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

NOTICE OF DISPUTE OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE

---

1. **PARTICULARS OF CREDITOR:**

   (a) Full Legal Name of Creditor:_____

   (b) Full Mailing Address of Creditor:_____

   _____

   _____

   (c) *Telephone Number of Creditor:_____

   (d) *Facsimile Number of Creditor:_____

   (e) *E-mail Address of Creditor:_____

(f) Attention (Contact Person):_____

***In order to ensure that all Claims are processed in an expedited manner you must provide one (1) or more of your telephone number, fax number or e-mail address.**

2. **PARTICULARS OF ORIGINAL CREDITOR FROM WHOM YOU ACQUIRED CLAIM, IF APPLICABLE:**

(a) Have you acquired this Claim by Assignment? Yes ☐ No ☐
(if yes, attach document evidencing assignment)

(b) Full Legal Name of original Creditor(s):_____

3. **DISPUTE OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM FOR VOTING AND/OR DISTRIBUTION PURPOSES:**

We hereby disagree with the value of our Claim set out in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance dated _____, as set out below:

Claim:

Claim Against	**Claim per Proof of Claim**	**Allowed Amount**	**Disallowed Amount**
	$	$	$
Total Claims			

REASONS FOR DISPUTE:

(Provide full particulars of the Claim and supporting documentation, including amount, description of transaction (s) or agreement(s) giving rise to the Claim, name of any guarantor(s) that has guaranteed the Claim, and amount of Claim allocated thereto, date and number of all invoices, particulars of all credits, discounts, etc. claimed.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

If you intend to dispute a Notice of Revision or Disallowance, you must, no later than **5:00 p.m. (Toronto Time) on October 5, 2012** deliver to the Monitor a Notice of Dispute of Revision or Disallowance in accordance with the Claims Solicitation Procedure Order to the following address, email or facsimile:

Deloitte & Touche Inc.
181 Bay Street West
Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
M5J 2V1

Attention: Catherine Hristow
Telephone: (416) 775-8831
Facsimile: (416) 601-6690
E-mail: christow@deloitte.ca

If you do not deliver a Notice of Dispute of Revision or Disallowance by the time and date set out above, as applicable, the value of your Claim shall be deemed to be as set out in the Monitor's Notice of Revision or Disallowance.

Dated at _____ this _____ day of _____, 2012.

Per:_____

#1900657

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST
Proceeding commenced at TORONTO

ORDER
(Claims Solicitation Procedure)

MINDEN GROSS LLP
145 King Street West, Suite 2200
Toronto ON M5H 4G2

Raymond M. Slattery (LSUC #20479L)
416-369-4149
rslattery@mindengross.com

David T. Ullmann (LSUC #423571)
416-369-4148
dullmann@mindengross.com

Sepideh Nassabi (LSUC #60139B)
416-369-4323
snassabi@mindengross.com
416-864-9223 fax

Lawyers for the Applicants

TAB 3

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	TUESDAY, THE 29th DAY
	)	
JUSTICE NEWBOULD	)	OF SEPTEMBER, 2015.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

(the "Applicants")

ORDER
(Extension of Stay Period, Admission of Late Claims and Interim Distributions)

THIS MOTION made by the Applicants for an Order extending the stay of proceedings, admitting certain late filed claims and approving the Valle Foam Interim Distribution and the A-Z Foam Interim Distribution (each as defined below) was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Affidavit of Tony Vallecoccia sworn September 25, 2015, and the exhibits thereto, the Twelfth Report of Deloitte Restructuring Inc. (formerly known as Deloitte & Touche Inc.), in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor of the Applicants (the "**Monitor**") and the appendices attached thereto (the "**Twelfth Report**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, counsel for the Monitor, no one appearing for anyone else on the

Service List, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Nada Hannouch sworn September 25, 2015.

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each capitalized term not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning set out in the Twelfth Report or the order of the Court dated June 15, 2012 (the "**Claims Solicitation Procedure Order**").

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

Stay Extension

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Stay Period granted under the Initial Order of Justice Newbould dated January 12, 2012 (the "**Initial Order**") and as subsequently extended by, *inter alia*, the Order of Justice Pattillo dated April 22, 2015, is hereby extended from September 30, 2015 to and including February 29, 2016.

Late Claims

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the following Claims filed after the Claims Bar Date (collectively, the "**Valle Foam Late Claims**") shall be admitted as Prefiling Claims against 3113736 Canada Ltd. ("**Valle Foam**") and shall deemed to be Proven Claims against Valle Foam for the purpose of any Distribution in these proceedings:

Claimant	Prefiling Claim Amount
Just Energy Group Inc.	$185,408.93
Ontario Ministry of Labour.	$46,309.15
Pitney Bowes	$1,395.57

Pitney Bowes	$3,435.23
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board	$117,738.58

For greater certainty, none of the Creditors holding a Valle Foam Late Claim shall be entitled to send a Notice of Dispute or otherwise dispute or seek to vary the amount or priority of such Valle Foam Late Claim.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Claim filed by WorkSafe BC in the amount of $1,673.41 after the Claims Bar Date (the "**A-Z Foam Late Claim**") against A-Z Foam and Sponge Ltd. ("**A-Z Foam**") shall be admitted as Prefiling Claims against A-Z Foam and shall deemed to be a Proven Claim for the purpose of any Distribution in these proceedings.

For greater certainty, WorkSafe BC shall not be entitled to send a Notice of Dispute or otherwise dispute or seek to vary the amount or priority of the A-Z Foam Late Claim.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Claim against Valle Foam filed by Manulife Financial after the Claims Bar Date in the amount of $39,240.08 shall be admitted as a Postfiling Claim against Valle Foam and paid in full by Valle Foam prior to the Valle Foam Interim Distribution.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Person with a Claim against any of the Applicants that is not a Proven Claim as of the date of this order shall not be entitled to participate in the Valle Foam Interim Distribution or the A-Z Foam Interim Distribution.

Directors' Indemnity and Charge

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that paragraph 19 of the Initial Order be and is hereby amended and restated as follows:

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants shall indemnify its respective directors and officers from and against all claims, costs, charges, expenses, obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the applicable Applicant, after the date hereof except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, such claim, cost, charge, expense obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the officer's or director's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that paragraph 20 of the Initial Order be and is hereby amended and restated as follows:

20A. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the directors and officers of 3113736 Canada Ltd. (formerly Valle Foam Industries (1995) Inc.) shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Valle Foam Directors' Charge**") on the Property of 3113736 Canada Ltd., which charge shall not exceed the amount of $200,000 as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 19 of this Order.

20B. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the directors and officers of 4362063 Canada Ltd. (formerly Doamfoam International Inc.) shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Domfoam Directors' Charge**") on the Property of 4362063 Canada Ltd., which charge shall not exceed the amount of $1,000,000 as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 19 of this Order. The Valle Foam Directors' Charge and the Doamfoam Directors' Charge granted shall have the priority set out in paragraph 32 herein.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Directors' Charge granted to the Directors and Officers on the Property of A-Z Foam be and is hereby permanently discharged.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that paragraph 32 of the Initial Order be and is hereby amended and restated as follows:

> 32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Valle Foam Directors' Charge, the Domfoam Directors' Charge and the Administration Charge as among them, shall be as follows:
>
> On the Property of 3113736 Canada Ltd.: First—Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $500,000); Second—Valle Foam Directors' Charge (to the maximum of $200,000);
>
> On the Property of 4362063 Canada Ltd.: First—Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $500,000); Second—Domfoam Directors' Charge (to the maximum of $1,000,000);

Valle Foam Interim Distribution

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor be and is hereby authorized to hold back from the Valle Foam Interim Distribution the following amounts from the Valle Foam Proceeds (as defined in the Twelfth Report):

(a) $225,000 as security for the Administration Charge; and

(b) $200,000 as security for the Valle Foam Directors' Charge.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, subject to the holdbacks set out in paragraph 12 above, the Monitor be and is hereby authorized to make an interim Distribution of the Valle Foam

Proceeds in the amount of $5,583,436.23 to the Valle Foam Creditors holding Proven Claims on a *pro rata, pari passu* basis (the "**Valle Foam Interim Distribution**").

A-Z Foam Interim Distribution

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor be and is hereby authorized to hold back $50,000 of the A-Z Foam Proceeds (as defined in the Twelfth Report) from the A-Z Foam Interim Distribution as security for the Administration Charge.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, subject to the holdback set out in paragraph 14 above, the Monitor be and is hereby authorized to make an interim Distribution of the A-Z Foam Proceeds in the amount of $623,820.39 to the A-Z Foam Creditors holding Proven Claims on a *pro rata, pari passu* basis (the "**A-Z Foam Interim Distribution**").

Approval of the Monitor's Actions, Fees and Expenses

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Twelfth Report and the actions, decisions and conduct of the Monitor as set out in the Twelfth Report are hereby authorized and approved.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the fees and disbursements of the Monitor and its legal counsel, as set out in the Twelfth Report and the Affidavit of Catherine Hristow sworn September 22, 2015 and the Affidavit of Grant Moffat sworn September 18, 2015, and the exhibits attached thereto, are hereby authorized and approved.

18. **THIS COURT HEREBY** requests the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such Orders and to provide such assistance to the

Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and are hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any Court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order.

#2412029 | 4079509

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT A TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

SEP 30 2015

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at TORONTO

ORDER
(Extension of Stay Period, Admission of Late Claims and Interim Distributions)

MINDEN GROSS LLP
145 King Street West, Suite 2200
Toronto ON M5H 4G2

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TAB 4

1990 CarswellOnt 139
Ontario Court of Appeal

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)

1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1192, 41 O.A.C. 282

ELAN CORPORATION et al. v. COMISKEY (TRUSTEE OF) et al.

Finlayson, Krever and Doherty JJ.A.

Heard: October 30 and 31, 1990
Judgment: November 2, 1990
Docket: Doc. Nos. CA 684/90 and CA 685/90

Counsel: *F.J.C. Newbould*, Q.C., and *G.B. Morawetz*, for appellant The Bank of Nova Scotia.
John Little, for respondents Elan Corporation and Nova Metal Products Inc.
Michael B. Rotsztain, for RoyNat Inc.
Kim Twohig and *Mel Olanow*, for Ontario Development Corp.
K.P. McElcheran, for monitor Ernst & Young.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Court having discretion when ordering creditors' meeting under s. 5 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to consider equities between debtor company and secured creditors and to consider possible success of plan of arrangement — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Opposing commercial and legal interests requiring secured creditors to be in separate classes — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Where receiver-manager having been appointed, corporation not entitled to issue debentures and trust deeds or to bring application for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 3.

The applicants were two related companies. The bank was the lender to the companies and was owed over $2,300,000. R Inc. was also a secured creditor of the companies, and was owed approximately $12 million. By agreement, the bank had a first registered charge on the companies' accounts receivable and inventory and a second registered charge on land, buildings and equipment, while R Inc. had a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The security agreements with the bank prohibited the companies from encumbering their assets without the bank's consent. The bank also had s. 178 *Bank Act* security. The Ontario Development Corporation ("ODC") guaranteed part of the companies' debt to R. Inc. and held as security a debenture from one of the companies ranking third to the bank and R Inc. Two municipalities had first priority liens on the companies' lands for unpaid municipal taxes.

The bank demanded payment of its outstanding loans and on August 27, 1990, appointed a receiver-manager pursuant to the security agreements. When the companies refused to allow the receiver-manager access to the premises, the Court made an interim order authorizing the receiver-manager access to monitor the companies' business, and permitting the companies to remain in possession and carry on business in the ordinary course. The bank was restrained from selling the assets and from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but could apply accounts receivable that were collected by the companies to the bank loans. On August 29, 1990, the companies each issued debentures to a friend and to the wife of the companies' principal, pursuant to trust deeds. The debentures conveyed personal property to a trustee as security. No consent was obtained from either the bank or the receiver-manager. It was conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of qualifying each company as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, ("CCAA").

The companies applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing the meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. The plan of arrangement filed provided that the companies would carry on business for 3 months, the secured creditors would be paid and could take no action on their security for 3 months, and the accounts receivable assigned to the bank could be utilized by the companies for their day-to-day operations. No compromise was proposed. At the hearing of the application, orders were granted which set dates for presenting the plan to the secured creditors and for holding the meeting of the secured creditors. The companies were permitted, for 3 months, to spend the accounts receivable collected in accordance with cash flow projections. Proceedings by the bank, acting on its security or paying down the loan from the accounts receivable were stayed. An order was granted that created two classes of creditors for purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The classes were: (a) the bank, R Inc., ODC and the municipalities; and (b) the principal's wife and friend, who had acquired the debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA. The bank appealed.

Held:

The appeal was allowed, Doherty J.A. dissenting in part; the application was dismissed.

Per Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A. concurring): — Since the CCAA was intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between the debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both, which could have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees, debtor corporations were entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA. However, it did not follow that in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA, a Court should not consider the equities as they related to the debtor company and to its secured creditors. Any discretion exercised by the Judge in this instance was not reflected in his reasons. Therefore, the appellate Court could examine the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise its own discretion.

The significant date was August 27, 1990. The effect of the appointment of the receiver-manager was to disentitle the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. Neither company had the power to create further indebtedness, and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver-manager to manage the two companies. The interim order granting the receiver-manager access to the premises restricted its powers, but did not divest the receiver-manager of all its managerial powers. The issue of the debentures to the friend and wife was outside the companies' jurisdiction to carry on business in the ordinary course. Rather, the residual power to take such initiatives to gain relief under the CCAA rested with the receiver-manager. The issuance and registration of the trust deeds required a court order.

The probability of the meeting of secured creditors achieving some measure of success was another relevant consideration. Had there been a proper classification of creditors, the meeting would not have been productive. It was improper to create one class of creditors comprised of all secured creditors except the debenture creditors.

There was no true community of interest among the former. The bank should have been classified in its own class. The companies had clearly intended to avoid having the bank designated as a separate class, because the companies knew that no plan of arrangement would succeed without the approval of the bank. The bank and R Inc. had opposing interests. It was in the commercial interest of the bank to collect and retain the accounts receivable while it was in R Inc.'s commercial interest to preserve the cash flow of the businesses and sell the businesses as going concerns. To have placed the bank and R Inc. in the same class would have enabled R Inc. to vote with the ODC to defeat the bank's prior claim.

There was no reason why the bank's legal interest in the receivables should be overriden by R Inc. as the second security holder in the receivables.

For the foregoing reasons, the application under the CCAA should be dismissed.

Per Doherty J.A. (dissenting in part): — The debentures and "instant" trust deeds sufficed to bring the companies within the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA even if, in issuing those debentures, the companies breached a prior agreement with the bank. Section 3 merely required that at the time of an application by the debtor company, an outstanding debenture or bond be issued under a trust deed. However, where a bond or debenture did not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and did not create a real debt owed by the company, such bond or debenture would not suffice for the purposes of s. 3. The statute should only be used for the purpose of attempting a legitimate reorganization. Where the application was brought for an improper purpose or the company acted in bad faith, the Court had means available to it, entirely apart from s. 3 of the CCAA, to prevent misuse of the Act. The contravention of the security agreement in creating the debentures without the bank's consent did not affect the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3, but could play a role in the Court's determination of what additional orders should be made under the statute.

The interim order regarding the receiver-manager effectively rendered the receiver-manager a monitor with rights of access but no further authority. Therefore, in light of the terms of the interim order, the existence of the receiver-manager installed by the bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the CCAA.

The Judge properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the CCAA. Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, the benefits flowing from the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in the order. However, the bank and R Inc., as the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of the statute. Their interests were not only different, but opposed. The classification scheme created by the Judge effectively denied the bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Per Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A. concurring)

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.) — *applied*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35 (S.C.), aff'd (16 September 1988), Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke JJ.A. (B.C. C.A.) — *considered*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.) — *considered*

Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. 246 (C.A.) — *applied*

Wellington Building Corp., Re, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.) — *applied*

Per Doherty J.A. (dissenting in part)

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.) — *considered*

Avery Construction Co., Re, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.) — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd., [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) — *considered*

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Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd., 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

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Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) — *referred to*

Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 158 — *referred to*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C.S.C.) — *considered*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-op., Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), rev'd (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253 (C.A.) — *considered*

Statutes considered:

Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 —

s. 178, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 25, s. 26

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s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 6(a)

s. 11

s. 14(2)

Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11 —

s. 144(1)

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 —

s. 12

Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302 —

s. 369

APPEAL from order of Hoolihan J. dated September 11, 1990, allowing application under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

***FINLAYSON J.A. (KREVER J.A.* concurring) (orally):**

1 This is an appeal by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") from orders made by Mr. Justice Hoolihan [(11 September 1990), Doc. Nos. Toronto RE 1993/90 and RE 1994/90 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] as hereinafter described. The Bank of Nova Scotia was the lender to two related companies, namely, Elan Corporation ("Elan") and Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova"), which commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"), for the purposes of having a plan of arrangement put to a meeting of secured creditors of those companies.

2 The orders appealed from are:

(i) An order of September 11, 1990, which directed a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova to consider the plan of arrangement filed, or other suitable plan. The order further provided that for 3 days until September 14, 1990, the bank be prevented from acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova, and that Elan and Nova could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be received.

(ii) An order dated September 14, 1990, extending the terms of the order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990. This order continued the stay against the bank and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank. Further orders dated September 27, 1990, and October 18, 1990, have extended the stay, and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable that have been assigned to the bank. The date of the meetings of creditors has been extended to November 9, 1990. The application to sanction the plan of arrangement must be heard by November 14, 1990.

(iii) An order dated October 18, 1990, directing that there be two classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The first class is to be comprised of the bank, RoyNat Inc. ("RoyNat"), the Ontario Development Corporation ("O.D.C."), the city of Chatham and the village of Glencoe. The second class is to be comprised of persons related to Elan and Nova that acquired debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA.

3 There is very little dispute about the facts in this matter, but the chronology of events is important and I am setting it out in some detail.

4 The bank has been the banker to Elan and Nova. At the time of the application in August 1990, it was owed approximately $1,900,000. With interest and costs, including receivers' fees, it is now owed in excess of $2,300,000. It has a first registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a second registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. It also has security under s. 178 of the *Bank Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 25, s. 26. The terms of credit between the bank and Elan as set out in a commitment agreement provide that Elan and Nova may not encumber their assets without the consent of the bank.

5 RoyNat is also a secured creditor of Elan and Nova, and it is owed approximately $12 million. It holds a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The bank and RoyNat entered into a priority agreement to define with certainty the priority which each holds over the assets of Elan and Nova.

6 The O.D.C. guaranteed payment of $500,000 to RoyNat for that amount lent by RoyNat to Elan. The O.D.C. holds debenture security from Elan and secure the guarantee which it gave to RoyNat. That security ranks third to the bank and RoyNat. The O.D.C. has not been called upon by RoyNat to pay under its guarantee. O.D.C. has not lent any money directly to Elan or Nova.

7 Elan owes approximately $77,000 to the City of Chatham for unpaid municipal taxes. Nova owes approximately $18,000 to the Village of Glencoe for unpaid municipal taxes. Both municipalities have a lien on the real property of the respective companies in priority to every claim except the Crown under s. 369 of the *Municipal Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302.

8 On May 8, 1990, the bank demanded payment of all outstanding loans owing by Elan and Nova to be made by June 1, 1990. Extensions of time were granted and negotiations directed to the settlement of the debt took place thereafter. On August 27, 1990, the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the assets of Elan and Nova, and as agent under the bank's security to realize upon the security. Elan and Nova refused to allow the receiver and manager to have access to their premises, on the basis that insufficient notice had been provided by the bank before demanding payment.

9 Later on August 27, 1990, the bank brought a motion in an action against Elan and Nova (Court File No. 54033/90) for an order granting possession of the premises of Elan and Nova to Coopers & Lybrand. On the evening of August 27, 1990, at approximately 9 p.m., Mr. Justice Saunders made an order adjourning the motion on certain conditions. The order authorized Coopers & Lybrand access to the premises to monitor Elan's business, and permitted Elan to remain in possession and carry on its business in the ordinary course. The bank was restrained in the order, until the motion could

be heard, from selling inventory, land, equipment or buildings or from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but was not restrained from applying accounts receivable that were collected against outstanding bank loans.

10 On Wednesday, August 29, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued a debenture for $10,000 to a friend of the principals of the companies, Joseph Comiskey, through his brother Michael Comiskey as trustee, pursuant to a trust deed executed the same day. The terms were not commercial and it does not appear that repayment was expected. It is conceded by counsel for Elan that the sole purpose of issuing the debentures was to qualify as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA. Section 3 reads as follows:

> 3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless
>
> (a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and
>
> (b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

11 The debentures conveyed the personal property of Elan and Nova as security to Michael Comiskey as trustee. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan agreements, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver. Cheques for $10,000 each, representing the loans secured in the debentures, were given to Elan and Nova on Wednesday, August 29, 1990, but not deposited until 6 days later on September 4, 1990, after an interim order had been made by Mr. Justice Farley in favour of Elan and Nova staying the bank from taking proceedings.

12 On August 30, 1990 Elan and Nova applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing a meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. Section 5 provides:

> 5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

13 The application was heard by Farley J. on Friday, August 31, 1990, at 8 a.m. Farley J. dismissed the application on the grounds that the CCAA required that there be more than one debenture issued by each company. Later on the same say, August 31, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued two debentures for $500 to the wife of the principal of Elan through her sister as trustee. The debentures provided for payment of interest to commence on August 31, 1992. Cheques for $500 were delivered that day to the companies but not deposited in the bank account until September 4, 1990. These debentures conveyed the personal property in the assets of Elan and Nova to the trustee as security. Once again it is conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan terms, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver.

14 On August 31, 1990, following the creation of the trust deeds and the issuance of the debentures, Elan and Nova commenced new applications under the CCAA which were heard late in the day by Farley J. He adjourned the applications to September 10, 1990, on certain terms, including a stay preventing the bank from acting on its security and allowing Elan to spend up to $321,000 from accounts receivable collected by it.

15 The plan of arrangement filed with the application provided that Elan and Nova would carry on business for 3 months, that secured creditors would not be paid and could take no action on their security for 3 months, and that the accounts receivable of Elan and Nova assigned to the bank could be utilized by Elan and Nova for purposes of its day-to-day operations. No compromise of any sort was proposed.

16 On September 11, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova be held no later than October 22, 1990, to consider the plan of arrangement that had been filed, or other suitable plan. He ordered that the plan of arrangement be presented to the secured creditors no later than September 27, 1990. He made further orders effective for 3 days until September 14, 1990, including orders:

(i) that the companies could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be collected in accordance with a cash flow forecast filed with the Court providing for $1,387,000 to be spent by September 30, 1990; and

(ii) a stay of proceedings against the bank acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova.

17 On September 14, 1990, Hoolihan J. extended the terms of his order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990 for final approval. This order continued the power of Elan and Nova to spend up to $1,387,000 of the accounts receivable assigned to the bank in accordance with the projected cash flow to September 30, 1990, and to spend a further amount to October 24, 1990, in accordance with a cash flow to be approved by Hoolihan J. prior to October 1, 1990. Further orders dated September 27 and October 18 have extended the power to spend the accounts receivable to November 14, 1990.

18 On September 14, 1990, the bank requested Hoolihan J. to restrict his order so that Elan and Nova could use the accounts receivable assigned to the bank only so long as they continued to operate within the borrowing guidelines contained in the terms of the loan agreements with the bank. These guidelines require a certain ratio to exist between bank loans and the book value of the accounts receivable and inventory assigned to the bank, and are designed in normal circumstances to ensure that there is sufficient value in the security assigned to the bank. Hoolihan J. refused to make the order.

19 On October 18, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that the composition of the classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors shall be as follows:

(a) The bank, RoyNat, O.D.C., the City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe shall comprise one class.

(b) The parties related to the principal of Elan that acquired their debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA shall comprise a second class.

20 On October 18, 1990, at the request of counsel for Elan and Nova, Hoolihan J. further ordered that the date for the meeting of creditors of Elan and Nova be extended to November 9, 1990, in order to allow a new plan of arrangement to be sent to all creditors, including unsecured creditors of those companies. Elan and Nova now plan to offer a plan of compromise or arrangement to the unsecured creditors of Elan and Nova as well as to the secured creditors.

21 There are five issues in this appeal.

(1) Are the debentures issued by Elan and Nova for the purpose of permitting the companies to qualify as applicants under the CCAA debentures within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA?

(2) Did the issue of the debentures contravene the provisions of the loan agreements between Elan and Nova and the bank? If so, what are the consequences for CCAA purposes?

(3) Did Elan and Nova have the power to issue the debentures and make application under the CCAA after the bank had appointed a receiver and after the order of Saunders J.?

(4) Did Hoolihan J. have the power under s. 11 of the CCAA to make the interim orders that he made with respect to the accounts receivable?

(5) Was Hoolihan J. correct in ordering that the bank vote on the proposed plan of arrangement in a class with RoyNat and the other secured creditors?

22 It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies, Elan and Nova, are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA. Having said that, it does not follow that in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA that the Court should not consider the equities in this case as they relate to these companies and to one of its principal secured creditors, the bank.

23 The issues before Hoolihan J. and this Court were argued on a technical basis. Hoolihan J. did not give effect to the argument that the debentures described above were a "sham" and could not be used for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Unfortunately, he did not address any of the other arguments presented to him on the threshold issue of the availability of the CCAA. He appears to have acted on the premise that if the CCAA can be made available, it should be utilized.

24 If Hoolihan J. did exercise any discretion overall, it is not reflected in his reasons. I believe, therefore, that we are in a position to look at the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise our own discretion. To me, the significant date is August 27, 1990 when the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets mortgaged and charged under the demand debenture and of the collateral under the general security agreement, both dated June 20, 1979. On the same date, it appointed the same company as receiver and manager for Nova under a general security agreement dated December 5, 1988. The effect of this appointment is to divest the companies and their boards of directors of their power to deal with the property comprised in the appointment: Raymond Walton, *Kerr on the Law and Practice as to Receivers*, 16th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), p. 292. Neither Elan nor Nova had the power to create further indebtedness, and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver to manage the two companies: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.).

25 Counsel for the debtor companies submitted that the management powers of the receiver were stripped from the receiver by Saunders J. in his interim order, when he allowed the receiver access to the companies' properties but would not permit it to realize on the security of the bank until further order. He pointed out that the order also provided that the companies were entitled to remain in possession and "to carry on business in the ordinary course" until further order.

26 I do not agree with counsel's submission covering the effect of the order. It certainly restricted what the receiver could do on an interim basis, but it imposed restrictions on the companies as well. The issue of these disputed debentures in support of an application for relief as insolvent companies under the CCAA does not comply with the order of Saunders J. This is not carrying on business in the ordinary course. The residual power to take all of these initiatives for relief under the CCAA remained with the receiver, and if trust deeds were to be issued, an order of the Court in Action 54033/90 was required permitting their issuance and registration.

27 There is another feature which, in my opinion, affects the exercise of discretion, and that is the probability of the meeting achieving some measure of success. Hoolihan J. considered the calling of the meeting at one hearing, as he was asked to do, and determined the respective classes of creditors at another. This latter classification is necessary because of the provisions of s. 6(a) of the CCAA, which reads as follows:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company.

28 If both matters had been considered at the same time, as in my view they should have been, and if what I regard as a proper classification of the creditors had taken place, I think it is obvious that the meeting would not be a productive one. It was improper, in my opinion, to create one class of creditors made up of all the secured creditors save the so-called "sham" creditors. There is no true community of interest among them, and the motivation of Elan and Nova in striving to create a single class is clearly designed to avoid the classification of the bank as a separate class.

29 It is apparent that the only secured creditors with a significant interest in the proceeding under the CCAA are the bank and RoyNat. The two municipalities have total claims for arrears of taxes of less than $100,000. They have first priority in the lands of the companies. They are in no jeopardy whatsoever. The O.D.C. has a potential liability in that it can be called upon by RoyNat under its guarantee to a maximum of $500,000, and this will trigger default under its debentures with the companies, but its interests lie with RoyNat.

30 As to RoyNat, it is the largest creditor with a debt of some $12 million. It will dominate any class it is in because, under s. 6 of the CCAA, the majority in a class must represent three-quarters in value of that class. It will always have a veto by reason of the size of its claim, but requires at least one creditor to vote for it to give it a majority in number (I am ignoring the municipalities). It needs the O.D.C.

31 I do not base my opinion solely on commercial self-interest, but also on the differences in legal interest. The bank has first priority on the receivables referred to as the "quick assets", and RoyNat ranks second in priority. RoyNat has first priority on the buildings and realty, the "fixed assets", and the bank has second priority.

32 It is in the commercial interests of the bank, with its smaller claim and more readily realizable assets, to collect and retain the accounts receivable. It is in the commercial interests of RoyNat to preserve the cash flow of the business and sell the enterprise as a going concern. It can only do that by overriding the prior claim of the bank to these receivables. If it can vote with the O.D.C. in the same class as the bank, it can achieve that goal and extinguish the prior claim of the bank to realize on the receivables. This it can do, despite having acknowledged its legal relationship to the bank in the priority agreement signed by the two. I can think of no reason why the legal interest of the bank as the holder of the first security on the receivables should be overridden by RoyNat as holder of the second security.

33 The classic statement on classes of creditors is that of Lord Esher M.R. in *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. 246 (C.A.), at pp. 579-580 [Q.B.]:

> The Act [*Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870*] says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes — classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes.

34 The *Sovereign Life* case was quoted with approval by Kingstone J. in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.), at p. 659 [O.R.]. He also quoted another English authority at p. 658:

> In *In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Ry. Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213, a scheme and arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act (1870), was submitted to the Court for approval. Lord Justice Bowen, at p. 243, says:

> Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation ... Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

35 Kingstone J. set aside a meeting where three classes of creditors were permitted to vote together. He said at p. 660:

> It is clear that Parliament intended to give the three-fourths majority of any class power to bind that class, but I do not think the Statute should be construed so as to permit holders of subsequent mortgages power to vote and thereby destroy the priority rights and security of a first mortgagee.

36 We have been referred to more modern cases, including two decisions of Trainor J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court, both entitled *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* One case is reported in (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, and the other in the same volume at p. 175 [C.B.R.]. Trainor J. was upheld on appeal on both judgments. The first judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal is unreported (16 September, 1988) [Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke JJ.A.]. The judgment in the second appeal is reported at 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122.

37 In the first *Northland* case, Trainor J. held that the difference in the terms of parties to and priority of different bonds meant that they should be placed in separate classes. He relied upon *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, supra. In the second *Northland* case, he dealt with 15 mortgagees who were equal in priority but held different parcels of land as security. Trainor J. held that their relative security positions were the same, notwithstanding that the mortgages were for the most part secured by charges against separate properties. The nature of the debt was the same, the nature of the security was the same, the remedies for default were the same, and in all cases they were corporate loans by sophisticated lenders. In specifically accepting the reasoning of Trainor J., the Court of Appeal held that the concern of the various mortgagees as to the quality of their individual securities was "a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both" (p. 203).

38 In *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.), the Court stressed that a class should be made up of persons "'whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest'" (p. 8 [of C.B.R.]).

39 My assessment of these secured creditors is that the bank should be in its own class. This being so, it is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance that it cannot succeed. This is another cogent reason for the Court declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the debtor companies.

40 For all the reasons given above, the application under the CCAA should have been dismissed. I do not think that I have to give definitive answers to the individual issues numbered (1) and (2). They can be addressed in a later case, where the answers could be dispositive of an application under the CCAA. The answer to (3) is that the combined effect of the receivership and the order of Saunders J. disentitled the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. It is not necessary to answer issue (4), and the answer to (5) is no.

41 Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the three orders of Hoolihan J., and, in their place, issue an order dismissing the application under the CCAA. The bank should receive its costs of this appeal, the applications for leave to appeal, and the proceedings before Farley and Hoolihan JJ., to be paid by Elan, Nova and RoyNat.

42 Ernst & Young were appointed monitor in the order of Hoolihan J. dated September 14, 1990, to monitor the operations of Elan and Nova and give effect to and supervise the terms and conditions of the stay of proceedings

in accordance with Appendix "C" appended to the order. The monitor should be entitled to be paid for all services performed to date, including whatever is necessary to complete its reports for past work, as called for in Appendix "C".

DOHERTY J.A. **(dissenting in part):**

I Background

43 On November 2, 1990, this Court allowed the appeal brought by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") and vacated several orders made by Hoolihan J. Finlayson J.A. delivered oral reasons on behalf of the majority. At the same time, I delivered brief oral reasons dissenting in part from the conclusion reached by the majority and undertook to provide further written reasons. These are those reasons.

44 The events relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set out in some detail in the oral reasons of Finlayson J.A. I will not repeat that chronology, but will refer to certain additional background facts before turning to the legal issues.

45 Elan Corporation ("Elan") owns the shares of Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova Inc."). Both companies have been actively involved in the manufacture of automobile parts for a number of years. As of March 1990, the companies had total annual sales of about $30 million, and employed some 220 people in plants located in Chatham and Glencoe, Ontario. The operation of these companies no doubt plays a significant role in the economy of these two small communities.

46 In the 4 years prior to 1989, the companies had operated at a profit ranging from $287,000 (1987) to $1,500,000 (1986). In 1989, several factors, including large capital expenditures and a downturn in the market, combined to produce an operational loss of about $1,333,000. It is anticipated that the loss for the year ending June 30, 1990, will be about $2.3 million. As of August 1, 1990, the companies continued in full operation, and those in control anticipated that the financial picture would improve significantly later in 1990, when the companies would be busy filling several contracts which had been obtained earlier in 1990.

47 The bank has provided credit to the companies for several years. In January 1989, the bank extended an operating line of credit to the companies. The line of credit was by way of a demand loan that was secured in the manner described by Finlayson J.A. Beginning in May 1989, and from time to time after that, the companies were in default under the terms of the loan advanced by the bank. On each occasion, the bank and the companies managed to work out some agreement so that the bank continued as lender and the companies continued to operate their plants.

48 Late in 1989, the companies arranged for a $500,000 operating loan from RoyNat Inc. It was hoped that this loan, combined with the operating line of $2.5 million from the bank, would permit the company to weather its fiscal storm. In March 1990, the bank took the position that the companies were in breach of certain requirements under their loan agreements, and warned that if the difficulties were not rectified the bank would not continue as the company's lender. Mr. Patrick Johnson, the president of both companies, attempted to respond to these concerns in a detailed letter to the bank dated March 15, 1990. The response did not placate the bank. In May 1990, the bank called its loan and made a demand for immediate payment. Mr. Spencer, for the bank, wrote: "We consider your financial condition continues to be critical and we are not prepared to delay further making formal demand." He went on to indicate that, subject to further deterioration in the companies' fiscal position, the bank was prepared to delay acting on its security until June 1, 1990.

49 As of May 1990, Mr. Johnson, to the bank's knowledge, was actively seeking alternative funding to replace the bank. At the same time, he was trying to convince the union which represented the workers employed at both plants to assist in a co-operative effort to keep the plants operational during the hard times. The union had agreed to discuss amendment of the collective bargaining agreement to facilitate the continued operation of the companies.

50 The June 1, 1990 deadline set by the bank passed without incident. Mr. Johnson continued to search for new financing. A potential lender was introduced to Mr. Spencer of the bank on August 13, 1990, and it appeared that the bank, through Mr. Spencer, was favourably impressed with this potential lender. However, on August 27, 1990, the

bank decided to take action to protect its position. Coopers & Lybrand was appointed by the bank as receiver-manager under the terms of the security agreements with the companies. The companies denied the receiver access to their plants. The bank then moved before the Honourable Mr. Justice E. Saunders for an order giving the receiver possession of the premises occupied by the companies. On August 27, 1990, after hearing argument from counsel for the bank and the companies, Mr. Justice Saunders refused to install the receivers and made the following interim order:

> 1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the receiver be allowed access to the property to monitor the operations of the defendants but shall not take steps to realize on the security of The Bank of Nova Scotia until further Order of the Court.
>
> 2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants shall be entitled to remain in possession and to carry on business in the ordinary course until further Order of this Court.
>
> 3. THIS COURT ORDERS that until further order the Bank of Nova Scotia shall not take steps to notify account debtors of the defendants for the purpose of collecting outstanding accounts receivable. This Order does not restrict The Bank of Nova Scotia from dealing with accounts receivable of the defendants received by it.
>
> 4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

51 The notice of motion placed before Saunders J. by the bank referred to "an intended action" by the bank. It does not appear that the bank took any further steps in connection with this "intended action."

52 Having resisted the bank's efforts to assume control of the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, and realizing that their operations could cease within a matter of days, the companies turned to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "Act"), in an effort to hold the bank at bay while attempting to reorganize their finances. Finlayson J.A. has described the companies' efforts to qualify under that Act, the two appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley on August 31, 1990, and the appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Hoolihan in September and October 1990, which resulted in the orders challenged on this appeal.

II The Issues

53 The dispute between the bank and the companies when this application came before Hoolihan J. was a straightforward one. The bank had determined that its best interests would be served by the immediate execution of the rights it had under its various agreements with the companies. The bank's best interest was not met by the continued operation of the companies as going concerns. The companies and their other two substantial secured creditors considered that their interests required that the companies continue to operate, at least for a period which would enable the companies to place a plan of reorganization before its creditors.

54 All parties were pursuing what they perceived to be their commercial interests. To the bank, these interests entailed the "death" of the companies as operating entities. To the companies, these interests required "life support" for the companies through the provisions of the Act to permit a "last ditch" effort to save the companies and keep them in operation.

55 The issues raised on this appeal can be summarized as follows:

> (i) Did Hoolihan J. err in holding that the companies were entitled to invoke the Act?
>
> (ii) Did Hoolihan J. err in exercising his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held under the Act?
>
> (iii) Did Hoolihan J. err in directing that the bank and RoyNat Inc. should be placed in the same class of creditors for the purposes of the Act?

(iv) Did Hoolihan J. err in the terms of the interim orders he made pending the meeting of creditors and the submission to the court of a plan of reorganization?

III The Purpose and Scheme of the Act

56 Before turning to these issues, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the Act, and the scheme established by the Act for achieving that purpose. The Act first appeared in the midst of the Great Depression (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36). The Act was intended to provide a means whereby insolvent companies could avoid bankruptcy and continue as ongoing concerns through a reorganization of their financial obligations. The reorganization contemplated required the cooperation of the debtor companies' creditors and shareholders: *Re Avery Construction Co.*, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.); Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at pp. 592-593; David H. Goldman, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)" (1985) 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36, at pp. 37-39.

57 The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy- or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

58 The purpose of the Act was artfully put by Gibbs J.A., speaking for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, an unreported judgment released October 29, 1990 [Doc. No. Vancouver CA12944, Carrothers, Cumming and Gibbs JJ.A., now reported [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84], at pp. 11 and 6 [unreported, pp. 91 and 88 B.C.L.R.]. In referring to the purpose for which the Act was initially proclaimed, he said:

> Almost inevitably liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A. ['the Act'], to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

59 In an earlier passage, His Lordship had said:

> The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business.

60 Gibbs J.A. also observed (at p. 13) that the Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees." Because of that "broad constituency", the Court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest. That interest is generally, but not always, served by permitting an attempt at reorganization: see S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 593.

61 The Act must be given a wide and liberal construction so as to enable it to effectively serve this remedial purpose: *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 14 [unreported, p. 92 B.C.L.R.].

62 The Act is available to all insolvent companies, provided the requirements of s. 3 of the Act are met. That section provides:

> 3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

(a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and

(b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

63 A debtor company, or a creditor of that company, invokes the Act by way of summary application to the Court under s. 4 or s. 5 of the Act. For present purposes, s. 5 is the relevant section:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

64 Section 5 does not require that the Court direct a meeting of creditors to consider a proposed plan. The Court's power to do so is discretionary. There will no doubt be cases where no order will be made, even though the debtor company qualifies under s. 3 of the Act.

65 If the Court determines that a meeting should be called, the creditors must be placed into classes for the purpose of that meeting. The significance of this classification process is made apparent by s. 6 of the Act:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

66 If the plan of reorganization is approved by the creditors as required by s. 6, it must then be presented to the Court. Once again, the Court must exercise a discretion, and determine whether it will ap prove the plan of reorganization. In exercising that discretion, the Court is concerned not only with whether the appropriate majority has approved the plan at a meeting held in accordance with the Act and the order of the Court, but also with whether the plan is a fair and reasonable one: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 182-185 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.).

67 If the Court chooses to exercise its discretion in favour of calling a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a plan of reorganization, the Act provides that the rights and remedies available to creditors, the debtor company, and others during the period between the making of the initial order and the consideration of the proposed plan may be suspended or otherwise controlled by the Court.

68 Section 11 gives a court wide powers to make any interim orders:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

69 Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the Court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1989), 102 A.R. 161 at p. 165 (Q.B.).

IV Did Hoolihan J. Err in Holding that the Debtor Companies were Entitled to Invoke the Act?

70 The appellant advances three arguments in support of its contention that Elan and Nova Inc. were not entitled to seek relief under the Act. It argues first that the debentures issued by the companies after August 27, 1990, were "shams" and did not fulfil the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. The appellant next contends that the issuing of the debentures by the companies contravened their agreements with the bank, in which they undertook not to further encumber the assets of the companies without the consent of the bank. Lastly, the appellant maintains that once the bank had appointed a receiver-manager over the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, the companies had no power to create further indebtedness by way of debentures or to bring an application on behalf of the companies under the Act.

(i) Section 3 and "Instant" Trust Deeds

71 The debentures issued in August 1990, after the bank had moved to install a receiver-manager, were issued solely and expressly for the purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. Indeed, it took the companies two attempts to meet those requirements. The debentures had no commercial purpose. The transactions did, however, involve true loans in the sense that moneys were advanced and debt was created. Appropriate and valid trust deeds were also issued.

72 In my view, it is inappropriate to refer to these transactions as "shams." They are neither false nor counterfeit, but rather are exactly what they appear to be, transactions made to meet jurisdictional requirements of the Act so as to permit an application for reorganization under the Act. Such transactions are apparently well known to the commercial Bar: B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1987) 4 Nat. Insolvency Rev. 38, at p. 39; C. Ham, " 'Instant' Trust Deeds Under the C.C.A.A." (1988) 2 Commercial Insolvency Reporter 25; G.B. Morawetz, "Emerging Trends in the Use of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1990) Proceedings, First Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Insolvency Institute of Canada.

73 Mr. Ham writes, at pp. 25 and 30:

Consequently, some companies have recently sought to bring themselves within the ambit of the C.C.A.A. by creating 'in stant' trust deeds, i.e., trust deeds which are created solely for the purpose of enabling them to take advantage of the C.C.A.A.

74 Applications under the Act involving the use of "instant" trust deeds have been before the Courts on a number of occasions. In no case has any court held that a company cannot gain access to the Act by creating a debt which meets the requirements of s. 3 for the express purpose of qualifying under the Act. In most cases, the use of these "instant" trust deeds has been acknowledged without comment.

75 The decision of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), at 55-56 [67 C.B.R.], speaks directly to the use of "instant" trust deeds. The Chief Justice refused to read any words into s. 3 of the Act which would limit the availability of the Act depending on the point at which, or the purpose for which, the debenture or bond and accompanying trust deed were created. He accepted [at p. 56 C.B.R.] the debtor company's argument that the Act:

> does not impose any time restraints on the creation of the conditions as set out in s. 3 of the Act, nor does it contain any prohibition against the creation of the conditions set out in s. 3 for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.

76 It should, however, be noted that in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, the debt itself was not created for the purpose of qualifying under the Act. The bond and the trust deed, however, were created for that purpose. The case is therefore factually distinguishable from the case at Bar.

77 The Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the Chief Justice ((1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253) on the basis that the bonds required by s. 3 of the Act had not been issued when the application was made, so that on a precise reading of the words of s. 3 the company did not qualify. The Court did not go on to consider whether, had the bonds been properly issued, the company would have been entitled to invoke the Act. Hoyt J.A., for the majority, did, however, observe without comment that the trust deeds had been created specifically for the purpose of bringing an application under the Act.

78 The judgment of MacKinnon J. in *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, unreported, Doc. No. Vancouver A893427, released January 24, 1990 (B.C. S.C.) [now reported 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248], is factually on all fours with the present case. In that case, as in this one, it was acknowledged that the sole purpose for creating the debt was to effect compliance with s. 3 of the Act. After considering the judgment of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, MacKinnon J. held, at p. 251:

> The reason for creating the trust deed is not for the usual purposes of securing a debt but, when one reads it, on its face, it does that. I find that it is a genuine trust deed and not a fraud, and that the petitioners have complied with s. 3 of the statute.

79 *Re Metals & Alloys Co.* (16 February 1990) is a recent example of a case in this jurisdiction in which "instant" trust deeds were successfully used to bring a company within the Act. The company issued debentures for the purpose of permitting the company to qualify under the Act, so as to provide it with an opportunity to prepare and submit a reorganization plan. The company then applied for an order, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the debtor company was a corporation within the meaning of the Act. Houlden J.A., hearing the matter at first instance, granted the declaration request in an order dated February 16, 1990. No reasons were given. It does not appear that the company's qualifications were challenged before Houlden J.A.; however, the nature of the debentures issued and the purpose for their issue was fully disclosed in the material before him. The requirements of s. 3 of the Act are jurisdictional in nature, and the consent of the parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction it does not have. One must conclude that Houlden J.A. was satisfied that "instant" trust deeds suffice for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act.

80 A similar conclusion is implicit in the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*. In that case, a debt of $50, with an accompanying debenture and trust deed, was created specifically to enable the company to make application under the Act. The Court noted that the debt was created solely for that purpose in an effort to forestall an attempt by the bank to liquidate the assets of the debtor company. The Court went on to deal with the merits, and to dismiss an appeal from an order granting a stay pending a reorganization meeting. The Court could not have reached the merits without first concluding that the $50 debt created by the company met the requirements of s. 3 of the Act.

81 The weight of authority is against the appellant. Counsel for the appellant attempts to counter that authority by reference to the remarks of the Minister of Justice when s. 3 was introduced as an amendment to the Act in the 1952-53 sittings of Parliament (House of Commons Debates, 1-2 Eliz. II (1952-53), vol. II, pp. 1268-1269). The interpretation of words found in a statute, by reference to speeches made in Parliament at the time legislation is introduced, has never found favour in our Courts: *Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario)*, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 138, at 721 [S.C.R.], 561 [D.L.R.]. Nor, with respect to Mr. Newbould's able argument, do I find the words of the Minister of Justice at the time the present s. 3 was introduced to be particularly illuminating. He indicated that the amendment to the Act left companies with complex financial structures free to resort to the Act, but that it excluded companies which had only unsecured mercantile creditors. The Minister does not comment on the intended effect of the amendment on the myriad situations between those two extremes. This case is one such situation. These debtor companies had complex secured debt structures, but those debts were not, prior to the issuing of the debentures in August 1990, in the form contemplated by s. 3 of the Act. Like Richard C.J.Q.B. in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, at pp. 52-53, I am not persuaded that the comments of the Minister of Justice assist in interpreting s. 3 of the Act in this situation.

82 The words of s. 3 are straightforward. They require that the debtor company have, at the time an application is made, an outstanding debenture or bond issued under a trust deed. No more is needed. Attempts to qualify those words are not only contrary to the wide reading the Act deserves, but can raise intractable problems as to what qualifications or modifications should be read into the Act. Where there is a legitimate debt which fits the criteria set out in s. 3, I see no purpose in denying a debtor company resort to the Act because the debt and the accompanying documentation was created for the specific purpose of bringing the application. It must be remembered that qualification under s. 3 entitles the debtor company to nothing more than consideration under the Act. Qualification under s. 3 does not mean that relief under the Act will be granted. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt needed to meet the s. 3 requirement may well have a bearing on how a court exercises its discretion at various stages of the application, but they do not alone interdict resort to the Act.

83 In holding that "instant" trust deeds can satisfy the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, I should not be taken as concluding that debentures or bonds which are truly shams, in that they do not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and do not create a real debt owed by the company, will suffice. Clearly, they will not. I do not, however, equate the two. One is a tactical device used to gain the potential advantages of the Act. The other is a fraud.

84 Nor does my conclusion that "instant" trust deeds can bring a debtor company within the Act exclude considerations of the good faith of the debtor company in seeking the protection of the Act. A debtor company should not be allowed to use the Act for any purpose other than to attempt a legitimate reorganization. If the purpose of the application is to advantage one creditor over another, to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors, to delay the inevitable failure of the debtor company, or for some other improper purpose, the Court has the means available to it, apart entirely from s. 3 of the Act, to prevent misuse of the Act. In cases where the debtor company acts in bad faith, the Court may refuse to order a meeting of creditors, it may deny interim protection, it may vary interim protection initially given when the bad faith is shown, or it may refuse to sanction any plan which emanates from the meeting of the creditors: see Lawrence J. Crozier, "Good Faith and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1989) 15 Can. Bus. L.J. 89.

(ii) Section 3 and the Prior Agreement with the Bank Limiting Creation of New Debt

85 The appellant also argues that the debentures did not meet the requirements of s. 3 of the Act because they were issued in contravention of a security agreement made between the companies and the bank. Assuming that the debentures were issued in contravention of that agreement, I do not understand how that contravention affects the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act. The bank may well have an action against the debtor company for issuing the debentures, and it may have remedies against the holders of the debentures if they attempted to collect on their debt or enforce their security. Neither possibility, however, negates the existence of the debentures and the related trust deeds. Section 3 does not contemplate an inquiry into the effectiveness or enforceability of the s. 3 debentures, as

against other creditors, as a condition precedent to qualification under the Act. Such inquiries may play a role in a judge's determination as to what orders, if any, should be made under the Act.

(iii) Section 3 and the Appointment of a Receiver-Manager

86 The third argument made by the bank relies on its installation of a receiver-manager in both companies prior to the issue of the debentures. I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the placement of a receiver, either by operation of the terms of an agreement or by court order, effectively removes those formerly in control of the company from that position, and vests that control in the receiver-manager: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd without deciding this point (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.). I cannot, however, agree with his interpretation of the order of Saunders J. I read that order as effectively turning the receiver into a monitor with rights of access, but with no authority beyond that. The operation of the business is specifically returned to the companies. The situation created by the order of Saunders J. can usefully be compared to that which existed when the application was made in *Hat Development Ltd.* Forsyth J., at p. 268 C.B.R., states:

> The receiver-manager in this case and indeed in almost all cases is charged by the court with the responsibility of managing the affairs of a corporation. It is true that it is appointed pursuant, in this case, to the existence of secured indebtedness and at the behest of a secured creditor to realize on its security and retire the indebtedness. Nonetheless, this receiver-manager was court-appointed and not by virtue of an instrument. As a court-appointed receiver it owed the obligation and the duty to the court to account from time to time and to come before the court for the purposes of having some of its decisions ratified or for receiving advice and direction. *It is empowered by the court to manage the affairs of the company and it is completely inconsistent with that function to suggest that some residual power lies in the hands of the directors of the company to create further indebtedness of the company and thus interfere, however slightly, with the receiver-manager's ability to manage.*

[Emphasis added.]

87 After the order of Saunders J., the receiver-manager in this case was not obligated to manage the companies. Indeed, it was forbidden from doing so. The creation of the "instant" trust deeds and the application under the Act did not interfere in any way with any power or authority the receiver-manager had after the order of Saunders J. was made.

88 I also find it somewhat artificial to suggest that the presence of a receiver-manager served to vitiate the orders of Hoolihan J. Unlike many applications under s. 5 of the Act, the proceedings before Hoolihan J. were not ex parte and he was fully aware of the existence of the receiver-manager, the order of Saunders J., and the arguments based on the presence of the receiver-manager. Clearly, Hoolihan J. considered it appropriate to proceed with a plan of reorganization despite the presence of the receiver-manager and the order of Saunders J. Indeed, in his initial order he provided that the order of Saunders J. "remains extant." Hoolihan J. did not, as I do not, see that order as an impediment to the application or the granting of relief under the Act. Had he considered that the receiver-manager was in control of the affairs of the company, he could have varied the order of Saunders J. to permit the applications under the Act to be made by the companies: *Hat Development Ltd.*, at pp. 268-269 C.B.R. It is clear to me that he would have done so had he felt it necessary. If the installation of the receiver-manager is to be viewed as a bar to an application under this Act, and if the orders of Hoolihan J. were otherwise appropriate, I would order that the order of Saunders J. should be varied to permit the creation of the debentures and the trust deeds and the bringing of this application by the companies. I take this power to exist by the combined effect of s. 14(2) of the Act and s. 144(1) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11.

89 In my opinion, the debentures and "instant" trust deeds created in August 1990 sufficed to bring the company within the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, even if in issuing those debentures the companies breached a prior agreement with the bank. I am also satisfied that, given the terms of the order of Saunders J., the existence of a receiver-manager installed by the bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the Act.

V Did Hoolihan J. Err in Exercising his Discretion in Favour of Directing that a Creditors' Meeting be Held to Consider the Proposed Plan of Reorganization?

90 As indicated earlier, the Act provides a number of points at which the Court must exercise its discretion. I am concerned with the initial exercise of discretion contemplated by s. 5 of the Act, by which the Court may order a meeting of creditors for purposes of considering a plan of reorganization. Hoolihan J. exercised that discretion in favour of the debtor companies. The factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion are as variable as the fact situations which may give rise to the application. Finlayson J.A. has concentrated on one such factor, the chance that the plan, if put before a properly constituted meeting of the creditors, could gain the required approval. I agree that the feasibility of the plan is a relevant and significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors: S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at pp. 594-595. I would not, however, impose a heavy burden on the debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success from the outset. As the Act will often be the last refuge for failing companies, it is to be expected that many of the proposed plans of reorganization will involve variables and contingencies which will make the plan's ultimate acceptability to the creditors and the Court very uncertain at the time the initial application is made.

91 On the facts before Hoolihan J., there were several factors which supported the exercise of his discretion in favour of directing a meeting of the creditors. These included the apparent support of two of the three substantial secured creditors, the companies' continued operation, and the prospect (disputed by the bank) that the companies' fortunes would take a turn for the better in the near future, the companies' ongoing efforts — that eventually met with some success — to find alternate financing, and the number of people depending on the operation of the company for their livelihood. There were also a number of factors pointing in the other direction, the most significant of which was the likelihood that a plan of reorganization acceptable to the bank could not be developed.

92 I see the situation which presented itself to Hoolihan J. as capable of a relatively straightforward risk-benefit analysis. If the s. 5 order had been refused by Hoolihan J., it was virtually certain that the operation of the companies would have ceased immediately. There would have been immediate economic and social damage to those who worked at the plants, and those who depended on those who worked at the plants for their well-being. This kind of damage cannot be ignored, especially when it occurs in small communities like those in which these plants are located. A refusal to grant the application would also have put the investments of the various creditors, with the exception of the bank, at substantial risk. Finally, there would have been obvious financial damage to the owner of the companies. Balanced against these costs inherent in refusing the order would be the benefit to the bank, which would then have been in a position to realize on its security in accordance with its agreements with the companies.

93 The granting of the s. 5 order was not without its costs. It has denied the bank the rights it had bargained for as part of its agreement to lend substantial amounts of money to the companies. Further, according to the bank, the order has put the bank at risk of having its loans become undersecured because of the diminishing value of the accounts receivable and inventory which it holds as security and because of the ever-increasing size of the companies' debt to the bank. These costs must be measured against the potential benefit to all concerned if a successful plan of reorganization could be developed and implemented.

94 As I see it, the key to this analysis rests in the measurement of the risk to the bank inherent in the granting of the s. 5 order. If there was a real risk that the loan made by the bank would become undersecured during the operative period of the s. 5 order, I would be inclined to hold that the bank should not have that risk forced on it by the Court. However, I am unable to see that the bank is in any real jeopardy. The value of the security held by the bank appears to be well in excess of the size of its loan on the initial application. In his affidavit, Mr. Gibbons of Coopers & Lybrand asserted that the companies had overstated their cash flow projections, that the value of the inventory could diminish if customers of the companies looked to alternate sources for their product, and that the value of the accounts receivable could decrease if customers began to claim set-offs against those receivables. On the record before me, these appear to be no more than speculative possibilities. The bank has had access to all of the companies' financial data on an ongoing

basis since the order of Hoolihan J. was made almost 2 months ago. Nothing was placed before this Court to suggest that any of the possibilities described above had come to pass.

95 Even allowing for some overestimation by the companies of the value of the security held by the bank, it would appear that the bank holds security valued at approximately $4 million for a loan that was, as of the hearing of this appeal, about $2.3 million. The order of Hoolihan J. was to terminate no later than November 14, 1990. I am not satisfied that the bank ran any real risk of having the amount of the loan exceed the value of the security by that date. It is also worth noting that the order under appeal provided that any party could apply to terminate the order at any point prior to November 14. This provision provided further protection for the bank in the event that it wished to make the case that its loan was at risk because of the deteriorating value of its security.

96 Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, I am satisfied that the benefits flowing from the making of the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in that order. In my view, Hoolihan J. properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the Act.

VI Did Hoolihan J. Err in Directing that the Bank and RoyNat Inc. Should be Placed in the Same Class for the Purposes of the Act?

97 I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the bank and RoyNat Inc., the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. Their interests are not only different, they are opposed. The classification scheme created by Hoolihan J. effectively denied the bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

98 To accord with the principles found in the cases cited by Finlayson J.A., the secured creditors should have been grouped as follows:

— Class 1 — The City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe

— Class 2 — The Bank of Nova Scotia

— Class 3 — RoyNat Inc., Ontario Development Corporation, and those holding debentures issued by the company on August 29 and 31, 1990.

VII Did Hoolihan J. Err in Making the Interim Orders He Made?

99 Hoolihan J. made a number of orders designed to control the conduct of all of the parties, pending the creditors' meeting and the placing of a plan of reorganization before the Court. The first order was made on September 11, 1990, and was to expire on or before October 24, 1990. Subsequent orders varied the terms of the initial order somewhat, and extended its effective date until November 14, 1990.

100 These orders imposed the following conditions pending the meeting:

(a) all proceedings with respect to the debtor companies should be stayed, including any action by the bank to realize on its security;

(b) the bank could not reduce its loan by applying incoming receipts to those debts;

(c) the bank was to be the sole banker for the companies;

(d) the companies could carry on business in the normal course, subject to certain very specific restrictions;

(e) a licensed trustee was to be appointed to monitor the business operations of the companies and to report to the creditors on a regular basis; and

(f) any party could apply to terminate the interim orders, and the orders would be terminated automatically if the companies defaulted on any of the obligations imposed on them by the interim orders.

101 The orders placed significant restrictions on the bank for a 2-month period, but balanced those restrictions with provisions limiting the debtor companies' activities, and giving the bank ongoing access to up-to-date financial information concerning the companies. The bank was also at liberty to return to the Court to request any variation in the interim orders which changes in financial circumstances might merit.

102 These orders were made under the wide authority granted to the court by s. 11 of the Act. L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, in *Bankruptcy Law of Canada*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at pp. 2-102 to 2-103, describe the purpose of the section:

> The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and it creditors. This aim is facilitated by s. 11 of the Act, which enables the court to restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company upon such terms as the court sees fit.

103 A similar sentiment appears in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*. Gibbs J.A., in discussing the scope of s. 11, said at p. 7 [unreported, pp. 88-89 B.C.L.R.]:

> When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

104 Similar views of the scope of the power to make interim orders covering the period when reorganization is being attempted are found in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd.*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) at 114-118 [C.B.R.]; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) at 12-15 [C.B.R.]; *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, an unreported judgment of Thackray J., released June 18, 1990 [since reported (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.)], at pp. 5-9 [pp. 196-198 B.C.L.R.]; and B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 41.

105 The interim orders made by Hoolihan J. are all within the wide authority created by s. 11 of the Act. The orders were crafted to give the company the opportunity to continue in operation, pending its attempt to reorganize, while at the same time providing safeguards to the creditors, including the bank, during that same period. I find no error in the interim relief granted by Hoolihan J.

VIII Conclusion

106 In the result, I would allow the appeal in part, vacate the order of Hoolihan J. of October 18, 1990, insofar as it purports to settle the class of creditors for the purpose of the Act, and I would substitute an order establishing the three classes referred to in Part VI of these reasons. I would not disturb any of the other orders made by Hoolihan J.

Appeal allowed.

TAB 5

CITATION: Target Canada Co. (Re), 2016 ONSC 316
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-10832-00CL
DATE: 2016-01-15

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP., and TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC.

BEFORE: Regional Senior Justice Morawetz

COUNSEL: *Jeremy Dacks, Shawn Irving* and *Tracy Sandler* for Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC (the "Applicants")

Linda Galessiere and *Gus Camelino* for 20 VIC Management Inc. (on behalf of various landlords), Morguard Investments Limited (on behalf of various landlords), Calloway Real Estate Investment Trust (on behalf of Calloway REIT (Hopedale) Inc.), Calloway REIT (Laurentian Inc.), Crombie REIT, Triovest Realty Advisors Inc. (on behalf of various landlords), Brad-Lea Meadows Limited and Blackwood Partners Management Corporation (on behalf of Surrey CC Properties Inc.)

Laura M. Wagner and *Mathew P. Gottlieb* for KingSett Capital Inc.

Yannick Katirai and *Daniel Hamson* for Eleven Points Logistics Inc.

Daniel Walker for M.E.T.R.O. (Manufacture, Export, Trade, Research Office) Incorporated / Kerson Invested Limited

Jay A. Schwartz, Robin Schwill for Target Corporation

Miranda Spence for CREIT

Jay Carfagnini, Jesse Mighton, Alan Mark and Melaney Wagner for Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. in its capacity as Monitor

James Harnum for Employee Representative Counsel

Harvey Chaiton for the Directors and Officers of the Applicants

Stephen M. Raicek and *Mathew Maloley* for Faubourg Boisbriand Shopping Centre Limited and Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada

Vern W. DaRe for Doral Holdings Limited and 430635 Ontario Inc.

Stuart Brotman for Sobeys Capital Incorporated

Catherine Francis for Primaris Reit

Kyla Mahar for Centerbridge Partners and Davidson Kempner

William V. Sasso, Pharmacist Representative Counsel

Varoujan C. Arman for Nintendo of Canada Ltd., Universal Studios Canada Inc., Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, RPI Consulting Group Inc.

Brian Parker for Montez (Cornerbrook) Inc., Admns Meadowlands Investment Corp, and Valiant Rental Inc.

Roger Jaipargas for Glentel Inc., Bell Canada and BCE Nexxia

Nancy Tourgis for Issi Inc.

HEARD: December 21, 2015 & December 22, 2015

SUPPLEMENTARY WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: December 30, 2015, January 6, 2016 and January 8, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The Applicants Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp, Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp, Target Canada Pharmacy Corp, Target Canada Pharmacy (Sk) Corp, and Target Canada Property LLC ("Target Canada") bring this motion for an order, *inter alia*:

(a) accepting the filing of a Joint Plan Compromise and Arrangement in respect of Target Canada Entities (defined below) dated November 27, 2015 (the "Plan");

(b) authorizing the Target Canada Entities to establish one class of Affected Creditors (as defined in the Plan) for the purpose of considering and voting on the Plan (the "Unsecured Creditors' Class");

(c) authorizing the Target Canada Entities to call, hold and conduct a meeting of the Affected Creditors (the "Creditors' Meeting") to consider and vote on a resolution to approve the Plan, and approving the procedures to be followed with respect to the Creditors' Meeting;

(d) setting the date for the hearing of the Target Canada Entities' motion seeking sanction of the Plan should the Plan be approved by the required majority of Affected Creditors of the Creditors Meeting.

[2] On January 13, 2016, the Record was endorsed as follows: "The Plan is not accepted for filing. The Motion is dismissed. Reasons to follow."

[3] These are the reasons.

[4] The Applicants and Partnerships listed on Schedule "A" to the Initial Order (the "Target Canada Entities") were granted protection from their creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") pursuant to the Initial Order dated January 15, 2015 (as Amended and Restated, the "Initial Order"). Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was appointed in the Initial Order to act as the Monitor. [1]

[5] The Target Canada Entities, with the support of Target Corporation as Plan Sponsor, have now developed a Plan to present to Affected Creditors.

[6] The Target Canada Entities propose that the Creditors' Meeting will be held on February 2, 2016.

[7] The requested relief sought by Target Canada is supported by Target Corporation, Employee Representative Counsel, Centerbridge Partners, L.P. and Davidson Kempner,

[1] Capitalized terms not defined herein have the same meaning as set out in the Plan.

CREIT, Glentel Inc., Bell Canada and BCE Nexxia, M.E.T.R.O. Incorporated, Eleven Points Logistics Inc., Issi Inc. and Sobeys Capital Incorporated.

[8] The Monitor also supports the motion.

[9] The motion was opposed by KingSett Capital, Morguard Investments Limited, Morguard Investment REIT, Smart REIT, Crombie REIT, Triovest, Faubourg Boisbriand and Sun Life Assurance, Primaris REIT, and Doral Holdings Limited (the "Objecting Landlords").

Background

[10] In February 2015, the court approved the Inventory Liquidation Process and the Real Property Portfolio Sale Process ("RPPSP") to enable the Target Canada Entities to maximize the value of their assets for distribution to creditors.

[11] By the summer of 2015, the processes were substantially concluded and a claims process was undertaken. The Target Canada Entities began to develop a plan that would distribute the proceeds and complete the orderly wind-down of their business.

[12] The Target Canada Entities discussed the development of the Plan with representatives of Target Corporation.

[13] The Target Canada Entities negotiated a structure with Target Corporation whereby Target Corporation would subordinate significant intercompany claims for the benefit of remaining creditors and would make other contributions under the Plan.

[14] Target Corporation maintained that it would only consider subordinating these intercompany claims and making other contributions as part of a global settlement of all issues relating to the Target Canada Entities including a settlement and release of all Landlord Guarantee Claims where Target Corporation was the Guarantor.

[15] The Plan as structured, if approved, sanctioned and implemented will

(i) complete the wind-down of the Target Canada Entities;

(ii) effect a compromise, settlement and payment of all Proven Claims; and

(iii) grant releases of the Target Canada Entities and Target Corporation, among others.

[16] The Plan provides that, for the purposes of considering and voting on the plan, the Affected Creditors will constitute a single class (the "Unsecured Creditors' Class").

[17] In the majority of CCAA proceedings, motions of this type are procedural in nature and more often than not they proceed without any significant controversy. This proceeding is, however, not the usual proceeding and this motion has attracted significant controversy. The Objecting Landlords have raised concerns about the terms of the Plan.

[18] The Objecting Landlords take the position that this motion deals with not only procedural issues but substantive rights. The Objecting Landlords have two major concerns.

Objection # 1 – Breach of paragraph 19A of the Amended and Restated Order

[19] First, in February 2015, an Amended and Restated Order was sought by Target Canada. Paragraph 19A was incorporated into the Amended and Restated Order, which provides that the claims of any landlord against Target Corporation relating to any lease of real property (the "Landlord Guarantee Claims") shall not be determined in this CCAA proceeding and shall not be released or affected in any way in any plan filed by the Applicants.

[20] Paragraph 19A provides as follows:

> 19A. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without in any way altering, increasing, creating or eliminating any obligation or duty to mitigate losses or damages, the rights, remedies and claims (collectively, the "Landlord Guarantee Claims") of any landlord against Target US pursuant to any indemnity, guarantee, or surety relating to a lease of real property, including, without limitation, the validity, enforceability or quantum of such Landlord Guarantee Claims: (a) shall be determined by a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List), whether or not the within proceeding under the CCAA continue (without altering the applicable and operative governing law of such indemnity, guarantee or surety) and notwithstanding the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes with respect to procedural matters relating to the Landlord Guarantee Claims; provided that any landlord holding such guarantees, indemnities or sureties that has not consented to the foregoing may, within fifteen (15) days of the making of this Order, bring a motion to have the matter of the venue for

the determination of its Landlord Guarantee Claim adjudicated by the Court; (b) shall not be determined, directly or indirectly, in the within CCAA proceedings; (c) shall be unaffected by any determination (including any findings of fact, mixed fact and law or conclusions of law) of any rights, remedies and claims of such landlords as against Target Canada Entities, whether made in the within proceedings under the CCAA or in any subsequent proposal or bankruptcy proceedings under the BIA, other than that any recoveries under such proceedings received by such landlords shall constitute a reduction and offset to any Landlord Guarantee Claims; and (d) shall be treated as unaffected and shall not be released or affected in any way in any Plan filed by the Target Canada Entities, or any of them, under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Target Canada Entities, or any of them, under the BIA.

[21] The evidence of Target Canada in support of the requested change consisted of the Affidavit of Mark Wong, who stated at the time:

"A component of obtaining the consent of the Landlord Group for approval of the Real Property Portfolio Sales Process ("RPPSP") was the agreement of The Target Canada Entities to seek approval of certain changes to the initial order in the form of an amended and restated initial order...[T]hese proposed changes were the subject of significant negotiation between the Landlord Group and The Target Canada Entities, with the assistance and input of the Monitor and Target Corporation."

[22] The Monitor, in its second report dated February 9, 2015, stated:

(3.4) Counsel to the Landlord Group advised that the Real Property Portfolio Sales Process proceeding on a consensual basis as described below is conditional on the proposed changes to the initial order.

(3.5) The Monitor recommends approval of the amended and restated initial order as it reflects;

(a) revisions negotiated as among The Target Canada Entities, the Landlord Group and Target U.S. (in conjunction with revisions to the Real Property Portfolio Sales Process), with the assistance of the Monitor; and

(b) a fair and reasonable balancing of interests.

[23] Thus, Objecting Landlords contend that the agreement resulting in Paragraph 19A of the Amended and Restated Initial Order was not just a condition of the Landlord Group's agreement to the RPPSP – it was also a condition of the Landlord Group withdrawing both its opposition to the CCAA process and its intention to commence a bankruptcy application to put the Applicants into bankruptcy at the come back hearing.

[24] The Objecting Landlords contend that the Applicants now seek to file a plan that releases the Landlord Guarantee Claims. This, in their view, is a clear breach of paragraph 19A, which Target Canada sought and the Monitor supported.

Objection # 2 – Breach of paragraph 55 of the Claim Procedure Order

[25] Second, the Objecting Landlords contend that the Plan violates the Claims Procedure Order and the CCAA. They argue that the Claims Procedure Order was also settled after prolonged negotiations between the Target Canada Entities and their creditors, including the landlords and that this order sets out a comprehensive claims process for determining all claims, including landlords' claims.

[26] The Objecting Landlords contend that Paragraph 55 of the Claims Procedure Order expressly excludes Landlord Guarantee Claims and provides that nothing in the Claims Procedure Order shall prejudice, limit, or otherwise affect any claims, including under any guarantee, against Target Corporation or any predecessor tenant. Paragraph 55 also ends with the *proviso* that "[f]or greater certainty, this Order is subject to and shall not derogate from paragraph 19A of the Initial Order."

[27] The Objecting Landlords take the position that, in clear breach of Paragraph 55 and of the Claims Procedure Order generally, the Plan provides for a set formula to determine landlord claims, including claims against Target Corporation under its guarantees. KingSett further contends that the formula not only purports to determine landlords' claims for distribution purposes, it also purports to determine their claims for voting purposes, with no ability to challenge either. KingSett contends that this violates the terms of the Claims Procedure Order that was sought by the Applicants and supported by the Monitor.

[28] In summary, the Objecting Landlords take the position that the foregoing issues are crucial threshold issues and are not merely "procedural" questions and as such the court has to determine whether it can accept a plan for filing if that plan in effect permits Target Canada to renege on their agreements with creditors, violate court orders and the CCAA.

[29] In my view the issues raised by the Objecting Landlords are significant and they should be determined at this time.

Position of Target Canada

[30] Target Canada takes the position that the threshold for the court to authorize Target Canada to hold the creditors meeting is low and that Target Canada meets this threshold.

[31] Target Canada submits that the Plan has been the subject of numerous discussions and/or negotiations with Target Corporation (leading to a structure based on Target Corporation serving as Plan Sponsor), the Monitor and a wide variety of stakeholders. Target Canada states that if approved, the Plan will effect a compromise, settlement and payment of all proven claims in the near term in a manner that maximizes and accelerates stakeholder recovery.

[32] Target Corporation, as Plan Sponsor and a creditor of Target Canada, has agreed to subordinate approximately $5 billion in intercompany claims to the claims of other Affected Creditors. Based on the Monitor's preliminary analysis, the Plan provides for recoveries for Affected Creditors generally in the range of 75% to 85% of their proven claims.

[33] Target Canada contends that recent case law supports the jurisdiction of the CCAA court to provide that third party claims be addressed within the CCAA and leaves it open to a debtor company to address such claims in a plan.

[34] The Plan provides that Affected Creditors will vote on the Plan as a single unsecured class. Target Canada submits that this is appropriate on the basis that all Affected Creditors have the required commonality of interest (i.e. an unsecured claim) in relation to the claims against Target Canada and the Plan will compromise and release all of their claims.

[35] Target Canada is of the view that fragmentation of these creditors into separate classes would jeopardize the ability to achieve a successful plan.

[36] The Plan values the Landlord Restructuring Period Claims of landlords whose leases have been disclaimed by applying a formula ("Landlord Formula Amount") derived from the formula provided under s. 65.2 (3) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA" and "BIA Formula"). The Landlord Formula Amount enhances the BIA Formula by permitting recovery of an additional year of rent. Target Corporation intends to contribute funds necessary to pay this enhancement (the "Landlord Guarantee Top-Up Amounts") Target Canada contends that the use of the BIA Formula to value landlord claims for voting and distribution purposes has been approved in other CCAA proceedings.

[37] With respect to the Landlord Formula Amount to calculate the Landlord Restructuring Period Claims, the formula provides for, in effect, Landlord Restructuring Period Claims to be valued at the lesser of either:

(i) rent payable under the lease for the two years following the disclaimer plus 15% of the rent for the remainder of the lease term; or

(ii) four years rent.

[38] Target Canada further contends that the court has the jurisdiction to modify the Initial Order on Plan Implementation to permit the Target Canada Entities to address Landlord Guarantee Claims in the Plan and that it is appropriate to do so in these circumstances. This justification is based on the premise that the landscape of the proceedings has been significantly altered since the filing date, particularly in light of the material contributions that Target Corporation prepared to make as Plan Sponsor in order to effect a global resolution of issues. Further, they argue that Landlord Guarantee Creditors are appropriately compensated under the Plan for their Landlord Guarantee Claims by means of the Landlord Guarantee Creditor Top-Up amounts, which will be funded by Target Corporation. As such, Landlord Guarantee Creditors will be paid 100% of their Landlord Restructuring Period Claims, valued in accordance with the Landlord Formula Amount.

[39] The Applicants contend that they seek to achieve a fair and equitable balance in the Plan. The Applicants submit that questions as to whether the Plan is in fact balanced, and fair and reasonable towards particular stakeholders, are matters best assessed by Affected Creditors who will exercise their business judgment in voting for or against the Plan. Until Affected Creditors have expressed their views, considerations of fairness are premature and are not matters that are required to be considered by the court in granting the requested Creditors' Meeting. If the Plan is approved by the requisite majority of the Affected Creditors, the court will then be in a position to fully evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan as a whole, with the benefit of the business judgment of Affected Creditors as reflected in the vote of the Creditors' Meeting.

[40] The significant features of the Plan include:

(i) the Plan contemplates that a single class of Affected Creditors will consider and vote on the plan.

(ii) the Plan entitles Affected Creditors holding proven claims that are less than or equal to $25,000 ("Convenience Class Creditors") to be paid in full;

(iii) the Plan provides that all Landlord Restructuring Period Claims will be calculated using the Landlord Formula Amount derived from the BIA Formula;

(iv) As a result of direct funding from Target Corporation of the Landlord Guarantee Creditor Top-Up amounts, Landlord Guarantee Creditors will be paid the full value of their Landlord Restructuring Period Claims;

(v) Intercompany Claims will be valued at the amount set out in the Monitor's Intercompany Claims Report;

(vi) If approved and sanctioned, the Plan will require an amendment to Paragraph 19A of the Initial Order which currently provides that the Landlord Guarantee Claims are to be dealt with outside these CCAA proceedings. The Plan provides that this amendment will be addressed at the sanction hearing once it has been determined whether the Affected Creditors support the Plan.

(vii) In exchange for Target Corporations' economic contributions, Target Corporation and certain other third parties (including Hudson's Bay Company and Zellers, which have indemnities from Target Corporation) will be released, including in relation to all Landlord Guarantee Claims.

[41] If the Plan is approved and implemented, Target Corporation will be making economic contributions to the Plan. In particular:

(a) In addition to the subordination of the $3.1 billion intercompany claim that Target Corporation agreed to subordinate at the outset of these CCAA proceedings, on Plan Implementation Date, Target Corporation will cause Property LLP to subordinate almost all of the Property LLP ("Propco") Intercompany Claim which was filed against Propco in an additional amount of approximately $1.4 billion;

(b) In turn, Propco will concurrently subordinate the Propco Intercompany Claim filed against TCC in an amount of approximately $1.9 billion (adjusted by the Monitor to $1.3 billion);

(c) Target Corporation will contribute funds necessary to pay the Landlord Guarantee Creditor Top-Up Amounts.

[42] Target Canada points out that in discussions with Target Corporation to establish the structure for the Plan, Target Corporation maintained that it would only consider subordinating these remaining intercompany claims as part of a global settlement of all issues relating to the Target Canada Entities, including all Landlord Guarantee Claims.

[43] The issue on this motion is whether the requested Creditors' Meeting should be granted. Section 4 of the CCAA provides:

4. Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, or any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

[44] Counsel cites *Nova Metal Products* for the proposition that the feasibility of a plan is a relevant significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors. However, the court should not impose a heavy burden on a debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success at the outset (*Nova Metal Products v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (C.A.).

[45] Counsel submit that the court should order a meeting of creditors unless there is no hope that the plan will be approved by the creditors or, if approved, the plan would not for some other reason be approved by the court (*ScoZinc Ltd.*, Re, 2009 NSSC 163, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 205).

[46] Counsel also submits that the court has described the granting of the Creditors' Meeting as essentially a "procedural step" that does not engage considerations of whether the debtors' plan is fair and reasonable. Thus, counsel contends, unless it is abundantly clear the plan will not be approved by its creditors, the debtor company is entitled to put its plan before those creditors and to allow the creditors to exercise their business judgment in determining whether to support or reject it.

[47] Target Canada takes the position that there is no basis for concluding that the Plan has, no hope of success and the court should therefore exercise its discretion to order the Creditors Meeting.

[48] Counsel to Target Canada submits that the flexibility of the CCAA allows the Target Canada Entities to apply a uniform formula for valuing Landlord Restructuring Period Claims for voting and distribution purposes, including Landlord Guarantee Claims, in the interests of ensuring expeditious distributions to all Affected Creditors

[49] Counsel contends that if each Landlord Restructuring Period Claim had to be individually calculated based on the unique facts applicable to each lease, including future prospects for mitigation and uncertain collateral damage, the resulting disputes would embroil disputes between landlords and the Target Canada Entities in lengthy proceedings. Counsel contends that the issue relating to the Landlord Guarantee Claims is more properly a matter of

the overall fairness and reasonableness of the Plan and should be addressed at the sanction hearing.

[50] The Plan also contemplates releases for the benefit of Target Corporation and other third parties to recognize the material economic contribution that have resulted in favourable recoveries for Affected Creditors. These releases, Target Canada contends, satisfy the well established test for the CCAA court to approve third party releases. (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, (2008) 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], affirmed 2008 ONCA 587, (sub nom. Re *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*)

[51] Likewise, the issue of Third Party Claims and Third Party Releases is a matter that can be addressed at sanction.

[52] With respect to the amendment to Paragraph 19A of the Initial Order, counsel submits that since the date of the Initial Order, and since this paragraph was included in the Initial Order, the landscape of the restructuring has shifted considerably, most notably in the form of the economic contributions that are being offered by Target Corporation, as Plan Sponsor.

[53] The Target Entities propose that on Plan Implementation, Paragraph 19A of the Initial Order will be deleted. Counsel submits that the court has the jurisdiction to amend the Initial Order through its broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances and further, the court would be exercising its discretion to amend its own order, on the basis that it is just and appropriate to do so in these particular circumstances. Counsel submits that the requested amendment is essential to the success of the Plan and to maximize and expedite recoveries for all stakeholders. Further, the notion that a post-filing contract cannot be amended despite subsequent events fails to do justice to the flexible and "real time" nature of a CCAA proceeding.

[54] As such, counsel contends that no further information is necessary in order for the landlords to determine whether the Plan is fair and reasonable and they are in a position to vote for or against the Plan.

Position of the Objecting Landlords

[55] At the outset of this proceeding, Target Canada, Target Corporation and Target Canada's landlords agreed that Landlord Guarantee Claims would not be affected by any Plan. In exchange, several landlords with Landlord Guarantee Claims agreed to withdraw their opposition to Target Canada proceeding with the liquidation under the CCAA and the RPPSP.

[56] Counsel to the landlords submit that 10 months after having received the benefit of the landlords not opposing the RPPSP and the continuation of the CCAA, Target Canada seeks the court's approval to unequivocally renege on the agreement that violates the Amended Order by filing a Plan that compromises Landlord Guarantee Claims.

[57] The Objecting Landlords also contend that the proposed plan violates the Amended Order and the Claims Procedure Order by purporting to the value the landlords' claims, including all Landlord Guarantee Claims, using a formula.

[58] Objecting Landlords take the position that they have claims against Target Canada as a result of its disclaimer of long term leases, guaranteed by Target Corporation, in excess of the amount that the Plan values these claim. One example is the claim of KingSett. KingSett insists they have a claim of at least $26 million which has been valued for Plan purposes at $4 million plus taxes.

[59] The Objecting Landlords submit that the court cannot and should not allow a plan to be filed that violates the court's orders and agreements made by the Applicant. Further, if the motion is granted, the CCAA will no longer allow for a reliable process pursuant to which creditors can expect to negotiate with an Applicant in good faith. Counsel contends that the amendment of the Initial Order to buttress the agreement between the parties not to compromise the Landlord Guarantee Claims was intended to strengthen, not weaken, the landlords' ability to enforce Target Canada and Target Corporation's contractual obligation not to file a plan that compromises Landlord Guarantee Claims and it would be a perverse outcome for the court to hold otherwise.

[60] With respect to claims procedure, the Claims Procedure Order provides in Paragraph 32 that a claim that is subject to a dispute "shall" be referred to a claims officer of the court for adjudication. The Objecting Landlords submit that the Claims Procedure Order reaffirms the agreement between Target Canada, Target Corporation and the Landlord Group with respect to Landlord Guarantee Claims; they refer to Paragraph 55 which specifically provides that nothing in the order shall prejudice, limit, bar, extinguish or otherwise affect any rights or claims, including under any guarantee or indemnity, against Target Corporation or any predecessor tenant.

[61] Counsel for the Objecting Landlords submit that the Plan provides the basis for Target Corporation to avoid its obligation to honour guarantees to landlords, which Target Corporation agreed would not be compromised as part of the CCAA proceedings. Counsel contends that the Plan seeks to use the leverage of the "Plan Sponsor" against the creditors to obtain approval to renege on its obligations. This, according to counsel, amounts to an economic decision by Target Corporation in its own financial interest.

[62] In support of its proposition that the court cannot accept a plan's call for a meeting where the plan cannot be sanctioned, counsel references *Crystallex International Corp.*, Re, 2013 ONSC 823, 2013 CarswellOnt 3043 [Commercial List]. Counsel submits that the court should not allow the Applicants to file a plan that from the outset cannot be sanctioned because it violates court orders or is otherwise improper.

[63] In this case, counsel submits that the Plan cannot be accepted for filing because it violates Paragraph 19A of the Amended Order and Paragraph 55 of the Claims Procedure Order. The Objecting Landlords stated as follows:

> Paragraph 19A of the Amended Order is unequivocal. Landlord Guarantee Claims:
>
> (a) shall not be determined, directly or indirectly, in the CCAA proceeding;
>
> (b) shall be unaffected by any determination of claims of landlords against Target Canada; and,

> (c) shall be treated as unaffected and shall not be released or affected in any way in any Plan filed by Target Canada under the CCAA.

Likewise, the Claims Procedure Order, as amended, clearly provides that:

> (a) disputed creditors' claims shall be adjudicated by a Claims Officer or the Court;
>
> (b) creditors have until February 12, 2016 to object to intercreditor claims; and,
>
> (c) the claims process shall not affect Landlord Guarantee Claims and shall not derogate from paragraph 19A of the Amended Order.

There is no dispute that the Plan that Target Canada now seeks to file violates these terms of the Amended Order and the Claims Procedure Order...

[64] With respect to the issue of Paragraph 19A, counsel submits that this provision benefits Target Canada's creditors who have guarantees from Target Corporation. Further, under the plan, these creditors gain nothing from subordination of Target Corporation's intercompany claim, which only benefits creditors who did not obtain guarantees from Target Corporation. Counsel referred to *Alternative Fuel Systems Inc.*, Re, 2003 ABQB 745, 20 Alta. L.R. (4th) 264, aff'd 2004 ABCA 31, 346 A.R. 28, where both courts emphasized the importance of following a claims procedure and complying with ss. 20(1)(a)(iii) to determine landlord claims.

[65] Accordingly, counsel submits that barring landlord consent at the claims process stage of the CCAA proceeding, the court cannot unilaterally impose a cookie cutter formula to determine landlord claims at the plan stage.

Analysis

[66] Target Canada submits that the threshold for the court to authorize Target Canada to hold the creditors meeting is low and that Target Canada meets this threshold.

[67] In my view, it is not necessary to comment on this submission insofar as this Plan is flawed to the extent that even the low threshold test has not been met.

[68] Simply put, I am of the view that this Plan does not have even a reasonable chance of success, as it could not, in this form, be sanctioned.

[69] As such, I see no point in directing Target Canada to call and conduct a meeting of creditors to consider this Plan, as proceeding with a meeting in these circumstances would only result in a waste of time and money.

[70] Even if the Affected Creditors voted in favour of the Plan in the requisite amounts, the court examines three criteria at the sanction hearing:

(i) Whether there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

(ii) Whether all materials filed and procedures carried out were authorized by the CCAA;

(iii) Whether the Plan is fair and reasonable.

(See *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C.S.C.); *Re Dairy Corp. of Canada Ltd.*, [1934] O.R. 436 (Ont. S.C.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 182, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.); *Re BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp.* (2000), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[71] As explained below, the Plan cannot meet the required criteria.

[72] It is incumbent upon the court, in its supervisory role, to ensure that the CCAA process unfolds in a fair and transparent manner. It is in this area that this Plan falls short. In considering whether to order a meeting of creditors to consider this Plan, the relevant question to consider is the following: Should certain landlords, who hold guarantees from Target Corporation, a non-debtor, be required, through the CCAA proceedings of Target Canada, to

release Target Corporation from its guarantee in exchange for consideration in the Plan in the form of the Landlord Formula Amount?

[73] The CCAA proceedings of Target Canada were commenced a year ago. A broad stay of proceedings was put into effect. Target Canada put forward a proposal to liquidate its assets. The record establishes that from the outset, it was clear that the Objecting Landlords were concerned about whether the CCAA proceedings would be used in a manner that would affect the guarantees they held from Target Corporation.

[74] The record also establishes that the Objecting Landlords, together with Target Canada and Target Corporation, reached an understanding which was formalized through the addition of paragraph 19A to the Initial and Restated Order. Paragraph 19A provides that these CCAA proceedings would not be used to compromise the guarantee claims that those landlords have as against Target Corporation.

[75] The Objecting Landlords take the position that in the absence of paragraph 19A, they would have considered issuing bankruptcy proceedings as against Target Canada. In a bankruptcy, landlord claims against Target Canada would be fixed by the BIA Formula and presumably, the Objecting Landlords would consider their remedies as against Target Corporation as guarantor. Regardless of whether or not these landlords would have issued bankruptcy proceedings, the fact remains that paragraph 19A was incorporated into the Initial and Restated Order in response to the concerns raised by the Objecting Landlords at the motion of the Target Corporation, and with the support of Target Corporation and the Monitor.

[76] Target Canada developed a liquidation plan, in consultation with its creditors and the Monitor, that allowed for the orderly liquidation of its inventory and established the sale process for its real property leases. Target Canada liquidated its assets and developed a plan to distribute the proceeds to its creditors. The proceeds are being made available to all creditors having Proven Claims. The creditors include trade creditors and landlords. In addition, Target Corporation agreed to subordinate its claim. The Plan also establishes a Landlord Formula Amount. If this was all that the Plan set out to do, in all likelihood a meeting of creditors would be ordered.

[77] However, this is not all that the plan accomplishes. Target Canada proposes that paragraph 19A be varied so that the Plan can address the guarantee claims that landlords have as against Target Corporation. In other words, Target Canada has proposed a Plan which requires the court to completely ignore the background that led to paragraph 19A and the reliance that parties placed in paragraph 19A.

[78] Target Canada contends that it is necessary to formulate the plan in this matter to address a change in the landscape. There may very well have been changes in the economic landscape, but I fail to see how that justifies the departure from the agreed upon course of action as set out in paragraph 19A. Even if the current landscape is not favourable for Target Corporation, this development does not justify this court endorsing a change in direction over the objections the Objecting Landlords.

[79] This is not a situation where a debtor is using the CCAA to compromise claims of creditor. Rather, this is an attempt to use the CCAA as a means to secure a release of Target Corporation from its liabilities under the guarantees in exchange for allowing claims of Objecting Landlords in amounts calculated under the Landlord Formula Amount. The proposal of Target Canada and Target Corporation clearly contravenes the agreement memorialized and enforced in paragraph 19A.

[80] Paragraph 19A arose in a post-CCAA filing environment, with each interested party carefully negotiating its position. The fact that the agreement to include paragraph 19A in the Amended and Restated Order was reached in a post-filing environment is significant (see *The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corporation,* 2015 ONSC 4004, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 134 at paras. 33-35). In my view, there was never any doubt that Target Canada and Target Corporation were aware of the implications of paragraph 19A and by proposing this Plan, Target Canada and Target Corporation seek to override the provisions of paragraph 19A. They ask the court to let them back out of their binding agreement after having received the benefit of performance by the landlords. They ask the court to let them try to compromise the Landlord Guarantee Claims against Target Corporation after promising not to do that very thing in these proceedings. They ask the court to let them eliminate a court order to which they consented without proving that they having

any grounds to rescind the order. In my view, it is simply not appropriate to proceed with the Plan that requires such an alteration.

[81] The CCAA process is one of building blocks. In this proceedings, a stay has been granted and a plan developed. During these proceedings, this court has made number of orders. It is essential that court orders made during CCAA proceedings be respected. In this case, the Amended Restated Order was an order that was heavily negotiated by sophisticated parties. They knew that they were entering into binding agreements supported by binding orders. Certain parties now wish to restate the terms of the negotiated orders. Such a development would run counter to the building block approach underlying these proceedings since the outset.

[82] The parties raised the issue of whether the court has the jurisdiction to vary paragraph 19A. In view of my decision that it is not appropriate to vary the Order, it is not necessary to address the issue of jurisdiction.

[83] A similar analysis can also be undertaken with respect to the Claims Procedure Order. The Claims Procedure Order establishes the framework to be followed to quantify claims. The Plan changes the basis by which landlord claims are to be quantified. Instead of following the process set forth in the Claims Procedure Order, which provides for appeal rights to the court or claims officer, the Plan provides for quantification of landlord claims by use of Landlord Formula Amount, proposed by Target Canada.

[84] In my view, it is clear that this Plan, in its current form, cannot withstand the scrutiny of the test to sanction a Plan. It is, in my view, not appropriate to change the rules to suit the applicant and the Plan Sponsor, in midstream.

[85] It cannot be fair and reasonable to ignore post-filing agreements concerning the CCAA process after they have been relied upon by counter-parties or to rescind consent orders of the court without grounds to do so.

[86] Target Canada submits that the foregoing issues can be the subject of debate at the sanction hearing. In my view, this is not an attractive alternative. It merely postpones the inevitable result, namely the conclusion that this Plan contravenes court orders and cannot be

considered to be fair and reasonable in its treatment of the Objecting Landlords. In my view, this Plan is improper (see *Crystallex*).

Disposition

[87] Accordingly, the Plan is not accepted for filing and this motion is dismissed.

[88] The Monitor is directed to review the implications of this Endorsement with the stakeholders within 14 days and is to schedule a case conference where various alternatives can be reviewed.

[89] At this time, it is not necessary to address the issue of classification of creditors' claim, nor is it necessary to address the issue of non-disclosure of the RioCan Settlement.

Regional Senior Justice G.B. Morawetz

Date: January 15, 2016

TAB 6

HMANALY N§36
Houlden & Morawetz Analysis N§36

Houlden and Morawetz Bankruptcy and Insolvency Analysis

Companies Creditors Arrangement Act
Section 5.1

L.W. Houlden and Geoffrey B. Morawetz

N§36 — Compromises of Claims Against Directors

N§36 — Compromises of Claims Against Directors

See s. 5.1

Section 5.1 is similar in wording to s. 50(13) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. A plan under the *CCAA* may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the debtor company where the directors are legally liable in their capacity as directors for payment of such claims. The right to compromise such claims is limited by the provisions of s. 5.1(2) and (3). To facilitate the making of such compromises, s. 11.5(1) permits a stay order to be made against creditors with claims against directors.

In *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.*, the clause of the plan releasing claims against directors did not include the exception created by s. 5.1(2) and did not make it clear that claims against directors were only released if they arose prior to the date of the commencement of the *CCAA* proceedings. On the application for sanction of the plan, the court amended the plan to add the words "excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the *CCAA*" and that claims against directors should only be released if they arose prior to the date of the commencement of *CCAA* proceedings. The plan also released claims against third parties such as officers and employees. The court held that although the *CCAA* does not authorize a release of such claims, it does not prohibit such releases either. Accordingly, it approved the release of the claims: *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41 (Q.B.); leave to appeal refused 2000 ABQB 238, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 CarswellAlta 919 (C.A. [In Chambers]); affirmed (2000), 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2000] A.J. No. 1028, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179, 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, [2000] 4 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, [2001] S.C.A. No. 60, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.). To the same effect, see *Re Liberty Oil & Gas Ltd.* (2002), 38 C.B.R. (4th) 227, 2002 CarswellAlta 1364, 2002 ABQB 949 (Alta Q.B.).

Unless it is plain and obvious the claim against directors coming within s. 5.1(2) discloses no reasonable cause of action, the claim should be allowed to proceed: *Re Liberty Oil & Gas Ltd.* (2002), 38 C.B.R. (4th) 227, 2002 CarswellAlta 1364, 2002 ABQB 949 (Alta. Q.B.).

In *Re Ball Machinery Sales Ltd.* (2002), 37 C.B.R. (4th) 39, 2002 CarswellOnt 2742 (Ont. S.C.J.), a release of claims against directors, officers and employees included the matters set out in s. 5.1(2) and in addition provided that no guarantor should be released from any liability under a guarantee. The court approved the terms of the release.

Where release clauses in a proposed plan purported to release not only the insolvent company and its directors but also third parties, the court amended the plan to limit the scope of the releases to the company and its directors only: *Minds Eye Entertainment Ltd. v. Royal Bank* (2004), 2004 CarswellSask 50, 2004 SKQB 8, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 211, (sub nom. *Minds Eye Entertainment Ltd. Re)* 244 Sask. R. 155 (Sask. Q.B.); affirmed (2004), 2004 CarswellSask 192, 1 C.B.R. (5th) 89, 249 Sask. R. 139, 2004 SKCA 41 (Sask. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2004), 2004 CarswellSask 797, 2004 CarswellSask 798 (S.C.C.).

TAB 7

2002 CarswellOnt 2742
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Ball Machinery Sales Ltd., Re

2002 CarswellOnt 2742, [2002] O.J. No. 3228, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 7, 37 C.B.R. (4th) 39

The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36 and A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Ball Machinery Sales Ltd. and the other Applicants Listed on Schedule "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: August 22, 2002
Docket: 01-CL-4154

Counsel: *Sean Lawler*, for Moving Parties, Ball Machinery Sales Ltd. et al
Craig Hill, for Aecon Construction Group Inc.
Harvey Chaiton, for Monitor, Deloitte & Touche Inc.
Alex Ilchenko, for Orix Financial Services

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous issues

Plan of compromise for debtor group of companies was approved at meetings of debtor's secured and unsecured creditors — Plan provided that it could be amended after meetings, provided court determined that amendment would not be materially prejudicial to interests of creditors — Subsequent to meetings, release provision of plan was amended at request of creditor A Inc. — A Inc. wished to preserve its rights to pursue claim against certain officers and directors of debtor for breach of trust pursuant to Construction Lien Act — Amended release provision provided that general release of claims by creditors did not include claims based on allegations of wrongful or oppressive conduct or misrepresentation by directors, officers and/or employees to any creditor or claims relating to contractual rights of any creditor — Debtor brought motion for order approving plan — Motion granted — Debtor group of companies fell within definition of companies to which Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act applied, notice was properly given, creditors were properly classified, meetings were properly constituted, voting was properly carried out and plan was overwhelmingly approved by requisite majorities — Plan was fair and reasonable — Amended wording of release was in accordance with s. 5.1(2) of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Amended release was not materially prejudicial to interests of creditors — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.1(2) — Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30.

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Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Northland Properties Ltd., Re, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175, 1988 CarswellBC 558 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 73 C.B.R.

(N.S.) 195, *(*sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 1989 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30
s. 13 — referred to

MOTION by debtor group of companies for order approving plan of compromise.

Pepall J.:

1 The Applicants, the Ball Machinery group of Companies ("Ball Machinery") bring a motion for, amongst other things, an order approving and sanctioning the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the Applicants which was approved and agreed to by the creditors of the Applicants at meetings held on July 24, 2002.

2 On May 24, 2001, an order was granted pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36 granting a stay of proceedings against Ball Machinery.

3 A Plan of Compromise was considered and voted upon by the secured and unsecured creditors at meetings held on July 24, 2002. Of all the creditors that voted in person or by proxy, only one unsecured creditor voted against the Plan.

4 The Respondent on the motion, Aecon Construction Group Inc. ("Aecon") is a creditor of Ball Machinery. Aecon opposes the release provision found in paragraph 9.08 of the Plan. While no factums were filed by any of the parties on this motion, my understanding is that Aecon wishes to preserve its rights to pursue a trust claim against certain officers and directors of Ball Machinery for breach of trust pursuant to s.13 of the *Construction Lien Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.30. Aecon agrees that the Plan should be sanctioned but proposes that paragraph 9.08 be amended to conform with the provisions of s.5.1 of the CCAA. It did not propose any amendment at the meeting called to approve the Plan which it attended. It abstained on the vote.

5 In an attempt to accommodate Aecon, the Applicants have proposed a new form of release. They are able to make amendments to the Plan after the creditors' meetings pursuant to paragraph 9.06 of the Plan provided the Court determines that the amendment is of a nature that would not be materially prejudicial to the interests of the creditors. That proposed release is more circumspect than the actual release which was approved and removes certain third party releasees. It states:

> Each Creditor shall, effective as of the Plan Implementation Date, be deemed to forever release any and all suits, claims and causes of action that such Creditor may have had against the directors, officers and/or employees of Ball that arose before the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and that relate to the obligations of Ball where the directors, officers and/or employees are by law liable in their respective capacities as directors, officers and/or employees for the payment of such obligations. The claims hereby released do not include claims that:
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of any Creditor; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors, officers and/or employees to any Creditor or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors, officers, and/or employees.

Despite the foregoing, no guarantor shall be released from any liability pursuant to any guarantee and nothing in the Plan or resulting from this Plan shall release any guarantor from any such liability.

6 In considering whether to sanction a Plan under the CCAA, the court must review the Plan to see if it satisfies the following requirements:

a) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;

b) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

c) the Plan must be fair and reasonable.

See *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.), at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.)

7 I am satisfied that these requirements have been met in the amended Plan presented to me for approval which includes the new form of release. Ball Machinery falls within the definition of companies to which the CCAA applies, notice was properly given, creditors were properly classified, the meetings were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was overwhelmingly approved by the requisite majorities. In light of the amended wording of the release which I note excludes wrongful conduct of directors, officers and employees, I am satisfied that the Plan is authorized by the CCAA and that the amended wording complies with s.5.1(2) and does not offend the Act. In addition, the Plan is fair and reasonable. I am also persuaded that the modified release is not materially prejudicial to the interests of the creditors. With this amendment, the Applicants meet the three part test for a sanction order.

8 Whether Aecon is ultimately successful in asserting its claim pursuant to s.13 of the *Construction Lien Act* and whether wrongful conduct is established are issues which will have to be addressed in the future. The draft order found at Tab 4 of the motion record is granted. In paragraph 18, the words commencing "including most" and ending "August 2, 2002" shall be deleted.

Motion granted.

End of Document

TAB 8

2000 CarswellOnt 4837
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp., Re

2000 CarswellOnt 4837, [2000] O.J. No. 4587, [2001] G.S.T.C. 2, 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 460, 10 B.L.R. (3d) 221, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 216

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp. and BlueStar Systems Canada Corp.

Farley J.

Heard: October 31, 2000
Judgment: November 6, 2000
Docket: 00-CL-3860

Counsel: *Kevin Dias*, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency).
Derrick Tay and *Orestes Pasparakis*, for BlueStar Applicants.
Brent MacPherson, for PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. (Monitor of Applicants).
Daniel R. Dowdall and *Alex A. Ilchenko*, for Finova Capital (Canada) Corp.
Steven Golick, for Enertek Mexico S. de R.L. de C.V.
Robert A. Klotz, for Bradley, Curtis Streelman and MDM Marketing Inc.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Insolvency

Headnote

Taxation --- Goods and services tax — Administration and enforcement — Directors' liability — General

Corporation owed in excess of $42,000,000 to unsecured creditors, including $1,096,684 in outstanding GST liability — Corporation filed plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) on September 5, 2000, with sanction hearing scheduled for October 31, 2000 — On October 26, creditors, including Minister, approved plan — On October 30, Minister brought motion for order declaring that claims against directors for outstanding GST liability were not compromised by plan, or for declaration that plan was not fair and reasonable, and for order granting leave to register certificate for amount of GST liability in Federal Court — Motion dismissed — Minister could not claim benefit of s. 5.1(3) of CCAA in circumstances — Plan of arrangement provided that all unsecured creditors accepted plan "in full and final satisfaction of their proven claims", including claims against directors — Minister was unsecured creditor by virtue of s. 18.4 of CCAA — Section 323(2) of Excise Tax Act provides that director is not liable unless certificate for amount of corporation's GST liability has been registered in Federal Court and execution returned unsatisfied — Approval of plan meant that Minister's claim for GST was fully satisfied, so that no directors' liability could arise — Time for crystallizing directors' liability had passed and order granting leave to register certificate at this point would have no effect — If Minister had perfected claim against directors in timely manner, directors might still have included compromise of claims against them in plan of arrangement under s. 5.1(1) of CCAA — Section 5.1(3) of CCAA vests court with discretion to declare that claim against directors not be compromised where compromise would not be fair and reasonable — Fact that Minister was only creditor with potential claim against corporation's directors would not alone be sufficient grounds for exercise of discretion in Minister's favour — Exercise of discretion might have been appropriate had Minister served motion on more timely basis, to allow each director opportunity to refute allegation that he had knowledge of corporation's

broken promises and late filing of GST returns — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 5.1, 5.1(1), 5.1(3), 18(4), 18.3(1), 18.3(2) — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222, 323(1), 323(2).

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Corporation owed in excess of $42,000,000 to unsecured creditors, including $1,096,684 in outstanding GST liability — Corporation filed plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) on September 5, 2000, with sanction hearing scheduled for October 31, 2000 — On October 26, creditors, including Minister, approved plan — On October 30, Minister brought motion for order declaring that claims against directors for outstanding GST liability were not compromised by plan, or for declaration that plan was not fair and reasonable, and for order granting leave to register certification for amount of GST liability in Federal Court — Motion dismissed — Minister could not claim benefit of s. 5.1(3) of CCAA in circumstances — Plan of arrangement provided that all unsecured creditors accepted plan "in full and final satisfaction of their proven claims", including claims against directors — Minister was unsecured creditor by virtue of s. 18.4 of CCAA — Section 323(2) of Excise Tax Act provides that director is not liable unless certificate for amount of corporation's GST liability has been registered in Federal Court and execution returned unsatisfied — Approval of plan meant that Minister's claim for GST was fully satisfied, so that no directors' liability could arise — Time for crystallizing directors' liability had passed and order granting leave to register certification at this point would have no effect — If Minister had perfected claim against directors in timely manner, directors might still have included compromise of claims against them in plan of arrangement pursuant to s. 5.1(1) of CCAA — Section 5.1(3) of CCAA vests court with discretion to declare that claim against directors not be compromised where compromise would not be fair and reasonable — Fact that Minister was only creditor with potential claim against corporation's directors would not alone be sufficient grounds to invoke exercise of discretion in Minister's favour — Exercise of discretion might have been appropriate had Minister served motion on more timely basis, to allow each director opportunity to refute allegation that he had knowledge of corporation's broken promises and late filing of GST returns — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 5.1, 5.1(1), 5.1(3), 18(4) — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 [am. 1990, c. 45, s. 12], s. 323(2).

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11, 8 O.R. (3d) 449, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 98, 55 O.A.C. 303 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Browne v. Southern Canada Power Co. (1941), 23 C.B.R. 131, 71 Que. K.B. 136 (Que. C.A.) — considered

Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116, (sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4)*) 110 N.S.R. (2d) 246, (sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4)*) 299 A.P.R. 246 (N.S. C.A.) — considered

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
Generally — considered

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
Generally — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — considered

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(2)(a) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(2)(b) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 [am. 1990, c. 45, s. 12]
Pt. IX — considered

s. 222 — considered

s. 227(4) [rep. & sub. 1994, c. 9, s. 13(2)] — considered

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1994, c. 9, s. 13(2)] — considered

s. 323(1) [rep. & sub. 1997, c. 10, s. 239(1)] — considered

s. 323(2) [am. 1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(p)] — considered

s. 323(2)(a) — considered

MOTION by Minister for order declaring that claims against directors were not compromised by corporation's plan of arrangement, or for declaration that plan was not fair and reasonable, and for order granting leave to register certification for amount of corporation's GST liability.

Farley J.:

1 Canada Customs and Revenue Agency ("RevCan") by material dated October 30, 2000 moved for an order declaring that the claims against the directors of the Applicants not be compromised by this Court's sanction of the Plan of Arrangement made pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). This Plan was filed on September 5, 2000, the same day that the Applicants sought protection under the CCAA. The sanction hearing had been long scheduled for October 31, 2000. On that date I approved the Plan vis-à-vis the Applicants; however I reserved judgement on RevCan's late blooming motion. I now deal with it as if it were being dealt with coincident with the sanction hearing (that is the fact that I approved the Plan vis-à-vis the Applicants a few days ago is to be ignored). I was advised that it

does not appear that s. 5.1 of the CCAA has been judicially commented on before. It may be that my analysis herein will be of some assistance — or at least a starting point for discussion — in understanding this section of the CCAA.

2 For the sake of easy reference I have reproduced s. 5.1 in its entirety below:

> 5.1(1) Claims against directors — compromise — A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> (2) Exception — A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> (3) Powers of court — The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
>
> (4) Resignation or removal of directors — Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

3 RevCan asked for the alternative relief of a declaration that the Plan was not fair and reasonable in the circumstances in that it precluded unsecured creditors of the Applicants from pursuing claims against the directors. RevCan sought the additional relief of an order granting it leave to register in the Federal Court a certification for the amount of the Goods and Services Tax ("GST") liability of BlueStar Systems Canada Corp. ("BSCC") and to obtain an execution for that amount from the Federal Court pursuant to s. 323 (2)(a) of the *Excise Tax Act* and leave to direct the Sheriff to attempt to satisfy that execution against assets of BSCC that were not protected by my CCAA stay order of September 5, 2000.

4 RevCan submitted that it was entitled to such relief for the following grounds. BSCC is indebted for GST liability for the period September 1999 to September 2000 in the amount of $1,096,684. While new management took control of the operations of BSCC beginning in February 2000, BSCC continued to fail to remit the GST it was required to remit pursuant to the *Excise Tax Act*. From March 2000 through the end of August 2000, BSCC representatives made numerous promises to RevCan representatives in respect of paying the outstanding GST liability but did not do so. GST returns for January — May 2000 were only filed at the end of August 2000. While not sworn to, RevCan asserts that the Applicants, their counsel and the Monitor were put on notice of RevCan's position several weeks before the hearing.

5 Sections 5.4 and 5.9 of the Plan that was approved by the unsecured creditors of the Applicants would compromise RevCan's claims against the directors of the Applicants. At the meeting of the unsecured creditors on October 26, 2000, the RevCan representative raised the concerns of RevCan and asked that the meeting consider amendments to the Plan. After consulting with representatives from BSCC, the chairman of the meeting, an officer of the Monitor, ruled that as BSCC did not wish to make any amendments to the Plan, the meeting would not consider such amendments. RevCan indicates that the Applicants never provided it with any explanation as to why the restructuring of both corporations could not proceed under the Plan without having the claims against the directors compromised by the Plan.

6 The meeting was attended by 222 unsecured creditors, either in person or by proxy. Three unsecured creditors abstained from voting. The 219 who voted represented claims totalling $42,286,376.82. A total of 211 unsecured creditors with claims totalling $41,877,271.70 voted to approve the Plan, representing 96.3% in number and 99.0% in value of those voting. RevCan did not vote against the Plan or abstain from voting; rather RevCan voted in favour of the unamended

Plan. I would also point out that RevCan did not advance a competing CCAA Plan including one which would not wipe out the liability of the directors.

7 The Initial Order of September 5, 2000 contained a "come back" clause. Any creditor, including RevCan, would have been at liberty to move in court before the Plan was voted upon to attempt to amend the Plan. However once a vote has been taken, there are fairly definite restrictions upon amending a CCAA plan. See *Re Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd.* (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at p. 143; *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at pp. 174-5; *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 15. I shall deal later with the question of whether the present case falls within the "exceptional circumstances only" condition of the Court of Appeal in Algoma as to an amendment.

8 One might view RevCan's motion as one challenging the classification of creditors; in other words RevCan appears in essence to wish to be put into a separate class from the rest of the unsecured creditors. I think it fair to observe that it appears that RevCan is the only unsecured creditor to be affected by the inclusion of the compromise of directors liability in the Plan. However, where an initial order of the Court places creditors into certain classes (or in the present case puts them all into a single class), the proper procedure for attacking the classification is by way of appeal of the classification order, and "not the sanctioning order": see *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S. C.A.) at pp. 251-2. In the present case, since the classification order was contained in the Initial Order effectively obtained on an *ex parte* basis since RevCan was not then present, RevCan could have utilized the "come back" clause on a timely basis instead of going to appeal. It is unfortunate for RevCan that it did not do so.

9 Under the CCAA, all Crown claims, including secured claims, rank as unsecured claims: see s. 18.4. Therefore RevCan's claim for unpaid GST is unsecured. In addition, the CCAA specifically eliminates the "deemed trust" in favour of GST found in s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*; but in contrast it does not interfere with the deemed trust provisions found in s. 227(4) and (4.1) of the *Excise Tax Act* [*] : see s. 18.3(1)(2) [**] .

10 Director liability for GST arises pursuant to s. 323(1) of the *Excise Tax Act* which provides:

> s. 323 (1) Where a corporation fails to remit an amount of net tax as required under subsection 228 (2) or (2.3), the directors of the corporation at the time the corporation was required to remit the amount are jointly and severally liable, together with the corporation, to pay that amount and any interest thereon or penalties relating thereto.

However that legislation goes on to provide that:

> s. 323(2) A director of a corporation is not liable under subsection (1) unless
>
> (a) a certificate for the amount of the corporation's liability referred to in that subsection has been registered in the Federal Court under section 316 and execution for that amount has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part;
>
> (b) the corporation has commenced liquidation or dissolution proceedings or has been dissolved and a claim for the amount of the corporation's liability referred to in subsection (1) has been proved within six months after the earlier of the date of commencement of the proceedings and the date of dissolution; or
>
> (c) the corporation has made an assignment or a receiving order has been made against it under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and a claim for the amount of the corporation's liability referred to in subsection (1) has been proved within six months after the date of the assignment or receiving order.

Only s. 323 (2)(a) would be of any relevance in the present analysis.

11 The Applicants point out that pursuant to the Plan, in respect of which RevCan voted in favour, unsecured creditors, including RevCan, accepted "in full and final satisfaction of their Proven Claims" the consideration provided for under

the Plan. The Applicants further reason that since RevCan's claim for GST has been fully satisfied, then pursuant to s. 323 (2)(a) of the *Excise Tax Act*, no director liability could arise in respect of same. On that basis, in respect of GST, RevCan's claim is satisfied by operation of law, and in particular the terms of the *Excise Tax Act*, upon confirmation of the Plan. On that basis, the directors of the applicants do not need to rely on s. 5.1 (1) of the CCAA to include "provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company". Given that one may puzzle over why the directors in the present case included an excusatory provision in the Plan vis-à-vis themselves when such a claim for GST is a derivative claim relating to the original or foundation liability of BSCC. Perhaps their concern was that RevCan in the seven weeks between the Initial Order of September 5, 2000 and the vote on October 26, 2000 might have obtained leave to register the certificate for BSCC's GST liability in the Federal Court and obtained an execution for that amount pursuant to s. 323 (2)(a) of the *Excise Tax Act* and leave to direct the Sheriff to attempt to satisfy the execution against assets of BSCC unprotected from the stay. If that had taken place, then it seems to me that the Court would have to take a look at the Plan as a whole and on a single point of time basis. In other words, one would not necessarily conclude that the Plan *first* compromised the claims against BSCC in full satisfaction of the proven claims, including the proven claim of RevCan, *before* moving on to consider RevCan's then perfected claim (as opposed to the inchoate one we actually have in this case) against the directors.

12 Thus it appears to me that RevCan, not having put itself into position where it could (and did) perfect its derivative claims against the directors as set out in s. 323 (2)(a) of the *Excise Tax Act* never had a claim against the directors which could survive the sanction of the Plan vis-à-vis the Applicants. Nothing that this Court could do at the present time (that is, at time when considering the CCAA sanction motion) could crystalize a RevCan claim against the directors. RevCan would have to take additional multiple steps over some period of time to establish a claim against the directors. RevCan was alert to this concern, yet it did nothing to initiate even the first step in the procedure. In these circumstances, even if this Court's leave were effective in any way to protect RevCan's claim, it would not seem to me that RevCan has established any basis for the exercise of this Court's discretion in that regard. It would also be remiss of me not to observe here that this would prevail even if RevCan had not for whatever unexplained reason voted in favour of the (complete) Plan (complete in the sense of compromising claims against the Applicants *and the directors*).

13 I would note that RevCan raised certain passages of K.D. McGuiness, *The Law of Guarantee* (2nd ed., 1996; Toronto, Carswell) in support of its position: specifically s. 10.114 at pp. 601-2 (including the somewhat dated and inaccurate view of the CCAA as set forth in *Browne v. Southern Canada Power Co.* (1941), 23 C.B.R. 131 (Que. C.A.)). Suffice it to say that the present case is not a surety claim release one.

14 What then *if* RevCan here had in fact perfected its claim against the directors? Would the directors have been able to utilize s. 5.1 of the CCAA as a safe haven? It would appear to me that the directors would have been entitled (s. 5.1 (1)) to have included in the Plan a compromise of their liability included in the Plan and would not be disqualified (s. 5.1 (2)) from doing so. This disqualification from utilizing s. 5.1 (1) as is found in s. 5.1 (2) relates to (a) contractual rights of a creditor, such as a guarantee by a director for example, or (b) claims based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful' or oppressive conduct by directors. Firstly there was nothing in this case to suggest that there was any sort of a contract (including a guarantee) from any of the directors. Secondly there was no allegation of any misrepresentation by any director nor was there any allegation of wrongful or oppressive conduct by any director. It would seem to me that while the reference in s. 5.1 (2) is to "directors", it would seem that the disqualification should relate to those of the directors who may fall within (a) or (b) thereof. As to the (b) category, there was no allegation against any director in the RevCan material; it appears that all of the RevCan dealing and difficulties with respect to either promises or getting information were restricted to non-directors at BSCC. However it seems to me that the directors of any corporation in difficulty and contemplating a CCAA plan would be unwise to engage in a game of hide and go seek since the language of s. 5.1 (2)(b) appears wide enough to encompass those situations where the directors stand idly by and do nothing to correct any misstatements or other wrongful or oppressive conduct of others in the corporation (either other directors acting qua directors, or officers or underlings). There was no evidence presented that the directors here had knowledge or ought to have had knowledge of such here. One may have the greatest of suspicion that they did or ought to have had such knowledge. This could have been crystallized if RevCan had put the directors on notice of

the promises to pay GST. It would seem to me at first glance that the oppression claims cases which arise pursuant to corporate legislation such as the *Canada Business Corporations Act* and the *Business Corporations Act* (Ontario) would be of assistance in defining "oppressive conduct". Similarly it would appear that "wrongful conduct" would be conduct which would be tortious (or akin thereto) as well as any conduct which was illegal.

15 What then of s. 5.1 (3)? This is not a disqualification provision which automatically applies. Rather this provision establishes that the Court may use its discretion to "declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances". It is key to note that this declaration does not affect the Plan then in question vis-à-vis the applicant corporation. In *Sammi Atlas Inc., supra*, I noted at p. 174:

> ... In *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11 (Ont. C.A.) the Court of Appeal observed at p. 15 that the court's jurisdiction to amend a plan should "be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances only" even if the amendment were merely technical and did not prejudice the interests of the corporation or its creditors and then only where there is jurisdiction under the CCAA to make the amendment requested, ...

However this s. 5.1 (3) declaration when viewed as an amendment (or equivalent to an amendment) of a plan is something which this amendment to the CCAA (enacted subsequent to the Algoma case) specifically authorizes, but in any even since the declaration only applies to the compromise as it relates to the directors, it does "not prejudice the interests of the corporation or its creditors".

16 Given that s. 5.1 (1) provides that the compromise of claims against directors be as to those claims "that relate to the obligations of the company unless the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such other factors" and given the exception disqualifications of s. 5.1 (2), one would reasonably conclude that the most usual type of claim would be that imposed by statute whereby the director qua director is obliged as well as the corporation to pay a government. Then the fact that RevCan is "singled" out in this Plan in question with respect to its GST claim, would not appear on this ground alone to be sufficient to invoke the Court's discretion in RevCan's favour. However if RevCan had served its motion on a more timely basis so as to allow the directors sufficient opportunity to dispute RevCan's allegations concerning broken promises, then if RevCan's allegations were unrefuted or unchallenged, given the magnitude of the GST claim over an extended period of a year which unlikely would have escaped the notice of a reasonable director, and given the repeated and broken promises to pay the GST and the lack of advance notice to RevCan before obtaining the Initial Order which precluded RevCan from taking any preliminary enforcement proceedings (it being recognized that RevCan has to walk the tightrope between collecting taxes when due and allowing delinquent companies some leeway so that they might attempt to get over temporary difficulties without that opportunity being precluded by draconian collection techniques otherwise available to RevCan), I might well have been inclined to give such a declaration that the GST claim against the directors not be compromised on the basis that such a compromise would not have been full and reasonable in the circumstances. I think it also worth noting that s. 5.1 (3) provides that "a claim" not be compromised, as opposed to all claims as may otherwise have been included pursuant to s. 5.1 (1). It would also seem to me that the language of this provision is sufficiently wide enough to be able to pick and choose amongst the directors and further that any individual claim may be segmented so that it may be partially excepted.

17 In the end result however RevCan's motion is dismissed. Even if this were not a matter of first instance I would not award any costs against RevCan in these circumstances.

Motion dismissed.

Footnotes

* *Sic.* Should be *Income Tax Act* — ed.

** *Sic.* Should be s. 18.3(1), (2) — ed.

End of Document

TAB 9

2010 QCCS 4450
Quebec Superior Court

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re

2010 CarswellQue 10118, 2010 QCCS 4450, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 360, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 80, EYB 2010-179705

In The Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of

AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and The Other Petitioners Listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C" (Debtors) and Ernst & Young Inc. (Monitor)

Clément Gascon, J.S.C.

Heard: September 20-21, 2010
Judgment: September 23, 2010
Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-036133-094

Counsel: Mr. Sean Dunphy, Me Guy P. Martel, Me Joseph Reynaud, for the Debtors
Me Gilles Paquin, Me Avram Fishman, for the Monitor
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Me Bernard Boucher, for BI Citibank (London Branch), as Agent for Citibank, N.A.
Me Jocelyn Perreault, for Bank of Nova Scotia (as Administrative and Collateral Agent)
Me Marc Duchesne, Me François Gagnon, for the Ad hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders
Mr. Frederick L. Myers, Mr. Robert J. Chadwick, for the Ad hoc Committee of Bondholders
Mr. Michael B. Rotsztein, for Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd.
Me Louise Hélène Guimond, for Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier (SCEP) et ses sections locales 59-N, 63, 84, 84-35, 88, 90, 92, 101, 109, 132, 138, 139, 161, 209, 227, 238, 253, 306, 352, 375, 1256 et 1455 and for Syndicat des employés(es) et employés(es) professionnels(-les) et de bureau - Québec (SEPB) et les sections locales 110, 151 et 526
Me Neil Peden, Mr. Raj Sahni, for The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of AbitibiBowater Inc. & al.
Me Sébastien Guy, for Cater Pillar Financial Services and Desjardins Trust inc.
Mr. Richard Butler, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and the Attorney General of British Columbia
Me Louis Dumont, Mr. Neil Rabinovitch, for Aurelius Capital Management LLC and Contrarian Capital Management LLC
Mr. Christopher Besant, for NPower Cogen Limited
Mr. Len Marsello, for the Attorney General for Ontario
Mr. Carl Holm, for Bowater Canada Finance Company
Mr. David Ward, for Wilmington Trust US Indenture Trustee of Unsecured Notes issued by BCFC

Subject: Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Pulp and paper company experienced financial difficulties and sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — In order to complete its restructuring process, company prepared plan of arrangement — Under plan, company's secured debt obligations would be paid in full while unsecured debt obligations would be

converted to equity of reorganized entity — Monitor as well as overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly supported plan while only handful of stakeholders raised limited objections — Company brought motion seeking approval of plan by Court — Motion granted — Sole issue to be determined was whether plan was fair and reasonable — Here, level of approval by creditors was significant factor to consider — Monitor's recommendation to approve plan was another significant factor, given his professionalism, objectivity and competence — As most of objecting parties had agreed upon "carve-out" wording to be included in Court's order, only two creditors actually objected to plan and it was Court's view that their objections were either ill-founded or moot — Should Court decide to go against vast majority of stakeholders' will and reject plan, not only would those stakeholders be adversely prejudiced but company would also go bankrupt — Court should not seek perfection as plan was result of many compromises and of favourable market window — Court was of view that it was important to allow company to move forthwith towards emergence from 18-month restructuring process — Therefore, Court considered it appropriate and justified to approve plan of arrangement.

Faillite et insolvabilité — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Approbation par le tribunal — « Juste et équitable »

Compagnie papetière a connu des problèmes financiers et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Afin de compléter son processus de restructuration, la compagnie a préparé un plan d'arrangement — Dans le cadre du plan, les dettes de la compagnie faisant l'objet d'une garantie seraient payées au complet tandis que les dettes de la compagnie ne faisant pas l'objet d'une garantie seraient converties en actions de l'entité restructurée — Contrôleur de même que la vaste majorité des parties intéressées étaient fortement en faveur du plan tandis qu'une poignée seulement des personnes intéressées soulevaient des objections limitées — Compagnie a déposé une requête visant l'approbation du plan par le Tribunal — Requête accueillie — Seule question à trancher était de savoir si le plan était juste et raisonnable — En l'espèce, la proportion des créanciers s'étant prononcés en faveur du plan était un élément important à considérer — Recommandation du contrôleur d'approuver le plan était un autre élément important, compte tenu de son professionnalisme, de son objectivité et de sa compétence — Comme la majeure partie des parties s'étant prononcées contre le plan avaient donné leur accord à la rédaction d'une clause de « retranchement » destinée à faire partie de l'ordonnance du Tribunal, seuls deux créanciers s'objectaient au plan dans les faits et le Tribunal était d'avis que leurs objections étaient soient sans fondement ou sans objet — S'il fallait que le Tribunal décide d'aller à l'encontre de la volonté de la vaste majorité des personnes intéressées et de rejeter le plan, non seulement ces personnes subiraient-elles des impacts négatifs mais aussi la compagnie ferait-elle faillite — Tribunal ne devrait pas chercher la perfection puisque le plan était le fruit de plusieurs compromis et le résultat d'une fenêtre d'opportunité favorable en terme de marché — Tribunal était d'avis qu'il était important que la compagnie puisse dès à présent mener à son terme un processus de restructuration long de dix-huit mois — Par conséquent, de l'avis du Tribunal, il était approprié et justifié de sanctionner le plan d'arrangement.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Clément Gascon, J.S.C.*:

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re (2009), 2009 QCCS 6459, 2009 CarswellQue 14194 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Cable Satisfaction International Inc. v. Richter & Associés inc. (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 810, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 205 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellQue 11376, 2008 QCCS 5388 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Doman Industries Ltd., Re (2003), 2003 BCSC 375, 2003 CarswellBC 552, 41 C.B.R. (4th) 42 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Hy Bloom inc. c. Banque Nationale du Canada (2010), 66 C.B.R. (5th) 294, 2010 QCCS 737, 2010 CarswellQue 1714, 2010 CarswellQue 11740, [2010] R.J.Q. 912 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Laidlaw, Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 239, 2003 CarswellOnt 787 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellQue 13408 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175, 1988 CarswellBC 558 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1989), (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 1989 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re)* 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2002), 33 C.B.R. (4th) 284, 2002 CarswellOnt 1261 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Raymor Industries inc., Re (2010), 66 C.B.R. (5th) 202, 2010 CarswellQue 9092, 2010 QCCS 376, 2010 CarswellQue 892, [2010] R.J.Q. 608 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
Chapter 11 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
s. 191 — considered

s. 241 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 9 — referred to

s. 10 — referred to

Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.40
s. 107 — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
s. 270 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — referred to

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
s. 159 — referred to

Ministère du Revenu, Loi sur le, L.R.Q., c. M-31
art. 14 — referred to

Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.31
s. 22 — referred to

Taxation Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 11, Sched. A
s. 117 — referred to

MOTION by debtor company seeking Court's approval of plan of arrangement.

Clément Gascon, J.S.C.:

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with the sanction and approval of a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*[1]. The sole issue to resolve is the fair and reasonable character of the plan. While the debtor company, the monitor and an overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly support this sanction and approval, three dissenting voices raise limited objections. The Court provides these reasons in support of the Sanction Order it considers appropriate and justified to issue under the circumstances.

The Relevant Background

2 On April 17, 2009 [2009 CarswellQue 14194 (C.S. Que.)], the Court issued an Initial Order pursuant to the *CCAA* with respect to the Abitibi Petitioners (listed in Schedule A), the Bowater Petitioners (listed in Schedule B) and the Partnerships (listed in Schedule C).

3 On the day before, April 16, 2009, AbitibiBowater Inc., Bowater Inc. and certain of their U.S. and Canadian Subsidiaries (the "*U.S. Debtors*") had, similarly, filed Voluntary Petitions for Relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

4 Since the Initial Order, the Abitibi Petitioners, the Bowater Petitioners and the Partnerships (collectively, "*Abitibi*") have, under the protection of the Court, undertaken a huge and complex restructuring of their insolvent business.

5 The restructuring of Abitibi's imposing debt of several billion dollars was a cross-border undertaking that affected tens of thousands of stakeholders, from employees, pensioners, suppliers, unions, creditors and lenders to government authorities.

6 The process has required huge efforts on the part of many, including important sacrifices from most of the stakeholders involved. To name just a few, these restructuring efforts have included the closure of certain facilities, the sale of assets, contracts repudiations, the renegotiation of collective agreements and several costs saving initiatives [2].

7 In a span of less than 18 months, more than 740 entries have been docketed in the Court record that now comprises in excess of 12 boxes of documents. The Court has, so far, rendered over 100 different judgments and orders. The Stay Period has been extended seven times. It presently expires on September 30, 2010.

8 Abitibi is now nearing emergence from this *CCAA* restructuring process.

9 In May 2010, after an extensive review of the available alternatives, and pursuant to lengthy negotiations and consultations with creditors' groups, regulators and stakeholders, Abitibi filed its Plan of Reorganization and Compromise in the *CCAA* restructuring process (the "*CCAA Plan* [3]"). A joint Plan of Reorganization was also filed at the same time in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court process (the "*U.S. Plan*").

10 In essence, the Plans provided for the payment in full, on the Implementation Date and consummation of the U.S. Plan, of all of Abitibi's and U.S. Debtors' secured debt obligations.

11 As for their unsecured debt obligations, save for few exceptions, the Plans contemplated their conversion to equity of the post emergence reorganized Abitibi. If the Plans are implemented, the net value would likely translate into a recovery under the *CCAA* Plan corresponding to the following approximate rates for the various Affected Unsecured Creditors Classes:

(a) 3.4% for the ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(b) 17.1% for the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(c) 4.2% for the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(d) 36.5% for the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(e) 20.8% for the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class; and

(f) 43% for the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class.

12 With respect to the remaining Petitioners, the illustrative recoveries under the *CCAA* Plan would be nil, as these entities have nominal assets.

13 As an alternative to this debt to equity swap, the basic structure of the *CCAA* Plan included as well the possibility of smaller unsecured creditors receiving a cash distribution of 50% of the face amount of their Proven Claim if such was less than $6,073, or if they opted to reduce their claim to that amount.

14 In short, the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan was to provide for a coordinated restructuring and compromise of Abitibi's debt obligations, while at the same time reorganizing and simplifying its corporate and capital structure.

15 On September 14, 2010, Abitibi's Creditors' Meeting to vote on the *CCAA* Plan was convened, held and conducted. The resolution approving the *CCAA* Plan was overwhelmingly approved by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi, save for the Creditors of one the twenty Classes involved, namely, the BCFC Affected Unsecured Creditors Class.

16 Majorities well in excess of the statutorily required simple majority in number and two-third majority in value of the Affected Unsecured Claims held by the Affected Unsecured Creditors were attained. On a combined basis, the percentages were 97.07% in number and 93.47% in value.

17 Of the 5,793 votes cast by creditors holding claims totalling some 8,9 billion dollars, over 8,3 billion dollars worth of claims voted in favour of approving the *CCAA* Plan.

The Motion [4] at Issue

18 Today, as required by Section 6 of the *CCAA*, the Court is asked to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan. The effect of the Court's approval is to bind Abitibi and its Affected Unsecured Creditors to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan.

19 The exercise of the Court's authority to sanction a compromise or arrangement under the *CCAA* is a matter of judicial discretion. In that exercise, the general requirements to be met are well established. In summary, before doing so, the Court must be satisfied that [5]:

a) There has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

b) Nothing has been done or purported to be done that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

c) The Plan is fair and reasonable.

20 Only the third condition is truly at stake here. Despite Abitibi's creditors' huge support of the fairness and the reasonableness of the *CCAA* Plan, some dissenting voices have raised objections.

21 They include:

a) The BCFC Noteholders' Objection;

b) The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia; and

c) The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited.

22 For the reasons that follow, the Court is satisfied that the *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia and of NPower Cogen Limited have now been satisfactorily resolved by adding to the Sanction Order sought limited "carve-out" provisions in that regard. As for the only other objection that remains, namely that of some of the BCFC Noteholders, the Court considers that it should be discarded.

23 It is thus appropriate to immediately approve the *CCAA* Plan and issue the Sanction Order sought, albeit with some minor modifications to the wording of specific conclusions that the Court deems necessary.

24 In the Court's view, it is important to allow Abitibi to move forthwith towards emergence from the *CCAA* restructuring process it undertook eighteen month ago.

25 No one seriously disputes that there is risk associated with delaying the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan. This risk includes the fact that part of the exit financing sought by Abitibi is dependent upon the capital markets being receptive to the high yield notes or term debt being offered, in a context where such markets are volatile. There is, undoubtedly, continuing uncertainty with respect to the strength of the economic recovery and the effect this could have on the financial markets.

26 Moreover, there are numerous arrangements that Abitibi and their key stakeholders have agreed to or are in the process of settling that are key to the successful implementation of the *CCAA* Plan, including collective bargaining agreements with employees and pension funding arrangements with regulators. Any undue delay with implementation of the *CCAA* Plan increases the risk that these arrangements may require alterations or amendments.

27 Finally, at hearing, Mr. Robertson, the Chief Restructuring Officer, testified that the monthly cost of any delay in Abitibi's emergence from this *CCAA* process is the neighbourhood of 30 million dollars. That includes the direct professional costs and financing costs of the restructuring itself, as well as the savings that the labour cost reductions and the exit financing negotiated by Abitibi will generate as of the Implementation Date.

28 The Court cannot ignore this reality in dealing rapidly with the objections raised to the sanction and approval of the *CCAA* Plan.

Analysis

1. The Court's approval of the CCAA Plan

29 As already indicated, the first and second general requirements set out previously dealing with the statutory requirements and the absence of unauthorized conduct are not at issue.

30 On the one hand, the Monitor has reached the conclusion that Abitibi is and has been in strict compliance with all statutory requirements. Nobody suggests that this is not the case.

31 On the other hand, all materials filed and procedures taken by Abitibi were authorized by the *CCAA* and the orders of this Court. The numerous reports of the Monitor (well over sixty to date) make no reference to any act or conduct by Abitibi that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; rather, the Monitor is of the view that Abitibi has not done or purported to do anything that was not authorized by the *CCAA*[6].

32 In fact, in connection with each request for an extension of the stay of proceedings, the Monitor has reported that Abitibi was acting in good faith and with due diligence. The Court has not made any contrary finding during the course of these proceedings.

33 Turning to the fairness and reasonableness of a *CCAA* Plan requirement, its assessment requires the Court to consider the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought. To that end, in reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of a given plan, the Court does not and should not require perfection[7].

34 Considering that a plan is, first and foremost, a compromise and arrangement reached, between a debtor company and its creditors, there is, indeed, a heavy onus on parties seeking to upset a plan where the required majorities have overwhelmingly supported it. From that standpoint, a court should not lightly second-guess the business decisions reached by the creditors as a body[8].

35 In that regard, courts in this country have held that the level of approval by the creditors is a significant factor in determining whether a *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable[9]. Here, the majorities in favour of the *CCAA* Plan, both in number and in value, are very high. This indicates a significant and very strong support of the *CCAA* Plan by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi.

36 Likewise, in its Fifty-Seventh Report, the Monitor advised the creditors that their approval of the *CCAA* Plan would be a reasonable decision. He recommended that they approve the *CCAA* Plan then. In its Fifty-Eighth Report, the Monitor reaffirmed its view that the *CCAA* Plan was fair and reasonable. The recommendation was for the Court to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan.

37 In a matter such as this one, where the Monitor has worked through out the restructuring with professionalism, objectivity and competence, such a recommendation carries a lot of weight.

38 The Court considers that the *CCAA* Plan represents a truly successful compromise and restructuring, fully in line with the objectives of the *CCAA*. Despite its weaknesses and imperfections, and notwithstanding the huge sacrifices and losses it imposes upon numerous stakeholders, the *CCAA* Plan remains a practical, reasonable and responsible solution to Abitibi's insolvency.

39 Its implementation will preserve significant social and economic benefits to the Canadian economy, including enabling about 11,900 employees (as of March 31, 2010) to retain their employment, and allowing hundreds of municipalities, suppliers and contractors in several regions of Ontario and Quebec to continue deriving benefits from a stronger and more competitive important player in the forest products industry.

40 In addition, the business of Abitibi will continue to operate, pension plans will not be terminated, and the Affected Unsecured Creditors will receive distributions (including payment in full to small creditors).

41 Moreover, simply no alternative to the *CCAA* Plan has been offered to the creditors of Abitibi. To the contrary, it appears obvious that in the event the Courtdoes not sanction the *CCAA* Plan, the considerable advantages that it creates will be most likely lost, such that Abitibi may well be placed into bankruptcy.

42 If that were to be the case, no one seriously disputes that most of the creditors would end up being in a more disadvantageous position than with the approval of the *CCAA* Plan. As outlined in the Monitor's 57th Report, the alternative scenario, a liquidation of Abitibi's business, will not prove to be as advantageous for its creditors, let alone its stakeholders as a whole.

43 All in all, the economic and business interests of those directly concerned with the end result have spoken vigorously pursuant to a well-conducted democratic process. This is certainly not a case where the Court should override the express and strong wishes of the debtor company and its creditors and the Monitor's objective analysis that supports it.

44 Bearing these comments in mind, the Court notes as well that none of the objections raised support the conclusion that the *CCAA* Plan is unfair or unreasonable.

2. The BCFC Noteholders' objections

45 In the end, only Aurelius Capital Management LP and Contrarian Capital Management LLC (the "*Noteholders*") oppose the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan [10].

46 These Noteholders, through their managed funds entities, hold about one-third of some six hundred million US dollars of Unsecured Notes issued by Bowater Canada Finance Company ("*BCFC*") and which are guaranteed by Bowater Incorporated. These notes are BCFC's only material liabilities.

47 BCFC was a Petitioner under the *CCAA* proceedings and a Debtor in the parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. However, its creditors voted to reject the *CCAA* Plan: while 76.8% of the Class of Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC approved the *CCAA* Plan in number, only 48% thereof voted in favour in dollar value. The required majorities of the *CCAA* were therefore not met.

48 As a result of this no vote occurrence, the Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC, including the Noteholders, are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan: they will not receive the distribution contemplated by the plan. As for BCFC itself, this outcome entails that it is not an "Applicant" for the purpose of this Sanction Order.

49 Still, the terms of the *CCAA* Plan specifically provide for the compromise and release of any claims BCFC may have against the other Petitioners pursuant, for instance, to any inter company transactions. Similarly, the *CCAA* Plan

specifies that BCFC's equity interests in any other Petitioner can be exchanged, cancelled, redeemed or otherwise dealt with for nil consideration.

50 In their objections to the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan, the Noteholders raise, in essence, three arguments:

(a) They maintain that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan and that no process has been established to provide for BCFC to receive distribution as a creditor of the other Petitioners;

(b) They criticize the overly broad and inappropriate character of the release provisions of the *CCAA* Plan;

(c) They contend that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been appropriately allocated.

51 With respect, the Court considers that these objections are ill founded.

52 First, given the vote by the creditors of BCFC that rejected the *CCAA* Plan and its specific terms in the event of such a situation, the initial ground of contestation is moot for all intents and purposes.

53 In addition, pursuant to a hearing held on September 16 and 17, 2010, on an Abitibi's *Motion for Advice and Directions*, Mayrand J. already concluded that BCFC had simply no claims against the other Petitioners, save with respect to the Contribution Claim referred to in that motion and that is not affected by the *CCAA* Plan in any event.

54 There is no need to now review or reconsider this issue that has been heard, argued and decided, mostly in a context where the Noteholders had ample opportunity to then present fully their arguments.

55 In her reasons for judgment filed earlier today in the Court record, Mayrand J. notably ruled that the alleged Inter Company Claims of BCFC had no merit pursuant to a detailed analysis of what took place.

56 For one, the Monitor, in its Amended 49th Report, had made a thorough review of the transactions at issue and concluded that they did not appear to give rise to any inter company debt owing to BCFC.

57 On top of that, Mayrand J. noted as well that the Independent Advisors, who were appointed in the Chapter 11 U.S. Proceedings to investigate the Inter Company Transactions that were the subject of the Inter Company Claims, had completed their report in this regard. As explained in its 58th Report, the Monitor understands that they were of the view that BCFC had no other claims to file against any other Petitioner. In her reasons, Mayrand J. concluded that this was the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence she heard.

58 As highlighted by Mayrand J. in these reasons, despite having received this report of the Independent Advisors, the Noteholders have not agreed to release its content. Conversely, they have not invoked any of its findings in support of their position either.

59 That is not all. In her reasons for judgment, Mayrand J. indicated that a detailed presentation of the Independent Advisors report was made to BCFC's Board of Directors on September 7, 2010. This notwithstanding, BCFC elected not to do anything in that regard since then.

60 As a matter of fact, at no point in time did BCFC ever file, in the context of the current *CCAA* Proceedings, any claim against any other Petitioner. None of its creditors, including the Noteholders, have either purported to do so for and/or on behalf of BCFC. This is quite telling. After all, the transactions at issue date back many years and this restructuring process has been going on for close to eighteen months.

61 To sum up, short of making allegations that no facts or analysis appear to support or claiming an insufficiency of process because the independent and objective ones followed so far did not lead to the result they wanted, the Noteholders simply have nothing of substance to put forward.

62 Contrary to what they contend, there is no need for yet again another additional process to deal with this question. To so conclude would be tantamount to allowing the Noteholders to take hostage the *CCAA* restructuring process and derail Abitibi's emergence for no valid reason.

63 The other argument of the Noteholders to the effect that BCFC would have had a claim as the holder of preferred shares of BCHI leads to similar comments. It is, again, hardly supported by anything. In any event, assuming the restructuring transactions contemplated under the *CCAA* Plan entail their cancellation for nil consideration, which is apparently not necessarily the case for the time being, there would be nothing unusual in having the equity holders of insolvent companies not receive anything in a compromise and plan of arrangement approved in a *CCAA* restructuring process.

64 In such a context, the Court disagrees with the Noteholders' assertion that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan or that no process was established to provide the latter to receive distribution as a potential creditor of the other Petitioners.

65 To argue that the *CCAA* Plan is not fair and reasonable on the basis of these alleged claims of BCFC against the other Petitioners has no support based on the relevant facts and Mayrand J.'s analysis of that specific point.

66 Second, given these findings, the issue of the breadth and appropriateness of the releases provided under the *CCAA* Plan simply does not concern the Noteholders.

67 As stated by Abitibi's Counsel at hearing, BCFC is neither an "Applicant" under the terms of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan nor pursuant to the Sanction Order. As such, BCFC does not give or get releases as a result of the Sanction Order. The *CCAA* Plan does not release BCFC nor its directors or officers acting as such.

68 As it is not included as an "Applicant", there is no need to provide any type of convoluted "carve-out" provision as the Noteholders requested. As properly suggested by Abitibi, it will rather suffice to include a mere clarification at paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order to reaffirm that in the context of the releases and the Sanction Order, "Applicant" does not include BCFC.

69 As for the Noteholders themselves, they are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan as a result of the no vote of their Class.

70 In essence, the main concern of the Noteholders as to the scope of the releases contemplated by the *CCAA* Plan and the Sanction Order is a mere issue of clarity. In the Court's opinion, this is sufficiently dealt with by the addition made to the wording of paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order.

71 Besides that, as explained earlier, any complaint by the Noteholders that the alleged inter company claims of BCFC are improperly compromised by the *CCAA* Plan has no merit. If their true objective is to indirectly protect their contentions to that end by challenging the wording of the releases, it is unjustified and without basis. The Court already said so.

72 Save for these arguments raised by the Noteholders that the Court rejects, it is worth noting that none of the stakeholders of Abitibi object to the scope of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan or their appropriateness given the global compromise reached through the debt to equity swap and the reorganization contemplated by the plan.

73 The *CCAA* permits the inclusion of releases (even ones involving third parties) in a plan of compromise or arrangement when there is a reasonable connection between the claims being released and compromised and the restructuring achieved by the plan. Amongst others, the broad nature of the terms "compromise or arrangement", the binding nature of a plan that has received creditors' approval, and the principles that parties should be able to put in a plan what could lawfully be incorporated into any other contract support the authority of the Court to approve these

kind of releases [11]. In accordance with these principles, the Quebec Superior Court has, in the past, sanctioned plans that included releases of parties making significant contribution to a restructuring [12].

74 The additional argument raised by the Noteholders with respect to the difference between the releases that could be approved by this Court as compared to those that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court may issue in respect of the Chapter 11 Plan is not convincing.

75 The fact that under the Chapter 11 Plan, creditors may elect not to provide releases to directors and officers of applicable entities does not render similar kind of releases granted under the *CCAA* Plan invalid or improper. That the result may be different in a jurisdiction as opposed to the other does not make the *CCAA* Plan unfair and unreasonable simply for that reason.

76 Third, the last objection of the Noteholders to the effect that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been properly allocated is simply a red herring. It is aimed at provoking a useless debate with respect to which the Noteholders have, in essence, no standing.

77 The Monitor testified that the NAFTA Settlement has no impact whatsoever upon BCFC. If it is at all relevant, all the assets involved in this settlement belonged to another of the Petitioners, ACCC, with respect to whom the Noteholders are not a creditor.

78 In addition, this apparent contestation of the allocation of the NAFTA Settlement Funds is a collateral attack on the Order granted by this Court on September 1, 2010, which approved the settlement of Abitibi's NAFTA claims against the Government of Canada, as well as the related payment to be made to the reorganised successor Canadian operating entity upon emergence. No one has appealed this NAFTA Settlement Order.

79 That said, in their oral argument, the Noteholders have finally argued that the Court should lift the Stay of Proceedings Order inasmuch as BCFC was concerned. The last extension of the Stay was granted on September 1, 2010, without objection; it expires on September 30, 2010. It is clear from the wording of this Sanction Order that any extension beyond September 30, 2010 will not apply to BCFC.

80 The Court considers this request made verbally by the Noteholders as unfounded.

81 No written motion was ever served in that regard to start with. In addition, the Stay remains in effect against BCFC up until September 30, 2010, that is, for about a week or so. The explanations offered by Abitibi's Counsel to leave it as such for the time being are reasonable under the circumstances. It appears proper to allow a few days to the interested parties to ascertain the impact, if any, of the Stay not being applicable anymore to BCFC, if alone to ascertain how this impacts upon the various charges created by the Initial Order and subsequent Orders issued by the Court during the course of these proceedings.

82 There is no support for the concern of the Noteholders as to an ulterior motive of Abitibi for maintaining in place this Stay of Proceedings against BCFC up until September 30, 2010.

83 All things considered, in the Court's opinion, it would be quite unfair and unreasonable to deny the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan for the benefit of all the stakeholders involved on the basis of the arguments raised by the Noteholders.

84 Their objections either reargue issues that have been heard, considered and decided, complain of a lack a clarity of the scope of releases that the addition of a few words to the Sanction Order properly addresses, or voice queries about the allocation of important funds to the Abitibi's emergence from the *CCAA* that simply do not concern the entities of which the Noteholders are allegedly creditors, be it in Canada or in the U.S.

85 When one remains mindful of the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought, it is obvious that the scales heavily tilt in favour of granting the Sanction Order sought.

3. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia

86 Following negotiations that the Provinces involved and Abitibi pursued, with the assistance of the Monitor, up to the very last minute, the interested parties have agreed upon a "carve-out" wording that is satisfactory to every one with respect to some potential environmental liabilities of Abitibi in the event future circumstances trigger a concrete dispute in that regard.

87 In the Court's view, this is, by far, the most preferred solution to adopt with respect to the disagreement that exists on their respective position as to potential proceedings that may arise in the future under environmental legislation. This approach facilitates the approval of the *CCAA* Plan and the successful restructuring of Abitibi, without affecting the right of any affected party in this respect.

88 The "carve-out" provisions agreed upon will be included in the Sanction Order.

4. The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited

89 By its Contestation, NPower Cogen Limited sought to preserve its rights with respect to what it called the "Cogen Motion", namely a "*motion to be brought by Cogen before this Honourable Court to have various claims heard*" (para. 24(b) and 43 of NPower Cogen Limited Contestation).

90 Here again, Abitibi and NPower Cogen Limited have agreed on an acceptable "carve-out" wording to be included in the Sanction Order in that regard. As a result, there is no need to discuss the impact of this Contestation any further.

5. Abitibi's Reorganization

91 The Motion finally deals with the corporate reorganization of Abitibi and the Sanction Order includes declarations and orders dealing with it.

92 The test to be applied by the Court in determining whether to approve a reorganization under Section 191 of the *CBCA* is similar to the test applied in deciding whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*, namely: (a) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company must be acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring must be fair and reasonable [13].

93 It is not disputed by anyone that these requirements have been fulfilled here.

6. The wording of the Sanction Order

94 In closing, the Court made numerous comments to Abitibi's Counsel on the wording of the Sanction Order initially sought in the Motion. These comments have been taken into account in the subsequent in depth revisions of the Sanction Order that the Court is now issuing. The Court is satisfied with the corrections, adjustments and deletions made to what was originally requested.

For these Reasons, The Court:

1 *GRANTS* the Motion.

Definitions

2 *DECLARES* that any capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the *CCAA* Plan [14] and the Creditors' Meeting Order, as the case may be.

Service and Meeting

3 *DECLARES* that the notices given of the presentation of the Motion and related Sanction Hearing are proper and sufficient, and in accordance with the Creditors' Meeting Order.

4 *DECLARES* that there has been proper and sufficient service and notice of the Meeting Materials, including the *CCAA* Plan, the Circular and the Notice to Creditors in connection with the Creditors' Meeting, to all Affected Unsecured Creditors, and that the Creditors' Meeting was duly convened, held and conducted in conformity with the *CCAA*, the Creditors' Meeting Order and all other applicable orders of the Court.

5 *DECLARES* that no meetings or votes of (i) holders of Equity Securities and/or (ii) holders of equity securities of ABH are required in connection with the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions as set out in the Restructuring Transactions Notice dated September 1, 2010, as amended on September 13, 2010.

CCAA Plan Sanction

6 *DECLARES* that:

a) the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation (including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions) have been approved by the Required Majorities of Affected Unsecured Creditors in each of the following classes in conformity with the *CCAA*: ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the 15.5% Guarantor Applicant Affected Unsecured Creditor Classes, the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the AbitibiBowater Canada Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Office Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class and the Recycling Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

b) the *CCAA* Plan was not approved by the Required Majority of Affected Unsecured Creditors in the BCFC Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and that the Holders of BCFC Affected Unsecured Claims are therefore deemed to be Unaffected Creditors holding Excluded Claims against BCFC for the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan and this Order, and that BCFC is therefore deemed not to be an Applicant for the purpose of this Order;

c) the Court is satisfied that the Petitioners and the Partnerships have complied with the provisions of the *CCAA* and all the orders made by this Court in the context of these *CCAA* Proceedings in all respects;

d) the Court is satisfied that no Petitioner or Partnership has either done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

e) the *CCAA* Plan (and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions), is fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the Applicants and the Partnerships, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

7 *ORDERS* that the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, are sanctioned and approved pursuant to Section 6 of the *CCAA* and Section 191 of the *CBCA*, and, as at the Implementation Date, will be effective and will enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

CCAA Plan Implementation

8 *DECLARES* that the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and the Monitor, as the case may be, are authorized and directed to take all steps and actions necessary or appropriate, as determined by the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors in accordance with and subject to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, to implement

and effect the *CCAA* Plan, including the Restructuring Transactions, in the manner and the sequence as set forth in the *CCAA* Plan, the Restructuring Transactions Notice and this Order, and such steps and actions are hereby approved.

9 *AUTHORIZES* the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors to request, if need be, one or more order(s) from this Court, including *CCAA* Vesting Order(s), for the transfer and assignment of assets to the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or other entities referred to in the Restructuring Transactions Notice, free and clear of any financial charges, as necessary or desirable to implement and effect the Restructuring Transactions as set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

10 *DECLARES* that, pursuant to Section 191 of the *CBCA*, the articles of AbitibiBowater Canada will be amended by new articles of reorganization in the manner and at the time set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

11 *DECLARES* that all Applicants and Partnerships to be dissolved pursuant to the Restructuring Transactions shall be deemed dissolved for all purposes without the necessity for any other or further action by or on behalf of any Person, including the Applicants or the Partnerships or their respective securityholders, directors, officers, managers or partners or for any payments to be made in connection therewith, provided, however, that the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors shall cause to be filed with the appropriate Governmental Entities articles, agreements or other documents of dissolution for the dissolved Applicants or Partnerships to the extent required by applicable Law.

12 *DECLARES* that, subject to the performance by the Applicants and the Partnerships of their obligations under the *CCAA* Plan, and in accordance with Section 8.1 of the *CCAA* Plan, all contracts, leases, Timber Supply and Forest Management Agreements ("TSFMA") and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements and other arrangements to which the Applicants or the Partnerships are a party and that have not been terminated including as part of the Restructuring Transactions or repudiated in accordance with the terms of the Initial Order will be and remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at the Implementation Date, and no Person who is a party to any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement may accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement and no automatic termination will have any validity or effect by reason of:

a) any event that occurred on or prior to the Implementation Date and is not continuing that would have entitled such Person to enforce those rights or remedies (including defaults, events of default, or termination events arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants and the Partnerships);

b) the insolvency of the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof or the fact that the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof sought or obtained relief under the *CCAA*, the CBCA or the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable legislation;

c) any of the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, the U.S. Plan or any action contemplated therein, including the Restructuring Transactions Notice;

d) any settlements, compromises or arrangements effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan or any action taken or transaction effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan; or

e) any change in the control, transfer of equity interest or transfer of assets of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the joint ventures, or any affiliate thereof, or of any entity in which any of the Applicants or the Partnerships held an equity interest arising from the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan (including the Restructuring Transactions Notice) or the U.S. Plan, or the transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

13 *DECLARES* that any consent or authorization required from a third party, including any Governmental Entity, under any such contracts, leases, TSFMAs and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements or other arrangements in respect of any change of control, transfer of equity

interest, transfer of assets or transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice be deemed satisfied or obtained, as applicable.

14 *DECLARES* that the determination of Proven Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders, the Cross-border Claims Protocol, the Cross-border Voting Protocol and the Creditors' Meeting Order shall be final and binding on the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and all Affected Unsecured Creditors.

Releases and Discharges

15 *CONFIRMS* the releases contemplated by Section 6.10 of the *CCAA* Plan and *DECLARES* that the said releases constitute good faith compromises and settlements of the matters covered thereby, and that such compromises and settlements are in the best interests of the Applicants and its stakeholders, are fair, equitable, and are integral elements of the restructuring and resolution of these proceedings in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, it being understood that for the purpose of these releases and/or this Order, the terms "Applicants" or "Applicant" are not meant to include Bowater Canada Finance Corporation ("*BCFC*").

16 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of all BI DIP Claims and ULC DIP Claim in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the BI DIP Lenders and the BI DIP Agent or ULC, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and other documents as the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the BI DIP Claims or the ULC DIP Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.

17 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of their Secured Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the ACCC Administrative Agent, the ACCC Term Lenders, the BCFPI Administrative Agent, the BCFPI Lenders, the Canadian Secured Notes Indenture Trustee and any Holders of a Secured Claim, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and other documents as the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the ACCC Term Loan Claim, BCFPI Secured Bank Claim, Canadian Secured Notes Claim or any other Secured Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.

For the purposes of the present paragraph [17], in the event of any dispute as to the amount of any Secured Claim, the Applicants, Partnerships or Reorganized Debtors, as the case may be, shall be permitted to pay to the Monitor the full amount in dispute (as specified by the affected Secured Creditor or by this Court upon summary application) and, upon payment of the amount not in dispute, receive the releases, discharges, authorizations, directions, instruments notices or other documents as provided for therein. Any amount paid to the Monitor in accordance with this paragraph shall be held in trust by the Monitor for the holder of the Secured Claim and the payer as their interests shall be determined by agreement between the parties or, failing agreement, as directed by this Court after summary application.

18 *PRECLUDES* the prosecution against the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, of any claim, obligation, suit, judgment, damage, demand, debt, right, cause of action, liability or interest released, discharged or terminated pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan.

Accounts with Financial Institutions

19 *ORDERS* that any and all financial institutions (the "Financial Institutions") with which the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors have or will have accounts (the "Accounts") shall process and/or facilitate

the transfer of, or changes to, such Accounts in order to implement the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

20 *ORDERS* that Mr. Allen Dea, Vice-President and Treasurer of ABH, or any other officer or director of the Reorganized Debtors, is empowered to take all required acts with any of the Financial Institutions to affect the transfer of, or changes to, the Accounts in order to facilitate the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

Effect of failure to implement CCAA Plan

21 *ORDERS* that, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur, Affected Unsecured Creditors shall not be bound to the valuation, settlement or compromise of their Affected Claims at the amount of their Proven Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders or the Creditors' Meeting Order. For greater certainty, nothing in the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders, the Creditors' Meeting Order or in any settlement, compromise, agreement, document or instrument made or entered into in connection therewith or in contemplation thereof shall, in any way, prejudice, quantify, adjudicate, modify, release, waive or otherwise affect the validity, enforceability or quantum of any Claim against the Applicants or the Partnerships, including in the *CCAA* Proceedings or any other proceeding or process, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur.

Charges created in the CCAA Proceedings

22 *ORDERS* that, upon the Implementation Date, all *CCAA* Charges against the Applicants and the Partnerships or their property created by the *CCAA* Initial Order or any subsequent orders shall be determined, discharged and released, provided that the BI DIP Lenders Charge shall be cancelled on the condition that the BI DIP Claims are paid in full on the Implementation Date.

Fees and Disbursements

23 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that, on and after the Implementation Date, the obligation to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants and the Partnerships, in each case at their standard rates and charges and including any amounts outstanding as of the Implementation Date, in respect of the *CCAA* Plan, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, shall become obligations of Reorganized ABH.

Exit Financing

24 *ORDERS* that the Applicants are authorized and empowered to execute, deliver and perform any credit agreements, instruments of indebtedness, guarantees, security documents, deeds, and other documents, as may be required in connection with the Exit Facilities.

Stay Extension

25 *EXTENDS* the Stay Period in respect of the Applicantsuntil the Implementation Date.

26 *DECLARES* that all orders made in the *CCAA* Proceedings shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with their respective terms, except to the extent that such Orders are varied by, or inconsistent with, this Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, or any further Order of this Court.

Monitor and Chief Restructuring Officer

27 *DECLARES* that the protections afforded to Ernst & Young Inc., as Monitor and as officer of this Court, and to the Chief Restructuring Officer pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order and the other Orders made in the *CCAA*

Proceedings, shall not expire or terminate on the Implementation Date and, subject to the terms hereof, shall remain effective and in full force and effect.

28 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that any distributions under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order shall not constitute a "distribution" and the Monitor shall not constitute a "legal representative" or "representative" of the Applicants for the purposes of section 159 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), section 270 of the Excise Tax Act (Canada), section 14 of the Act Respecting the Ministère du Revenu (Québec), section 107 of the Corporations Tax Act (Ontario), section 22 of the Retail Sales Tax Act (Ontario), section 117 of the Taxation Act, 2007 (Ontario) or any other similar federal, provincial or territorial tax legislation (collectively the "Tax Statutes") given that the Monitor is only a Disbursing Agent under the *CCAA* Plan, and the Monitor in making such payments is not "distributing", nor shall be considered to "distribute" nor to have "distributed", such funds for the purpose of the Tax Statutes, and the Monitor shall not incur any liability under the Tax Statutes in respect of it making any payments ordered or permitted hereunder, and is hereby forever released, remised and discharged from any claims against it under or pursuant to the Tax Statutes or otherwise at law, arising in respect of payments made under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order and any claims of this nature are hereby forever barred.

29 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that the Disbursing Agent, the Applicants and the Reorganized Debtors, as necessary, are authorized to take any and all actions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with applicable Tax withholding and reporting requirements, including withholding a number of shares of New ABH Common Stock equal in value to the amount required to comply with such withholding requirements from the shares of New ABH Common Stock to be distributed to current or former employees and making the necessary arrangements for the sale of such shares on the TSX or the New York Stock Exchange on behalf of the current or former employees to satisfy such withholding requirements. All amounts withheld on account of Taxes shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to the Affected Unsecured Creditor in respect of which such withholding was made, provided such withheld amounts are remitted to the appropriate Governmental Entity.

Claims Officers

30 *DECLARES* that, in accordance with paragraph [25] hereof, any claims officer appointed in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders shall continue to have the authority conferred upon, and to the benefit from all protections afforded to, claims officers pursuant to Orders in the *CCAA* Proceedings.

General

31 *ORDERS* that, notwithstanding any other provision in this Order, the *CCAA* Plan or these *CCAA* Proceedings, the rights of the public authorities of British Columbia, Ontario or New Brunswick to take the position in or with respect to any future proceedings under environmental legislation that this or any other Order does not affect such proceedings by reason that such proceedings are not in relation to a claim within the meaning of the *CCAA* or are otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament or a court under the *CCAA* to affect in any way is fully reserved; as is reserved the right of any affected party to take any position to the contrary.

32 *DECLARES* that nothing in this Order or the *CCAA* Plan shall preclude NPower Cogen Limited ("Cogen") from bringing a motion for, or this Court from granting, the relief sought in respect of the facts and issues set out in the Claims Submission of Cogen dated August 10, 2010 (the "Claim Submission"), and the Reply Submission of Cogen dated August 24, 2010, provided that such relief shall be limited to the following:

a) a declaration that Cogen's claim against Abitibi Consolidated Inc. ("Abitibi") and its officers and directors, arising from the supply of electricity and steam to Bridgewater Paper Company Limited between November 1, 2009 and February 2, 2010 in the amount of £9,447,548 plus interest accruing at the rate of 3% *per annum* from February 2, 2010 onwards (the "Claim Amount") is (i) unaffected by the *CCAA* Plan or Sanction Order; (ii) is an Excluded Claim; or (iii) is a Secured Claim; (iv) is a D&O Claim; or (v) is a liability of Abitibi under its Guarantee;

b) an Order directing Abitibi and its Directors and Officers to pay the Claim Amount to Cogen forthwith; or

c) in the alternative to (b), an order granting leave, if leave be required, to commence proceedings for the payment of the Claim Amount under s. 241 of the *CBCA* and otherwise against Abitibi and its directors and officers in respect of same.

33 *DECLARES* that any of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for directions concerning the exercise of their respective powers, duties and rights hereunder or in respect of the proper execution of the Order on notice to the Service List.

34 *DECLARES* that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

35 *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any Court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of the Order, including the registration of this Order in any office of public record by any such court or administrative body or by any Person affected by the Order.

Provisional Execution

36 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

37 *WITHOUT COSTS.*

Schedule "A" — Abitibi Petitioners

1. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.*

2. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA*

3. *3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED*

4. *MARKETING DONOHUE INC.*

5. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.*

6. *3834328 CANADA INC.*

7. *6169678 CANADA INC.*

8. *4042140 CANADA INC.*

9. *DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.*

10. *1508756 ONTARIO INC.*

11. *3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*

12. *LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

13. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED*

14. *SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

15. *TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.*

16. *THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY*

17. *THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY*

18. *SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.*

19. *9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.*

20. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.*

Schedule "B" — Bowater Petitioners

1. *BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.*

2. *BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION*

3. *BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED*

4. *3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*

5. *ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.*

6. *BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION*

7. *BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

8. *BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION*

9. *BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION*

10. *ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED*

11. *BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.*

12. *CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.*

13. *9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.*

14. *ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.*

15. *BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.*

16. *BOWATER MARITIMES INC.*

17. *BOWATER MITIS INC.*

18. *BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.*

19. *BOWATER COUTURIER INC.*

Schedule "C" — 18.6 CCAA Petitioners

1. *ABITIBIBOWATER INC.*

2. *ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.*

3. *BOWATER VENTURES INC.*

4. *BOWATER INCORPORATED*

5. *BOWATER NUWAY INC.*

6. *BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.*

7. *CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC*

8. *BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.*

9. *BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED*

10. *BOWATER AMERICA INC.*

11. *LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

12. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC*

13. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC*

14. *BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC*

15. *BOWATER ALABAMA LLC*

16. *COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC*

Motion granted.

Footnotes

1 *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

2 See Monitor's Fifty-Seventh Report dated September 7, 2010, and Monitor's Fifty-Ninth Report dated September 17, 2010.

3 This Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii) dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) (collectively, the "*CCAA Plan*") is included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.

4 Motion for an Order Sanctioning the Plan of Reorganization and Compromise and Other Relief (the "Motion"), pursuant to Sections 6, 9 and 10 of the CCAA and Section 191 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (the "CBCA").

5 *Boutiques San Francisco Inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185, B.E. 2004BE-775 (S.C.); *Cable Satisfaction International Inc. v. Richter & Associés inc.*, J.E. 2004-907 (C.S. Que.) [2004 CarswellQue 810 (C.S. Que.)].

6 See Monitor's Fifty-Eight Report dated September 16, 2010.

7 *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re)* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

8 *Uniforêt inc., Re* (C.S. Que.) [2003 CarswellQue 3404 (C.S. Que.)], *TQS inc., Re*, 2008 QCCS 2448 (C.S. Que.), B.E. 2008BE-834; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

9 *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Boutiques San Francisco inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185 , B.E. 2004BE-775; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.).

10 The Indenture Trustee acting under the Unsecured Notes supports the Noteholders in their objections.

11 See, in this respect, *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.); *Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., Re* (2008), J.E. 2009-9, 2008 QCCS 5388 (C.S. Que.); *Hy Bloom inc. c. Banque Nationale du Canada*, [2010] R.J.Q. 912 (C.S. Que.).

12 *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, N° 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J.

13 *Raymor Industries inc. (Proposition de)*, [2010] R.J.Q. 608, 2010 QCCS 376 (C.S. Que.); *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, N° 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J., at para. 7-8; *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re* [2005 CarswellQue 13408 (C.S. Que.)], (S.C., 2005-11-14), SOQUIJ AZ-50380254, 2005 CanLII 54083; *Doman Industries Ltd., Re*, 2003 BCSC 375 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Laidlaw, Re* (Ont. S.C.J.).

14 It is understood that for the purposes of this Sanction Order, the CCAA Plan is the Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii) dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.

End of Document

TAB 10

2005 CarswellOnt 6483
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Stelco Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 6483, [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: November 9, 2005
Judgment: November 10, 2005*
Docket: 04-CL-5306

Proceedings: affirmed *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510 (Ont. C.A.)

Counsel: Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage, Geoff R. Hall for Applicants
Kyla Mahar for Monitor
Robert Staley for Senior Debenture Holders
Ashley John Taylor (Agent) to Secured Creditors for CIT
Paul MacDonald, Andy Kent, Hilary Clarke for Converts Committee
Aubrey Kauffman for Tricap
Ken Rosenberg, Jeff Larry for USW
H. Whitely for CIBC
Steven Bosnick for USW Locals 8782, 8328
Murray Gold, Andrew Hatney for Salaried Retirees
Gale Rubenstein for Superintendent

Subject: Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — General principles

Designation of creditor class — Steel manufacturer was under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Committee of senior debenture holders and informal independent converts' committee were creditors — Informal independent converts' committee brought motion for order that proposed plan be amended regarding rights of bondholders to bring action against bankrupt, and for designation regarding classes of creditors — Committee of senior debenture holders brought contingent cross-motion for order that it be constituted as separate class of creditor — Motions dismissed — Separate classes for senior debenture holders and/or informal independent converts' committee inappropriate — All debt in question was unsecured debt — No confiscation of rights occurred by placing creditors in same class — No conflict of interest existed — Questions of tyranny by minority or minority were not appropriate.

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Proposal — Effect of proposal — General principles

Steel manufacturer was under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Committee of senior debenture holders and informal independent ionverts' committee were creditors — Informal independent converts' committee brought motion for order that proposed plan be amended regarding rights of bondholders to bring action against bankrupt, and for designation regarding classes of creditors — Committee of senior debenture holders brought contingent cross-motion for order that it be constituted as separate class of creditor — Motions dismissed — Bankrupt undertook to amend plan to clarify intent regarding rights of bondholders — Plan was not intended to affect rights of certain creditors as against other creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

Campeau Corp., Re (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 570, 1991 CarswellOnt 155 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 623, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 149, 2000 CarswellAlta 503, 80 Alta. L.R. (3d) 213, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33, 261 A.R. 120, 225 W.A.C. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada (2001), 2001 BCSC 1721, 2001 CarswellBC 2943, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc. (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 248, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 170, 1 C.L.R. (3d) 260 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2232, 15 B.L.R. (3d) 25, 147 O.A.C. 96 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 792, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2004), 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 352, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92, 359 A.R. 71, 2004 ABQB 705, 2004 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2004), 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 371, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 361 A.R. 220, 339 W.A.C. 220, 2004 ABCA 386, 2004 CarswellAlta 1607 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

843504 Alberta Ltd., Re (2003), 2003 ABQB 1015, 2003 CarswellAlta 1786, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 306, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 91, 351 A.R. 222 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 8 — referred to

MOTION by creditors relating to terms of proposal in bankruptcy.

***Farley J.*:**

1 Fortunately time cleared so that the motion of the Informal Independent Converts' Committee ("ConCom") which surfaced late last week — and the responding cross motion of the Informal Committee of Senior Debenture Holders ("BondCom") — could be accommodated today, less than week before the scheduled vote on Stelco Inc.'s Plan of Arrangement under the CCAA set for November 15, 2005.

2 The motion of ConCom was for an order:

> (i) directing the Applicants to amend page 39 of the Notice of Proceedings and Meetings and Information Circular (the "Information Circular") with respect to the Applicants' Proposed Plan of Arrangement or Compromise (the "Proposed Plan") in the manner set out in the Draft Order to confirm that the right (if any) of the Bondholders (as hereinafter defined) to assert claims or other remedies against other creditors of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") will be subject to the effect of the Proposed Plan (the "Bondholders Claims Statement") and that the right (if any) of the Bondholders to assert claims (the "Anti-Convert Claims") pursuant to Article 6 (the "Inter-Trustee Provisions") of the First Supplemental Trust Indenture dated January 21, 2002 between Stelco and CIBC Mellon Trust Company (the "Supplemental Trust Indenture") will be extinguished effective upon the implementation of the Proposed Plan;
>
> (ii) declaring that, if the Proposed Plan is approved by the requisite majority of the creditors of Stelco and sanctioned by this Court, the Inter-Trustee Provisions shall, from and after the effective date of the Proposed Plan, be of no force or effect;
>
> (iii) in the alternative, directing the Applicants to amend the Proposed Plan to provide that the Noteholders (as hereinafter defined) shall constitute a separate class of Stelco creditors for the purposes of voting on the Proposed Plan or any amended version thereof; and
>
> (iv) such further and other relief as counsel may request and this Honourable Court may permit.

3 The cross motion of BondCom was for an Order:

> 2. for a declaration that, if any or all of the relief sought by the Convertible Noteholders as set out in its notice of motion dated November 4, 2005 is granted, that the Senior Debenture Holders shall constitute a separate class of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") creditors for the purposes of voting on the Proposed Plan of Arrangement or Compromise (the "Proposed Plan") or any amended version thereof; and
>
> 3. such further and other relief as to this Honourable Court seems just.

4 No one present at this hearing disputed the proposition that it was appropriate to have the creditors vote on the Plan with the necessary benefit of clear statements of what was involved in such a vote and to eliminate therefore any ambiguities to the extent possible so that an objective creditor could make a reasoned decision. In that respect it would appear to me that the language of the Information Circular at p.39 thereof should be clarified to track that of the Meeting Order of October 4, 2005 at para. 34 thereof as to the operative element. Further it was acknowledged by everyone that the Plan itself provided that it may be amended before the vote. In that respect there would be no impediment for Stelco to adjust the language of the Plan in the sense of clarifying what its intent has been and continues to be in respect of matters affecting the debt in question and as held by those represented by the ConCom and by the BondCom. (Note: Subsequent to release of these reasons in handwritten form, I was advised on November 10, 2005 that Stelco has undertaken to make the aforesaid clarifications.)

5 I wish to emphasize that nothing in my reasons should be taken as being determinative of or affecting the relationship of the ConCom holders of debt vis-à-vis the BondCom holders of debt (that would as well encompass the holders of all Senior Debt as that term is defined in the Supplemental Trust Indenture). If those two sides are not able to work out an agreement between themselves, then they are at liberty to come to court to have that adjudicated.

6 ConCom points out that the Supplemental Trust Indenture was an agreement between Stelco and the holders of the ConCom debt, but it was not an agreement signed by the holders of the BondCom debt. While true, that would not preclude a claim of the BondCom holders based on the concept of third party beneficiary.

7 The CCAA is styled as "An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors" and its short title is: *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company. See *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 24-25; *Royal Bank v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc.*, [2000] O.J. No. 315 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 41, appeal dismissed (Ont. C.A.); *843504 Alberta Ltd., Re*, [2003] A.J. No. 1549 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 13; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re*, [1999] O.J. No. 709 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 24; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re*, [1999] O.J. No. 864 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 1.

8 ConCom points out the language of article 4.01 of the Plan:

> **4.01 Cancellation of Certificates**
>
> At the Effective Time, all debentures, certificates, agreements, invoices and other instruments evidencing Affected Claims against Stelco or Existing Common Shares will not entitle any holder thereof to any compensation or participation other than as expressly provided for in this Plan or in the Articles or Reorganization, respectively, and will be cancelled and null and void, and all debentures, certificates, agreements, invoices and other instruments evidencing Affected Claims against any Subsidiary Applicant will not entitle any holder thereof (other than Stelco or its successors and assignees) to any compensation or participation other than as expressly provided for in this Plan and, if in the possession or control of any Person must, at the request of Stelco, be delivered to Stelco. (emphasis added)

However this must be carefully analyzed in context. This deals with "Affected Claims against Stelco." See also in this respect articles 6.01, 6.02 and 6.05.

> **6.01 Effect of Plan Generally**
>
> At the Effective Time, the treatment of Affected Claims will be final and binding on the Applicants, the Affected Creditors and the trustees under the trust indentures for the Bonds (and their respective heirs, executors, administrators and other legal representatives, successors and assigns), and this Plan will constitute: (a) full, final and absolute settlement of all rights of the Affected Creditors; (b) an absolute release and discharge of all indebtedness,

liabilities and obligations of or in respect of the Affected Claims against Stelco, including any interest and costs accruing thereon; (c) an absolute assignment to Stelco of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of or in respect of the Affected Claims against Subsidiary Applicants, including any interest and costs accruing thereon, and an absolute release and discharge of any rights of Affected Creditors in respect thereof (excluding, for greater certainty, any rights assigned to Stelco); and (d) a reorganization of the capital and change in the minimum and maximum number of directors of Stelco in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 and the Articles of Reorganization. (emphasis added)

6.02 Prosecution of Judgments

At the Effective Time, no step or proceeding may be taken in respect of any suit, judgement, execution, cause of action or similar proceeding in connection with any Affected Claim (other than by Stelco in respect of Affected Claims assigned to it pursuant to this Plan) and any such proceedings will be deemed to have no further effect against any Applicant or any of its assets and will be released, discharged, dismissed or vacated without cost to the Applicants. Any Applicant may apply to Court to obtain a discharge or dismissal, if necessary, of any such proceedings without notice to the Affected Creditor. (emphasis added)

6.05 Consents, Waivers and Agreements

At the Effective Time, each Affected Creditor will be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Plan, as an entirety. Without limitation to the foregoing, each Affected Creditor (but for greater certainty, excluding Stelco in respect of Affected Claims assigned to it pursuant to this Plan) will be deemed:

(a) to have executed and delivered to the Applicants all consents, assignments, releases and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out this Plan as an entirety;

(b) to have waived any default by or rescinded any demand for payment against any Applicant that has occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date pursuant to, based on or as a result of any provision, express or implied, in any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and such Applicant with respect to an Affected Claim; and

(c) to have agreed that, if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and any Applicant with respect to an Affected Claim as at the Plan Implementation Date and the provisions of this Plan, then the provisions of this Plan take precedence and priority and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangement are amended accordingly.

(emphasis added)

This is not language which purports to, nor in my opinion does, affect relationships between creditors vis-à-vis themselves. With respect, I do not see s. 8 of the CCAA as coming into play here, nor is it necessary to have it come into play in this inter-creditor dispute which does not directly involve Stelco. No doubt it would be helpful to have Stelco clarify that aspect which ConCom has sincerely felt was ambiguous in article 4.01 of the Plan to reflect that these instruments are cancelled and null and void only as to the future (ie. that is after the Effective Time) vis-à-vis Stelco, but not as to the inter-creditor dispute or relationship. (See note above re: undertaking of Stelco.)

9 I would only note in passing that the holders of the ConCom debt freely bought into a situation governed by s. 6.2 of the Supplemental Trust Indenture which contemplated their relationship with the BondCom debt (Senior Debt) in the event of insolvency proceedings or a reorganization. Give the caveats in s. 6.3 it would not appear to me that this clause advances the argument pressed by the ConCom.

10 Therefore as to the relief request by ConCom in (i) and (ii) above, I would dismiss that part of the motion. That dismissal in no way affects the clarification of language mentioned above which would be of assistance to all concerned.

11 Secondly, I would note that while apparently Stelco had not specifically advised as to its position, at the time of the hearing, its counsel was quite straight forward in his opening comments when he stated that Stelco had intended and always intended that its Plan (as distributed) was only to affect rights between Stelco and its Affected Creditors, and specifically Stelco had no intent to alter the relationship between its creditors in the sense of one group of creditors vis-à-vis another group (i.e. the ConCom debt vis-à-vis BondCom debt (Senior Debt)). In this latter regard he indicated that Stelco was not intending to affect whatever subordination rights there may be between these two groups. This would be in the sense that what was the situation between these two groups as a result of the Supplemental Trust Indenture, especially at s. 6, would continue to be the relationship after the Effective Time.

12 The next question is whether or not there should be separate classes for the ConCom debt and/or the BondCom debt/Senior Debt. I am of the view that the law in regard to classification is correctly set out in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), cited in the Alberta Court of Appeal subsequent decision *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 261 A.R. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27. See also *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 11, leave to appeal denied 2004 ABCA 386 (Alta. C.A.). As noted by Toplinski J. at para. 11 of San Francisco:

> (11) The commonality of interest test has evolved over time and now involves application of the following guidelines that were neatly summarized by Paperny J. (as she then was) in *Resurgence Asset Management LLS v. Canadian Airlines Corp.* ("Canadian Airlines")
>
> 1. Community of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test.
>
> 2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the Plan as well as on liquidation.
>
> 3. The commonality of interests should be viewed purposively, bearing in mind that the object of the CCAA, namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
>
> 4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the CCAA, the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans.
>
> 5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
>
> 6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors before or after the Plan in a similar manner. (emphasis added)

13 I would note as well that the primary and most significant attribute of the ConCom debt and that of the BondCom debt/Senior Debt plus the trade debt vis-à-vis Stelco is that it is all unsecured debt. Thus absent valid reason to have separate classes it would be reasonable, logical, rational and practical to have all this unsecured debt in the same class. Certainly that would avoid any unnecessary fragmentation — and in this respect multiplicity of classes does not mean that that fragmentation starts only when there are many classes. Unless more than one class is necessary, fragmentation would start at two classes. Fragmentation if necessary, but not necessarily fragmentation.

14 Is it necessary to have more than one class? Firstly, it would not appear to me that as between Stelco and the unsecured creditors overall there is any material distinction. Secondly, there would not appear to me to be any confiscation of any rights (or the other side of the coin any new imposition of obligations) upon the holders of ComCom debt. The subrogation issue was something which these holders assumed on the issue of that debt. Thirdly, I do not see that there is a realistic conflict of interest. Each group of unsecured creditors including the ConCom debt holders and the

BondCom debt holders has the same general interest vis-à-vis Stelco, namely to extract from Stelco through the Plan the maximum value in the sense of consideration possible (subject to the practical caution that whatever is achieved must be compatible with Stelco being able to continue in a competitive industry so that the burden of this consideration cannot be so great as to swamp the newly renovated boat which had previously been sinking). That situation is not impacted for our purposes here in this motion by the possibility that in a subsequent dispute between the ConCom holders and the BondCom holders there may be a difference of opinion as to the valuation of the consideration obtained.

15 Counsel for BondCom and Stelco raised generally the question of there possibly being a tyranny of the minority if the ConCom debt was a separate class; counsel for ConCom raised the issue of tyranny of the majority if there was not a separate class for the ConCom debt. To my mind that questions of tyranny of the majority is something which may be addressed in the sanction hearing, if one takes place, as to the fairness, reasonableness and equitableness of the Plan. See item 4 of the Paperny list in *Canadian Airlines Corp.*; see also *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 318 and *Campeau Corp., Re* (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 103.

16 Therefore I do not see that ConCom has made out a case for a separate class. That aspect of its motion is also dismissed.

17 Given the dismissal of the ConCom motion, the BondCom motion for a separate class for its debt becomes moot.

Motions dismissed.

Footnotes

* Affirmed *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 305 (Ont. C.A.)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Court File No. CV-12-9545-00CL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 3113736 CANADA LTD., 4362063 CANADA LTD., and A-Z SPONGE & FOAM PRODUCTS LTD.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

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