

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. AND
DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

APPLICANTS

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS
(Motion returnable on June 4, 2010)**

June 3, 2010

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2010 CarswellOnt 3509

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re .

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING
INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC., AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC. (Appli-
cants)

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Pepall J.

Judgment: May 21, 2010
Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

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David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders Syndicate

M.P. Gottlieb, J.A. Swartz for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders

Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for 7535538 Canada Inc.

Deborah McPhail for Superintendent of Financial Services (FSCO)

Thomas McRae for Certain Canwest Employees

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency.

Pepall J.:

Endorsement

2010 CarswellOnt 3509, 2010 ONSC 2870

Relief Requested

1 The LP Entities seek an order: (1) authorizing them to enter into an Asset Purchase Agreement based on a bid from the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders ("the AHC Bid"); (2) approving an amended claims procedure; (3) authorizing the LP Entities to resume the claims process; and (4) amending the SISP procedures so that the LP Entities can advance the Ad Hoc Committee transaction (the AHC Transaction") and the Support Transaction concurrently. They also seek an order authorizing them to call a meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan on June 10, 2010. Lastly, they seek an order conditionally sanctioning the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan.

AHC Bid

2 Dealing firstly with approval of the AHC Bid, in my Initial Order of January 8, 2010, I approved the Support Agreement between the LP Entities and the Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders and authorized the LP Entities to file a Senior Lenders' Plan and to commence a sale and investor solicitation process (the SISP). The objective of the SISP was to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the Support Transaction.

3 On January 11, 2010, the Financial Advisor, RBC Capital Markets, commenced the SISP. Qualified Bids (as that term was defined in the SISP) were received and the Monitor, in consultation with the Financial Advisor and the LP CRA, determined that the AHC Bid was a Superior Cash Offer and that none of the other bids was a Superior Offer as those terms were defined in the SISP.

4 The Monitor recommended that the LP Entities pursue the AHC Transaction and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors accepted that recommendation.

5 The AHC Transaction contemplates that 7535538 Canada Inc. ("Holdco") will effect a transaction through a new limited partnership (Opco LP) in which it will acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the LP Entities and the shares of National Post Inc. and assume certain liabilities including substantially all of the operating liabilities for a purchase price of \$1.1 billion. At closing, Opco LP will offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and will assume all of the pension liabilities and other benefits for employees of the LP Entities who will be employed by Opco LP, as well as for retirees currently covered by registered pension plans or other benefit plans. The materials submitted with the AHC Bid indicated that Opco LP will continue to operate all of the businesses of the LP Entities in substantially the same manner as they are currently operated, with no immediate plans to discontinue operations, sell material assets or make significant changes to current management. The AHC Bid will also allow for a full payout of the debt owed by the LP Entities to the LP Secured Lenders under the LP credit agreement and the Hedging Creditors and provides an additional \$150 million in value which will be available for the unsecured creditors of the LP Entities.

6 The purchase price will consist of an amount in cash that is equal to the sum of the Senior Secured Claims Amount (as defined in the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement), a promissory note of \$150 million (to be exchanged for up to 45% of the common shares of Holdco) and the assumption of certain liabilities of the LP Entities.

7 The Ad Hoc Committee has indicated that Holdco has received commitments for \$950 million of funded debt and equity financing to finance the AHC Bid. This includes \$700 million of new senior funded debt to be raised by Opco LP and \$250 million of mezzanine debt and equity to be raised including from the current members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

8 Certain liabilities are excluded including pre-filing liabilities and restructuring period claims, certain employee related liabilities and intercompany liabilities between and among the LP Entities and the CMI Entities. Ef-

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fective as of the closing date, Opco LP will offer employment to all full-time and part-time employees of the LP Entities on substantially similar terms as their then existing employment (or the terms set out in their collective agreement, as applicable), subject to the option, exercisable on or before May 30, 2010, to not offer employment to up to 10% of the non-unionized part-time or temporary employees employed by the LP Entities.

9 The AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise or arrangement between the LP Entities and certain unsecured creditors (the "AHC Plan"). In brief, the AHC Plan would provide that Opco LP would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities. The Senior Lenders would be unaffected creditors and would be paid in full. Unsecured creditors with proven claims of \$1,000 or less would receive cash. The balance of the consideration would be satisfied by an unsecured demand note of \$150 million less the amounts paid to the \$1,000 unsecured creditors. Ultimately, affected unsecured creditors with proven claims would receive shares in Holdco and Holdco would apply for the listing of its common shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

10 The Monitor recommended that the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement based on the AHC Bid be authorized. Certain factors were particularly relevant to the Monitor in making its recommendation:

- the Senior Lenders will received 100 cents on the dollar;

- the AHC Transaction will preserve substantially all of the business of the LP Entities to the benefit of the LP Entities' suppliers and the millions of people who rely on the LP Entities' publications each day;

- the AHC Transaction preserves the employment of substantially all of the current employees and largely protects the interests of former employees and retirees;

- the AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented through a Plan under which \$150 million in cash or shares will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors;

- unlike the Support Transaction, there is no option not to assume certain pension or employee benefits obligations.

11 The Monitor, the LP CRA and the Financial Advisor considered closing risks associated with the AHC Bid and concluded that the Bid was credible, reasonably certain and financially viable. The LP Entities agreed with that assessment. All appearing either supported the AHC Transaction or were unopposed.

12 Clearly the SISP was successful and in my view, the LP Entities should be authorized to enter the Ad Hoc Committee Asset Purchase Agreement as requested.

13 The proposed disposition of assets meets the section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*^[FN1] decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable and the Monitor was content with it. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid; the SISP was widely publicized; ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy. The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well. The LP Entities' Senior Lenders were either consulted and/or had the right to approve the various steps in the SISP. The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors. The consideration to be received is reasonable and fair. The Financial Advisor and the Monitor were both of the opinion that the SISP was a thorough canvassing of the market. The AHC Transaction was the highest offer received and delivers considerably more value than

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the Support Transaction which was in essence a "stalking horse" offer made by the single largest creditor constituency. The remaining subsequent provisions of section 36 of the CCAA are either inapplicable or have been complied with. In conclusion the AHC Transaction ought to be and is approved.

Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order

14 Turning to the Claims Procedure Order, as a result of the foregoing, the scope of the claims process needs to be expanded. Claims that have been filed will move to adjudication and resolution and in addition, the scope of the process needs to be expanded so as to ensure that as many creditors as possible have an opportunity to participate in the meeting to consider the Ad Hoc Committee Plan and to participate in distributions. Dates and timing also have to be adjusted. In these circumstances the requested Claims Procedure Order should be approved. Additionally, the Meeting Order required to convene a meeting of unsecured creditors on June 10, 2010 to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan is granted.

SISP Amendment

15 It is proposed that the LP Entities will work diligently to implement the AHC Transaction while concurrently pursuing such steps as are required to effect the Support Transaction. The SISP procedures must be amended. The AHC Transaction which is to be effected through the Ad Hoc Committee Plan cannot be completed within the sixty days contemplated by the SISP. On consent of the Monitor, the LP Administrative Agent, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP Entities, the SISP is amended to extend the date for closing of the AHC Transaction and to permit the proposed dual track procedure. The proposed amendments to the SISP are clearly warranted as a practical matter and so as to procure the best available going concern outcome for the LP Entities and their stakeholders. Paragraph 102 of the Initial Order contains a comeback clause which provides that interested parties may move to amend the Initial Order on notice. This would include a motion to amend the SISP which is effectively incorporated into the Initial Order by reference. The Applicants submit that I have broad general jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA to make such amendments. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide that issue as the affected parties are consenting to the proposed amendments.

Dual Track and Sanction of Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan

16 In my view, it is prudent for the LP Entities to simultaneously advance the AHC Transaction and the Support Transaction. To that end, the LP Entities seek approval of a conditional sanction order. They ask for conditional authorization to enter into the Acquisition and Assumption Agreement pursuant to a Credit Acquisition Sanction, Approval and Vesting Order.

17 The Senior Lenders' meeting was held January 27, 2010 and 97.5% in number and 88.7% in value of the Senior Lenders holding Proven Principal Claims who were present and voting voted in favour of the Senior Lenders' Plan. This was well in excess of the required majorities.

18 The LP Entities are seeking the sanction of the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan on the basis that its implementation is conditional on the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate. The certificate will not be delivered if the AHC Bid closes. Satisfactory arrangements have been made to address closing timelines as well as access to advisor and management time. Absent the closing of the AHC Transaction, the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable as between the LP Entities and its creditors. If the AHC Transaction is unable to close, I conclude that there are no available commercial going concern alternatives to the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan. The market was fully canvassed during the SISP; there was ample time to conduct such a canvass; it was professionally supervised; and the AHC Bid was the only Superior Offer as that term was defined in the SISP. For these reasons, I am prepared to find that the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable and may be conditionally sanctioned. I also note that there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements and nothing has been done or purported to have been done which

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was not authorized by the CCAA. As such, the three part test set forth in the *Re: Canadian Airlines Corp.* [FN2] has been met. Additionally, there has been compliance with section 6 of the CCAA. The Crown, employee and pension claims described in section 6 (3),(5), and (6) have been addressed in the Senior Lenders' Plan at sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

Conclusion

19 In conclusion, it is evident to me that the parties who have been engaged in this CCAA proceeding have worked diligently and cooperatively, rigorously protecting their own interests but at the same time achieving a positive outcome for the LP Entities' stakeholders as a whole. As I indicated in Court, for this they and their professional advisors should be commended. The business of the LP Entities affects many people - creditors, employees, retirees, suppliers, community members and the millions who rely on their publications for their news. This is a good chapter in the LP Entities' CCAA story. Hopefully, it will have a happy ending.

FN1 [1991] O.J. 1137.

FN2 2000, A.B.Q.B. 442, leave to appeal refused 2000, A.B.C.A. 23, affirmed 2001, A.B.C.A. 9, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001.

END OF DOCUMENT

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2006 CarswellOnt 2541

Fund 321 Ltd. Partnership v. Samsys Technologies Inc.

Fund 321 Limited Partnership, c.o.b. as Wellington-Financial Fund II (Plaintiff) and Samsys Technologies Inc.,
Samsys Incorporated, and Hamel-Davidson Corporation (Defendants)

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Mesbur J.

Heard: April 13, 2006
Judgment: April 28, 2006
Docket: 06-CL-6380

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Counsel: Fred Myers, Jason Wadden for Plaintiff / Applicant

T. Reyes for Proposed Receiver, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

Robin B. Schwill for Defendants

Brandon Jaffe for Opposing Shareholder, Tiger Capital Corporation

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Interim receiver — Appointment

Defendants were small cap, publicly-traded technology company comprised of North Carolina parent company and its two Canadian subsidiaries in Ontario and Nova Scotia — Plaintiff was defendants' first secured lender by debenture — Defendants secured indebtedness under debenture to plaintiff by general security agreements, guarantees and share pledge agreements, which were registered under relevant personal property legislation in each jurisdiction — Defendants defaulted on debenture and repaid \$2 million, but defendants defaulted again and plaintiff sent notice of default — Defendants were well aware of financial difficulties and were seeking solutions including new financing, being acquired, merger, licensing its intellectual property rights or selling some of its shares — Defendants' board of directors spent 15 months trying to market company — Only S Inc. showed any significant interest, but was not interested in share purchase after completion of due diligence — Plaintiff entered direct negotiations with S Inc. and reached agreement on sale of defendants' assets to S Inc. — Under plaintiff's deal with S Inc., plaintiff would be repaid but little would remain for remaining creditors and shareholders — Defendants supported transaction, but defendants' shareholders opposed sale — Plaintiff brought motion for order under s. 47 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for appointment of receiver of defendants for limited purpose of approving and effecting sale of assets — Motion granted — Plaintiff had valid, perfected security interest over defendants' property — It was necessary to

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appoint receiver to effect sale in order to protect plaintiff's interests — Sufficient efforts were made to get price and sale as only option was provident one — Debtor's interests had been met since defendants supported sale as only viable option — Given the board's attempts, it could not be concluded that anyone's interests were improperly preferred over any others — There was no unfairness in marketing and sale process.

Cases considered by *Mesbur J.*:

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 47 — pursuant to

s. 47(1) — considered

s. 47(3) — considered

s. 244 — referred to

s. 244(1) — considered

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

Generally — referred to

MOTION by plaintiff for order under s. 47 of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* for appointment of receiver of defendants for limited purpose of approving and effecting sale of assets.

***Mesbur J.*:**

1 The plaintiff, Wellington, moved under s. 47 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* for an order appointing PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. (PwC) as receiver of the defendants for the limited purpose of approving and effecting a sale transaction of the property assets and undertaking of SAMSys Technologies Inc. to a purchaser, Sirit Inc. If the receiver was appointed, and the sale approved, the plaintiff also sought a vesting order so the transaction could be completed immediately. This type of transaction involving a limited purpose receiver, has been referred to as a "quick flip", and has often been utilized in the technology sector.^[FN1]

2 Tiger Capital Corporation is a SAMSys shareholder. On behalf of itself and some other shareholders, Tiger opposed the sale, or, at the very least, sought an adjournment of the motion.

3 At the end of the hearing I indicated to counsel that I was satisfied the order should be granted. I made the requested order, with my reasons for doing so to follow, since the transaction was scheduled to close April 13, 2006. These are those reasons.

Some factual background

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4 The defendants comprise SAMSys Technologies Inc., a North Carolina company, and its Canadian subsidiaries, SAMSys Incorporated, and Hamel-Davidson Corporation, Ontario and Nova Scotia companies. I will refer to the defendants collectively as SAMSys. SAMSys is a "small cap" publicly traded technology company. It is in the business of developing and marketing Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID's), a product that has been described as the next generation of bar codes. The product is used for things as diverse as inventory control, tracking animals, or reading transponders.

5 The plaintiff is SAMSys' first secured lender. It advanced a \$6 million loan in August of 2005, pursuant to the terms of a debenture. To secure its obligations under the debenture, SAMSys and its subsidiaries secured the indebtedness by the usual panoply of General Security Agreements, guarantees, and share pledge agreements. Wellington registered the necessary financing statements or other similar documents concerning the security under the *Personal Property Security Act* of Ontario, or similar legislation in Nova Scotia and North Carolina.

6 One of the provisions of the debenture required SAMSys to maintain certain revenue thresholds. If it failed to do so, it was required to immediately repay \$2 million of the debt. These circumstances occurred at the end of December, 2005, and \$2 million was repaid. As a result of making this payment, SAMSys' cash resources dropped to about \$4.7 million compared to the roughly \$8.7 million it had reported in its financial statements dated December 31, 2005 for the period October to December, 2005.

7 SAMSys continued to experience financial pressure. Although it had estimated revenues of over \$ 6 million for the first 6 months of the 2006 fiscal year, (that is from October 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006), its actual revenues for the period were only \$1.62 million. There was concern its cash reserves would fall below \$2 million by early May, thus putting it in breach of one of its covenants under the debenture. Around the same time, the company's Chief Executive Officer advised Wellington's CEO that SAMSys was utilizing its cash reserves at a rate of about \$1 million per month.

8 Section 6.1(c) of the debenture defines one of the events of default as follows:

The Corporation or any subsidiary becomes unable to satisfy its liabilities as they become due and/or the realizable value of the Corporation's assets is less than the aggregate sum of its liabilities.

9 Wellington took the position that the net realizable value of the corporation's assets was less than the aggregate sum of its liabilities, and delivered a notice of default dated March 28, 2006. Initially, SAMSys denied that it was in default. However, once it determined that there was no inherent underlying value in its development costs in its intellectual property, it conceded that the realizable value of its assets was less than the aggregate sum of its liabilities, and therefore default had occurred under the terms of the debenture.

10 SAMSys' Board of Directors was, and had been, well aware of the company's declining fortunes, and was actively seeking a solution. George Kypreos, the company's Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer has provided an affidavit in which he outline the steps the Board took to deal with SAMSys' financial situation.

11 He states that back in January of 2005, the Board retained DecisionPoint International, LLC, to advise the company about strategic alternatives available to it. Mr Kypreos describes DecisionPoint as a "boutique investment bank offering global merger and acquisition advisory services, including buy and sell-side assignments, to leading middle-market technology firms." DecisionPoint tried for 15 months to locate a strategic investor or buyer for all or part of SAMSys' business. The affidavit goes on to describe the marketing process, the list of potential targets who were identified and contacted, and parties who executed a confidentiality agreement and went on to do due diligence.

12 SAMSys also sought advice from TDSI (TD Securities Inc.) to assist in the process with advice about possi-

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ble equity or debt transactions.

13 In late March of this year the Board announced that it had established a Special Committee of independent directors "to review and consider strategic alternatives available to the company for enhancing shareholder value including, but not limited to, business combinations and strategic partnerships."

14 According to Mr. Kapreos, SAMSys investigated the possibility of new financing, the possibility of being acquired by or merged into another company, the possibility of licensing its intellectual property rights, or selling some or all of its assets. With the input of the Special Committee, the Board concluded that it was in the best interests of the company to conclude a transaction involving the sale of its business.

15 Apparently, only Sirit Inc., a company with whom SAMSys had had intermittent negotiations over the years, showed any significant interest in a strategic transaction. After they completed their due diligence, however, Sirit indicated it was not interested in purchasing the shares of SAMSys. It negotiated the current transaction with the plaintiff, and SAMSys entered into the negotiations as well.

16 The Board was of the view that in light of their failure to effect a sale, the only remaining option for the company would be to cease operations. As Mr. Kapreos says in his affidavit, this is the only responsible course the Board could take under the circumstances.

17 As I have mentioned, the plaintiff entered into direct discussions with Sirit and was able to reach agreement on the proposed transaction. The transaction will see Sirit purchase all the shares of the North Carolina company, and purchase the remaining assets of the Ontario operations. The plaintiff will be repaid its debt, but there will be little or nothing for the remaining creditors who are owed about \$1.5 million, and, needless to say, there will be nothing for the shareholders.

18 SAMSys supports the transaction, and indeed has signed the letter of intent. This itself is an act of default under the debenture, which gives the plaintiff the right to seek the appointment of a receiver. The second debenture holder was served with this motion, but did not appear, and apparently takes no position. No other creditor appeared, either.

19 PwC, in anticipation of this motion, conducted an independent analysis of the steps SAMSys has taken to market the company. Greg Watson, a Senior Vice-President of PwC has reviewed the preliminary liquidation analysis SAMSys prepared. PwC has discussed the company's financial status with management, and also reviewed the steps taken by DecisionPoint to market the company. Mr. Watson states, "it seems clear that the transaction proposed by the Plaintiff and Sirit is the only available alternative to maximize the value of realization on SAMSys' assets. Even if the company had sufficient cash to allow it to engage in yet another marketing process, there is no basis to expect that it would be able to obtain a better realization."

20 Importantly, Mr. Watson also points out that although the company had sought to realize value on its development costs concerning its intellectual property, "historically, in an insolvency context, buyers will only pay for a product that is ready for market. Buyers do not typically invest fresh cash to pay for development or other sunk costs." Mr. Kapreos confirms this view. He deposes that although SAMSys has invested over \$2 million in its current product development project, it was unable to find anyone to value the investment without a market-ready product.

21 Mr. Watson's affidavit concludes with the following observation:

In light of the breadth and lengthy duration of the marketing process undertaken by SAMSys and Decision-Point, the absence of available alternatives, and significantly, the fact that SAMSys is quickly depleting its cash

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reserves, I do not believe that SAMSys can afford to undertake any further marketing efforts or that there would be any valuable purpose served by doing so. The price offered by Sirit is acceptable to the secured creditor and is the only available alternative to liquidation. As such, it represents the maximum realizable value for the property, assets and undertaking of SAMSys that is attainable in the circumstances.

Position of the parties

22 Wellington and SAMSys take the position that this transaction is the only viable alternative for the company. SAMSys has actively marketed itself over a lengthy period, with no success. If this sale is not approved, the Board takes the position the company will have to cease operations.

23 Tiger objects to the transaction on a number of grounds. First, it points to the fact that the company's shares were recently trading at 50 to 60 cents per share, suggesting there is equity in the company. It also says that since on March 31, 2006 SAMSys apparently had \$3.5 million on hand, against a debt of \$4 million to the plaintiff, it needs only to come up with an additional \$500,000 to pay out Wellington, which might be available through equity financing. Tiger and the other shareholders have not proposed to supply this financing, nor have they proposed any viable alternative financing source.

24 Tiger also complains of the sale being essentially a liquidation, with almost nothing for the value of the company as a going concern. Tiger points to the lack of an appraisal, and is particularly concerned about the seeming lack of any value ascribed to SAMSys' assets, its value as an enterprise, and particularly the value of the development work the company has done on a new RFID reader called the Saturn reader. Tiger says that the Saturn was almost ready to go to market, sometime in May. It says now the president of Sirit is scheduled to talk about Saturn on behalf of Sirit, replacing a SAMSys executive in that role.

25 Tiger suggests that as a result of Wellington's actions, the value of the company's shares plummeted over a matter of days, with a resulting \$19 million of erosion in the value of the company. This is based on the share price of 50 cents/share on March 26, when the company's press release indicated it was looking at options. Then, on March 28, the company issued a new press release, disclosing it had received Wellington's default notice. Then the price dropped to 19 cents per share. This was followed by a TSX investigation, and the company's press release of March 31, indicating the intent to sell. Tiger complains that Wellington could, and should have handled the matter differently, thus preserving, rather than eroding value.

26 Tiger also complains about not knowing the details of the DecisionPoint marketing plan. The Kypreos affidavit does set out significant detail about the marketing plan, including the DecisionPoint engagement letter, the "teaser" document it prepared to send to potential interested parties, beginning a year ago, as well as the Management Presentation sent to the parties that executed a confidentiality agreement. The Kypreos affidavit also includes the TDSI engagement letter. It relates to their advisory services in connection with possible equity or debt transactions.

27 Tiger expresses concern about the lack of evidence about anyone wanting to acquire SAMSys' technology, or development costs.

28 In Tiger's view, the entire sale process is proceeding far too quickly, and is being forced on the shareholders. Tiger does not at this time, however, suggest that the Board has acted in any way that is contrary to its obligations to the company, its shareholders or its creditors.

29 Finally, Tiger expresses some suspicion about the real or perceived relationship between Wellington and either the purchaser Sirit, or its principals, particularly John Albright.

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30 Although Tiger voices many complaints, and says it simply wants to block the sale, it has no suggestion as to how the company is to fund its ongoing obligations of \$29,000 per day, if the motion is delayed or dismissed. It suggests that PwC should be appointed Receiver to develop and conduct a marketing plan, but does not offer to fund that process.

31 It is important to address these concerns in the context of the legal analysis required to assess the motion as a whole.

The law and analysis

32 Section 47(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* permits the appointment of an interim receiver where a notice is or is about to be sent under subsection 244(1) of the *Act*. Section 244(1) requires a secured creditor who intends to enforce its security against the property of an insolvent purpose to send notice of that intention to the insolvent person. Here, Wellington sent the prescribed notice, dated March 28, 2006.

33 First, I must address whether Wellington has a perfected security that entitles it to have given notice under section 244. Then I must look at the provisions of section 47(3), which require the court to find that the appointment of a receiver is necessary either to protect the debtor's estate or to protect the interests of the creditor who sent the section 244 notice. In that context, I must consider whether the proposed sale is reasonable. Lastly, I will address the concerns Tiger raises to see if they have an impact on whether the sale is reasonable or not.

34 Wellington has provided three legal opinions, one from Ontario, one from North Carolina and one from Nova Scotia, all opining that Wellington has a valid, perfected security over the property of the defendants in their respective jurisdictions. No one questions the validity of Wellington's security. I am satisfied it has a valid, perfected security over the defendants' property.

35 Next I must address the issue of whether the appointment of an interim receiver is necessary either to protect the debtor's estate or Wellington's interests. It is clear to me that a sale is the only way for the creditor to recover, and will provide maximum recovery for this creditor who stands in priority to all others. It is therefore necessary to appoint the receiver to effect a sale in order to protect Wellington's interests. The next question is whether this sale is reasonable, and should it be immediately approved.

Is the proposed sale reasonable?

36 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*[FN2] sets out the relevant considerations to determine whether a court should approve a proposed sale. Although *Soundair* centres on the issue of when, and if, the court should second-guess the recommendations of a receiver who has been appointed and has carried out the marketing process itself, its considerations are nevertheless apposite here, particularly since the proposed receiver has expressed the view that the marketing and sale process SAMSys undertook were appropriate.

37 *Soundair* confirms the duties of the court in considering whether a receiver who has sold property has acted properly. The court must do the following:

- (a) it should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) it should consider the interests of all parties;
- (c) it should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained;

(d) it should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

Although this is not technically a receiver's sale, applying the *Soundair* principles seems an appropriate route for the court to consider the reasonableness of the sale, particularly since the receiver is of the view that the process was reasonable, and no purpose would be served in a new marketing plan. As the Court of Appeal did in *Soundair*, I will discuss each of the factors in turn.

Has there been a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has the task been approached providently?

38 The Board spent 15 months trying to market the company and get the best price for it. Tiger suggests, somewhat inferentially, that Wellington undermined the process by negotiating directly with Sirit, who therefore must have known it could acquire SAMSys at a lower price by waiting until the company was desperate, and basically paying only enough to satisfy Wellington's security.

39 First, there is no evidence to support what is essentially an innuendo. Second, there is also no suggestion the Board has acted improperly, or contrary to any of its fiduciary obligations. A fifteen-month active marketing process bore no fruit. Sirit has been in negotiations, on and off, with SAMSys for many years. Sirit was not prepared to make an offer in the context of the general marketing process. SAMSys utilized the services of two professional firms to assist in helping to sell the company, but had no success. I must conclude that sufficient efforts were made to get the best price, and the sale, as the only option, is a provident one. The receiver's opinion confirms this view.

Consideration of the interests of the parties

40 In *Soundair*, the court confirmed the well-established principle that "the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor." The court goes on to say that there are also other persons whose interests require consideration. The court referred specifically to the interests of the debtor and those of the prospective purchaser. It did not mention the interests of the shareholders in this context. Here, the debtor supports the sale as the only viable option open to the company. The debtor's interests have clearly been considered. The prospective purchaser is the only potential purchaser. Its interests would be met by approving the sale.

41 The Board undertook the lengthy process of trying to sell all or part of SAMSys assets, shares, or undertaking. They approached the task on a number of levels, with the assistance of both DecisionPoint and TDSI. On reviewing the history of the Board's attempts, I cannot conclude that anyone's interests were improperly preferred over any other's.

The efficacy and integrity of the process obtaining the offer

42 The courts have long identified an important consideration as the integrity of the process by which the sale has been effected. Here, Tiger has suggested that there were other options open to the company. They say equity financing, for example, was an option instead of a sale. This was tried, and failed. They suggest other borrowing might have been available to pay out the balance of Wellington's loan, but have no concrete suggestions of where this money might have come from. Tiger candidly admitted the shareholders were not proposing to supply it.

Was there unfairness in the process?

43 Tiger does not really point to anything that is described as "unfair" in the marketing/sale process, other than some specific concerns that I will deal with below. I cannot conclude there was any unfairness in the process as that term is described in *Soundair*. I note that Mr. Watson of PwC deposes that he and a colleague had extensive conver-

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sations with the managing director of DecisionPoint, with Mr. Kypreos of SAMSys, and reviewed the advertisements DecisionPoint prepared, together with the Management Presentation issued to prospective purchasers. He reviewed the list of 35 parties DecisionPoint and SAMSys approached, and the control log of the 16 parties DecisionPoint had follow up efforts with. Mr. Watson concludes, "it seems clear that the transaction proposed by the Plaintiff and Sirit is the only available alternative to maximize the value of realization on SAMSys' assets. Even if the company had sufficient cash to allow it to engage in yet another marketing process, there is no basis to expect that it would be able to obtain a better realization." Mr. Watson speaks of the "breadth and lengthy duration" of the marketing process.

44 On the basis of the *Soundair* criteria, I would approve the sale. However, I must also address Tiger's concerns, to see if they have any effect on my final determination.

Tiger's additional concerns

45 Is there equity in the company, or is equity financing an option, as Tiger suggests? In my view, there is not. The trading price of the shares is but one indicator of value. I have reviewed the most recent financial statements of the company, for the year ended September 30, 2005, with comparative figures for 2004. Over that time period, the company's deficit increased from just under \$27 million to over \$39 million. Although sales figures were higher in the 2005 fiscal year, expenses were proportionally even higher, resulting in a loss for the year of nearly \$11 million, compared with a loss of \$7.5 million the previous fiscal year.

46 As I have already stated, the company's projected revenues for the first six months of its 2006 fiscal year fell short of projections by over \$4 million, and the company was depleting its cash reserves by \$1 million per month. It is clear the company is, and has been haemorrhaging money. Efforts at finding equity financing with the help of TDSI failed. I cannot see there is any merit to this complaint of Tiger's.

47 Tiger's next concern is about a liquidation-type sale, with no appraisal, and no value for what are commonly referred to as "sunk costs" for product development. The sale process has gone on for well over a year, with no buyer except for Sirit. The sale process itself provided confidential financial information to a number of prospective purchasers. Although many of these prospects went through the due diligence process, none was interested enough to make an offer. Even without an appraisal, I am satisfied, as is the Board, that the proposed sale is the maximum realization available for the assets, business and undertaking of SAMSys.

48 Tiger also expresses concern about the effect of Wellington's actions on share value. First, there are many reasons for share prices to rise and fall. Wellington quite properly was concerned about its security, having regard to SAMSys' failed revenue targets, significant expenses, and declining cash reserves. Tiger suggests that the default Wellington relies on is a "soft" default, rather than SAMSys failing to pay monthly payments. The parties negotiated and agreed on all the default provisions. Wellington is as entitled to rely on any one of them as any other. The general RFID industry is apparently facing uncertainties, according to the affidavit of Mark McQueen. It is indeed unfortunate there will be no return for the shareholders, who are understandably upset about their investment going bad. That does not mean, however, that a secured lender need hold off on enforcing its security pursuant to any defined event of default.

49 As to Tiger's complaints about the lack of particularity of the marketing plan used in SAMSys' attempts to find a buyer, I am satisfied that the affidavit material sets out the plan with reasonable detail. It persuades me that the marketing efforts were reasonable, focused, and sensible, with the assistance of appropriate professional advice.

50 It is also clear to me that in situations like this, it would be extremely rare for a potential buyer to ascribe any value to an insolvent company's sunk development costs. I am not surprised there is no purchase value ascribed to these costs. I am also satisfied that potential buyers for these products in development were marketed as well, sadly

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with no results.

51 The marketing process as a whole has gone on for well over a year. It is true that the current transaction has happened quickly. However, the Board has considered it in the context of the overall efforts to effect a sale. While the process may appear rushed to the shareholders, I am not persuaded the proposed sale has been undertaken lightly, or without reasoned consideration by the Board and its Special Committee.

52 Lastly, I would like to address the suggestion that there is an improper or non-arms length relationship between Wellington and Sirit. Tiger says that John L. Albright sits on Wellington's advisory counsel, and a corporation called J.L. Albright Venture Partners holds over 21% of Sirit's shares. Tiger assumes that Mr. Albright and J.L. Albright Venture Partners do not deal at arms length. From these facts Tiger infers there is a non-arms length relationship between Wellington and Sirit.

53 In an affidavit sworn April 12, 2006, Mark McQueen, the CEO of Wellington, deals with the question of the relationship between Wellington and Sirit. He unequivocally states, "there is no economic relationship of any nature whatsoever between the secured creditor (Wellington-Financial) and either the purchaser, Sirit Inc. ("Sirit"), or its principals." Mr. McQueen concedes that Mr. Albright, one of the principals of one of Sirit's significant shareholders is a member of Wellington's unpaid Advisory Committee. He states, however, that the Committee has never met, and its members have no active role in Wellington's management. Thus, Mr. Albright and Sirit would have no active role in Wellington's management. In my view, this adequately answers Tiger's concerns about a non-arms length relationship.

54 For these reasons, I am not persuaded that the issues Tiger raises are sufficient to delay or deny the sale transaction. I am satisfied that the sale is necessary to protect Wellington's interests, and thus the requirements of s. 47(3) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* have been met, and a limited purpose receiver should be appointed to effect the sale.

Disposition

55 In the result, it is for these reasons that I granted the motion. As the parties have agreed, there will be no order as to costs.

Motion granted.

FN1 See R.I. Thornton and G.R. Azeff, *The Interim Receiver Under Section 47 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada)*, Insolvency Institute of Canada, 13th annual Conference, October 24-27, 2002, at pages 3-4 and P. Farkas, *Sale of a Business: What Does the Court Expect of the Receiver*, Canadian Institute Third Annual Insolvency Law and Practice Conference, at page 3.

FN2 (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.)

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2009 CarswellOnt 4467

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS
CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION,
NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009

Written reasons: July 23, 2009

Docket: 09-CL-7950

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Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

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Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008

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CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 236, 2006 CarswellAlta 383, (sub nom. Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc. (Bankrupt), Re) 393 A.R. 340, 62 Alta. L.R. (4th) 168, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

s. 363 — referred to

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Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.:

Introduction

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been

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commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

(a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;

(b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and

(c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

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18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

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(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows

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the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, at paras. 43, 45.*

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra, at para. 3.*

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra, at para. 1.*

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.)*, *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44*, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.*

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("Cliffs Over Maple Bay")*, the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

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43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring" ...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a re-financing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views

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previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most fa-

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avourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

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C

2004 CarswellOnt 469

Air Canada, Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 191 OF THE CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-44, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF AIR CANADA AND
THOSE SUBSIDIARIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Farley J.

Heard: January 16, 2004

Judgment: January 16, 2004

Docket: 03-CL-4932

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Peter J. Osborne, Peter H. Griffin for Monitor

Howard Gorman for Ad Hoc Unsecured Creditors Committee

Aubrey Kauffman for Ad Hoc Committee of Various Creditors

Jay Swartz for Deutsche Bank

Mark Gelowitz for Trinity Time Investments

Robert Thornton, Gregory Azeff for GE Capital Aviation Services Inc.

J. Porter for Cerberus

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Kevin McElcheran for CIBC

Murray Gold for CUPE

Ian Dick for AG Canada

James Tory for Air Canada Board

Joseph J. Bellissimo for Aircraft Lessor/Lender Group

Terri Hilborn for Unionized Retiree Committee

William Sasso, Sharon Strosberg for Mizuho International, PLC

Jim Dube for Deutsche Lufthansa A.G.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtor applied for approval of indemnity, amendments to equity plan, and global restructuring agreements — Application granted — Indemnity was customary and not opposed — Amendments were recommended by monitor and opposed by only one interested party — Board, in exercising its fiduciary duties, properly considered alternative proposal before choosing equity programme sponsor — Restructuring agreement was fair and reasonable and on balance beneficial to debtor and interested parties generally — Court must look at interests of creditors generally and objecting creditors specifically — Rights may be compromised but not confiscated in attempt to balance interests — Agreement had to be either taken as package or rejected — Delay and uncertainty resulting from rejection of agreement would likely be devastating for debtor.

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 72 O.T.C. 99, 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1989), (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 1989 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123, 1991 CarswellOnt 142 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

2004 CarswellOnt 469, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169

820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113, 1991 CarswellOnt 141 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
— referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

APPLICATION for approval of various agreements under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Farley J.:

1 These reasons deal with three matters which the court was asked to approve Air Canada (AC) entering into various agreements; simply put they were as follows:

- (1) the Merrill Lynch (ML) indemnity;
- (2) the entering into the amendments to the Trinity Agreement; and
- (3) the Global Restructuring Agreements (GRA).

ML Indemnity

2 There was no opposition to this. The court was advised that such an indemnity was customarily given and that the terms of this particular one were such as is normally given. I therefore approve AC granting such an indemnity to ML.

Trinity Amendments

3 As I understood the submissions this morning, Mizuho a member of the Unsecured Creditors Committee (UCC) was the only interested party which spoke out against the Trinity amendments. It continues to be dissatisfied with the process by which Trinity was selected as the equity plan sponsor. I merely point out, once again, that this process was not of the Court's choosing but rather one which AC commenced on notice to the service list and as to which there were no objections before Trinity was selected on November 8, 2003 (together with the "fiduciary out" provision contained in its proposal). Aside from the court approvals envisaged by that process, the court only became involved when it was appreciated that there were some difficulties with the practical implementation of the process.

4 I further understand that the Ad Hoc Committee of Various Creditors (CVC) withdrew its opposition yesterday along with its cross motion. The UCC (one assumes on some majority basis) supported the Trinity Amendments but indicated that, as a sounding board, it wished to continue sounding that it still had concerns about aspects of corporate governance and management incentives.

5 I have no doubt, if adjustments in any particular area make sense between the signatories (AC and Trinity) and to the extent that any beneficiaries are involved, that such adjustments will be made for everyone's overall benefit (everyone in the sense of AC including all of its stakeholders including creditors, labour, management, pensioners, etc.) not only for the short term interests but the long term interests of AC emerging from these CCAA proceedings as an ongoing viable enterprise on into the future, well able to serve the public (both Canadian and foreign). A har-

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monious relationship with trust and respect flowing in all directions amongst the stakeholders will be to everyone's long term advantage. With respect to corporate governance though, I am able to make a more direct observation. A director, no matter who nominates that person, owes duties and obligations to the corporation, not the nominator: see 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at 123, aff'd (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

6 There was no evidence to show that the Board of AC in exercising its fiduciary duties did not properly consider on a quantitative and qualitative basis the factors (on a pro and con basis) relating to whether Cerberus had provided a Superior Proposal (as that was defined in section 9 of the Trinity Agreement approved earlier by this Court). Indeed there was no complaint from Cerberus in this respect. The Board's letter to me of December 22, 2003 carefully reviewed the considerations which the Board (with the assistance of Seabury and ML, together with the general oversight and views of the Monitor) gave in their deliberations with their ultimate decision that the Cerberus December 10, 2003 proposal was not a Superior Proposal with the result that the Board has selected Trinity to be the equity program sponsor in accordance with the Trinity amended deal. I approve AC executing the Trinity amended deal and implementing same, with the recognition and proviso that there may be further amendments/adjustments which may be entered into subject to the guidelines of my discussion above. I note in particular that the UCC helpfully pointed out that section 7.3 still needs to be modified, and that is being worked on. The Air Canada Pilots Association observed that there still needed to be some fine-tuning at para. 22 of its factum noting that: "These matters of the detailed implementation of the Amended Trinity Investment Agreement can all be resolved by good faith negotiations between Air Canada, Trinity and affected stakeholders, with the assistance and support of the Monitor"; I did not have the benefit of any submissions in this regard (para.22) nor was any expected to either be given or taken as the parties all appreciated that this was not to be an exercise in "nitpicking".

7 At paragraph 71 of its 19th report, the Monitor stated:

71. The Monitor is of the continuing view that the Equity Solicitation Process must be completed as soon as possible. The restructuring process and many other restructuring initiatives have been delayed by approximately two months as a result of the continued uncertainty concerning the selection of the equity plan sponsor. The equity solicitation process must be concluded so that the balance of the restructuring process can be completed before the expiry on April 30, 2004 of the financing commitments from each of Trinity, GECC and DB pursuant to the Standby Agreement. The Monitor recommends that this Honourable Court approve the Company's motion seeking approval of the Amended Trinity Investment Agreement.

8 I would therefore approve the Trinity amendments so that AC can proceed to enter into and implement the Amended Trinity Investment Agreement. I note that this approval is not intended to determine any rights which third parties may have.

GRA

9 As with the previous approvals, I take the requirement under the CCAA is that approval of the Court may be given where there is consistency with the purpose and spirit of that legislation, a conclusion by the Court that as a primary consideration, the transaction is fair and reasonable and will be beneficial to the debtor and its stakeholders generally: see Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.), at 201. In Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Blair J. at p. 316 adopted the principles in Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) as an appropriate guideline for determining when an agreement or transaction should be approved during a CCAA restructuring but prior to the actual plan of reorganization being in place. In Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I observed at p. 173 that in considering what is fair and reasonable treatment, one must look at the creditors as a whole (i.e. generally) and to the objecting creditors (specifically) and see if rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests (and have the pain of the compromise equitably shared) as opposed to the confiscation of rights. I think that philosophy should be applicable to the circumstances

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here involving the various stakeholders. As I noted immediately above in *Sammi Atlas Inc.*, equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment.

10 The Monitor's 19th report at paragraphs 20-21 indicates that:

20. The GRA provides the following benefits for Air Canada:

- The retention of a significant portion of its fleet of core aircraft, spare engines and flight simulators, which are critical to its ongoing operations;
- The restructuring of obligations with respect to 106 of 107 Air Canada and Jazz air operating, parked and undelivered aircraft (effective immediately for 12 GECC-managed aircraft and upon exit from CCAA for the remaining 94 GECC-owned aircraft, except as indicated below), including lease rate reductions on 51 aircraft (of which 3 aircraft have been returned as of the current date), cash flow relief for 29 aircraft, termination of the Applicants' obligations with respect to 20 parked aircraft (effective immediately), the cancellation of 4 future aircraft lease commitments and the restructuring of the overall obligations with respect to 2 aircraft. Obligations with respect to the last remaining aircraft remain unaffected as it is management's view that this lease was already at market;
- Exit financing of approximately US\$585 million (the "Exit Facility") to be provided by GECC upon the Company's emergence from CCAA;
- Aircraft financing up to a maximum of US\$950 million (the "RJ Aircraft Financing") to be provided by GECC and to be used by Air Canada to finance the future purchase of approximately 43 regional jet aircraft; and
- The surrender of any distribution on account of any deficiency claims under the CCAA Plan with respect to GECC-owned aircraft only, without in any way affecting GECC's right to vote on the Plan in respect of any deficiency claim.

21. In return for these restructuring and financing commitments, the GRA provides for the following:

- Payment of all current aircraft rent by Air Canada to GECC, during the interim period until emergence from CCAA proceedings, at contractual lease rates for GECC-owned aircraft and at revised lease rates for GECC-managed aircraft;
- The delivery of notes refinancing existing obligations to GECC in connection with 2 B747-400 cross-collateralized leases (the "B747 Restructuring") including one note convertible into equity of the restructured Air Canada at GECC's option;
- The delivery of stock purchase warrants (the "Warrants") for the purchase of an additional 4% of the common stock of the Company at a strike price equal to the price paid by any equity plan sponsor; and
- The cross-collateralization of all GECC and affiliate obligations (the "Interfacility Collateralization Agreement") on Air Canada's emergence from CCAA proceedings for a certain period of time.

The Monitor concluded at paragraph 70:

70. The Monitor notes that, if considered on their own, the lease concessions provided to Air Canada by GECC pursuant to the GRA differ substantially from those being provided by other aircraft lessors. In addition, the Monitor notes that GECC has benefitted from the cross collateralization on 22 aircraft pursuant to the CCAA

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Credit Facility and Interfacility Collateralization Agreement, particularly as it relates to the settlement of Air Canada's obligations to GECC under the B747 Restructuring. However, the Monitor also notes that the substantial benefits provided to Air Canada under the GRA including the availability of US \$585 million of exit financing and US\$950 million of regional jet aircraft financing are significant and critical to the Company's emergence from CCAA proceedings in an expedited manner. In the Monitor's view the financial benefits provided to Air Canada under the GRA outweigh the costs to the Applicants' estate arising as a result of the cross collateralization benefit provided to GECC under the CCAA Credit Facility and Interfacility Collateralization Agreement. Accordingly, the Monitor recommends to this Honourable Court that the GRA be approved.

11 The GRA was opposed by the UCC (again apparently on some majority basis as one of its members, Cara, was indicated as being in favour and I also understand that Lufthansa was also supportive); the UCC's position was supplemented by separate submissions by another of its members, CIBC. I agree with the position of the UCC that the concern of the court is not with respect to the past elements of the DIP financing by GE and the cross-collateralization of 22 aircraft that agreement provided for. I also note the position of the UCC that it recognizes that the GRA is a package deal which cannot be cherry picked by any stakeholder nor modified by the Court; the UCC accepts that the GRA must be either taken as a package deal or rejected. It suggested that GE, if the court rejects the GRA as advocated by the UCC, will not abandon the field but rather it will stay and negotiate terms which the UCC feels would be more appropriate. That may be true but I would observe that in my view the delay and uncertainty involved would likely be devastating for AC. Would AC be able to meet the April 30, 2004 deadline for the Trinity deal which requires that the GRA be in place? What would the effect be upon the booking public?

12 I note that the UCC complains that other creditors are not being given equal treatment. However, counsel for another large group of aircraft lessors and financiers indicated that they had no difficulty with the GRA. Indeed, it seems to me that GE is in a somewhat significantly different position than the other creditors given the aforesaid commitment to provide an Exit Facility and an RJ facility. Trinity and Deutsche Bank (DB) with respect to their proposed inflow of \$1 billion in equity would be subordinate to GE; this new money (as opposed to sunk old money of the UCC and as well as that of the other creditors) supports the GRA. I note as well although it is "past history" that GE has compromised a significant portion of its \$2 billion claim for existing commitments down to \$1.4 billion, while at the same time committing to funding of large amounts for future purposes, all at a time when the airline industry generally does not have ready access to such.

13 With respect to the two 747 LILOs (lease in, lease out), there is the concession that AC will enjoy any upside potential in an after marketing while being shielded from any further downside. GE has also provided AC with some liquidity funding assistance by deferring some of its charges to a latter period post emergence. Further it has been calculated that as to post filing arrears, there will be a true up on emergence and assuming that would be March 31, 2004, it is expected that there would be a wash as between AC and GE, with a slight "advantage" to AC if emergence were later. I pause to note here that emergence sooner rather than later is in my view in everyone's best interests - and that everyone should focus on that and give every reasonable assistance and cooperation.

14 With respect to the snapback rights, I note that AC would be able to eliminate same by repaying the LILO notes and the Tranche Loans and AC would be legally permitted to eliminate this concern 180 days post emergence. I recognize that AC would be in a much stronger functional and psychological bargaining position to obtain replacement funding post emergence than it is now able to do while in CCAA protection proceedings. I would assume that such a project would be a financial priority for AC post emergence and that timing should not prevent AC from starting to explore that possibility in the near future (even before emergence). I also note that GE anticipates that the snapback rights would not likely come into play, given, I take it, its analysis of the present and future condition of AC and its experience and expertise in the field. I take it *as a side note* that GE from this observation by it will not have a quick trigger finger notwithstanding the specific elements in the definition of Events of Default; that of course may only be commercial reality - and that could of course change, but one would think that GE would have to be concerned about its ongoing business reputation and thus have to justify such action. Snapback rights only come into existence upon emergence, not on the entry into the GRA.

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15 I conclude that on balance the GRA is beneficial to AC and its stakeholders; in my view it is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of AC. It will permit AC to get on with the remaining and significant steps its needs to accomplish before it can emerge. The same goes for the Trinity deal. I therefore approve AC's entering into and implementing the GRA, subject to the same considerations as to completing the documentation and making amendments/adjustments as I discussed above in *Trinity Amendments*.

16 Orders accordingly.

Application granted.

END OF DOCUMENT

1991 CarswellOnt 205, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321

▷
1991 CarswellOnt 205

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION (respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant) and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)

Ontario Court of Appeal

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

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Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman*, for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

J. T. Morin, Q.C., for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and *L.E. Ritchie*, for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

S.F. Dunphy and *G.K. Ketcheson*, for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

W.G. Horton, for Ontario Express Limited.

N.J. Spies, for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver.

Receivers — Sale of debtor's assets — Approval by court — Court appointing receiver to sell airline as going concern — Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to

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approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

Cases considered:

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd. (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to

Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) — referred to

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenburg (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R.

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(4th) 526 (H.C.) — *applied*

Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — *referred to*

Selkirk, Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — *referred to*

Selkirk, Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

Galligan J.A.:

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a

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sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?

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14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer,

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which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL. Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

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[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

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31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreason-

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able.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, and *Re Selkirk*, supra (Saunders J.). However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work

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that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered

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into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

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The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do

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not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited

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their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

McKinlay J.A.:

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

Goodman J.A. (dissenting):

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall

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of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. said at p. 243:

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This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron*, supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron*, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the

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receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18 million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

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Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

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106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

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113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them*."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be

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most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of

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the other parties or intervenors.

Appeal dismissed.

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2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

▷
2002 CarswellNat 822

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001

Judgment: April 26, 2002

Docket: 28020

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Proceedings: reversing (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 970, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: *J. Brett Ledger* and *Peter Chapin*, for appellant

Timothy J. Howard and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada

Graham Garton, Q.C., and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure; Evidence; Environmental

Evidence --- Documentary evidence — Privilege as to documents — Miscellaneous documents

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.

Practice --- Discovery — Discovery of documents — Privileged document — Miscellaneous privileges

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

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Practice --- Discovery — Examination for discovery — Range of examination — Privilege — Miscellaneous privileges

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Preuve --- Preuve documentaire — Confidentialité en ce qui concerne les documents — Documents divers

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimales sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Communication des documents — Documents confidentiels — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimales sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Interrogatoire préalable — Étendue de l'interrogatoire — Confidentialité — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimales sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

The federal government provided a Crown corporation with a \$1.5 billion loan for the construction and sale of two

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CANDU nuclear reactors to China. An environmental organization sought judicial review of that decision, maintaining that the authorization of financial assistance triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. The Crown corporation was an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review. The Crown corporation filed an affidavit by a senior manager referring to and summarizing confidential documents. Before cross-examining the senior manager, the environmental organization applied for production of the documents. After receiving authorization from the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the Crown corporation sought to introduce the documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and requested a confidentiality order. The confidentiality order would make the documents available only to the parties and the court but would not restrict public access to the proceedings.

The trial judge refused to grant the order and ordered the Crown corporation to file the documents in their current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. The Crown corporation appealed under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and the environmental organization cross-appealed under R. 312. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The confidentiality order would have been granted by the dissenting judge. The Crown corporation appealed.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Publication bans and confidentiality orders, in the context of judicial proceedings, are similar. The analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles set out in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). A confidentiality order under R. 151 should be granted in only two circumstances, when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

The alternatives to the confidentiality order suggested by the Trial Division and Court of Appeal were problematic. Expunging the documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution. Providing summaries was not a reasonable alternative measure to having the underlying documents available to the parties. The confidentiality order was necessary in that disclosure of the documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the Crown corporation, and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting the order.

The confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the Crown corporation's right to a fair trial and on freedom of expression. The deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal. If the order was not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the Crown corporation was not required to mount a defence under the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, it was possible that the Crown corporation would suffer the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. The salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects.

Le gouvernement fédéral a fait un prêt de l'ordre de 1,5 milliards de dollar en rapport avec la construction et la vente par une société d'État de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU à la Chine. Un organisme environnemental a sollicité le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision, soutenant que cette autorisation d'aide financière avait déclenché l'application de l'art. 5(1)(b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*. La société d'État était intervenante au débat et elle avait reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire. Elle a déposé l'affidavit d'un cadre supérieur dans lequel ce dernier faisait référence à certains documents confidentiels et en faisait le résumé. L'organisme environnemental a demandé la production des documents avant de procéder au contre-interrogatoire du cadre supérieur. Après avoir obtenu l'autorisation des autorités chinoises de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, la société d'État a cherché à les introduire en invoquant la r. 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et elle a aussi demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon les

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termes de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, les documents seraient uniquement mis à la disposition des parties et du tribunal, mais l'accès du public aux débats ne serait pas interdit.

Le juge de première instance a refusé l'ordonnance de confidentialité et a ordonné à la société d'État de déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une forme révisée, à son gré. La société d'État a interjeté appel en vertu de la r. 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et l'organisme environnemental a formé un appel incident en vertu de la r. 312. Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d'appel ont rejeté le pourvoi et le pourvoi incident. Le juge dissident aurait accordé l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La société d'État a interjeté appel.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Il y a de grandes ressemblances entre l'ordonnance de non-publication et l'ordonnance de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la r. 151 devrait refléter les principes sous-jacents énoncés dans l'arrêt *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Une ordonnance de confidentialité rendue en vertu de la r. 151 ne devrait l'être que lorsque: 1) une telle ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le cadre d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres solutions raisonnables pour écarter ce risque; et 2) les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris les effets sur les droits des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris les effets sur le droit à la liberté d'expression, lequel droit comprend l'intérêt du public à l'accès aux débats judiciaires.

Les solutions proposées par la Division de première instance et par la Cour d'appel comportaient toutes deux des problèmes. Épurer les documents serait virtuellement impraticable et inefficace. Fournir des résumés des documents ne constituait pas une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base. L'ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la communication des documents menacerait gravement un intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'existait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance.

L'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression. Elle n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression. Advenant que l'ordonnance ne soit pas accordée et que, dans le cadre de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, la société d'État n'ait pas l'obligation de présenter une défense en vertu de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, il se pouvait que la société d'État subisse un préjudice du fait d'avoir communiqué cette information confidentielle en violation de ses obligations, sans avoir pu profiter d'un avantage similaire à celui du droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables.

Cases considered by *Iacobucci J.*:

AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), 1998 CarswellNat 2520, 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428, 161 F.T.R. 15 (Fed. T.D.) — considered

AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), 2000 CarswellNat 356, 5 C.P.R. (4th) 149, 253 N.R. 284, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, 2000 CarswellNat 3254 (Fed. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 2 C.R. (5th) 1, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 182 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 463 A.P.R. 81, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 203 N.R. 169, 1996 CarswellNB 462, 1996 CarswellNB 463, 2 B.H.R.C. 210 (S.C.C.) — followed

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 34 C.R. (4th) 269, 20 O.R. (3d) 816 (note), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835,

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, 175 N.R. 1, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 76 O.A.C. 81, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 1994 CarswellOnt 112, 1994 CarswellOnt 1168 (S.C.C.) — followed

Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General) (1989), [1990] 1 W.W.R. 577, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 102 N.R. 321, 71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 273, 103 A.R. 321, 41 C.P.C. (2d) 109, 45 C.R.R. 1, 1989 CarswellAlta 198, 1989 CarswellAlta 623 (S.C.C.) — followed

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437, 82 F.T.R. 147, 1994 CarswellNat 537 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to

Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CarswellOnt 380, 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général), 94 N.R. 167, (sub nom. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 24 O.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 39 C.R.R. 193, 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 CarswellQue 115 (S.C.C.) — followed

M. (A.) v. Ryan, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 207 N.R. 81, 4 C.R. (5th) 220, 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 133, [1997] 4 W.W.R. 1, 85 B.C.A.C. 81, 138 W.A.C. 81, 34 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 42 C.R.R. (2d) 37, 8 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 1997 CarswellBC 99, 1997 CarswellBC 100 (S.C.C.) — considered

N. (F.), Re, 2000 SCC 35, 2000 CarswellNfld 213, 2000 CarswellNfld 214, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 35 C.R. (5th) 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 191 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 577 A.P.R. 181 (S.C.C.) — considered

R. v. E. (O.N.), 2001 SCC 77, 2001 CarswellBC 2479, 2001 CarswellBC 2480, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187, 97 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C. 161, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Keegstra, 1 C.R. (4th) 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 77 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R. 1, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 114 A.R. 81, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 53 O.R. (2d) 719, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally — referred to

s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

s. 11(d) — referred to

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37

Generally — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — referred to

s. 8 — referred to

s. 54 — referred to

s. 54(2)(b) — referred to

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

s. 486(1) — referred to

Rules considered:

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

APPEAL from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (Fed. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (Fed. T.D.), granting application in part.

POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (C.A. Féd.), qui a rejeté le pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (C.F. (1^{re} inst.)), qui avait accueilli en partie la demande.

The judgment of the court was delivered by *Iacobucci J.*:

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

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2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and, accordingly, would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

6 In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Dr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang, which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order; otherwise, it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Dr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take

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the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

11 *Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106*

151.(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments below

A. Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to R. 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondents would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the appellant's own cause

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as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under R. 312.

22 With respect to R. 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b), which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under R. 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered R. 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

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24 In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (Fed. C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

25 Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

26 Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus, the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) *Robertson J.A. (dissenting)*

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

31 Robertson J.A. stated that, although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made

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to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets," this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35

A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

(1) *The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles*

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

37 A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, *supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais*, *supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it pro-

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

vided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

(a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;

(b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and

(c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case *R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an ex-

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cessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the *Oakes* test", we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 *Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) *The Rights and Interests of the Parties*

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEEA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

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51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 22.

(3) *Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties*

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in *Mentuck, supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35 (S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

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57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

(1) Necessity

58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEEA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary,

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and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

64 There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and, in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal in the sense that at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

65 Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the Court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are *reasonably* alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order

70 As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial

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right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

71 The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

72 Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

(b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a *general* principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the *particular* deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.), at p. 976, *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J., at pp. 762-764. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra, supra*, at pp. 760-761. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

76 Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal, supra*, per Wilson J., at pp. 1357-1358. Clearly, the confidentiality order, by deny-

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ing public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

77 However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be *promoted* by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents, with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would, in turn, assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focuses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

81 The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the

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level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

83 Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will *always* be engaged where the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the *substance* of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below, where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish *public* interest from *media* interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, "we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity."

86 Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application *as a whole* is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1353-1354:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the CEAA or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the CEAA are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the CEAA, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on *either* the public interest in freedom of expression *or* the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

90 In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

91 In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the CEAA, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

92 Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

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2007 CarswellOnt 89

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Beta Ltée/Beta Brands Ltd.

TEXTRON FINANCIAL CANADA LIMITED (Applicant) v. BETA LIMITEE/BETA BRANDS LIMITED (Respondent)

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Lax J.

Heard: January 3, 5, 2007
Oral reasons: January 5, 2007
Written reasons: January 12, 2007
Docket: 06-CL-6820

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Counsel: Patrick E. Shea for Applicant, Textron Financial Canada Limited

Jeffrey J. Simpson for Proposed Receiver, Mintz & Partners Limited

Steven Weisz for Sun Beta LLC, Sole Shareholder, Beta Brands Limited

Sam Babe, Steven Graff for Proposed Purchaser, Bremner, Inc.

Michael Klug, Steven Bosnick for Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco & Grain Millers International Union, Local 242G

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Grounds

Debtor manufactured bakery and confectionary products — Debtor was in continual default on its financial covenants — Secured creditor applied for order appointing receiver and authorizing sale of portion of bakery business assets — Application granted — Application was opposed only by union representing debtor's workers on basis that its purpose was to avoid severance and termination pay obligations — Private receiver could not effectively carry out its duties in face of union opposition — Appointment of court-supervised receiver was necessary to protect interests of creditors — Proposed sale was result of fair and reasonable marketing process, considered interests of all parties, and was provident — Time was of essence given perishable inventory — Sale of company as going concern was not feasible — Court must place great deal of confidence in business judgment of receiver.

Cases considered by *Lax J.*:

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Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Fund 321 Ltd. Partnership v. Samsys Technologies Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 2541, 9 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 185, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 3641, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [2000] B.P.I.R. 531 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 244 — referred to

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 100 — referred to

s. 101 — referred to

Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A

s. 69 — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

s. 67 — referred to

APPLICATION by secured creditor for order appointing receiver and authorizing sale of portion of debtor company's assets.

Lax J.:

1 The applicant, Textron Financial Canada Limited ("Textron") is the major secured creditor and operating lender of the respondent, Beta Limitee/Beta Brands Limited ("Beta Brands"). It moved under sections 100 and 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43 and section 67 of the *Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 for an order appointing Mintz & Partners Limited ("Mintz") as receiver and receiver manager of the assets of Beta Brands and for an order authorizing the Receiver to complete a sale of a portion of its assets ("the bakery business") to a purchaser, Bremner, Inc. and vesting the assets in Bremner. The Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco and Grain Millers International Union, Local 242G ("the Union") strenuously opposed both orders. At the end of a

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lengthy hearing on January 3, I granted the receivership order, substantially in the form of the Commercial List standard form Order.

2 The Bremner transaction was scheduled to close on January 4. During the course of the hearing on January 3, I was advised that the closing had been extended to January 5. On January 4 and 5, the parties attempted to negotiate terms of an order approving the sale. These negotiations were unsuccessful and commencing on the late afternoon of January 5 and extending well into the evening, I heard the motion for approval. At its conclusion, I indicated that I was satisfied that the proposed sale was in accordance with the principles in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) and granted the requested order with reasons to follow.

Background

3 Beta Brands is a manufacturer of bakery and confectionary products for the Canadian and U.S. markets with its head office and manufacturing facilities located in a 5-storey building on Dundas Street East in London, Ontario. The company has operated from these premises since 1913, originally as the McCormick Manufacturing Co. Ltd and from 1997, by Beta Brands. Its sole shareholder is Sun Beta, LLC., a Delaware corporation. The company's assets consist of the Dundas Street plant and land, intellectual property, including various trademarks and formulas, accounts receivable, and inventory and equipment. The company currently has about 295 unionized employees and 30 salaried employees.

4 Beta Brands carries on three distinct manufacturing, marketing and sales businesses: (a) baked goods; (b) confectionary goods; and (c) panned chocolate products. Beta Brands also manufactured Breath Savers brand hard candies, but this division was sold in May 2006. A subsidiary, Beta Brands U.S.A. Ltd., carries on business in the United States marketing Beta Brands' products to U.S. customers, but Beta USA does not have assets or carry on business in Canada.

5 Pursuant to a Loan and Security Agreement dated as of December 17, 2004, Textron and Beta Brands entered into financing arrangements, which were amended as of August 29, 2005 and June 20, 2006. Pursuant to a Participation Agreement made as of August 29, 2005 and amended as of June 20, 2006, Sun Beta, LLC purchased from Textron an interest in certain of the advances made by Textron to Beta Brands. Almost from the beginning of the relationship between Textron and Beta Brands, the company found it difficult to operate within the Loan Facilities. The amendments and the Participation Agreement were intended to assist Beta Brands in overcoming its financial difficulties, but it continued to default on the financial covenants contained in the Loan and Security Agreements.

6 In August 2005, Beta Brands, in consultation with Sun Beta, determined that it needed to restructure its operations and considered the possibilities of selling its business to a third party in whole or parts, completing a strategic acquisition, moving to leased premises using existing or new equipment, or an orderly liquidation of the assets of the company. On September 19, 2005, it engaged Capitalink, L.C. of Coral Gables, Florida to investigate several of these options, most notably, marketing the business and/or each of its divisions to potential acquirers throughout North America and Europe.

7 The efforts of Capitalink resulted in the sale of the Breath Savers business in May 2006 for about \$1.2 million. It was also successful in generating a proposal in March 2006 from Ralcorp Holdings, Inc. of St. Louis, Missouri, to purchase certain of the assets of the bakery business at a purchase price of US\$3 million. The Ralcorp proposal was not pursued at that time as the company decided to focus on a restructuring in an attempt to preserve the business and continue operations. Several restructuring alternatives were explored, but none were completed. No further proposals were received for the bakery business or for the other divisions.

8 In November 2006 and in the face of a pending liquidity crisis, company management resurrected discussions with Ralcorp with respect to the sale of the bakery business. Ralcorp was prepared to honour its March 2006 pro-

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posal and to complete the transaction through its subsidiary, Bremner. Also in November 2006, the company retained Mintz as its consultant to review the company's financial position, its short-term cash flow forecasts and to conduct a security position review. Mintz concluded that the realizations from the company's assets would be significantly lower if the Bremner transaction was not completed.

9 Textron has valid, perfected security over the property of the company and delivered the notices required under s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B.3 in late November. On December 13, 2006, an Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") was executed between Beta Brands and Bremner. On the same day, the company entered into a Forbearance Agreement with Textron whereby Textron agreed to forbear on enforcing its security and provide Beta Brands with financing to complete the sale to Bremner.

Appointment of Receiver

10 The subordinated creditors did not appear and take no position. The Union opposed the appointment of the Receiver and submitted that its true purpose was to avoid or eliminate the contractual and/or legislative obligations for severance and termination pay, which are substantial.

11 In its materials, the Union indicated its intention to exercise its rights under the collective agreement and in the event of a sale to Bremner, to file an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board under section 69 of the *Labour Relations Act, 1995*, alleging that there has been a "sale of a business" to the Receiver and/or Bremner and to confirm that the current collective agreement is binding on them. There is no reasonable prospect that a privately-appointed receiver could effectively and efficiently carry out its duties and obligations in the face of this. The Union will exercise its rights as it sees fit, but the appointment of a receiver whose activities will be supervised by the court is necessary to protect the interests of all creditors. It provides the greatest likelihood of maximizing the recovery for all creditors and will permit all stakeholders to have input into the best process to achieve this: see, *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 11 and 13.

Sale to Bremner

12 Bremner is purchasing the trademarks associated with the bakery business, customer lists, and some, but not all of the equipment involved in bakery production. As well, the APA requires that Beta Brands deliver approximately \$750,000 of inventory at cost to permit Bremner to service bakery customers while equipment is moved and production re-established at Bremner's facilities. Bremner is not purchasing the accounts receivable, any assets associated with the candy or panned chocolate businesses, the remaining equipment for the bakery business, the land or building.

13 The Union opposed the sale to Bremner on the basis that it eliminates or curtails the possibility of the sale of the entire business as a going concern and the prospect of recovery for the substantial severance and termination pay claims of its members. It objected to what it described as the "quick flip" nature of the transaction and the fact that it was left out of the process that culminated in the Bremner offer on December 13.

14 I accept that the Union was brought into this late in the day. It was short-served with notice of the application, but once served, it was provided with documentation and information regarding the company's attempts to re-structure and market its divisions in an attempt to satisfy the Union that the sale process was the best option available to all parties. Before returning to court on January 5 for an order approving the sale, considerable efforts were made to achieve a resolution on terms acceptable to the Union, the purchaser and the secured creditors whose funds are at risk. The secured creditors were not prepared to forego the Bremner sale in the faint hope that a third party purchaser can be found who is willing to operate the business and continue the employment relationship. The Receiver and the purchaser do not plan to fulfill this role. The gap could not be bridged.

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15 The Union has received assurances that it will have a place at the table in formulating a strategy for the company's remaining assets. Beta Brands no longer has any ability to carry on operations or to fund a marketing effort. The proposed sale to Bremner will generate cash proceeds, some portion of which can be allocated to fund future marketing efforts. The Receiver intends to explore every reasonable option to market the remaining assets of Beta Brands and to maximize recovery for its creditors, and, will attempt to realize sufficient proceeds such that unsecured creditors, including employees, receive some payments of amounts owing to them. There is no evidence that any alternative purchaser for the bakery division or the company as a whole exists. Capitalink's marketing process, discussed more fully below, demonstrates that one is unlikely to surface. The employees stand the best chance of recovering as creditors if the Bremner sale is approved. Without it, there will be a shortfall in the millions of dollars.

16 Courts have looked to the four-part test in *Soundair* for guidance where the court is being asked to approve a realization process, whether or not there is a marketing process and sale conducted by a receiver: *Fund 321 Ltd. Partnership v. Samsys Technologies Inc.*, 2006 CarswellOnt 254 [Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]] at para. 37; *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 3346 [Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]] at para.47. The court's duty is to consider:

- (a) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) whether the interests of all parties have been considered;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained;
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 From approximately September 2005 until November or December 2006, Capitalink engaged in a marketing process of the company's assets, including the bakery division. Potential purchasers were solicited for offers to purchase the entire company, but Capitalink also prepared separate confidential information memoranda ("CIM") for each division. Attached as an Appendix to the Receiver's First Report is a schedule provided to the Receiver by Capitalink that describes the parties Capitalink contacted and the discussions and meetings it held in its efforts to seek purchasers for Beta Brands, including its bakery business. The strategy employed by Capitalink was no different than the strategy typically utilized by receivers in selling assets of a business. As a result of its initial targeting of potentially interested parties, the bakery division CIM was distributed to nine different interested parties. The Ralcorp proposal in March 2006 was the only offer received.

18 The Receiver was not in a position to verify the recorded entries in the schedule provided by Capitalink and it was pointed out that two of the nine potentially interested parties who are believed to have received CIM'S are not referred to at all in the schedule, which is otherwise quite detailed. Nonetheless, based on its review of the schedule as well as other documents provided to it by the company and/or Capitalink and on the basis of discussions with company management, the Receiver believes that the marketing process as a whole conducted by Capitalink was fair and reasonable and that the assets were exposed to the market for a sufficient period of time.

19 The purchase price of \$US3 million in the Bremner transaction is the same as proposed by its parent corporation in March 2006. This suggests that the purchase price is closer to true going concern rather than liquidation value. The equipment being purchased appears to be above appraised value. The Receiver is not satisfied that further marketing of the bakery division assets will result in higher net realizations or result in a reasonable chance of locating alternative willing purchasers or what alternative marketing efforts have not already been undertaken by Capitalink. I am satisfied that the Receiver would have proceeded no differently than Capitalink did and a further marketing effort would not be productive. I conclude that sufficient efforts were made to obtain the best price following a marketing process that was fair and reasonable and that it produced a provident sale.

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20 Apart from the Union, all parties support the proposed sale. The Receiver recommends it. As the major secured creditors, Textron and Sun Beta have the largest financial stake and their support for the transaction is highly significant, even though Sun Beta *qua* shareholder may not see a penny from it. The realization schedules prepared by Mintz in its consulting capacity show that there is the potential to pay a portion of the unsecured claims with the Bremner sale and none without it. The company explored reasonable alternatives over a six-month period before reviving the Bremner transaction. I am satisfied that there was proper consideration of the interests of all parties and that there was no unfairness in the process.

21 It is true that the Union was given little time to attempt to bring forward other options, but it is also true that it brought forward no concrete proposals or offered any protection to the secured creditors in the event the sale was not approved and the purchaser walked away. There was some suggestion that a Brazilian candy company was prepared to purchase the entire business. When the Receiver investigated this suggestion, the Receiver learned that the possible purchaser had never presented an offer and in discussions with Capitalink, had indicated that it might be interested in purchasing the entire company, but for the same amount that Bremner was prepared to pay for only the bakery business.

22 The terms of the Bremner transaction contemplate an uninterrupted flow of products to assist in an orderly transition of the business. If the transaction is not completed and the company's operations are shut down, the perishable inventory, valued at approximately \$750,000, is at risk of spoilage. More importantly, any interruption in supply will likely result in customers sourcing products from other suppliers, thereby significantly impairing value for the bakery trademarks and customer supply relationships in any potential future purchase as well as jeopardizing the value of the accounts receivable. Time is therefore of the essence. Any disruption to the timely and orderly removal of the purchased equipment and inventory will harm the creditors and seriously impair the best chance of maximizing value for all stakeholders.

23 While a going concern sale of Beta Brands would undeniably be in the best interests of the company's employees, a secured creditor is not required to continue to fund a business to satisfy a union's need for an employer. Embarking on a process to attempt to locate one is, in the opinion of the Receiver, not in the interest of creditors and the Receiver does not recommend this for reasons I have already discussed. The court must place a great deal of confidence in the Receiver's expert business judgment for reasons elaborated by Farley J. in *Skyepharm PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 1999 CarswellOnt 3641 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 3-8. On this basis, the material filed and the comprehensive submissions of counsel, I am satisfied that all of the *Soundair* principles are met in this case, that the sale is advantageous to the creditors and other stakeholders of Beta Brands and that it should be approved.

24 A final comment on procedure. On the initial attendance, the Union disputed that the application should be heard on the Commercial List in Toronto. In my view, there was sufficient connection to Toronto to make it appropriate to hear it, particularly in view of its urgency. A number of members of the Union travelled from London to Toronto on January 3 and again on January 5. Textron acknowledged the burden this placed on them, on the Union and on the Union's counsel who are all from London. While consent, unopposed, and purely administrative matters in this receivership will continue to be heard on the Commercial List in Toronto, any proceeding that involves the Union and is opposed by it is to be heard in London. I appreciate the co-operation of the Regional Senior Justice in West Region for facilitating this. Counsel have been informed how to schedule these matters.

Application granted.

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2008 CarswellOnt 6258

Tool-Plas Systems Inc., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF TOOL-PLAS SYSTEMS INC. (Applicant) AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 101 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT, AS AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Morawetz J.

Heard: September 29, 2008
Judgment: October 24, 2008
Docket: CV-08-7746-00-CL

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Counsel: D. Bish for Applicant, Tool-Plas

T. Reyes for Receiver, RSM Richter Inc.

R. van Kessel for EDC, Comerica

C. Staples for BDC

M. Weinczok for Roynat

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Debtor manufactured auto parts — Debtor wished to appoint receiver and execute "quick flip", including terms that purchaser would acquire assets of debtor and hire same employees, and assume debt to secured lenders — Receiver brought motion for approval of transaction — Motion granted — Transaction was best available option, and was reasonable — Plan was in best interests of shareholders — Certain parties would benefit, including secured lenders, certain lessors, and certain employees — Certain employees and suppliers would have no possibility of recovery, but were unlikely to recover under any scenario — Price proposed was higher than liquidation value or value of going concern — Secured lenders supported transaction and subordinated secured lenders did not object — Harm could be caused by delay in that relationship with customers could be harmed by disruption.

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

2008 CarswellOnt 6258, 48 C.B.R. (5th) 91

MOTION by receiver for approval of purchase of debtor corporation.

Morawetz J.:

1 This morning, RSM Richter Inc. ("Richter" or the "Receiver") was appointed receiver of Tool-Plas, (the "Company"). In the application hearing, Mr. Bish in his submissions on behalf of the Company made it clear that the purpose of the receivership was to implement a 'quick flip' transaction, which if granted would result in the sale of assets to a new corporate entity in which the existing shareholders of the Company would be participating. The endorsement appointing the Receiver should be read in conjunction with this endorsement.

2 The Receiver moves for approval of the sale transaction. The Receiver has filed a comprehensive report in support of its position — which recommends approval of the sale.

3 The transaction has the support of four Secured Lenders — EDC, Comerica, Roynat and BDC.

4 Prior to the receivership appointment, Richter assessed the viability of the Company. Richter concluded that any restructuring had to focus on the mould business and had to be concluded expeditiously given the highly competitive and challenging nature of the auto parts business. Further, steps had to be taken to minimize the risk of losing either or both key customers — namely Ford and Johnson Controls. Together these two customer account for 60% of the Company's sales.

5 Richter was also involved in assisting the Company in negotiating with its existing Secured Lenders. As a result, these Lenders have agreed to continue to finance the Company's short term needs, but only on the basis that a sale transaction occurs.

6 Under the terms of the proposed offer the Purchaser will acquire substantially all of the assets of the Company. The purchase price will consist of the assumption or notional repayment of all of the outstanding obligations to each of the Secured Lenders, subject to certain amendments and adjustments.

7 The proposed purchaser would be entitled to use the name Tool-Plas. The purchaser would hire all current employees and would assume termination and vacation liabilities of the current employees; the obligations of the Company to trade creditors related to the mould business, subject to working out terms with those creditors; as well as the majority of the Company's equipment leases, subject to working out terms with the lessors.

8 The only substantial condition to the transaction is the requirement for an approval and vesting order.

9 The Receiver is of the view that the transaction would enable the purchaser to carry on the Company's mould business and that this would be a successful outcome for customers, suppliers, employees and other stakeholders, including the Secured Lenders.

10 The Receiver recommends the 'quick flip' transaction. The Receiver is of the view that there is substantial risk associated with a marketing process, since any process other than an expedited process could result in a risk that the key customers would resource their business elsewhere. Reference was made to other recent insolvencies of auto parts suppliers which resulted in receivership and owners of tooling equipment repossessing their equipment with the result that there was no ongoing business. (Polywheels and Progressive Moulded Tooling).

11 The Receiver is also of the view that the proposed purchase price exceeds both a going concern and a liquidation value of the assets. The Receiver has also obtained favourable security opinions with respect to the security held

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by the Secured Lenders. Not all secured creditors are being paid. There are subordinate secured creditors consisting of private arms-length investors who have agreed to forego payment.

12 Counsel to the Receiver pointed out that the transaction only involved the mould business. The die division has already been shut down. The die division employees were provided with working notice. They will not have ongoing jobs. Suppliers to the die division will not have their outstanding obligations assumed by the purchaser. There is no doubt that employees and suppliers to the die division will receive different treatment than employees and suppliers to the mould business. However, as the Receiver points out, these decisions are, in fact, business decisions which are made by the purchaser and not by the Receiver. The Receiver also stresses the fact that the die business employees and suppliers are unsecured creditors and under no scenario would they be receiving any reward from the sales process.

13 This motion proceeded with limited service. Employees and unsecured creditors (with the exception of certain litigants) were not served. The materials were served on Mr. Brian Szucs, who was formerly employed as an Account Manager. Mr. Szucs has issued a Statement of Claim against the Company claiming damages as a result of wrongful dismissal. His employment contract provides for a severance package in the amount of his base salary (\$120,000) plus bonuses.

14 Mr. Szucs appeared on the motion arguing that his Claim should be exempted from the approval and vesting order — specifically that his claim should not be vested out, rather it should be treated as unaffected. Regretfully for Mr. Szucs, he is an unsecured creditor. There is nothing in his material to suggest otherwise. His position is subordinate to the secured creditors and the purchaser has made a business decision not to assume the Company's obligations to Mr. Szucs. If the sale is approved, the relief requested by Mr. Szucs cannot be granted.

15 A 'quick flip' transaction is not the usual transaction. In certain circumstances, however, it may be the best, or the only, alternative. In considering whether to approve a 'quick flip' transaction, the Court should consider the impact on various parties and assess whether their respective positions and the proposed treatment that they will receive in the 'quick flip' transaction would realistically be any different if an extended sales process were followed.

16 In this case certain parties will benefit if this transaction proceeds. These parties include the Secured Lenders, equipment and vehicle lessors, unsecured creditors of the mould division, the landlord, employees of the mould division, suppliers to the mould division, and finally — the customers of the mould division who stand to benefit from continued supply.

17 On the other hand, certain parties involved in litigation, former employees of the die division and suppliers to the die division will, in all likelihood, have no possibility of recovery. This outcome is regrettable, but in the circumstances of this case, would appear to be inevitable. I am satisfied that there is no realistic scenario under which these parties would have any prospect of recovery.

18 I am satisfied that, having considered the positions of the above-mentioned parties, the proposed sale is reasonable. I accept the view of the Receiver that there is a risk if there is a delay in the process. I am also satisfied that the sale price exceeds the going concern and the liquidation value of the assets and that, on balance, the proposed transaction is in the best interests of the stakeholders. I am also satisfied that the prior involvement of Richter has resulted in a process where alternative courses of action have been considered.

19 I am also mindful that the Secured Lenders have supported the proposed transaction and that the subordinated secured lenders are not objecting.

20 In these circumstances the process can be said to be fair and in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the principles set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) have been followed.

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21 In the result, the motion of the Receiver is granted and an Approval and Vesting Order shall issue in the requested form.

22 The confidential customer and product information contained in the Offer is such that it is appropriate for a redacted copy to be placed in the record with an unredacted copy to be filed separately, under seal, subject to further order.

Motion granted.

END OF DOCUMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. AND DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

Court File No: 10-8699-00CL

APPLICANTS

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS
(Motion returnable on June 4, 2010)

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