COURT FILE NUMBER	25 – 2172984
ESTATE NUMBER	25 – 2172984
COURT	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
	IN THE MATTER OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, AS AMENDED
	AND IN THE MATTER OF MICROPLANET TECHNOLOGY CORP.
DOCUMENT	**SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT, MICROPLANET TECHNOLOGY CORP.**
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	**BENNETT JONES LLP** 4500 Bankers Hall East 855 2nd Street SW Calgary, AB T2P 4K7 Attention: Alexis Teasdale / Michael Selnes Telephone No.: (403) 298-3067 / 3311 Fax No.: (403) 265-7219 Client File No.: 55088.16

Commercial List Chambers Application
Scheduled for the 9th day of February, 2017 at 9:00 am
Before the Honourable Justice B. Nixon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OVERVIEW

1. This Second Supplemental Brief of Argument is submitted by MicroPlanet Technology Corp. ("**MTC**") to address three discrete matters:

(a) the arguments raised by Brett Ironside ("**Ironside**") in his Supplemental Brief filed January 31, 2017 (the "**Second Ironside Brief**");

(b) the Trustee's report on value of tax losses in MTC and its MTC's wholly-owned US subsidiary, MicroPlanet, Inc. ("**MI**"); and

(c) certain evidence arising out of the Questioning on Affidavit of Wayne Smith, held on January 17, 2017 (the "**Smith Questioning**") and of Wolfgang Struss, held on January 20, 2017 (the "**Struss Questioning**").

2. It is noted that, apart from the issues set out in the Second Ironside Brief, MTC and Ironside have largely resolved the issues between them and Ironside has withdrawn his opposition to MTC's application (the "**Approval Application**") for, among other things, the approval of its Amended Amended Proposal (the "**Twice Amended Proposal**") and the transfer of the MTC Asset to Emerald Ventures Inc. ("**EVI**") and has abandoned the outstanding portions of his Application filed on January 5, 2017. MTC understands that Ironside maintains his opposition to MTC's request for an Order to further amend the release of the directors in Article 7.1 of the Twice Amended Proposal.

3. Those capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Struss Affidavits, as defined below.

II. FACTS

A. Evidence Before This Court

4. The facts relevant to the Approval Application are set out in the following filed documents:

(a) the Affidavits of Wolfgang Struss, sworn December 5, 2016 (the "**Struss Affidavit No. 1**"); December 14, 2016 (the "**Struss Affidavit No. 2**"); December 22, 2016 (the "**Struss Affidavit No. 3**"); January 4, 2017 (the "**Struss Affidavit No 4**"); and January 25, 2017 (the "**Struss Affidavit No. 5**") (collectively, the "**Struss Affidavits**");

(b) the Affidavit of Wayne Smith, sworn December 5, 2016 (the "**Smith Affidavit**");

(c) the Affidavit of Brett Ironside, sworn December 13, 2016;

(d) the reports of Deloitte Restructuring Inc., in its capacity as Proposal Trustee of MTC (the "**Trustee**") including:

(i) the Trustee's Report Pursuant to Section 59(1) and paragraph 58(d) of the BIA, dated December 6, 2016 (the "**Trustee's First Report**");

(ii) the Trustee's Supplemental Report to Creditors, dated December 14, 2016;

(iii) the Trustee's Second Supplemental Report to Creditors, dated January 6, 2017;

(iv) the Trustee's Third Supplemental Report to Creditors, dated January 26, 2017 (the "**Trustee's Final Report**").

(e) the transcript of Questioning on Affidavit of Wayne Smith held on January 17, 2017 and filed on January 25, 2017 (the "**Smith Transcript**");

(f) the transcript of Questioning on Affidavit of Wolfgang Struss held on January 20, 2017 and filed on January 27, 2017 (the "**Struss Transcript**");

(g) the answers to undertakings given by Wayne Smith, filed January 31, 2017 (the "**Smith Undertakings**");

(h) the answers to undertakings given by Wolfgang Struss, filed January 31, 2017 (the "**Struss Undertakings**"); and

(i) the Affidavit of Wayne Smith, sworn February 2, 2017 (the "**Smith Affidavit No. 2**").

B. Relevant Facts

5. The facts supporting MTC's application for approval of the Twice Amended Proposal are set out in detail in MTC's Brief of Argument, filed December 7, 2016 (the "**First MTC Brief**"), at

paragraphs 10 to 43. For the sake of efficiency, MTC has included any facts relevant to this Second Supplemental Brief in the argument portion hereof.

III. ISSUES

6. This Second Supplemental Brief addresses the following issues:

(a) whether the further amendment to the release of directors in the Twice Amended Proposal can be made by this Honourable Court;

(b) whether, in light of further information about the MI Tax Losses, the Twice Amended Proposal is still reasonable and fair; and

(c) further support for MTC's Approval Application arising from the evidence given by Mr. Struss and Mr. Smith on Questioning.

IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. This Honourable Court has jurisdiction to amend the release of directors

7. Ironside argues that the Twice Amended Proposal, as currently drafted, does not compromise claims against current and former directors. This in turn forms the basis for his argument that the requested amendment to the Twice Amended Proposal to clarify the release of current and former directors, is a substantive amendment that this Honourable Court ought not to grant.

8. Contrary to Mr. Ironside's position, section 50(13) of the BIA has been interpreted by Canadian courts to apply to current and former directors of an insolvent entity. As the definition of "Director Claims" in the Twice Amended Proposal mirrors section 50(13), the Twice Amended Proposal as it is currently drafted provides for the compromise of claims against MTC's current and former directors. The requested amendment is therefore neither substantive nor prejudicial, as it simply gives effect to the compromise of claims that was accepted by the requisite majority of MTC's creditors.

1. "Directors" in BIA section 50(13) includes both current and former directors

9. Ironside argues that Parliament's use of the word "occupying" in the definition of "director" in the BIA limits the definition to individuals currently occupying the position of director, based

on a plain reading of the word "occupying". However, the British Columbia Supreme Court in bankruptcy has interpreted the word "director" in the context of section 50(13) of the BIA as referring to both current and former directors.

- *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSA 1985 c B-3 [BIA], at section 2 **[TAB 1]**
- *Re Port Chevrolet*, 2003 BCSC 1460 [*Port Chevrolet*] **[TAB 2]**

10. In *Port Chevrolet*, Madam Justice Loo considered whether or not the proposal in question compromised the Canada Revenue Agency's claim for GST arrears against both former and present directors. The proposal in *Port Chevrolet* included the following provision:

> Any claims against directors of the Company that arose before the Filing Date regardless of the date of crystallization of such claim, and that relate to the obligations of the Company which relate to the time period before that date where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for payment of such obligations shall be deemed to be fully satisfied by the terms of this Proposal and shall not be enforceable against those directors in law or in equity. [emphasis added]

- *Port Chevrolet*, *supra*, at para 17 **[TAB 2]**

11. As in *Port Chevrolet*, MTC has had only one director since May of 2015. Under Article 7.1 of the Twice Amended Proposal, upon distribution of the distribution fund, all "Director Claims" are deemed to be fully satisfied. The definition of "Director Claims" in the Twice Amended Proposal is very similar to the wording of the proposal in *Port Chevrolet*:

> …claims against directors of MTC that are based in whole or in part on facts, events or matters which existed or occurred on or before the date of this Proposal and that relate to the obligations of MTC for which the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations; [emphasis added]

- Twice Amended Proposal, at 1.1(o)

12. The Court concluded that the language of the compromise of director claims set out above included claims against former directors:

> I do not accept the contention of the CCRA that paragraph 11(d) applies to only present directors, and not former directors. To read the paragraph in that manner would defeat the intent of s. 50(13) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and, moreover, makes no sense because in this case, since on or about October 30, 2001, Port has had only one director, whereas paragraph 11(d) refers to directors.

- *Port Chevrolet*, *supra*, at para 23 [**TAB 2]**

13. *Port Chevrolet* unequivocally supports MTC's interpretation of the definition of "Director Claims" in the Twice Amended Proposal.

14. A corollary of Ironside's interpretation of the word "directors" in s. 50(13) of the BIA, is that it would mean former directors of an insolvent corporation could never be released from the obligations of the debtor, because the statute would not permit it.

15. In this regard, it is helpful to consider how CCAA courts have dealt with the issue of claims against former directors, as the definition of "director" and the provisions allowing for the release of directors in the CCAA are nearly identical to those in the BIA. It is a well-accepted principle that Courts should strive, to the greatest extent possible, to read the CCAA and BIA in harmony when the two statutes deal with the same subject matter.

- *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA] at sections 2, 5.1 **[TAB 3]**
- BIA, section 2, 50(13) **[TAB 1]**
- *Re Kitchener Frame Limited*, 2012 ONSC 234 [*Kitchener*], at para 47 **[TAB 4]**

16. The fact that CCAA courts have allowed former directors to be released from certain claims against them suggests that Canadian insolvency courts do not share Ironside's narrow interpretation of the word "directors" in the restructuring context. For example, the plan of arrangement in *Sinoforest*, which was sanctioned by the Ontario Superior Court, provided for the release of certain current and former directors and officers of the debtor company, with an exception for claims for fraud or criminal conduct, conspiracy claims and claims that were not permitted to be released under section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

- *Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v Sino-Forest Corp*, 2012 ONSC 7050 [*Sinoforest*], at para 43 **[TAB 5]**

17. Two more examples of such cases are *Re Cheng* and *Re Canadian Airlines*, in which the Court released claims against former directors.

- *Re Cheng*, 2009 SKQB 186 [*Cheng*], at paras 18 and 47 **[TAB 6]**
- *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, 2000 ABQB 442 [*Canadian*], at para 86 **[TAB 7]**

18. The releases of current and former directors in *Sinoforest*, *Cheng*, and *Canadian* were based on section 5.1 of the CCAA and were granted notwithstanding the use of the word "directors", which is also defined as a person "occupying" the position of director. In *Canadian*, Justice Paperny amended the plan to make it consistent with section 5.1; yet she did not amend the proposal to remove the release of former directors. This implies that the release of former directors included in the plan was consistent with section 5.1. The Courts in *Sinoforest*, *Cheng* and *Canadian* thus expressly or impliedly endorsed the broader interpretation of the word "directors" by allowing the compromise of claims against former directors, while Ironside's interpretation of the word "directors" runs contrary to these decisions.

- *Canadian*, *supra* at paras 88 to 90 **[TAB 7]**

2. This Court may amend the Twice Amended Proposal to include the words "current and former" directors

19. If this Court accepts MTC's interpretation of the word "directors" in the BIA, then the amendment of the Twice Amended Proposal to include the words "current and former" in Article 7.1 is not a substantive amendment, and this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to approve it.

20. MTC's full argument on this point is set out in paragraphs 8-14 of MTC's Supplemental Brief filed on December 22, 2016 (the "**Second MTC Brief**"). The requested amendment is neither substantive nor prejudicial, as it merely clarifies Article 7.1 of the Twice Amended Proposal and gives effect to the existing compromise of claims against MTC's current and former directors.

B. The Twice Amended Proposal is reasonable and fair in light of the value of the Tax Losses

21. During oral submissions on January 11, 2017, this Honourable Court made inquiries about the value, if any, of the tax losses of MI (the "**MI Tax Losses**"), and directed the Trustee to provide a further report on that issue. The Trustee's Final Report accordingly addresses the value of MI's tax losses. The Trustee's recommendation that the Twice Amended Proposal should be approved remains unchanged.

- Order of the Hon. Justice D. B. Nixon, granted January 13, 2017 and filed January 20, 2017, at para 2(f) (the "**Adjournment Order**")
- Trustee's Final Report, at paras 14-39, 42

22. In addition to requesting that the Trustee provide additional analysis in relation to the MI Tax Losses, this Court also provided Ironside an opportunity to submit further evidence on the value of the MI Tax Losses, and any of MI's other assets. No further evidence was filed by Ironside; rather, he sent a letter to the service list, suggesting that he was "unable to ascertain the value of the Tax Losses associated with MI in the context of the Twice Amended Proposal," suggesting that, but not explaining why, the structure of the Twice Amended Proposal drove the value of the tax losses.

- Adjournment Order, at para 2(e)
- Letter from John Regush to Service List (January 17, 2017) **[Appendix, TAB A]**

23. The value of the MI Tax Losses is relevant to the test for approval of the Twice Amended Proposal, and the test for approval of the sale of the MTC Asset to EVI. As outlined in this section, the Trustee's Final Report ultimately concludes that the MI Tax Losses and the tax losses in MTC (the "**MTC Tax Losses**") are of nominal value. As such, and in the absence of any contrary valuation evidence or an alternative offer, the Trustee's Final Report supports MTC's position that the Twice Amended Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of MTC's creditors, and that the consideration offered by EVI for the MTC Asset is reasonable and fair.

24. The Trustee's Final Report undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the value of the MI and MTC Tax Losses. Regarding the MI Tax Losses, the Trustee's Final Report concludes that the MI Tax Losses would be severely restricted in their future use, and that even absent a change of control of MI, the MI Tax Losses can only be used if income is generated, which is not guaranteed. Finally, in the Trustee's view, the value of the MI Tax Losses would remain nominal and is contingent on the amount of revenue that can be sheltered from tax. The Trustee reached similar conclusions with respect to the MTC Tax Losses.

- Trustee's Final Report, at paras 35 and 36

25. In addition, the Trustee's Final Report includes information on the market for tax losses in the US and Canada. It concludes that there generally is no legitimate "market" in the US for selling loss companies purely for their tax attributes. The Trustee comments that in Canada, the market for pure loss companies like MTC has largely been shut down by new provisions of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada), and that it is difficult to generalize the market value of tax losses, given the effect of underlying criteria on the valuation of the losses.

- Trustee's Final Report, at paras 33 and 34

26. On the value of MI more generally, although it appears that there has been some extremely limited unsolicited interest in MI, its tax losses and its technology, the fact remains that no offers have been received despite the significant amount of information about MI and MTC that has been available on the Trustee's website for nearly four months.

- Trustee's Final Report, at para 40

C. The Evidence from Questioning Supports Approval of the Twice Amended Proposal

27. Wayne Smith and Wolfgang Struss were questioned on the various affidavits sworn by them in these proceedings on January 17 and January 20, 2017, respectively. In this section of its Second Supplemental Brief, MTC will briefly address evidence given by Mr. Smith and Mr. Struss on Questioning, which is relevant to the test for approval of the Twice Amended Proposal.

1. The Amended Amended Proposal is Reasonable

28. The evidence given by Mr. Struss in Questioning on Affidavit is supportive of MTC"s position that the Twice Amended Proposal is reasonable, and more particularly, meets the requirements of commercial morality and maintains the integrity of the bankruptcy system. MTC relies on the First MTC Brief regarding the remaining parts of the test for approval.

29. As argued in the First MTC Brief, nothing about the Twice Amended Proposal is contrary to good commercial conscience or harms the integrity of the proposal process. While none of the evidence given by Mr. Struss or Mr. Smith on Questioning changes this conclusion, it provides context to the manner in which the Twice Amended Proposal and the related sale to EVI came to be.

30. Ironside's counsel suggested in his Questioning of Mr. Struss that Mr. Struss's relationship with the loosely-knit group of "Seattle Investors" somehow taints the Twice Amended Proposal or the process leading to it. The evidence shows that the Twice Amended Proposal, and the sale to EVI, evolved over time, as Mr. Struss came to understand MTC's situation and considered the possibilities open to MTC and MI.

- Struss Transcript, at page 21, line 24 to page 25, line 22; page 74, lines 2 – 24

31. Mr. Struss' evidence was that from the beginning, the entirety of his efforts were focused on investigating and exploring opportunities to resurrect MTC and drive its business forward. Mr. Struss described how, over time, and through discussions with potential lenders, he came to realize full capitalization of the enterprise was untenable as a result of the company's structure. He was resistant to accept this reality until circumstances outside his control forced him to rethink his position. Mr. Struss explained how his fiduciary responsibilities narrowed over time from a broad focus on all of MTC's stakeholders to a narrower focus on saving MI's technology for the benefit of the enterprise, which he came to believe could be done by unwinding MTC from MI.

- Struss Transcript, at page 64, lines 1 – 6
- Struss Transcript, at page 26, lines 4 – 15
- Struss Transcript, at page 26, line 21 to page 27, line 21

32. Mr. Struss rejected the notion that the Twice Amended Proposal was brought about by the EVI investors so they could obtain the benefit of purchasing MI. His evidence was that the decision to sell the shares of MI to EVI was a corollary of the BIA proposal process, which itself was borne out of his decision to unwind MTC and MI as a way of saving and capitalizing MI's technology and driving it towards commercialization and sale.

- Struss Transcript, at page 13, line 12 to page 14, line 4
- Struss Transcript, at page 15, lines 16 – 23
- Struss Transcript, at page 18, lines 16 – 21
- Struss Transcript, at page 18, line 25 to page 19, line 14; page 20 lines 16 - 19; page 20, line 24 to page 21, line 23
- Struss Transcript, at page 66, lines 12 - 20

33. As for why Mr. Struss focused on the group of investors in Seattle in relation to MTC's proposal proceedings, the simple answer is because he had easy access to them and time was of the essence. He did not know which other MTC shareholders he should approach and noted that he had approached Mr. Ironside to raise funds, who declined to help. Mr. Struss rejected the idea that the sale to EVI created a conflict of interest because he had a relationship with certain investors in the Seattle area. The evidence given by Mr. Struss and Mr. Smith on questioning supports Mr. Struss' position. The "Seattle investors" are not a formal or defined group or entity, and only

some of them are interested in the transaction between MTC and EVI by virtue of being potential future shareholders. Importantly, Mr. Struss is not an investor in EVI and is not advancing funds to complete the Twice Amended Proposal.

- Struss Transcript, at page 10, lines 17 - 25; page 11, lines 1 - 12; page 12, lines 4 - 7; page 72, lines 2 – 23; page 75, lines 14-17
- Smith Transcript, at page16, lines 6 - 15; page 45, lines 13 - 22

34. In terms of whether Mr. Struss has any interest in the transfer of MI's shares to EVI, the evidence shows that Mr. Struss does not stand to gain any direct or significant indirect benefit from the transaction. Mr. Struss has no direct involvement with, nor any current or prospective interest in, EVI and does not expect to obtain any future benefit from EVI or any of the EVI investors. Although the suggestion was made that Mr. Struss may benefit in a continued role as director of MI, the expectation of both EVI and Mr. Struss is that Mr. Struss may continue as a director of MI on an interim basis after the proposal is complete, but that the intention is to recruit a new c-suite of management or an industry expert to run the company.

- Smith Transcript, at page 14, lines 2 - 10; page 38, line 6 to page 39, line 10; page 39, lines 15 - 18
- Smith Undertakings, Answer to Undertaking No. 1
- Struss Transcript, at page 15, line 24 to page 16, line 22; page 87, line 18 to page 89, line 5; page 90, line 25 to page 91, line 11

35. Based on all of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that there is no secret benefit accruing to anyone, and that the Twice Amended Proposal is in no way contrary to commercial morality or the integrity of the bankruptcy system.

2. The "Seattle Investors" do not control MTC

36. At paragraphs 72 to 77 of the First MTC Brief, MTC addressed the issue of whether MTC and EVI are "related persons" within the meaning of section 65.13 of the BIA. Specifically, MTC argued that the EVI investors are not in control of MTC. The evidence given by Mr. Struss and Mr. Smith on Questioning was consistent with MTC's position that MTC and EVI are not "related persons".

- BIA, ss. 4, 65.13 **[TAB 1]**

37. During Mr. Smith's Questioning, Ironside's counsel elicited evidence that the identity of the beneficial owners of a large percentage of MTC shares is unknown, thereby casting doubt on whether the various "Seattle Investors" collectively have *de jure* or *de facto* control of MTC.

- Smith Transcript, page 26, line 7 to page 29, line 10

38. While the evidence now on the record does not definitely establish that the individuals with contingent equity interests in EVI do not control MTC, the evidence also does not establish that those individuals do control MTC. In order to control MTC, the EVI investors would need to hold in excess of than 105,000,000 share of MTC. On the face of the shareholder register attached to Mr. Smith's Affidavit sworn December 6, 2016, the individuals who invested in EVI appear to directly and indirectly hold 21,928,499 shares – approximately 10% of the issued shares of MTC.

- Smith Affidavit, Exhibit "3"
- MTC Direct and Indirect Shareholdings Information **[Appendix, TAB B]**

39. To have a controlling interest in MTC, the EVI investors would have to beneficially own 83,401,453 shares through corporations or depository services in addition to the shares they hold as registered holders. In concrete terms, they would have to be the beneficial holders of all of the shares held by CDS & Co., and then some in order to have *de jure* control of MTC. On balance, it is unlikely that the EVI investors have beneficial holdings to significant an extent, in addition to their registered holdings; further, it is unlikely that the EVI investors would hold shares through corporations or trusts established in other states or countries. On a balance of probabilities, the evidence before the Court establishes that the EVI investors do not control MTC.

- Smith Affidavit, Exhibit "3"
- MTC Direct and Indirect Shareholdings Information **[Appendix, TAB B]**

3. The MI Guarantee and MI GSA can be compromised

40. During Mr. Struss' Questioning, Ironside's counsel elicited evidence that the only claims against MI being compromised through the Twice Amended Proposal were the claims of 2009 Noteholders under the MI Guarantee and the MI GSA. The suggestion, presumably, is that the compromise of these liabilities, but not others, is inequitable and should not be allowed.

- Struss Transcript at page 82, lines 4 – 25; page 88, line 1 to page 89, line 25

41. The law governing the compromise of claims against third parties through restructuring proceedings does not require that all claims against the third party be compromised. In fact, at least one experienced insolvency judge has indicated that the overly broad release of claims against third parties is to be avoided.

- ATB Financial v Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp (Ltd), 2008 ONCA 587 [*Metcalfe*], at paras 70 - 71 **[TAB 8]**
- *Kitchener*, at paras 63, 85 **[TAB 4]**

42. As explained in detail in the First MTC Brief, the compromise of claims against MI is limited to the claims under the MI Guarantee and the MI GSA because MI is necessary to the Twice Amended Proposal, and in turn, the compromise of claims against it is also necessary. If the MI Guarantee and GSA were not compromised, it is a virtual certainty that EVI would refuse to sponsor the Twice Amended Proposal. It would be commercially unreasonable to expect EVI to pay the 2009 Noteholders 10% of the principal amount of the claims underlying the MI Guarantee, but agree to face continuing liability to those creditors.

43. As noted, the 2009 Noteholders will receiving consideration for the compromise of their claims through the Twice Amended Proposal. MI's other creditors, whose goodwill is necessary to MI's future, are receiving nothing – there is no justification for the release of their claims against MI. A compromise of the claims of MI's other creditors would not meet the test for the compromise of third party claims under *Metcalfe*.

V. RELIEF SOUGHT

44. The Applicant seeks Orders approving the Twice Amended Proposal, as further amended, approving the sale of the MTC Asset to EVI, and vesting title in and to the MTC Asset in EVI, substantially in the forms attached to the Applicant's Application filed December 6, 2016.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

BENNETT JONES LLP

Per: 

Alexis Teasdale / Michael W. Selnes
Counsel for the Applicant,
Microplanet Technology Corp.

APPENDICES

1. Letter from John Regush to Service List (January 17, 2017)

2. MTC Direct and Indirect Shareholdings Information

AUTHORITIES

Jurisprudence

TAB A

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January 19, 2017

File No.: 557940-6

DELIVERED VIA COURIER OR EMAIL

Service List

To Whom it May Concern:

RE: **In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c. B-3, as amended and in the Matter of MicroPlanet Technology Corp. ("MTC")**
Court File No.: 25-2172984

Further to the option made available in the Order made by the Honourable Justice D.B. Nixon in this matter on January 13, 2017, Mr. Ironside has made efforts to determine the value of the U.S. tax losses (the "**Tax Losses**") associated with MicroPlanet, Inc. ("**MI**"). Notwithstanding these efforts, Mr. Ironside has been unable to ascertain the value of the Tax Losses in the context of the current amended amended proposal put forward by MTC. The Tax Losses may have value in the context of a proposal structured differently from the amended amended proposal currently before the Court, and Mr. Ironside reserves the right to put before the Court alternative proposals that could better preserve the value of the Tax Losses for consideration by the Court.

Yours truly,
Dentons Canada LLP

John Regush
Associate

JAKR/jakr

CC: Brett Ironside
David Mann, Dentons Canada LLP

TAB B

Seattle Group Members	Shares - Direct		Shares - Indirect	
Rob Spitzer		513,850	The Spitzer Foundation c/o Rob Sptizer	508,850
Greg and Karen Kusnick		389,075		
		3,581,027		
		508,600		
Elihu Rubin		1,771,392		
Doug Cerretti		1,675,515		
		3,187,100		
Eric Kreitzer		823,110		
Larry Coplan		2,029,305		
Mike Ballard				
Jerry Jerome		306,000	RIA FBO Jerome T Jerome IRA	411,080
			Real Trust IRA Alternatives LLC FBO	872,925
			Real Trust IRA Alternatives LLC FBO	1,389,550
Joe Campbell		3,381,124		
Herb Pruzan		71,146		
		508,850		
Jerry Rosenburg				
Chris Ciarcia				
Total		21,928,499		
Total MTC		210,660,303		
Percentage		0.104094121		
Total Direct		**18,746,094**		
			Total Indirect	**3,182,405**
Total		**21,928,499**		

Canadian Corporations	
1565661 Alberta Inc.	500,000
6585116 Canada Inc.	1,000,000
1565661 Alberta Inc.	5,000,000
Regulus Investments Inc.	290,000
Total Canadian Corporations	**6,290,000**
USA Corporations	
The Friendship Circle **(WA)**	857,180
City LightCapital **(CT)**	250,000
Conlee LLC **(WA)**	29,246
Koved Eneterprises LLC **(WA)**	1,097,480
Pershing LLC **(NJ)**	34,104
Xeno Lights LLC **(NY)**	32,768
Total USA Corporations	**2,300,778**
US LP's	
Durham Family Limited Partnership **(WA)**	548,740
Howse Family Partership **(WA)**	27,298
Kevin Mead Tr Mead Family **(WA)**	1,103,740
Sutter Investments II 11 LP **(WA)**	6,777
Total US Limited Partnerships	**1,926,555**
Australian Trusts	
Foulgerise TTEE For The Rowson Family TR (AUS)	**240,000.00**
Bahamas Corp Corporations	
Exuma Beach Ltd.	**9,671,138**
Total (Unknown) Indirect Holdings in MTC	**20,188,471**
CDS & Co (NCI)	**79,214,971**

TAB 1

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité

R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3

L.R.C. (1985), ch. B-3

Current to January 17, 2017

Last amended on February 26, 2015

À jour au 17 janvier 2017

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OFFICIAL STATUS OF CONSOLIDATIONS

Subsections 31(1) and (2) of the *Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act*, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as follows:

Published consolidation is evidence
31 (1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regulation and of its contents and every copy purporting to be published by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shown.

Inconsistencies in Acts
(2) In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the original statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the *Publication of Statutes Act*, the original statute or amendment prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.

NOTE

This consolidation is current to January 17, 2017. The last amendments came into force on February 26, 2015. Any amendments that were not in force as of January 17, 2017 are set out at the end of this document under the heading "Amendments Not in Force".

CARACTÈRE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les paragraphes 31(1) et (2) de la *Loi sur la révision et la codification des textes législatifs*, en vigueur le 1er juin 2009, prévoient ce qui suit :

Codifications comme élément de preuve
31 (1) Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiée ou d'un règlement codifié, publié par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi sur support papier ou sur support électronique, fait foi de cette loi ou de ce règlement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire donné comme publié par le ministre est réputé avoir été ainsi publié, sauf preuve contraire.

Incompatibilité — lois
(2) Les dispositions de la loi d'origine avec ses modifications subséquentes par le greffier des Parlements en vertu de la *Loi sur la publication des lois* l'emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la loi codifiée publiée par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi.

NOTE

Cette codification est à jour au 17 janvier 2017. Les dernières modifications sont entrées en vigueur le 26 février 2015. Toutes modifications qui n'étaient pas en vigueur au 17 janvier 2017 sont énoncées à la fin de ce document sous le titre « Modifications non en vigueur ».

R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3

An Act respecting bankruptcy and insolvency

Short Title

Short title

1 This Act may be cited as the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

R.S., 1985, c. B-3, s. 1; 1992, c. 27, s. 2.

Interpretation

Definitions

2 In this Act,

affidavit includes statutory declaration and solemn affirmation; (*affidavit*)

aircraft objects [Repealed, 2012, c. 31, s. 414]

application, with respect to a bankruptcy application filed in a court in the Province of Quebec, means a motion; (*Version anglaise seulement*)

assignment means an assignment filed with the official receiver; (*cession*)

bank means

(a) every bank and every authorized foreign bank within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*,

(b) every other member of the Canadian Payments Association established by the *Canadian Payments Act*, and

(c) every local cooperative credit society, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Act referred to in paragraph (b), that is a member of a central cooperative credit society, as defined in that subsection, that is a member of that Association; (*banque*)

L.R.C., 1985, ch. B-3

Loi concernant la faillite et l'insolvabilité

Titre abrégé

Titre abrégé

1 *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*.

L.R. (1985), ch. B-3, art. 1; 1992, ch. 27, art. 2.

Définitions et interprétation

Définitions

2 Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent à la présente loi.

accord de transfert de titres pour obtention de crédit Accord aux termes duquel une personne insolvable ou un failli transfère la propriété d'un bien en vue de garantir le paiement d'une somme ou l'exécution d'une obligation relativement à un contrat financier admissible. (*title transfer credit support agreement*)

actif à court terme Sommes en espèces, équivalents de trésorerie — notamment les effets négociables et dépôts à vue —, inventaire, comptes à recevoir ou produit de toute opération relative à ces actifs. (*current assets*)

actionnaire S'agissant d'une personne morale ou d'une fiducie de revenu assujetties à la présente loi, est assimilée à l'actionnaire la personne ayant un intérêt dans cette personne morale ou détenant des parts de cette fiducie. (*shareholder*)

administrateur S'agissant d'une personne morale autre qu'une fiducie de revenu, toute personne exerçant les fonctions d'administrateur, indépendamment de son titre, et, s'agissant d'une fiducie de revenu, toute personne exerçant les fonctions de fiduciaire, indépendamment de son titre. (*director*)

current assets means cash, cash equivalents — including negotiable instruments and demand deposits — inventory or accounts receivable, or the proceeds from any dealing with those assets; (*actif à court terme*)

date of the bankruptcy, in respect of a person, means the date of

(a) the granting of a bankruptcy order against the person,

(b) the filing of an assignment in respect of the person, or

(c) the event that causes an assignment by the person to be deemed; (*date de la faillite*)

date of the initial bankruptcy event, in respect of a person, means the earliest of the day on which any one of the following is made, filed or commenced, as the case may be:

(a) an assignment by or in respect of the person,

(b) a proposal by or in respect of the person,

(c) a notice of intention by the person,

(d) the first application for a bankruptcy order against the person, in any case

(i) referred to in paragraph 50.4(8)(a) or 57(a) or subsection 61(2), or

(ii) in which a notice of intention to make a proposal has been filed under section 50.4 or a proposal has been filed under section 62 in respect of the person and the person files an assignment before the court has approved the proposal,

(e) the application in respect of which a bankruptcy order is made, in the case of an application other than one referred to in paragraph (d), or

(f) proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; (*ouverture de la faillite*)

debtor includes an insolvent person and any person who, at the time an act of bankruptcy was committed by him, resided or carried on business in Canada and, where the context requires, includes a bankrupt; (*débiteur*)

director in respect of a corporation other than an income trust, means a person occupying the position of director by whatever name called and, in the case of an income trust, a person occupying the position of trustee by whatever name called; (*administrateur*)

créancier garanti Personne titulaire d'une hypothèque, d'un gage, d'une charge ou d'un privilège sur ou contre les biens du débiteur ou une partie de ses biens, à titre de garantie d'une dette échue ou à échoir, ou personne dont la réclamation est fondée sur un effet de commerce ou garantie par ce dernier, lequel effet de commerce est détenu comme garantie subsidiaire et dont le débiteur n'est responsable qu'indirectement ou secondairement. S'entend en outre :

a) de la personne titulaire, selon le *Code civil du Québec* ou les autres lois de la province de Québec, d'un droit de rétention ou d'une priorité constitutive de droit réel sur ou contre les biens du débiteur ou une partie de ses biens;

b) lorsque l'exercice de ses droits est assujetti aux règles prévues pour l'exercice des droits hypothécaires au livre sixième du *Code civil du Québec* intitulé *Des priorités et des hypothèques* :

(i) de la personne qui vend un bien au débiteur, sous condition ou à tempérament,

(ii) de la personne qui achète un bien du débiteur avec faculté de rachat en faveur de celui-ci,

(iii) du fiduciaire d'une fiducie constituée par le débiteur afin de garantir l'exécution d'une obligation. (*secured creditor*)

date de la faillite S'agissant d'une personne, la date :

a) soit de l'ordonnance de faillite la visant;

b) soit du dépôt d'une cession de biens la visant;

c) soit du fait sur la base duquel elle est réputée avoir fait une cession de biens. (*date of the bankruptcy*)

débiteur Sont assimilées à un débiteur toute personne insolvable et toute personne qui, à l'époque où elle a commis un acte de faillite, résidait au Canada ou y exerçait des activités. S'entend en outre, lorsque le contexte l'exige, d'un failli. (*debtor*)

disposition [Abrogée, 2005, ch. 47, art. 2]

enfant [Abrogée, 2000, ch. 12, art. 8]

entreprise de service public Vise notamment la personne ou l'organisme qui fournit du combustible, de l'eau ou de l'électricité, un service de télécommunications, d'enlèvement des ordures ou de lutte contre la pollution ou encore des services postaux. (*public utility*)

(c) the event that causes an assignment by the person to be deemed; (*moment de la faillite*)

title transfer credit support agreement means an agreement under which an insolvent person or a bankrupt has provided title to property for the purpose of securing the payment or performance of an obligation of the insolvent person or bankrupt in respect of an eligible financial contract; (*accord de transfert de titres pour obtention de crédit*)

transfer at undervalue means a disposition of property or provision of services for which no consideration is received by the debtor or for which the consideration received by the debtor is conspicuously less than the fair market value of the consideration given by the debtor; (*opération sous-évaluée*)

trustee or ***licensed trustee*** means a person who is licensed or appointed under this Act. (*syndic* ou *syndic autorisé*)

R.S., 1985, c. B-3, s. 2; R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 69; 1992, c. 1, s. 145(F), c. 27, s. 3; 1995, c. 1, s. 62; 1997, c. 12, s. 1; 1999, c. 28, s. 146, c. 31, s. 17; 2000, c. 12, s. 8; 2001, c. 4, s. 25, c. 9, s. 572; 2004, c. 25, s. 7; 2005, c. 3, s. 11, c. 47, s. 2; 2007, c. 29, s. 91, c. 36, s. 1; 2012, c. 31, s. 414; 2015, c. 3, s. 6(F).

du paragraphe 5(1) de la *Loi sur le Bureau du surintendant des institutions financières*. (*Superintendent of Financial Institutions*)

syndic ou ***syndic autorisé*** Personne qui détient une licence ou est nommée en vertu de la présente loi. (*trustee* or *licensed trustee*)

tribunal Sauf aux alinéas 178(1)a) et a.1) et aux articles 204.1 à 204.3, tout tribunal mentionné aux paragraphes 183(1) ou (1.1). Y est assimilé tout juge de ce tribunal ainsi que le greffier ou le registraire de celui-ci, lorsqu'il exerce les pouvoirs du tribunal qui lui sont conférés au titre de la présente loi. (*court*)

union de fait Relation qui existe entre deux conjoints de fait. (*common-law partnership*)

valeurs nettes dues à la date de résiliation La somme nette obtenue après compensation des obligations mutuelles des parties à un contrat financier admissible effectuée conformément à ce contrat. (*net termination value*)

L.R. (1985), ch. B-3, art. 2; L.R. (1985), ch. 31 (1er suppl.), art. 69; 1992, ch. 1, art. 145(F), ch. 27, art. 3; 1995, ch. 1, art. 62; 1997, ch. 12, art. 1; 1999, ch. 28, art. 146, ch. 31, art. 17; 2000, ch. 12, art. 8; 2001, ch. 4, art. 25, ch. 9, art. 572; 2004, ch. 25, art. 7; 2005, ch. 3, art. 11, ch. 47, art. 2; 2007, ch. 29, art. 91, ch. 36, art. 1; 2012, ch. 31, art. 414; 2015, ch. 3, art. 6(F).

Designation of beneficiary

2.1 A change in the designation of a beneficiary in an insurance contract is deemed to be a disposition of property for the purpose of this Act.

1997, c. 12, s. 2; 2004, c. 25, s. 8; 2005, c. 47, s. 3.

Désignation de bénéficiaires

2.1 La modification de la désignation du bénéficiaire d'une police d'assurance est réputée être une disposition de biens pour l'application de la présente loi.

1997, ch. 12, art. 2; 2004, ch. 25, art. 8; 2005, ch. 47, art. 3.

Superintendent's division office

2.2 Any notification, document or other information that is required by this Act to be given, forwarded, mailed, sent or otherwise provided to the Superintendent, other than an application for a licence under subsection 13(1), shall be given, forwarded, mailed, sent or otherwise provided to the Superintendent at the Superintendent's division office as specified in directives of the Superintendent.

1997, c. 12, s. 2.

Bureau de division

2.2 Sauf dans le cas de la demande de licence prévue au paragraphe 13(1), les notifications et envois de documents ou renseignements à effectuer au titre de la présente loi auprès du surintendant le sont au bureau de division spécifié par ses instructions.

1997, ch. 12, art. 2.

3 [Repealed, 2005, c. 47, s. 4]

3 [Abrogé, 2005, ch. 47, art. 4]

Definitions

4 (1) In this section,

entity means a person other than an individual; (*entité*)

related group means a group of persons each member of which is related to every other member of the group; (*groupe lié*)

Définitions

4 (1) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent au présent article.

entité Personne autre qu'une personne physique. (*entity*)

unrelated group means a group of persons that is not a related group. (*groupe non lié*)

groupe lié Groupe de personnes dont chaque membre est lié à chaque autre membre du groupe. (*related group*)

groupe non lié Groupe de personnes qui n'est pas un groupe lié. (*unrelated group*)

Definition of *related persons*

(2) For the purposes of this Act, persons are related to each other and are ***related persons*** if they are

(a) individuals connected by blood relationship, marriage, common-law partnership or adoption;

(b) an entity and

(i) a person who controls the entity, if it is controlled by one person,

(ii) a person who is a member of a related group that controls the entity, or

(iii) any person connected in the manner set out in paragraph (a) to a person described in subparagraph (i) or (ii); or

(c) two entities

(i) both controlled by the same person or group of persons,

(ii) each of which is controlled by one person and the person who controls one of the entities is related to the person who controls the other entity,

(iii) one of which is controlled by one person and that person is related to any member of a related group that controls the other entity,

(iv) one of which is controlled by one person and that person is related to each member of an unrelated group that controls the other entity,

(v) one of which is controlled by a related group a member of which is related to each member of an unrelated group that controls the other entity, or

(vi) one of which is controlled by an unrelated group each member of which is related to at least one member of an unrelated group that controls the other entity.

Définition de *personnes liées*

(2) Pour l'application de la présente loi, des personnes sont liées entre elles et constituent des ***personnes liées*** si elles sont :

a) soit des particuliers unis par les liens du sang, du mariage, d'une union de fait ou de l'adoption;

b) soit une entité et, selon le cas :

(i) la personne qui la contrôle, si elle est contrôlée par une seule personne,

(ii) toute personne qui est membre du groupe lié qui la contrôle,

(iii) toute personne unie de la manière indiquée à l'alinéa a) à une personne visée aux sous-alinéas (i) ou (ii);

c) soit, selon le cas, deux entités :

(i) contrôlées par la même personne ou le même groupe de personnes,

(ii) dont chacune est contrôlée par une seule personne et si la personne qui contrôle l'une d'elles est liée à celle qui contrôle l'autre,

(iii) dont l'une est contrôlée par une seule personne qui est liée à un membre du groupe lié qui contrôle l'autre,

(iv) dont l'une est contrôlée par une seule personne qui est liée à chacun des membres du groupe non lié qui contrôle l'autre,

(v) dont l'une est contrôlée par un groupe lié dont l'un des membres est lié à chacun des membres du groupe non lié qui contrôle l'autre,

(vi) dont l'une est contrôlée par un groupe non lié dont chaque membre est lié à au moins un membre du groupe non lié qui contrôle l'autre.

Relationships

(3) For the purposes of this section,

Liens

(3) Pour l'application du présent article :

(a) if two entities are related to the same entity within the meaning of subsection (2), they are deemed to be related to each other;

(b) if a related group is in a position to control an entity, it is deemed to be a related group that controls the entity whether or not it is part of a larger group by whom the entity is in fact controlled;

(c) a person who has a right under a contract, in equity or otherwise, either immediately or in the future and either absolutely or contingently, to, or to acquire, ownership interests, however designated, in an entity, or to control the voting rights in an entity, is, except when the contract provides that the right is not exercisable until the death of an individual designated in the contract, deemed to have the same position in relation to the control of the entity as if the person owned the ownership interests;

(d) if a person has ownership interests in two or more entities, the person is, as holder of any ownership interest in one of the entities, deemed to be related to himself or herself as holder of any ownership interest in each of the other entities;

(e) persons are connected by blood relationship if one is the child or other descendant of the other or one is the brother or sister of the other;

(f) persons are connected by marriage if one is married to the other or to a person who is connected by blood relationship or adoption to the other;

(f.1) persons are connected by common-law partnership if one is in a common-law partnership with the other or with a person who is connected by blood relationship or adoption to the other; and

(g) persons are connected by adoption if one has been adopted, either legally or in fact, as the child of the other or as the child of a person who is connected by blood relationship, otherwise than as a brother or sister, to the other.

a) lorsque deux entités sont liées à la même entité au sens où l'entend le paragraphe (2), elles sont réputées liées entre elles;

b) lorsqu'un groupe lié est en mesure de contrôler une entité, il est réputé être un groupe lié qui contrôle l'entité, qu'il fasse ou non partie d'un groupe plus considérable par lequel l'entité est en fait contrôlée;

c) la personne qui a, en vertu d'un contrat, en equity ou autrement, un droit de participation aux capitaux propres d'une entité, soit immédiatement, soit à l'avenir, et de façon absolue ou conditionnelle, ou le droit d'acquérir un tel droit, ou de contrôler ainsi les droits de vote de l'entité, est réputée, sauf si le contrat stipule que le droit ne peut être exercé qu'au décès d'une personne qui y est désignée, occuper la même position à l'égard du contrôle de l'entité que si elle était titulaire de ce droit;

d) la personne qui détient un droit de participation aux capitaux propres de deux ou plusieurs entités est réputée être liée à elle-même à titre de titulaire du droit de participation dans chacune de ces entités;

e) des personnes sont unies par les liens du sang si l'une est l'enfant ou autre descendant de l'autre ou si l'une est le frère ou la sœur de l'autre;

f) des personnes sont unies par les liens du mariage si l'une est mariée à l'autre ou à une personne qui est unie à l'autre par les liens du sang ou de l'adoption;

f.1) des personnes sont unies par les liens d'une union de fait si l'une vit en union de fait avec l'autre ou avec une personne qui est unie à l'autre par les liens du sang ou de l'adoption;

g) des personnes sont unies par les liens de l'adoption si l'une a été adoptée, en droit ou de fait, comme enfant de l'autre ou comme enfant d'une personne unie à l'autre par les liens du sang, autrement qu'à titre de frère ou de sœur.

Question of fact

(4) It is a question of fact whether persons not related to one another were at a particular time dealing with each other at arm's length.

Question de fait

(4) La question de savoir si des personnes non liées entre elles n'avaient pas de lien de dépendance, à tel ou tel moment, est une question de fait.

Presumptions

(5) Persons who are related to each other are deemed not to deal with each other at arm's length while so related. For the purpose of paragraph 95(1)(b) or 96(1)(b), the

Présomption

(5) Les personnes liées entre elles sont réputées avoir un lien de dépendance tant qu'elles sont ainsi liées et il en va

Report to creditors

(11) An interim receiver who has been directed under subsection 47.1(2) to carry out the duties set out in subsection (10) in substitution for the trustee shall deliver a report on the state of the insolvent person's business and financial affairs, containing any prescribed information, to the trustee at least fifteen days before the meeting of creditors referred to in subsection 51(1), and the trustee shall send the report to the creditors and the official receiver, in the prescribed manner, at least ten days before the meeting of creditors referred to in that subsection.

Court may declare proposal as deemed refused by creditors

(12) The court may, on application by the trustee, the interim receiver, if any, appointed under section 47.1 or a creditor, at any time before the meeting of creditors, declare that the proposal is deemed to have been refused by the creditors if the court is satisfied that

(a) the debtor has not acted, or is not acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the proposal will not likely be accepted by the creditors; or

(c) the creditors as a whole would be materially prejudiced if the application under this subsection is rejected.

Effect of declaration

(12.1) If the court declares that the proposal is deemed to have been refused by the creditors, paragraphs 57(a) to (c) apply.

Claims against directors — compromise

(13) A proposal made in respect of a corporation may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the corporation that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the corporation where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(14) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors arising from contracts with one or more directors; or

Rapport à l'intention des créanciers

(11) Le séquestre intérimaire qui, aux termes du paragraphe 47.1(2), s'est vu confier l'exercice, en remplacement du syndic, des fonctions visées au paragraphe (10) est tenu de remettre à celui-ci, au moins quinze jours avant la tenue de l'assemblée des créanciers prévue au paragraphe 51(1), un rapport portant sur les affaires et les finances de la personne insolvable et contenant les renseignements prescrits; le syndic expédie, de la manière prescrite, ce rapport aux créanciers et au séquestre officiel au moins dix jours avant la tenue de l'assemblée des créanciers prévue à ce paragraphe.

Présomption de refus de la proposition

(12) À la demande du syndic, d'un créancier ou, le cas échéant, du séquestre intérimaire nommé aux termes de l'article 47.1, le tribunal peut, avant l'assemblée des créanciers, déclarer que la proposition est réputée refusée par les créanciers, s'il est convaincu que, selon le cas :

a) le débiteur n'agit pas — ou n'a pas agi — de bonne foi et avec toute la diligence voulue;

b) la proposition ne sera vraisemblablement pas acceptée par les créanciers;

c) le rejet de la demande causerait un préjudice sérieux à l'ensemble des créanciers.

Effet de la déclaration

(12.1) Si le tribunal déclare que la proposition est réputée avoir été refusée par les créanciers, les alinéas 57a) à c) s'appliquent.

Transaction — réclamations contre les administrateurs

(13) La proposition visant une personne morale peut comporter, au profit de ses créanciers, des dispositions relatives à une transaction sur les réclamations contre ses administrateurs qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de celle-ci dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit.

Restriction

(14) La transaction ne peut toutefois viser des réclamations portant sur des droits contractuels d'un ou plusieurs créanciers à l'égard de contrats conclus avec un ou plusieurs administrateurs, ou fondées sur la fausse représentation ou la conduite injustifiée ou abusive des administrateurs.

(c) the failure to issue the order is likely to result in irreparable damage to the insolvent person.

c) elle subirait vraisemblablement des dommages irréparables s'il ne la rendait pas.

No delay on vote on proposal

(3) The vote of the creditors in respect of a proposal may not be delayed solely because the period provided in the laws of the jurisdiction governing collective bargaining between the insolvent person and the bargaining agent has not expired.

Vote sur la proposition

(3) Le vote des créanciers sur la proposition ne peut être retardé pour la seule raison que le délai imparti par les règles de droit applicables aux négociations collectives entre les parties à la convention collective n'a pas expiré.

Claims arising from revision of collective agreement

(4) If the parties to the collective agreement agree to revise the collective agreement after proceedings have been commenced under this Act in respect of the insolvent person, the bargaining agent that is a party to the agreement has a claim, as an unsecured creditor, for an amount equal to the value of concessions granted by the bargaining agent with respect to the remaining term of the collective agreement.

Réclamation consécutive à la révision

(4) Si les parties acceptent de réviser la convention collective après que des procédures ont été intentées sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une personne insolvable, l'agent négociateur en cause est réputé avoir une réclamation à titre de créancier non garanti pour une somme équivalant à la valeur des concessions accordées pour la période non écoulée de la convention.

Order to disclose information

(5) On the application of the bargaining agent and on notice to the person to whom the application relates, the court may, subject to any terms and conditions it specifies, make an order requiring the person to make available to the bargaining agent any information specified by the court in the person's possession or control that relates to the insolvent person's business or financial affairs and that is relevant to the collective bargaining between the insolvent person and the bargaining agent. The court may make the order only after the insolvent person has been authorized to serve a notice to bargain under subsection (1).

Ordonnance visant la communication de renseignements

(5) Sur demande de l'agent négociateur partie à la convention collective et sur avis aux personnes intéressées, le tribunal peut ordonner à celles-ci de communiquer au demandeur, aux conditions qu'il précise, tous renseignements qu'elles ont en leur possession ou à leur disposition — sur les affaires et la situation financière de la personne insolvable — qui ont un intérêt pour les négociations collectives. Le tribunal ne peut rendre l'ordonnance qu'après l'envoi à l'agent négociateur de l'avis de négociations collectives visé au paragraphe (1).

Unrevised collective agreements remain in force

(6) For greater certainty, any collective agreement that the insolvent person and the bargaining agent have not agreed to revise remains in force.

Maintien en vigueur des conventions collectives

(6) Il est entendu que toute convention collective que la personne insolvable et l'agent négociateur n'ont pas convenu de réviser demeure en vigueur.

Parties

(7) For the purpose of this section, the parties to a collective agreement are the insolvent person and the bargaining agent who are bound by the collective agreement.

2005, c. 47, s. 44.

Parties

(7) Pour l'application du présent article, les parties à la convention collective sont la personne insolvable et l'agent négociateur liés par elle.

2005, ch. 47, art. 44.

Restriction on disposition of assets

65.13 (1) An insolvent person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale

Restriction à la disposition d'actifs

65.13 (1) Il est interdit à la personne insolvable à l'égard de laquelle a été déposé un avis d'intention aux termes de l'article 50.4 ou une proposition aux termes du paragraphe 62(1) de disposer, notamment par vente, d'actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires sans l'autorisation du tribunal. Le tribunal peut accorder l'autorisation sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'obtenir l'acquiescement

or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

Individuals

(2) In the case of an individual who is carrying on a business, the court may authorize the sale or disposition only if the assets were acquired for or used in relation to the business.

Notice to secured creditors

(3) An insolvent person who applies to the court for an authorization shall give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

Factors to be considered

(4) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the trustee approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the trustee filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

Additional factors — related persons

(5) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the insolvent person, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (4), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the insolvent person; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other

des actionnaires, et ce malgré toute exigence à cet effet, notamment en vertu d'une règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale.

Personne physique

(2) Toutefois, lorsque l'autorisation est demandée par une personne physique qui exploite une entreprise, elle ne peut viser que les actifs acquis ou utilisés dans le cadre de l'exploitation de celle-ci.

Avis aux créanciers

(3) La personne insolvable qui demande l'autorisation au tribunal en avise les créanciers garantis qui peuvent vraisemblablement être touchés par le projet de disposition.

Facteurs à prendre en considération

(4) Pour décider s'il accorde l'autorisation, le tribunal prend en considération, entre autres, les facteurs suivants :

a) la justification des circonstances ayant mené au projet de disposition;

b) l'acquiescement du syndic au processus ayant mené au projet de disposition, le cas échéant;

c) le dépôt par celui-ci d'un rapport précisant que, à son avis, la disposition sera plus avantageuse pour les créanciers que si elle était faite dans le cadre de la faillite;

d) la suffisance des consultations menées auprès des créanciers;

e) les effets du projet de disposition sur les droits de tout intéressé, notamment les créanciers;

f) le caractère juste et raisonnable de la contrepartie reçue pour les actifs compte tenu de leur valeur marchande.

Autres facteurs

(5) Si la personne insolvable projette de disposer d'actifs en faveur d'une personne à laquelle elle est liée, le tribunal, après avoir pris ces facteurs en considération, ne peut accorder l'autorisation que s'il est convaincu :

a) d'une part, que les efforts voulus ont été faits pour disposer des actifs en faveur d'une personne qui n'est pas liée à la personne insolvable;

b) d'autre part, que la contrepartie offerte pour les actifs est plus avantageuse que celle qui découlerait de

offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

Related persons

(6) For the purpose of subsection (5), a person who is related to the insolvent person includes

(a) a director or officer of the insolvent person;

(b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the insolvent person; and

(c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

Assets may be disposed of free and clear

(7) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the insolvent person or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

Restriction — employers

(8) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the insolvent person can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 60(1.3)(a) and (1.5)(a) if the court had approved the proposal.

2005, c. 47, s. 44; 2007, c. 36, s. 27.

Insolvent person may disclaim or resiliate commercial lease

65.2 (1) At any time between the filing of a notice of intention and the filing of a proposal, or on the filing of a proposal, in respect of an insolvent person who is a commercial lessee under a lease of real property or an immovable, the insolvent person may disclaim or resiliate the lease on giving thirty days notice to the lessor in the prescribed manner, subject to subsection (2).

Lessor may challenge

(2) Within fifteen days after being given notice of the disclaimer or resiliation of a lease under subsection (1), the lessor may apply to the court for a declaration that subsection (1) does not apply in respect of that lease, and the court, on notice to any parties that it may direct, shall, subject to subsection (3), make that declaration.

toute autre offre reçue dans le cadre du projet de disposition.

Personnes liées

(6) Pour l'application du paragraphe (5), les personnes ci-après sont considérées comme liées à la personne insolvable :

a) le dirigeant ou l'administrateur de celle-ci;

b) la personne qui, directement ou indirectement, en a ou en a eu le contrôle de fait;

c) la personne liée à toute personne visée aux alinéas a) ou b).

Autorisation de disposer des actifs en les libérant de restrictions

(7) Le tribunal peut autoriser la disposition d'actifs de la personne insolvable, purgés de toute charge, sûreté ou autre restriction, et, le cas échéant, est tenu d'assujettir le produit de la disposition ou d'autres de ses actifs à une charge, sûreté ou autre restriction en faveur des créanciers touchés par la purge.

Restriction à l'égard des employeurs

(8) Il ne peut autoriser la disposition que s'il est convaincu que la personne insolvable est en mesure d'effectuer et effectuera les paiements qui auraient été exigés en vertu des alinéas 60(1.3)a) et (1.5)a) s'il avait approuvé la proposition.

2005, ch. 47, art. 44; 2007, ch. 36, art. 27.

Résiliation d'un bail commercial

65.2 (1) Entre le dépôt d'un avis d'intention et celui d'une proposition relative à une personne insolvable qui est un locataire commercial en vertu d'un bail sur un immeuble ou un bien réel, ou lors du dépôt d'une telle proposition, cette personne peut, sous réserve du paragraphe (2), résilier son bail sur préavis de trente jours donné de la manière prescrite.

Contestation

(2) Sur demande du locateur, faite dans les quinze jours suivant le préavis, et sur préavis aux parties qu'il estime indiquées, le tribunal déclare le paragraphe (1) inapplicable au bail en question.

TAB 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: ***In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Port Chevrolet,*** 2003 BCSC 1460

Date: 20030916
Docket: 228939VA02
Registry: Vancouver

In Bankruptcy And Insolvency

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of Port Chevrolet Oldsmobile Ltd.

Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Loo

Oral Reasons for Judgment

September 16, 2003

Counsel for A.G. CCRA	D. Jacyk J. Gibb-Carsley
Counsel for Trustee	B. Ingram
Counsel for Company & Wolfes	J. Grieve
Place of Hearing:	Vancouver

[1] **THE COURT:** The Queen in Right of Canada seeks an order lifting the stay of proceedings in effect to allow Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada to file a renouncement of Certificate number 3253-02 in the Federal Court trial division, file a new Certificate in the Federal Court of Canada and to obtain and arrange for service of a Writ of Seizure and Sale on Port Chevrolet Oldsmobile Ltd.

[2] Briefly, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, ("CCRA") on this application wishes to pursue against two former directors of Port Chevrolet Oldsmobile Ltd. ("Port") an assessment against Port in excess of $16 million. The assessment is made under the provisions of the ***Excise Tax Act,*** R.S. 1985, c. E-15.

[3] Evan Wolf and Frank Wolf, who are the former directors, resigned as directors of Port on October 30, 2001. CCRA seeks a lift of the stay in effect, so that it can serve Port and comply with s. 323(5) of the ***Excise Tax Act***, which provides that an assessment under s-s. (4) of any amount payable by a director of a corporation shall not be made more than two years after the person last ceased to be a director of the corporation. The "drop dead" date, as counsel for the applicant describes it, is October 30, 2003.

[4] By way of background, Port was a General Motors dealer in Port Coquitlam, British Columbia. In or around 1996, it entered into an arrangement to sell used cars, and claims that it was fraudulently induced to participate in the sale of cars it turned out did not exist.

[5] On April 9, 2002, after a lengthy investigation, CCRA issued an assessment to Port pursuant to the ***Excise Tax Act*** for approximately $16,400,000 made up of adjustments to input

tax credits of approximately $8,600,000 plus penalties and interest.

[6] Immediately upon filing the assessment, notwithstanding that it was fully aware during the investigation that Port objected to the assessment, without warning, CCRA commenced realization proceedings and attempted to seize various assets of Port's which I understand was made up of primarily cars.

[7] On July 10, 2002, Port filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act***, R.S. 1985, c. B-3.

[8] On September 12, 2002, Port filed a Notice of Objection to the assessment. It says that Port did not participate fraudulently with respect to its obligations to remit GST, and in addition, claimed entitlement to refunds amounting to some $600,000.

[9] On October 4, 2002, Port filed a Proposal that included a term staying all actions against directors where those actions relate to liability incurred in their capacity as directors.

[10] On October 24, 2002, CCRA filed with a trustee a Proof of Claim for approximately $16 million. The Trustee treated the claim as a contingent claim and assigned it a value of zero.

[11] On October 25, 2002, at the first meeting of creditors, the Proposal was approved by the majority of creditors eligible to vote. CCRA was allowed to vote against the Proposal, but its vote was valued as nil.

[12] On October 28, 2002, the Trustee issued to CCRA a Notice of a Disallowance. CCRA appealed, and on November 13, 2002, Madam Justice Neilson dismissed its appeal. She concludes at ¶45:

> In the circumstances I have described, I am satisfied that the trustee had the power to classify CCRA's claim as contingent. As Port's counsel points out, to hold otherwise could permit CCRA to issue a substantial but erroneous assessment against an innocent and profitable debtor and put it into bankruptcy and out of business before the validity of the assessment can be determined under the appropriate process provided by the ***Excise Tax Act***. That cannot be the intent of either the ***Excise Tax Act*** or the ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.***

[13] On November 18, 2002, Mr. Justice Groberman approved the Proposal, but postponed the effective date of the order until noon on Thursday, November 21, 2002, to allow CCRA, which he described as the "purported creditor," to seek leave to appeal the rejection of their claim and the order, and to seek a further stay. CCRA did not seek a further stay from the Court of Appeal.

[14] CCRA's appeal from the order approving the Proposal and disallowing its Proof of Claim is set to be heard by the Court of Appeal on November 24, 2003. However, as counsel for CCRA says, by then it is too late because the "drop dead" date will have passed.

[15] As a result of General Motors not extending its franchise to a company operating on a Proposal, Port tabled an Amended Proposal by which the unsecured creditors would be paid a dividend based in part on the GST refund recoverable by Port against CCRA. The only remaining asset of Port at this time is its GST refund claim of approximately $600,000.

[16] The Amended Proposal, like the initial Proposal, includes a compromise of claims against directors of Port for directors' liability for any debts of the company for which a director is liable in their capacity as directors, which therefore includes a claim against a director for unpaid statutory remittances, that is, the $16 million claim at issue here.

[17] Paragraph 11(d) of the Proposal and Amended Proposal reads:

> Any claims against directors of the Company that arose before the Filing Date regardless of the date of crystallization of such claim, and that relate to the obligations of the Company which relate to the

> time period before that date where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for payment of such obligations shall be deemed to be fully satisfied by the terms of this Proposal and shall not be enforceable against those directors in law or in equity.

[18] Paragraph 11(d) of the Proposal and Amended Proposal, in my view, reflect s. 50(13) of the ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act***, which reads:

> s. 50(13) A proposal made in respect of a corporation may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the corporation that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the corporation where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

[19] As I indicated earlier, the sole purpose for which this application is brought is so that CCRA can overcome s. 323 of the ***Excise Tax Act*** and can, in the words of its counsel, "explore" or "raise" an assessment against its former directors and overcome the "drop dead" date.

[20] An order lifting a stay of proceedings is a discretionary order. It is argued on behalf of CCRA that the reasons for allowing the stay are:

1. that the action sought to be taken is in furtherance of a statutory collection avenue not generally available to other creditors; and

2. there is no risk of prejudice to the other creditors.

[21] CCRA has not satisfied me that there is no risk of prejudice to other creditors. Moreover, I decline to order a stay on the basis of paragraph 11(d) of the Amended Proposal.

[22] The claims against the directors of Port that are compromised by the operation of the Amended Proposal include the contingent claims of CCRA against directors for GST arrears. Those claims are clearly the claims contemplated to be caught by the provision of s. 50(13) of the ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act***. By statute, directors are liable for GST arrears only by virtue of being directors of a company that has failed to remit amounts collected in respect of GST.

[23] I do not accept the contention of CCRA that paragraph 11(d) applies to only present directors, and not former directors. To read the paragraph in that manner would defeat the intent of s. 50(13) of the ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*** and, moreover, makes no sense because in this case, since on

or about October 30, 2001, Port has had only one director, whereas paragraph 11(d) refers to directors.

[24] To allow the order sought and lift the stay would enable CCRA to file a Certificate in the Federal Court of Canada and serve a Writ of Seizure and Sale against Port, so that it could levy an assessment against the former directors personally. I accept the contention of Port and its former directors, that CCRA is attempting to get through the back door what it could not get through the front door. If the stay were lifted, CCRA could issue a Writ of Seizure and Sale directing the sheriff to seize any assets of Port. Its only remaining asset is its GST refund or return. That, however, is the basis of the Amended Proposal. Without this one remaining asset, the Amended Proposal will fail.

[25] The facts in this case are similar to ***Hodgin's Steel and Iron Works Ltd. (Re)*** (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 39 (Ont. S.C.) and ***BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp. (Re)*** (2000), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 216. To lift the stay would interfere with the orderly administration of the Proposal.

[26] In the ***BlueStar*** case, CCRA had not perfected its claim and, likewise, CCRA has in this case only a contingent claim.

[27] In summary, the Proposal and Amended Proposal have compromised CCRA's claim against former and present directors and, accordingly, the application is dismissed.

(SUBMISSIONS)

[28] THE COURT: Costs will go in the manner directed by Madam Justice Neilson, and they would be costs with respect to both respondents.

“L.A. Loo, J.”
The Honourable Madam Justice L.A. Loo

TAB 3

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to January 17, 2017

Last amended on February 26, 2015

À jour au 17 janvier 2017

Dernière modification le 26 février 2015

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OFFICIAL STATUS OF CONSOLIDATIONS

Subsections 31(1) and (2) of the *Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act*, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as follows:

Published consolidation is evidence
31 (1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regulation and of its contents and every copy purporting to be published by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shown.

Inconsistencies in Acts
(2) In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the original statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the *Publication of Statutes Act*, the original statute or amendment prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.

NOTE

This consolidation is current to January 17, 2017. The last amendments came into force on February 26, 2015. Any amendments that were not in force as of January 17, 2017 are set out at the end of this document under the heading "Amendments Not in Force".

CARACTÈRE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les paragraphes 31(1) et (2) de la *Loi sur la révision et la codification des textes législatifs*, en vigueur le 1er juin 2009, prévoient ce qui suit :

Codifications comme élément de preuve
31 (1) Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiée ou d'un règlement codifié, publié par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi sur support papier ou sur support électronique, fait foi de cette loi ou de ce règlement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire donné comme publié par le ministre est réputé avoir été ainsi publié, sauf preuve contraire.

Incompatibilité — lois
(2) Les dispositions de la loi d'origine avec ses modifications subséquentes par le greffier des Parlements en vertu de la *Loi sur la publication des lois* l'emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la loi codifiée publiée par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi.

NOTE

Cette codification est à jour au 17 janvier 2017. Les dernières modifications sont entrées en vigueur le 26 février 2015. Toutes modifications qui n'étaient pas en vigueur au 17 janvier 2017 sont énoncées à la fin de ce document sous le titre « Modifications non en vigueur ».

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors

Short Title

Short title

1 This Act may be cited as the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 1.

Interpretation

Definitions

2 (1) In this Act,

aircraft objects [Repealed, 2012, c. 31, s. 419]

bargaining agent means any trade union that has entered into a collective agreement on behalf of the employees of a company; (*agent négociateur*)

bond includes a debenture, debenture stock or other evidences of indebtedness; (*obligation*)

cash-flow statement, in respect of a company, means the statement referred to in paragraph 10(2)(a) indicating the company's projected cash flow; (*état de l'évolution de l'encaisse*)

claim means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim provable within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; (*réclamation*)

collective agreement, in relation to a debtor company, means a collective agreement within the meaning of the jurisdiction governing collective bargaining between the debtor company and a bargaining agent; (*convention collective*)

L.R.C., 1985, ch. C-36

Loi facilitant les transactions et arrangements entre les compagnies et leurs créanciers

Titre abrégé

Titre abrégé

1 *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies*.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 1.

Définitions et application

Définitions

2 (1) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent à la présente loi.

accord de transfert de titres pour obtention de crédit Accord aux termes duquel une compagnie débitrice transfère la propriété d'un bien en vue de garantir le paiement d'une somme ou l'exécution d'une obligation relativement à un contrat financier admissible. (*title transfer credit support agreement*)

actionnaire S'agissant d'une compagnie ou d'une fiducie de revenu assujetties à la présente loi, est assimilée à l'actionnaire la personne ayant un intérêt dans cette compagnie ou détenant des parts de cette fiducie. (*shareholder*)

administrateur S'agissant d'une compagnie autre qu'une fiducie de revenu, toute personne exerçant les fonctions d'administrateur, indépendamment de son titre, et, s'agissant d'une fiducie de revenu, toute personne exerçant les fonctions de fiduciaire, indépendamment de son titre. (*director*)

agent négociateur Syndicat ayant conclu une convention collective pour le compte des employés d'une compagnie. (*bargaining agent*)

biens aéronautiques [Abrogée, 2012, ch. 31, art. 419]

company means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies; (*compagnie*)

court means

(a) in Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court,

(a.1) in Ontario, the Superior Court of Justice,

(b) in Quebec, the Superior Court,

(c) in New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Queen's Bench,

(c.1) in Newfoundland and Labrador, the Trial Division of the Supreme Court, and

(d) in Yukon and the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and in Nunavut, the Nunavut Court of Justice; (*tribunal*)

debtor company means any company that

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent,

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts,

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent; (*compagnie débitrice*)

director means, in the case of a company other than an income trust, a person occupying the position of director by whatever name called and, in the case of an income trust, a person occupying the position of trustee by whatever named called; (*administrateur*)

eligible financial contract means an agreement of a prescribed kind; (*contrat financier admissible*)

compagnie Toute personne morale constituée par une loi fédérale ou provinciale ou sous son régime et toute personne morale qui possède un actif ou exerce des activités au Canada, quel que soit l'endroit où elle a été constituée, ainsi que toute fiducie de revenu. La présente définition exclut les banques, les banques étrangères autorisées, au sens de l'article 2 de la *Loi sur les banques*, les compagnies de chemin de fer ou de télégraphe, les compagnies d'assurances et les sociétés auxquelles s'applique la *Loi sur les sociétés de fiducie et de prêt*. (*company*)

compagnie débitrice Toute compagnie qui, selon le cas :

a) est en faillite ou est insolvable;

b) a commis un acte de faillite au sens de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou est réputée insolvable au sens de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, que des procédures relatives à cette compagnie aient été intentées ou non sous le régime de l'une ou l'autre de ces lois;

c) a fait une cession autorisée ou à l'encontre de laquelle une ordonnance de faillite a été rendue en vertu de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*;

d) est en voie de liquidation aux termes de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations* parce que la compagnie est insolvable. (*debtor company*)

contrat financier admissible Contrat d'une catégorie réglementaire. (*eligible financial contract*)

contrôleur S'agissant d'une compagnie, la personne nommée en application de l'article 11.7 pour agir à titre de contrôleur des affaires financières et autres de celle-ci. (*monitor*)

convention collective S'entend au sens donné à ce terme par les règles de droit applicables aux négociations collectives entre la compagnie débitrice et l'agent négociateur. (*collective agreement*)

créancier chirographaire Tout créancier d'une compagnie qui n'est pas un créancier garanti, qu'il réside ou soit domicilié au Canada ou à l'étranger. Un fiduciaire pour les détenteurs d'obligations non garanties, lesquelles sont émises en vertu d'un acte de fiducie ou autre acte fonctionnant en faveur du fiduciaire, est réputé un créancier chirographaire pour toutes les fins de la présente loi sauf la votation à une assemblée des créanciers relativement à ces obligations. (*unsecured creditor*)

if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 5.

manière qu'il prescrit, une assemblée de ces créanciers ou catégorie de créanciers, et, si le tribunal en décide ainsi, des actionnaires de la compagnie.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 5.

Claims against directors — compromise

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

1997, c. 12, s. 122.

Transaction — réclamations contre les administrateurs

5.1 (1) La transaction ou l'arrangement visant une compagnie débitrice peut comporter, au profit de ses créanciers, des dispositions relativement à une transaction sur les réclamations contre ses administrateurs qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de celle-ci dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit.

Restriction

(2) La transaction ne peut toutefois viser des réclamations portant sur des droits contractuels d'un ou de plusieurs créanciers ou fondées sur la fausse représentation ou la conduite injustifiée ou abusive des administrateurs.

Pouvoir du tribunal

(3) Le tribunal peut déclarer qu'une réclamation contre les administrateurs ne peut faire l'objet d'une transaction s'il est convaincu qu'elle ne serait ni juste ni équitable dans les circonstances.

Démission ou destitution des administrateurs

(4) Si tous les administrateurs démissionnent ou sont destitués par les actionnaires sans être remplacés, quiconque dirige ou supervise les activités commerciales et les affaires internes de la compagnie débitrice est réputé un administrateur pour l'application du présent article.

1997, ch. 12, art. 122.

Compromises to be sanctioned by court

6 (1) If a majority in number representing two thirds in value of the creditors, or the class of creditors, as the case may be — other than, unless the court orders otherwise, a class of creditors having equity claims, — present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings of creditors respectively held under sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court and, if so sanctioned, is binding

Homologation par le tribunal

6 (1) Si une majorité en nombre représentant les deux tiers en valeur des créanciers ou d'une catégorie de créanciers, selon le cas, — mise à part, sauf ordonnance contraire du tribunal, toute catégorie de créanciers ayant des réclamations relatives à des capitaux propres — présents et votant soit en personne, soit par fondé de pouvoir à l'assemblée ou aux assemblées de créanciers respectivement tenues au titre des articles 4 et 5, acceptent une transaction ou un arrangement, proposé ou modifié à cette ou ces assemblées, la transaction ou l'arrangement peut être homologué par le tribunal et, le cas échéant, lie :

TAB 4

2012 ONSC 234
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 2012 ONSC 234, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 631, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274

In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as Amended

In the Matter of the Consolidated Proposal of Kitchener Frame Limited and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada, Inc. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Judgment: February 3, 2012
Docket: CV-11-9298-00CL

Counsel: Edward A. Sellers, Jeremy E. Dacks for Applicants
Hugh O'Reilly — Non-Union Representative Counsel
L.N. Gottheil — Union Representative Counsel
John Porter for Proposal Trustee, Ernst & Young Inc.
Michael McGraw for CIBC Mellon Trust Company
Deborah McPhail for Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.
Bankruptcy and insolvency

VI Proposal
VI.4 Approval by court
VI.4.b Conditions
VI.4.b.i General principles

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Approval by court — Conditions — General principles

Applicants KFL and BC were inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets — Applicants had significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-employment benefit (OPEB) obligations to their former employees and surviving spouses of such former employees or others entitled to claim through such persons — Affiliates of BC provided up to date funding for pension and OPEB obligations, however, given that KFL and BC had no active operations status quo was unsustainable — KFL and BC brought motion to sanction amended consolidated proposal — Motion was granted — Proposal was reasonable — Proposal was calculated to benefit general body of creditors — Proposal was made in good faith — Proposal contained broad release in favour of applicants and certain third parties — Release of third-parties was permitted — Release covered all affected claims, pension claims, and existing escrow fund claims — Release did not cover criminal or wilful misconduct with respect to any matters set out in s. 50(14) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Unaffected claims were specifically carved out of release — No creditors or stakeholders objected to scope of release which was fully disclosed in negotiations — There was no express prohibition in BIA against including third-party releases

in proposal — Any provision of BIA which purported to limit ability of debtor to contract with its creditors had to be clear and explicit — Third-party releases were permissible under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and court should strive, where language of both statutes supported it, to give both statutes harmonious interpretation — There was no principled basis on which analysis and treatment of third-party release in BIA proposal proceeding should differ from CCAA proceeding — Released parties contributed in tangle and realistic way to proposal — Without inclusion of releases it was unlikely that certain parties would have supported proposal — Releases benefited applicants and creditors generally — Applicants provided full and adequate disclosure of releases and their effect.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

A. & F. Baillargeon Express Inc., Re (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36, 1993 CarswellQue 49 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1842, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 1279, 2011 ONSC 733 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 450, 2011 CarswellBC 841, 76 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3449, 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 744 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

C.F.G. Construction inc., Re (2010), [2010] R.J.Q. 2360, 2010 CarswellQue 10226, 2010 QCCS 4643 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2010 ONSC 4209, 2010 CarswellOnt 5510 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cosmic Adventures Halifax Inc., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 22, 1999 CarswellNS 320 (N.S. S.C.) — considered

Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd. (1976), 1976 CarswellQue 32, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 84, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 63, (sub nom. *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1969) Ltd.*) 14 N.R. 503, 1976 CarswellQue 25 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Farrell, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1015, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re (1931), 1931 CarswellSask 3, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 633, 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Lofchik, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 194, 1 C.B.R. (4th) 245 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

Magnus One Energy Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 488, 2009 ABQB 200, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 243 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Mayer, Re (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113, 1994 CarswellOnt 268 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

Mister C's Ltd., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 372, 32 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered

N.T.W. Management Group Ltd., Re (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 139, 1994 CarswellOnt 325 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co. (2006), 2006 CarswellQue 4890, 2006 CarswellQue 4891, 2006 SCC 24, (sub nom. *Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. International Lease Finance Corp.*) 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., (Bankrupt), Re*) 349 N.R. 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re*) [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865, 10 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 66, 20 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 212 O.A.C. 338, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re*) 269 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93, 1995 CarswellOnt 340 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 1997 CarswellOnt 657 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4120, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160, 50 O.R. (3d) 688, 137 O.A.C. 74 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Steeves, Re (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 317, 208 Sask. R. 84, 2001 SKQB 265, 2001 CarswellSask 392 (Sask. Q.B.) — referred to

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Pt. III — referred to

s. 50(14) — considered

s. 54(2)(d) — considered

s. 59(2) — considered

s. 62(3) — considered

s. 136(1) — referred to

s. 178(2) — referred to

s. 179 — considered

s. 183 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
Generally — referred to

MOTION by applicants for court sanction of proposal under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which contained third-party release.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 At the conclusion of this unopposed motion, the requested relief was granted. Counsel indicated that it would be helpful if the court could provide reasons in due course, specifically on the issue of a third-party release in the context of a proposal under Part III of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("*BIA*").

2 Kitchener Frame Limited ("KFL") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada Inc. ("Budd Canada"), and together with KFL, (the "Applicants"), brought this motion for an order (the "Sanction Order") to sanction the amended consolidated proposal involving the Applicants dated August 31, 2011 (the "Consolidated Proposal") pursuant to the provisions of the *BIA*. Relief was also sought authorizing the Applicants and Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as proposal trustee of each of the Applicants (the "Proposal Trustee") to take all steps necessary to implement the Consolidated Proposal in accordance with its terms.

3 The Applicants submit that the requested relief is reasonable, that it benefits the general body of the Applicants' creditors and meets all other statutory requirements. Further, the Applicants submit that the court should also consider that the voting affected creditors (the "Affected Creditors") unanimously supported the Consolidated Proposal. As such, the Applicants submit that they have met the test as set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* with respect to approval of the Consolidated Proposal.

4 The motion of the Applicants was supported by the Proposal Trustee. The Proposal Trustee filed its report recommending approval of the Consolidated Proposal and indicated that the Consolidated Proposal was in the best interests of the Affected Creditors.

5 KFL and Budd Canada are inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets (other than the Escrow Funds). They do have significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-employment benefit ("OPEB") obligations to the Applicants' former employees and certain former employees of Budcan Holdings Inc. or the surviving spouses of such former employees or others who may be entitled to claim through such persons in the *BIA* proceedings, including the OPEB creditors.

6 The background facts with respect to this motion are fully set out in the affidavit of Mr. William E. Aziz, sworn on September 13, 2011.

7 Affiliates of Budd Canada have provided up to date funding to Budd Canada to enable Budd Canada to fund, on behalf of KFL, such pension and OPEB obligations. However, given that KFL and Budd Canada have no active operations, the *status quo* is unsustainable.

8 The Applicants have acknowledged that they are insolvent and, in connection with the *BIA* proposal, proceedings were commenced on July 4, 2011.

9 On July 7, 2011, Wilton-Siegel J. granted Procedural Consolidation Orders in respect of KFL and Budd Canada which authorized the procedural consolidation of the Applicants and permitted them to file a single consolidated proposal to their creditors.

10 The Orders of Wilton-Siegel J. also appointed separate representative counsel to represent the interests of the Union and Non-Union OPEB creditors and further authorized the Applicants to continue making payments to Blue Cross in respect of the OPEB Claims during the *BIA* proposal proceedings.

11 On August 2, 2011, an order was granted extending the time to file a proposal to August 19, 2011.

12 The parties proceeded to negotiate the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which meetings involved the Applicants, the Proposal Trustee, senior members of the CAW, Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

13 An agreement in principle was reached which essentially provided for the monetization and compromise of the OPEB claims of the OPEB creditors resulting in a one-time, lump-sum payment to each OPEB creditor term upon implementation of the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal also provides that the Applicants and their affiliates will forego any recoveries on account of their secured and unsecured inter-company claims, which total approximately $120 million. A condition precedent was the payment of sufficient funds to the Pension Fund Trustee such that when such funds are combined with the value of the assets held in the Pension Plans, the Pension Fund Trustee will be able to fully annuitize the Applicants' pension obligations and pay the commuted values to those creditors with pension claims who so elected so as to provide for the satisfaction of the Applicants' pension obligations in full.

14 On August 19, 2011, the Applicants filed the Consolidated Proposal. Subsequent amendments were made on August 31, 2011 in advance of the creditors' meeting to reflect certain amendments to the proposal.

15 The creditors' meeting was held on September 1, 2011 and, at the meeting, the Consolidated Proposal, as amended, was accepted by the required majority of creditors. Over 99.9% in number and over 99.8% in dollar value of the Affected Creditors' Class voted to accept the Consolidated Proposal. The Proposal Trustee noted that all creditors voted in favour of the Consolidated Proposal, with the exception of one creditor, Canada Revenue Agency (with 0.1% of the number of votes representing 0.2% of the value of the vote) who attended the meeting but abstained from voting. Therefore, the Consolidated Proposal was unanimously approved by the Affected Creditors. The Applicants thus satisfied the required "double majority" voting threshold required by the *BIA*.

16 The issue on the motion was whether the court should sanction the Consolidated Proposal, including the substantive consolidation and releases contained therein.

17 Pursuant to s. 54(2)(d) of the *BIA*, a proposal is deemed to be accepted by the creditors if it has achieved the requisite "double majority" voting threshold at a duly constituted meeting of creditors.

18 The *BIA* requires the proposal trustee to apply to court to sanction the proposal. At such hearing, s. 59(2) of the *BIA* requires that the court refuse to approve the proposal where its terms are not reasonable or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

19 In order to satisfy s. 59(2) test, the courts have held that the following three-pronged test must be satisfied:

(a) the proposal is reasonable;

(b) the proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors; and

(c) the proposal is made in good faith.

See *Mayer, Re* (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113 (Ont. Bktcy.); *Steeves, Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 317 (Sask. Q.B.); *Magnus One Energy Corp., Re* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 243 (Alta. Q.B.).

20 The first two factors are set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* while the last factor has been implied by the court as an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. The courts have generally taken into account the interests of the debtor, the interests of the creditors and the interests of the public at large in the integrity of the bankruptcy system. See *Farrell, Re* (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

21 The courts have also accorded substantial deference to the majority vote of creditors at a meeting of creditors; see *Lofchik, Re*, [1998] O.J. No. 332 (Ont. Bktcy.). Similarly, the courts have also accorded deference to the recommendation of the proposal trustee. See *Magnus One*, *supra*.

22 With respect to the first branch of the test for sanctioning a proposal, the debtor must satisfy the court that the proposal is reasonable. The court is authorized to only approve proposals which are reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. The court should also consider the payment terms of the proposal and whether the distributions provided for are adequate to meet the requirements of commercial morality and maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy system. For a discussion on this point, see *Lofchik*, *supra*, and *Farrell* , *supra*.

23 In this case, the Applicants submit that, if the Consolidated Proposal is sanctioned, they would be in a position to satisfy all other conditions precedent to closing on or prior to the date of the proposal ("Proposal Implementation Date").

24 With respect to the treatment of the Collective Bargaining Agreements, the Applicants and the CAW brought a joint application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB") on an expedited basis seeking the OLRB's consent to an early termination of the Collective Bargaining Agreements. Further, the CAW has agreed to abandon its collective bargaining rights in connection with the Collective Bargaining Agreements.

25 With respect to the terms and conditions of a Senior Secured Loan Agreement between Budd Canada and TK Finance dated as of December 22, 2010, TK Finance provided a secured creditor facility to the Applicants to fund certain working capital requirements before and during the *BIA* proposal proceedings. As a result of the approval of the Consolidated Proposal at the meeting of creditors, TK Finance agreed to provide additional credit facilities to Budd Canada such that the Applicants would be in a position to pay all amounts required to be paid by or on behalf of the Applicants in connection with the Consolidated Proposal.

26 On the issue as to whether creditors will receive greater recovery under the Consolidated Proposal than they would receive in the bankruptcy, it is noted that creditors with Pension Claims are unaffected by the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the satisfaction of Pension Claims in full as a condition precedent to implementation.

27 With respect to Affected Creditors, the Applicants submit that they will receive far greater recovery from distributions under the Consolidated Proposal than the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants. (See Sanction Affidavit of Mr. Aziz at para. 61.)

28 The Proposal Trustee has stated that the Consolidated Proposal is advantageous to creditors for the reasons outlined in its Report and, in particular:

> (a) the recoveries to creditors with claims in respect of OPEBs are considerably greater under the Amended Proposal than in a bankruptcy;
>
> (b) payments under the Amended Proposal are expected in a timely manner shortly after the implementation of the Amended Proposal;
>
> (c) the timing and quantum of distributions pursuant to the Amended Proposal are certain while distributions under a bankruptcy are dependent on the results of litigation, which cannot be predicted with certainty; and
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> (d) the Pension Plans (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) will be fully funded with funds from the Pension Escrow (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) and, if necessary, additional funding from an affiliate of the Companies if the funds in the Pension Escrow are not sufficient. In a bankruptcy, the Pension Plans may not be fully funded.

29 The Applicants take the position that the Consolidated Proposal meets the requirements of commercial morality and maintains the integrity of the bankruptcy system, in light of the superior coverage to be afforded to the Applicants' creditors under the Consolidated Proposal than in the event of bankruptcy.

30 The Applicants also submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the proposal will not prejudice any of the Affected Creditors and is appropriate in the circumstances. Although not expressly contemplated under the *BIA*, the Applicants submit that the court may look to its incidental, ancillary and auxiliary jurisdiction under s. 183 of the *BIA* and its equitable jurisdiction to grant an order for substantive consolidation. See *Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc.* (2006), 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In deciding whether to grant substantive consolidation, courts have held that it should not be done at the expense of, or possible prejudice of, any particular creditor. See *Ashley* , *supra*. However, counsel submits that this court should take into account practical business considerations in applying the *BIA*. See *A. & F. Baillargeon Express Inc., Re* (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36 (C.S. Que.).

31 In this case, the Applicants submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the Consolidated Proposal is appropriate in the circumstances due to, among other things, the intertwined nature of the Applicants' assets and liabilities. Each Applicant had substantially the same creditor base and known liabilities (other than certain Excluded Claims). In addition, KFL had no cash or cash equivalents and the Applicants are each dependant on the Escrow Funds and borrowings under the Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement to fund the same underlying pension and OPEB obligations and costs relating to the Proposal Proceedings.

32 The Applicants submit that creditors in neither estate will be materially prejudiced by substantive consolidation and based on the fact that no creditor objected to the substantial consolidation, counsel submits the Consolidated Proposal ought to be approved.

33 With respect to whether the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, TK Finance would be entitled to priority distributions out of the estate in a bankruptcy scenario. However, the Applicants and their affiliates have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their secured and unsecured intercompany claims in the amount of approximately $120 million, thus enhancing the level of recovery for the Affected Creditors, virtually all of whom are OPEB creditors. It is also noted that TK Finance will be contributing over $35 million to fund the Consolidated Proposal.

34 On this basis, the Applicants submit that the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

35 With respect to the requirement of the proposal being made in good faith, the debtor must satisfy the court that it has provided full disclosure to its creditors of its assets and encumbrances against such assets.

36 In this case, the Applicants and the Proposal Trustee have involved the creditors pursuant to the Representative Counsel Order, and through negotiations with the Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

37 There is also evidence that the Applicants have widely disseminated information regarding their *BIA* proposal proceedings through the media and through postings on the Proposal Trustee's website. Information packages have also prepared by the Proposal Trustee for the creditors.

38 Finally, the Proposal Trustee has noted that the Applicants' conduct, both prior to and subsequent to the commencement of the *BIA* proposal proceedings, is not subject to censure in any respect and that the Applicants' have acted in good faith.

39 There is also evidence that the Consolidated Proposal continues requisite statutory terms. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the payment of preferred claims under s. 136(1) of the *BIA*.

40 Section 7.1 of the Consolidated Proposal contains a broad release in favour of the Applicants and in favour of certain third parties (the "Release"). In particular, the Release benefits the Proposal Trustee, Martinrea, the CAW, Union Representative Counsel, Non-Union Representative Counsel, Blue Cross, the Escrow Agent, the present and former shareholders and affiliates of the Applicants (including Thyssenkrupp USA, Inc. ("TK USA"), TK Finance, Thyssenkrupp Canada Inc. ("TK Canada") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Company), as well as their subsidiaries, directors, officers, members, partners, employees, auditors, financial advisors, legal counsel and agents of any of these parties and any person liable jointly or derivatively through any or all of the beneficiaries of the of the release (referred to individually as a "Released Party").

41 The Release covers all Affected Claims, Pension Claims and Escrow Fund Claims existing on or prior to the later of the Proposal Implementation Date and the date on which actions are taken to implement the Consolidated Proposal.

42 The Release provides that all such claims are released and waived (other than the right to enforce the Applicants' or Proposal Trustee's obligations under the Consolidated Proposal) to the full extent permitted by applicable law. However, nothing in the Consolidated Proposal releases or discharges any Released Party for any criminal or other wilful misconduct or any present or former directors of the Applicants with respect to any matters set out in s. 50(14) of the *BIA*. Unaffected Claims are specifically carved out of the Release.

43 The Applicants submit that the Release is both permissible under the *BIA* and appropriately granted in the context of the *BIA* proposal proceedings. Further, counsel submits, to the extent that the Release benefits third parties other than the Applicants, the Release is not prohibited by the *BIA* and it satisfies the criteria that has been established in granting third-party releases under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("*CCAA*"). Moreover, counsel submits that the scope of the Release is no broader than necessary to give effect to the purpose of the Consolidated Proposal and the contributions made by the third parties to the success of the Consolidated Proposal.

44 No creditors or stakeholders objected to the scope of the Release which was fully disclosed in the negotiations, including the fact that the inclusion of the third-party releases was required to be part of the Consolidated Proposal. Counsel advises that the scope of the Release was referred to in the materials sent by the Proposal Trustee to the Affected Creditors prior to the meeting, specifically discussed at the meeting and adopted by the unanimous vote of the voting Affected Creditors.

45 Counsel also submits that there is no provision in the *BIA* that clearly and expressly precludes the Applicants from including the Release in the Consolidated Proposal as long as the court is satisfied that the Consolidated Proposal is reasonable and for the general benefit of creditors.

46 In this respect, it seems to me, that the governing statutes should not be technically or stringently interpreted in the insolvency context but, rather, should be interpreted in a manner that is flexible rather than technical and literal, in order to deal with the numerous situations and variations which arise from time to time. Further, taking a technical approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* would defeat the purpose of the legislation. See *N.T.W. Management Group Ltd., Re* (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Bktcy.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85 (Ont. Bktcy.).

47 Moreover, the statutes which deal with the same subject matter are to be interpreted with the presumption of harmony, coherence and consistency. See *NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co.*, 2006 SCC 24 (S.C.C.). This principle militates in favour of adopting an interpretation of the *BIA* that is harmonious, to the greatest extent possible, with the interpretation that has been given to the *CCAA*.

48 Counsel points out that historically, some case law has taken the position that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* precludes a proposal from containing a release that benefits third parties. Counsel submits that this result is not supported by a plain meaning of s. 62(3) and its interaction with other key sections in the *BIA*.

49 Subsection 62(3) of the *BIA* reads as follows:

> (3) The acceptance of a proposal by a creditor does not release any person who would not be released under this Act by the discharge of the debtor.

50 Counsel submits that there are two possible interpretations of this subsection:

> (a) It prohibits third party releases — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "cannot release any person"; or
>
> (b) It simply states that acceptance of a proposal does not automatically release any party other than the debtor — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "does not release any person without more"; it is protective not prohibitive.

51 I agree with counsel's submission that the latter interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* conforms with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used. If Parliament had intended that only the debtor could be released, s. 62(3) would have been drafted more simply to say exactly that.

52 Counsel further submits that the narrow interpretation would be a stringent and inflexible interpretation of the *BIA*, contrary to accepted wisdom that the *BIA* should be interpreted in a flexible, purposive manner.

53 The *BIA* proposal provisions are designed to offer debtors an opportunity to carry out a going concern or value maximizing restructuring in order to avoid a bankruptcy and related liquidation and that these purposes justify taking a broad, flexible and purposive approach to the interpretation of the relevant provisions. This interpretation is supported by *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.).

54 Further, I agree with counsel's submissions that a more flexible purposive interpretation is in keeping with modern statutory principles and the need to give purposive interpretation to insolvency legislation must start from the proposition that there is no express prohibition in the *BIA* against including third-party releases in a proposal. At most, there are certain limited constraints on the scope of such releases, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA*, and the provision dealing specifically with the release of directors.

55 In the absence of an express prohibition against including third-party releases in a proposal, counsel submits that it must be presumed that such releases are permitted (subject to compliance with any limited express restrictions, such as in the case of a release of directors). By extension, counsel submits that the court is entitled to approve a proposal containing a third-party release if the court is able to satisfy itself that the proposal (including the third-party release) is reasonable and for the general benefit for creditors such that all creditors (including the minority who did not vote in favour of the proposal) can be required to forego their claims against parties other than the debtors.

56 The Applicants also submit that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* can only be properly understood when read together with other key sections of the *BIA*, particularly s. 179 which concerns the effect of an order of discharge:

> 179. An order of discharge does not release a person who at the time of the bankruptcy was a partner or co-trustee with the bankrupt or was jointly bound or had made a joint contract with the bankrupt, or a person who was surety or in the nature of a surety for the bankrupt.

57 The order of discharge of a bankrupt has the effect of releasing the bankrupt from all claims provable in bankruptcy (section 178(2) *BIA*). In the absence of s. 179, this release could result in the automatic release at law of certain types of claims that are identified in s. 179. For example, under guarantee law, the discharge of the principal debt results in the automatic discharge of a guarantor. Similarly, counsel points out the settlement or satisfaction of a debt by one joint obligor generally results in the automatic release of both joint obligors. Section 179 therefore serves the limited purpose of altering the result that would incur at law, indicating that the rule that the *BIA* generally is that there is no automatic release of third-party guarantors of co-obligors when a bankrupt is discharged.

58 Counsel submits that s. 62(3), which confirms that s. 179 applies to a proposal, was clearly intended to fulfil a very limited role — namely, to confirm that there is no automatic release of the specific types of co-obligors identified in s. 179 when a proposal is approved by the creditors and by the court. Counsel submits that it does not go further and preclude the creditors and the court from approving a proposal which contains the third-party release of the types of co-obligors set out in s. 179. I am in agreement with these submissions.

59 Specific considerations also apply when releasing directors of a debtor company. The *BIA* contains specific limitations on the permissible scope of such releases as set out in s. 50(14). For this reason, there is a specific section in the *BIA* proposal provisions outlining the principles governing such a release. However, counsel argues, the presence of the provisions outlining the circumstances in which a proposal can contain a release of claims against the debtor's directors does not give rise to an inference that the directors are the only third parties that can be released in a proposal. Rather, the inference is that there are considerations applicable to a release or compromise of claims against directors that do not apply generally to other third parties. Hence, it is necessary to deal with this particular type of compromise and release expressly.

60 I am also in agreement with the alternative submissions made by counsel in this area to the effect that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* operates as a prohibition it refers only to those limitations that are expressly identified in the *BIA*, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA* and the specific limitations on the scope of releases that can benefit directors of the debtor.

61 Counsel submits that the Applicants' position regarding the proper interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* and its place in the scheme of the *BIA* is consistent with the generally accepted principle that a proposal under the *BIA* is a contract. See *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.); *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.* (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.); and *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160 (Ont. C.A.). Consequently, counsel submits that parties are entitled to put anything into a proposal that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract (see *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])) and that given that the prescribed majority creditors have the statutory right under the *BIA* to bind a minority, however, this principle is subject to any limitations that are contained in the express wording of the *BIA*.

62 On this point, it seems to me, that any provision of the *BIA* which purports to limit the ability of the debtor to contract with its creditors should be clear and explicit. To hold otherwise would result in severely limiting the debtor's ability to contract with its creditors, thereby the decreasing the likelihood that a viable proposal could be reached. This would manifestly defeat the purpose of the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

63 The Applicants further submit that creditors' interests — including the interests of the minority creditors who do not vote in favour of a proposal containing a third-party release — are sufficiently protected by the overriding ability of a court to refuse to approve a proposal with an overly broad third-party release, or where the release results in the proposal failing to demonstrate that it is for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The Applicants submit that the application of the *Metcalfe* criteria to the release is a mechanism whereby this court can assure itself that these preconditions to approve the Consolidated Proposal contained in the Release have been satisfied.

64 The Applicants acknowledge that there are several cases in which courts have held that a *BIA* proposal that includes a third-party release cannot be approved by the court but submits that these cases are based on a mistaken premise, are readily distinguishable and do not reflect the modern approach to Canadian insolvency law. Further, they submit that none of these cases are binding on this court and should not be followed.

65 In *Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re* (1931), 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.), the court refused to approve a proposal that contained a release of the debtor's directors, officers and employees. Counsel points out that the court's refusal was based on a provision of the predecessor to the *BIA* which specifically provided that a proposal could only be binding on creditors (as far as relates to any debts due to them from the debtor). The current *BIA* does not contain equivalent general language. This case is clearly distinguishable.

66 In *Mister C's Ltd., Re* (1995), 32 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Bktcy.), the court refused to approve a proposal that had received creditor approval. The court cited numerous bases for its conclusion that the proposal was not reasonable or calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, one of which was the release of the principals of the debtor company. The scope of the release was only one of the issues with the proposal, which had additional significant issues (procedural irregularities, favourable terms for insiders, and inequitable treatment of creditors generally). I agree with counsel to the Applicants that this case can be distinguished.

67 *Cosmic Adventures Halifax Inc., Re* (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 22 (N.S. S.C.) relies on *Kern* and furthermore the Applicants submit that the discussion of third-party releases is technically *obiter* because the proposal was amended on consent.

68 The fourth case is *C.F.G. Construction inc., Re*, 2010 CarswellQue 10226 (C.S. Que.) where the Quebec Superior Court refused to approve a proposal containing a release of two sureties of the debtor. The case was decided on alternate grounds — either that the *BIA* did not permit a release of sureties, or in any event, the release could not be justified on the facts. I agree with the Applicants that this case is distinguishable. The case deals with the release of sureties and does not stand for any broader proposition.

69 In general, the Applicants' submission on this issue is that the court should apply the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Metcalfe*, together with the binding principle set out by the Supreme Court in *Ted Leroy Trucking*, dictating a more liberal approach to the permissibility of third-party releases in *BIA* proposals than is taken by the Quebec court in *C.F.G. Construction Inc*. I agree.

70 The object of proposals under the *BIA* is to permit the debtor to restructure its business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets, which is precisely the same purpose as the *CCAA*. Although there are some differences between the two regimes and the *BIA* can generally be characterized as more "rules based", the thrust of the case law and the legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible, encouraging reorganization over liquidation. See *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

71 Recent case law has indicated that, in appropriate circumstances, third-party releases can be included in a plan of compromise and arrangement that is approved under the *CCAA*. See *Metcalfe*. The *CCAA* does not contain any express provisions permitting such third-party releases apart from certain limitations that apply to the compromise of claims against directors of the debtor company. See *CCAA* s. 5.1 and *Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 733 (Ont. S.C.J.).

72 Counsel submits that although the mechanisms for dealing with the release of sureties and similar claimants are somewhat different in the *BIA* and *CCAA*, the differences are not of such significance that the presence of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* should be viewed as dictating a different approach to third-party releases generally from the approach that applies under the *CCAA*. I agree with this submission.

73 I also accept that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* is interpreted as a prohibition against including the third-party release in the *BIA* proposal, the *BIA* and the *CCAA* would be in clear disharmony on this point. An interpretation of the *BIA* which leads to a result that is different from the *CCAA* should only be adopted pursuant to clear statutory language which, in my view, is not present in the *BIA*.

74 The most recent and persuasive example of the application of such a harmonious approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA* can be found in *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

75 At issue in *Ted Leroy Trucking* was how to resolve an apparent conflict between the deemed trust provisions of the *Excise Tax Act* and the provisions of the *CCAA*. The language of the *Excise Tax Act* created a deemed trust over GST amounts collected by the debtor that was stated to apply "despite any other Act of Parliament". The *CCAA* stated that the deemed trust for GST did not apply under the *CCAA*, unless the funds otherwise specified the criteria for a "true" trust. The court was required to determine which federal provision should prevail.

76 By contrast, the same issue did not arise under the *BIA*, due to the language in the *Excise Tax Act* specifically indicating that the continued existence of the deemed trust depended on the terms of the *BIA*. The *BIA* contained a similar provision to the *CCAA* indicating that the deemed trust for GST amounts would no longer apply in a *BIA* proceeding.

77 Deschamps J., on behalf of six other members of the court, with Fish J. concurring and Abella J. dissenting, held that the proper interpretation of the statutes was that the *CCAA* provision should prevail, the deemed trust under the *Excise Tax Act* would cease to exist in a *CCAA* proceeding. In resolving the conflict between the *Excise Tax Act* and the *CCAA*, Deschamps J. noted the strange asymmetry which would arise if the *BIA* and *CCAA* were not in harmony on this issue:

> Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

78 It seems to me that these principles indicate that the court should generally strive, where the language of both statutes can support it, to give both statutes a harmonious interpretation to avoid the ills that can arise from "statute-shopping". These considerations, counsel submits, militate against adopting a strained reading of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* as a prohibition against third-party releases in a *BIA* proposal. I agree. In my opinion, there is no principled basis on which the analysis and treatment of a third-party release in a *BIA* proposal proceeding should differ from a CCAA proceeding.

79 The Applicants submit that it logically follows that the court is entitled to approve the Consolidated Proposal, including the Release, on the basis that it is reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. Further, in keeping with the principles of harmonious interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the court should satisfy itself

that the *Metcalfe* criteria, which apply to the approval of a third-party release under the CCAA, has been satisfied in relation to the Release.

80 In *Metcalfe*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the requirements that must be satisfied to justify a third-party release are:

> (a) the parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan (Proposal) and necessary for it;
>
> (c) the Plan (Proposal) cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> (d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan (Proposal); and
>
> (e) the Plan (Proposal) will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditors generally.

81 These requirements have also been referenced in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re* (2011), 76 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

82 No single requirement listed above is determinative and the analysis must take into account the facts particular to each claim.

83 The Applicants submit that the Release satisfies each of the *Metcalfe* criteria. Firstly, counsel submits that following the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement in 2006, Budd Canada had no operating assets or income and relied on inter-company advances to fund the pension and OPEB requirements to be made by Budd Canada on behalf of KFL pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Such funded amounts total approximately $112.7 million in pension payments and $24.6 million in OPEB payments between the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Filing Date. In addition, TK Finance has been providing Budd Canada and KFL with the necessary funding to pay the professional and other costs associated with the *BIA* Proposal Proceedings and will continue to fund such amounts through the Proposal Implementation Date. Moreover, TK Canada and TK Finance have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their existing secured and unsecured intercompany loans in the amount of approximately $120 million.

84 Counsel submits that the releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are the *quid pro quo* for the sacrifices made by such affiliates to significantly enlarge recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants, particularly the OPEB creditors and reflects that the affiliates have provided over $135 million over the last five years in respect of the pension and OPEB amounts and additional availability of approximately $49 million to allow the Applicants to discharge their obligations to their former employees and retirees. Without the Releases, counsel submits, the Applicants' affiliates would have little or no incentive to contribute funds to the Consolidated Proposal and to waive their own rights against the Applicants.

85 The Release in favour of Martinrea is fully discussed at paragraphs 121-127 of the factum. The Applicants submit that the third-party releases set out in the Consolidated Proposal are clearly rationally related, necessary and essential to the Consolidated Proposal and are not overly broad.

86 Having reviewed the submissions in detail, I am in agreement that the Released Parties are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Consolidated Proposal.

87 I am also satisfied that without the Applicants' commitment to include the Release in the Consolidated Proposal to protect the Released Parties, it is unlikely that certain of such parties would have been prepared to support the Consolidated Proposal. The releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are particularly significant in this

regard, since the sacrifices and monetary contributions of such affiliates are the primary reason that the Applicants have been able to make the Consolidated Proposal. Further, I am also satisfied that without the Release, the Applicants would be unable to satisfy the borrowing conditions under the Amended and Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement with respect to the Applicants having only certain permitted liabilities after the Proposal Implementation Date. The alternative for the Applicants is bankruptcy, a scenario in which their affiliates' claims aggregating approximately $120 million would significantly erode recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants.

88 I am also satisfied that the Releases benefit the Applicants and creditors generally. The primary non-affiliated Creditors of the Applicants are the OPEB Creditors and Creditors with Pension Claims, together with the CRA. The Consolidated Proposal, in my view, clearly benefits these Creditors by generating higher recoveries than could be obtained from the bankruptcies of the Applicants. Moreover, the timing of any such bankruptcy recoveries is uncertain. As noted by the Proposal Trustee, the amount that the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants is uncertain both in terms of quantum and timing, with the Applicants' funding of OPEB Claims terminating on bankruptcy, but distributions to the OPEB Creditors and other Creditors delayed for at least a year or two but perhaps much longer.

89 The Applicants and their affiliates also benefit from the Release as an affiliate of the Applicants may become enabled to use the net operating losses (NOL) following a series of transactions that are expected to occur immediately following the Proposal Implementation Date.

90 I am also satisfied that the Applicants have provided full and adequate disclosure of the Releases and their effect. Full disclosure was made in the proposal term sheet circulated to both Representative Counsel in early August 2011. The Release was negotiated as part of the Consolidated Proposal and the scope of the Release was disclosed by the Proposal Trustee in its Report to the creditors on the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which Report was circulated by the Proposal Trustee to the Applicants' known creditors in advance of the creditors' meeting.

91 I am satisfied that the Applicants, with the assistance of the Proposal Trustee, took appropriate steps to ensure that the Affected Creditors were aware of the existence of the release provisions prior to the creditors' meeting.

92 For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the Release contained in the Consolidated Proposal meets the *Metcalfe* criteria and should be approved.

93 In the result, I am satisfied that the section 59(2) *BIA* test has been met and that it is appropriate to grant the Sanction Order in the form of the draft order attached to the Motion Record. An order has been signed to give effect to the foregoing.

Motion granted.

End of Document

TAB 5

CITATION: Sino-Forest Corporation (Re), 2012 ONSC 7050
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9667-00CL
DATE: 20121212

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: **IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION, Applicant

BEFORE: **MORAWETZ J.**

COUNSEL: **Robert W. Staley, Kevin Zych, Derek J. Bell and Jonathan Bell, for Sino-Forest Corporation**

Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam, and Cliff Prophet for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Robert Chadwick and Brendan O'Neill, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

Kenneth Rosenberg, Kirk Baert, Max Starnino, and A. Dimitri Lascaris, for the Class Action Plaintiffs

Won J. Kim, James C. Orr, Michael C. Spencer, and Megan B. McPhee, for Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.

Peter Griffin, Peter Osborne and Shara Roy, for Ernst & Young Inc.

Peter Greene and Ken Dekkar, for BDO Limited

Edward A. Sellers and Larry Lowenstein, for the Board of Directors of Sino-Forest Corporation

John Pirie and David Gadsden, for Poyry (Beijing)

James Doris, for the Plaintiff in the New York Class Action

David Bish, for the Underwriters

Simon Bieber and Erin Pleet, for David Horsley

James Grout, for the Ontario Securities Commission

Emily Cole and Joseph Marin, for Allen Chan

Susan E. Freedman and Brandon Barnes, for Kai Kit Poon

Paul Emerson, for ACE/Chubb

Sam Sasso, for Travelers

HEARD: DECEMBER 7, 2012

ENDORSED: DECEMBER 10, 2012

REASONS: DECEMBER 12, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

[1] On December 10, 2012, I released an endorsement granting this motion with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Overview

[2] The Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC"), seeks an order sanctioning (the "Sanction Order") a plan of compromise and reorganization dated December 3, 2012 as modified, amended, varied or supplemented in accordance with its terms (the "Plan") pursuant to section 6 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

[3] With the exception of one party, SFC's position is either supported or is not opposed.

[4] Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc. (collectively, the "Funds") object to the proposed Sanction Order. The Funds requested an adjournment for a period of one month. I denied the Funds' adjournment request in a separate endorsement released on December 10, 2012 (*Re Sino-Forest Corporation*, 2012 ONSC 7041). Alternatively, the Funds requested that the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 "Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants".

[5] The defined terms have been taken from the motion record.

[6] SFC's counsel submits that the Plan represents a fair and reasonable compromise reached with SFC's creditors following months of negotiation. SFC's counsel submits that the Plan, including its treatment of holders of equity claims, complies with CCAA requirements and is consistent with this court's decision on the equity claims motions (the "Equity Claims Decision")

(2012 ONSC 4377, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 99), which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (2012 ONCA 816).

[7] Counsel submits that the classification of creditors for the purpose of voting on the Plan was proper and consistent with the CCAA, existing law and prior orders of this court, including the Equity Claims Decision and the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

[8] The Plan has the support of the following parties:

(a) the Monitor;

(b) SFC's largest creditors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders (the "Ad Hoc Noteholders");

(c) Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y");

(d) BDO Limited ("BDO"); and

(e) the Underwriters.

[9] The Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities (the "Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee", also referred to as the "Class Action Plaintiffs") has agreed not to oppose the Plan. The Monitor has considered possible alternatives to the Plan, including liquidation and bankruptcy, and has concluded that the Plan is the preferable option.

[10] The Plan was approved by an overwhelming majority of Affected Creditors voting in person or by proxy. In total, 99% in number, and greater than 99% in value, of those Affected Creditors voting favoured the Plan.

[11] Options and alternatives to the Plan have been explored throughout these proceedings. SFC carried out a court-supervised sales process (the "Sales Process"), pursuant to the sales process order (the "Sales Process Order"), to seek out potential qualified strategic and financial purchasers of SFC's global assets. After a canvassing of the market, SFC determined that there were no qualified purchasers offering to acquire its assets for qualified consideration ("Qualified Consideration"), which was set at 85% of the value of the outstanding amount owing under the notes (the "Notes").

[12] SFC's counsel submits that the Plan achieves the objective stated at the commencement of the CCAA proceedings (namely, to provide a "clean break" between the business operations of the global SFC enterprise as a whole ("Sino-Forest") and the problems facing SFC, with the aspiration of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business for the benefit of SFC's creditors).

Facts

[13] SFC is an integrated forest plantation operator and forest products company, with most of its assets and the majority of its business operations located in the southern and eastern regions of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). SFC's registered office is located in Toronto and its principal business office is located in Hong Kong.

[14] SFC is a holding company with six direct subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries") and an indirect majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited (Bermuda), a publicly-traded company. Including SFC and the Subsidiaries, there are 137 entities that make up Sino-Forest: 67 companies incorporated in PRC, 58 companies incorporated in British Virgin Islands, 7 companies incorporated in Hong Kong, 2 companies incorporated in Canada and 3 companies incorporated elsewhere.

[15] On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters"), a short-seller of SFC's securities, released a report alleging that SFC was a "near total fraud" and a "Ponzi scheme". SFC subsequently became embroiled in multiple class actions across Canada and the United States and was subjected to investigations and regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"), Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

[16] SFC was unable to file its 2011 third quarter financial statements, resulting in a default under its note indentures.

[17] Following extensive arm's length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties agreed on a framework for a consensual resolution of SFC's defaults under its note indentures and the restructuring of its business. The parties ultimately entered into a restructuring support agreement (the "Support Agreement") on March 30, 2012, which was initially executed by holders of 40% of the aggregate principal amount of SFC's Notes. Additional consenting noteholders subsequently executed joinder agreements, resulting in noteholders representing a total of more than 72% of aggregate principal amount of the Notes agreeing to support the restructuring.

[18] The restructuring contemplated by the Support Agreement was commercially designed to separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing the parent holding company outside of PRC, with the intention of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business. Two possible transactions were contemplated:

(a) First, a court-supervised Sales Process to determine if any person or group of persons would purchase SFC's business operations for an amount in excess of the 85% Qualified Consideration;

(b) Second, if the Sales Process was not successful, a transfer of six immediate holding companies (that own SFC's operating business) to an acquisition vehicle to be owned by Affected Creditors in compromise of their claims against SFC. Further, the creation of a litigation trust (including funding) (the "Litigation Trust") to enable SFC's litigation claims against any person not otherwise released within the CCAA proceedings,

preserved and pursued for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders in accordance with the Support Agreement (concurrently, the "Restructuring Transaction").

[19] SFC applied and obtained an initial order under the CCAA on March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order"), pursuant to which a limited stay of proceedings ("Stay of Proceedings") was also granted in respect of the Subsidiaries. The Stay of Proceedings was subsequently extended by orders dated May 31, September 28, October 10, and November 23, 2012, and unless further extended, will expire on February 1, 2013.

[20] On March 30, 2012, the Sales Process Order was granted. While a number of Letters of Intent were received in respect of this process, none were qualified Letters of Intent, because none of them offered to acquire SFC's assets for the Qualified Consideration. As such, on July 10, 2012, SFC announced the termination of the Sales Process and its intention to proceed with the Restructuring Transaction.

[21] On May 14, 2012, this court granted an order (the "Claims Procedure Order") which approved the Claims Process that was developed by SFC in consultation with the Monitor.

[22] As of the date of filing, SFC had approximately $1.8 billion of principal amount of debt owing under the Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest. As of May 15, 2012, Noteholders holding in aggregate approximately 72% of the principal amount of the Notes, and representing more than 66.67% of the principal amount of each of the four series of Notes, agreed to support the Plan.

[23] After the Muddy Waters report was released, SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's former auditors, technical consultants and Underwriters involved in prior equity and debt offerings, were named as defendants in a number of proposed class action lawsuits. Presently, there are active proposed class actions in four jurisdictions: Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York (the "Class Action Claims").

[24] *The Labourers v. Sino-Forest Corporation Class Action* (the "Ontario Class Action") was commenced in Ontario by Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP. It has the following two components: first, there is a shareholder claim (the "Shareholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of current and former shareholders of SFC seeking damages in the amount of $6.5 billion for general damages, $174.8 million in connection with a prospectus issued in June 2007, $330 million in relation to a prospectus issued in June 2009, and $319.2 million in relation to a prospectus issued in December 2009; second, there is a $1.8 billion noteholder claim (the "Noteholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of former holders of SFC's Notes. The noteholder component seeks damages for loss of value in the Notes.

[25] The Quebec Class Action is similar in nature to the Ontario Class Action, and both plaintiffs filed proof of claim in this proceeding. The plaintiffs in the Saskatchewan Class Action did not file a proof of claim in this proceeding, whereas the plaintiffs in the New York Class Action did file a proof of claim in this proceeding. A few shareholders filed proofs of claim separately, but no proof of claim was filed by the Funds.

[26] In this proceeding, the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee - represented by Siskinds LLP, Koskie Minsky, and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP - has appeared to represent the interests of the shareholders and noteholders who have asserted Class Action Claims against SFC and others.

[27] Since 2000, SFC has had the following two auditors ("Auditors"): E&Y from 2000 to 2004 and 2007 to 2012 and BDO from 2005 to 2006.

[28] The Auditors have asserted claims against SFC for contribution and indemnity for any amounts paid or payable in respect of the Shareholder Class Action Claims, with each of the Auditors having asserted claims in excess of $6.5 billion. The Auditors have also asserted indemnification claims in respect the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[29] The Underwriters have similarly filed claims against SFC seeking contribution and indemnity for the Shareholder Class Action Claims and Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[30] The Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC") has also investigated matters relating to SFC. The OSC has advised that they are not seeking any monetary sanctions against SFC and are not seeking monetary sanctions in excess of $100 million against SFC's directors and officers (this amount was later reduced to $84 million).

[31] SFC has very few trade creditors by virtue of its status as a holding company whose business is substantially carried out through its Subsidiaries in PRC and Hong Kong.

[32] On June 26, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order declaring that all claims made against SFC arising in connection with the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC and related indemnity claims to be "equity claims" (as defined in section 2 of the CCAA). These claims encapsulate the commenced Shareholder Class Action Claims asserted against SFC. The Equity Claims Decision did not purport to deal with the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[33] In reasons released on July 27, 2012, I granted the relief sought by SFC in the Equity Claims Decision, finding that the "the claims advanced in the shareholder claims are clearly equity claims." The Auditors and Underwriters appealed the decision and on November 23, 2012, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal.

[34] On August 31, 2012, an order was issued approving the filing of the Plan (the "Plan Filing and Meeting Order").

[35] According to SFC's counsel, the Plan endeavours to achieve the following purposes:

(a) to effect a full, final and irrevocable compromise, release, discharge, cancellation and bar of all affected claims;

(b) to effect the distribution of the consideration provided in the Plan in respect of proven claims;

(c) to transfer ownership of the Sino-Forest business to Newco and then to Newco II, in each case free and clear of all claims against SFC and certain related claims against the Subsidiaries so as to enable the Sino-Forest business to continue on a viable, going concern basis for the benefit of the Affected Creditors; and

(d) to allow Affected Creditors and Noteholder Class Action Claimants to benefit from contingent value that may be derived from litigation claims to be advanced by the litigation trustee.

[36] Pursuant to the Plan, the shares of Newco ("Newco Shares") will be distributed to the Affected Creditors. Newco will immediately transfer the acquired assets to Newco II.

[37] SFC's counsel submits that the Plan represents the best available outcome in the circumstances and those with an economic interest in SFC, when considered as a whole, will derive greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business as a going concern than would result from bankruptcy or liquidation of SFC. Counsel further submits that the Plan fairly and equitably considers the interests of the Third Party Defendants, who seek indemnity and contribution from SFC and its Subsidiaries on a contingent basis, in the event that they are found to be liable to SFC's stakeholders. Counsel further notes that the three most significant Third Party Defendants (E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters) support the Plan.

[38] SFC filed a version of the Plan in August 2012. Subsequent amendments were made over the following months, leading to further revised versions in October and November 2012, and a final version dated December 3, 2012 which was voted on and approved at the meeting. Further amendments were made to obtain the support of E&Y and the Underwriters. BDO availed itself of those terms on December 5, 2012.

[39] The current form of the Plan does not settle the Class Action Claims. However, the Plan does contain terms that would be engaged if certain conditions are met, including if the class action settlement with E&Y receives court approval.

[40] Affected Creditors with proven claims are entitled to receive distributions under the Plan of (i) Newco Shares, (ii) Newco notes in the aggregate principal amount of U.S. $300 million that are secured and guaranteed by the subsidiary guarantors (the "Newco Notes"), and (iii) Litigation Trust Interests.

[41] Affected Creditors with proven claims will be entitled under the Plan to: (a) their *pro rata* share of 92.5% of the Newco Shares with early consenting noteholders also being entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 7.5% of the Newco Shares; and (b) their *pro rata* share of the Newco Notes. Affected Creditors with proven claims will be concurrently entitled to their *pro rata* share of 75% of the Litigation Trust Interests; the Noteholder Class Action Claimants will be entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 25% of the Litigation Trust Interests.

[42] With respect to the indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims, these relate to claims by former noteholders against third parties who, in turn, have alleged corresponding indemnification claims against SFC. The Class Action Plaintiffs have agreed that the aggregate

amount of those former noteholder claims will not exceed the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit of $150 million. In turn, indemnification claims of Third Party Defendants against SFC with respect to indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims are also limited to the $150 million Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit.

[43] The Plan includes releases for, among others, (a) the subsidiary; (b) the Underwriters' liability for Noteholder Class Action Claims in excess of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit; (c) E&Y in the event that all of the preconditions to the E&Y settlement with the Ontario Class Action plaintiffs are met; and (d) certain current and former directors and officers of SFC (collectively, the "Named Directors and Officers"). It was emphasized that non-released D&O Claims (being claims for fraud or criminal conduct), conspiracy claims and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are not being released pursuant to the Plan.

[44] The Plan also contemplates that recovery in respect of claims of the Named Directors and Officers of SFC in respect of any section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims and any conspiracy claims shall be directed and limited to insurance proceeds available from SFC's maintained insurance policies.

[45] The meeting was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order and that the meeting materials were sent to stakeholders in the manner required by the Plan Filing and Meeting Order. The Plan supplement was authorized and distributed in accordance with the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

[46] The meeting was ultimately held on December 3, 2012 and the results of the meeting were as follows:

(a) the number of voting claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan;

(b) The results of the Meeting were as follows:

a. the number of Voting Claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan:

	Number of Votes	%	Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	250	98.81%	$ 1,465,766,204	99.97%
Total Claims Voting Against	3	1.19%	$ 414,087	0.03%
Total Claims Voting	253	100.00%	$ 1,466,180,291	100.00%

b. the number of votes for and against the Plan in connection with Class Action Indemnity Claims in respect of Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims up to the Indemnified Noteholder Limit:

	Vote For	Vote Against	Total Votes
Class Action Indemnity Claims	4	1	5

c. the number of Defence Costs Claims votes for and against the Plan and their value:

	Number of Votes	%		Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	12	92.31%	$	8,375,016	96.10%
Total Claims Voting Against	1	7.69%	$	340,000	3.90%
Total Claims Voting	13	100.00%	$	8,715,016	100.00%

d. the overall impact on the approval of the Plan if the count were to include Total Unresolved Claims (including Defence Costs Claims) and, in order to demonstrate the "worst case scenario" if the entire $150 million of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit had been voted a "no" vote (even though 4 of 5 votes were "yes" votes and the remaining "no" vote was from BDO, who has now agreed to support the Plan):

	Number of Votes	%		Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	263	98.50%	$	1,474,149,082	90.72%
Total Claims Voting Against	4	1.50%	$	150,754,087	9.28%
Total Claims Voting	267	100.00%	$	1,624,903,169	100.00%

[47] E&Y has now entered into a settlement ("E&Y Settlement") with the Ontario plaintiffs and the Quebec plaintiffs, subject to several conditions and approval of the E&Y Settlement itself.

[48] As noted in the endorsement dated December 10, 2012, which denied the Funds' adjournment request, the E&Y Settlement does not form part of the Sanction Order and no relief is being sought on this motion with respect to the E&Y Settlement. Rather, section 11.1 of the Plan contains provisions that provide a framework pursuant to which a release of the E&Y claims under the Plan will be effective if several conditions are met. That release will only be granted if all conditions are met, including further court approval.

[49] Further, SFC's counsel acknowledges that any issues relating to the E&Y Settlement, including fairness, continuing discovery rights in the Ontario Class Action or Quebec Class Action, or opt out rights, are to dealt with at a further court-approval hearing.

Law and Argument

[50] Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that courts may sanction a plan of compromise if the plan has achieved the support of a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors.

[51] To establish the court's approval of a plan of compromise, the debtor company must establish the following:

(a) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;

(b) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) the plan is fair and reasonable.

(See *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, 2000 ABQB 442, leave to appeal denied, 2000 ABCA 238, aff'd 2001 ABCA 9, leave to appeal to SCC refused July 21, 2001, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 and Re Nelson Financial Group Limited, 2011 ONSC 2750, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307).

[52] SFC submits that there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements.

[53] On the initial application, I found that SFC was a "debtor company" to which the CCAA applies. SFC is a corporation continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* ("CBCA") and is a "company" as defined in the CCAA. SFC was "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time" prior to the Initial Order and, as such, was and continues to be insolvent. SFC has total claims and liabilities against it substantially in excess of the $5 million statutory threshold.

[54] The Notice of Creditors' Meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order and the revised Noteholder Mailing Process Order and, further, the Plan supplement and the voting procedures were posted on the Monitor's website and emailed to each of the ordinary Affected Creditors. It was also delivered by email to the Trustees and DTC, as well as to Globic who disseminated the information to the Registered Noteholders. The final version of the Plan was emailed to the Affected Creditors, posted on the Monitor's website, and made available for review at the meeting.

[55] SFC also submits that the creditors were properly classified at the meeting as Affected Creditors constituted a single class for the purposes of considering the voting on the Plan. Further, and consistent with the Equity Claims Decision, equity claimants constituted a single class but were not entitled to vote on the Plan. Unaffected Creditors were not entitled to vote on the Plan.

[56] Counsel submits that the classification of creditors as a single class in the present case complies with the commonality of interests test. See *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*.

[57] Courts have consistently held that relevant interests to consider are the legal interests of the creditors hold *qua* creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the plan. Further, the commonality of interests should be considered purposively, bearing in mind the object of the CCAA, namely, to facilitate reorganizations if possible. See *Stelco Inc*. (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.), *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, and *Re Nortel Networks Corporation* (2009) O.J. No. 2166 (Ont. S.C.). Further, courts should resist classification approaches that potentially jeopardize viable plans.

[58] In this case, the Affected Creditors voted in one class, consistent with the commonality of interests among Affected Creditors, considering their legal interests as creditors. The classification was consistent with the Equity Claims Decision.

[59] I am satisfied that the meeting was properly constituted and the voting was properly carried out. As described above, 99% in number, and more than 99% in value, voting at the meeting favoured the Plan.

[60] SFC's counsel also submits that SFC has not taken any steps unauthorized by the CCAA or by court orders. SFC has regularly filed affidavits and the Monitor has provided regular reports and has consistently opined that SFC is acting in good faith and with due diligence. The court has so ruled on this issue on every stay extension order that has been granted.

[61] In *Nelson Financial*, I articulated relevant factors on the sanction hearing. The following list of factors is similar to those set out in *Re Canwest Global Communications Corporation*, 2010 ONSC 4209, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1:

1. The claims must have been properly classified, there must be no secret arrangements to give an advantage to a creditor or creditor; the approval of the plan by the requisite majority of creditors is most important;

2. It is helpful if the Monitor or some other disinterested person has prepared an analysis of anticipated receipts and liquidation or bankruptcy;

3. If other options or alternatives have been explored and rejected as workable, this will be significant;

4. Consideration of the oppression rights of certain creditors; and

5. Unfairness to shareholders.

6. The court will consider the public interest.

[62] The Monitor has considered the liquidation and bankruptcy alternatives and has determined that it does not believe that liquidation or bankruptcy would be a preferable alternative to the Plan. There have been no other viable alternatives presented that would be acceptable to SFC and to the Affected Creditors. The treatment of shareholder claims and related indemnity claims are, in my view, fair and consistent with CCAA and the Equity Claims Decision.

[63] In addition, 99% of Affected Creditors voted in favour of the Plan and the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee have agreed not to oppose the Plan. I agree with SFC's submission to the effect that these are exercises of those parties' business judgment and ought not to be displaced.

[64] I am satisfied that the Plan provides a fair and reasonable balance among SFC's stakeholders while simultaneously providing the ability for the Sino-Forest business to continue as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

[65] The Plan adequately considers the public interest. I accept the submission of counsel that the Plan will remove uncertainty for Sino-Forest's employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders and provide a path for recovery of the debt owed to SFC's non-subordinated creditors. In addition, the Plan preserves the rights of aggrieved parties, including SFC through the Litigation Trust, to pursue (in litigation or settlement) those parties that are alleged to share some or all of the responsibility for the problems that led SFC to file for CCAA protection. In addition, releases are not being granted to individuals who have been charged by OSC staff, or to other individuals against whom the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee wishes to preserve litigation claims.

[66] In addition to the consideration that is payable to Affected Creditors, Early Consent Noteholders will receive their *pro rata* share of an additional 7.5% of the Newco Shares ("Early Consent Consideration"). Plans do not need to provide the same recovery to all creditors to be considered fair and reasonable and there are several plans which have been sanctioned by the courts featuring differential treatment for one creditor or one class of creditors. See, for example, *Canwest Global* and *Re Armbro Enterprises Inc.* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Gen. Div.). A common theme permeating such cases has been that differential treatment does not necessarily result in a finding that the Plan is unfair, as long as there is a sufficient rational explanation.

[67] In this case, SFC's counsel points out that the Early Consent Consideration has been a feature of the restructuring since its inception. It was made available to any and all noteholders and noteholders who wished to become Early Consent Noteholders were invited and permitted to do so until the early consent deadline of May 15, 2012. I previously determined that SFC made available to the noteholders all information needed to decide whether they should sign a joinder agreement and receive the Early Consent Consideration, and that there was no prejudice to the noteholders in being put to that election early in this proceeding.

[68] As noted by SFC's counsel, there was a rational purpose for the Early Consent Consideration. The Early Consent Noteholders supported the restructuring through the CCAA proceedings which, in turn, provided increased confidence in the Plan and facilitated the negotiations and approval of the Plan. I am satisfied that this feature of the Plan is fair and reasonable.

[69] With respect to the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit, I have considered SFC's written submissions and accept that the $150 million agreed-upon amount reflects risks faced by both sides. The selection of a $150 million cap reflects the business judgment of the parties making assessments of the risk associated with the noteholder component of the Ontario Class Action and, in my view, is within the "general range of acceptability on a commercially reasonable basis". See *Re Ravelston Corporation*, (2005) 14 C.B.R. (5^{th}) 207 (Ont. S.C). Further, as noted by SFC's counsel, while the New York Class Action Plaintiffs filed a proof of claim, they have not appeared in this proceeding and have not stated any opposition to the Plan, which has included this concept since its inception.

[70] Turning now to the issue of releases of the Subsidiaries, counsel to SFC submits that the unchallenged record demonstrates that there can be no effective restructuring of SFC's business and separation from its Canadian parent if the claims asserted against the Subsidiaries arising out of or connected to claims against SFC remain outstanding. The Monitor has examined all of the releases in the Plan and has stated that it believes that they are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[71] The Court of Appeal in *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corporation*, 2008 ONCA 587, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 stated that the "court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring".

[72] In this case, counsel submits that the release of Subsidiaries is necessary and essential to the restructuring of SFC. The primary purpose of the CCAA proceedings was to extricate the business of Sino-Forest, through the operation of SFC's Subsidiaries (which were protected by the Stay of Proceedings), from the cloud of uncertainty surrounding SFC. Accordingly, counsel submits that there is a clear and rational connection between the release of the Subsidiaries in the Plan. Further, it is difficult to see how any viable plan could be made that does not cleanse the Subsidiaries of the claims made against SFC.

[73] Counsel points out that the Subsidiaries who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan. The Subsidiaries are effectively contributing their assets to SFC to satisfy SFC's obligations under their guarantees of SFC's note indebtedness, for the benefit of the Affected Creditors. As such, counsel submits the releases benefit SFC and the creditors generally.

[74] In my view, the basis for the release falls within the guidelines previously set out by this court in *ATB Financial*, *Re Nortel Networks*, 2010 ONSC 1708, and *Re Kitchener Frame Limited*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274. Further, it seems to me that the Plan cannot succeed without the releases of the Subsidiaries. I am satisfied that the releases are fair and reasonable and are rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan.

[75] With respect to the Named Directors and Officers release, counsel submits that this release is necessary to effect a greater recovery for SFC's creditors, rather than having those directors and officers assert indemnity claims against SFC. Without these releases, the quantum of the unresolved claims reserve would have to be materially increased and, to the extent that any such indemnity claim was found to be a proven claim, there would have been a corresponding dilution of consideration paid to Affected Creditors.

[76] It was also pointed out that the release of the Named Directors and Officers is not unlimited; among other things, claims for fraud or criminal conduct, conspiracy claims, and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are excluded.

[77] I am satisfied that there is a reasonable connection between the claims being compromised and the Plan to warrant inclusion of this release.

[78] Finally, in my view, it is necessary to provide brief comment on the alternative argument of the Funds, namely, the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 "Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants". The Plan was presented to the meeting with Article 11 in place. This was the Plan that was subject to the vote and this is the Plan that is the subject of this motion. The alternative proposed by the Funds was not considered at the meeting and, in my view, it is not appropriate to consider such an alternative on this motion.

Disposition

[79] Having considered the foregoing, I am satisfied that SFC has established that:

(i) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to the previous orders of the court;

(ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(iii) the Plan is fair and reasonable.

[80] Accordingly, the motion is granted and the Plan is sanctioned. An order has been signed substantially in the form of the draft Sanction Order.

MORAWETZ J.

Date: December 12, 2012

TAB 6

QUEEN'S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN

Citation: **2009 SKQB 186**

Date: **2009 05 22**
Docket: Q.B.G. No. 2885/2002
Judicial Centre: Regina

BETWEEN:

TOM KING TONG CHENG, in his personal capacity and as Trustee of CHENG FAMILY TRUST

PLAINTIFFS

- and -

WORLDWIDE PORK COMPANY LIMITED, KENJI NOSE in his personal capacity and as Trustee of NOSE FAMILY TRUST

DEFENDANTS

Counsel:

David R. Barth — for the plaintiffs
Michael W. Milani, Q.C. — for the proposed defendants Amos Skinner, Ernie Donnawell and the Government of Saskatchewan

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JUDGMENT — DAWSON J.
May 22, 2009

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[1] The plaintiffs apply, pursuant to Rule 165 of *The Queen's Bench Rules of Court*, to amend the statement of claim in the within action and to add Amos Skinner, Ernie Donnawell and the Government of Saskatchewan as defendants.

[2] The plaintiffs (also referred to as "Cheng") seek alternatively, pursuant to Rule 236, that the Government of Saskatchewan produce those documents in its possession that relate to the defendant, Worldwide Pork Company Limited and the

directors of Worldwide Pork Company Limited that the Government of Saskatchewan appointed. The plaintiffs seek, in the further alternative, pursuant to Rule 222A, leave to examine that Government of Saskatchewan officer currently in charge of the Agriculture Food and Equity Fund.

BACKGROUND

[3] The Agriculture Food and Equity Fund ("AFEF") was established by the Government of Saskatchewan (the "Government") as a fund administered by the Agricultural Credit Corporation of Saskatchewan ("ACS"). The function of ACS was to provide investment capital to the food industry in Saskatchewan. In 2003 the operations of AFEF were wound up and AFEF's assets and liabilities were transferred to ACS.

[4] It appears that around 2000 a corporation called CITA Foods Inc. ("CITA"), which was controlled by the plaintiff, Tom Cheng, applied for funding from AFEF in order to enable CITA to purchase a pork slaughter and processing facility in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. AFEF provided funding to CITA through the form of an investment in a company called Worldwide Pork Company Limited ("WWP"). WWP was the company through which CITA operated the pork processing facility.

[5] In 2000 the Government, through AFEF, invested $1,000,000.00 in WWP by subscribing 1,000,000 Class "C" preferred shares. The preferred shares were issued in the name of AFEF. At the time that AFEF became a shareholder, the other shareholders of WWP were Kenji Nose, Nose Family Trust, Tom Cheng, Cheng Family Trust, Okanomi House Limited and Yamato Development Canada Inc.

[6] AFEF's share rights relating to the 1,000,000 preferred shares included the following:

1. AFEF was entitled to elect one director to the Board of Directors of WWP;

2. WWP was to redeem the preferred shares commencing March 31, 2004 according to a formula;

3. In the event that WWP failed to redeem AFEF's preferred shares, AFEF had a right to convert any or all of the shares (and any dividends or interest owing) into a loan payable to AFEF by WWP.

[7] In April 2000 Amos Skinner, an investment manager with AFEF, became AFEF's appointee to the Board of Directors of WWP. In 2001 Mr. Skinner resigned as a director of WWP and Ernie Donnawell, an investment manager with AFEF, became AFEF's appointee to the Board of WWP.

[8] On May 11, 2001 Mr. Skinner ceased being an employee of the Government. On May 30, 2001 Mr. Skinner became President and Chief Executive Officer of WWP. In January 2002 Mr. Skinner resigned as President and Chief Executive Officer of WWP.

[9] On March 28, 2002 Ernie Donnawell resigned as a director of WWP. Between May 2002 and November 2003, Mr. Donnawell was elected to and resigned from the WWP Board a number of times.

[10] On December 31, 2002 the plaintiffs, Tom Cheng and Cheng Family Trust ("Cheng") issued the within statement of claim against the defendants, WWP and Kenji Nose.

[11] In February 2003 the preferred shares owned by AFEF in WWP were transferred to ACS. After that date, the Government's investment in WWP was held through ACS.

[12] On May 28, 2004, ACS wrote to WWP notifying WWP that as WWP had failed to redeem the preferred shares on March 31, 2004, as required, ACS was converting the shares into a demand loan. ACS also advised that it was exercising its conversion rights in respect of 999,999 of the preferred shares. This resulted in all but one of the preferred shares being converted into a demand loan in favour of ACS, in the amount of $1,329,634.00. ACS later indicated to WWP that it had miscalculated the amount owing, and indicated that the demand loan was for $1,512,196.02. WWP was also indebted to ACS under other credit facilities.

[13] On July 5, 2005 WWP applied to the court for protection under *The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S., 1985, c.C-36 ("CCAA"). The court file regarding the CCAA proceedings is Q.B.G. No. 1175 of 2005. On July 5, 2005 Justice Ball ordered a stay of all proceedings against WWP under a CCAA initial order. That initial order stayed all claims against WWP, which included the within plaintiffs' statement of claim, which was issued December 31, 2002. That CCAA order said, in part:

> 12. During the Stay Period, no Proceeding or Enforcement shall be commenced or continued against any one or more of the Directors in regard to or in respect of:

> (a) claims involving acts or omissions of those individuals in their capacity as Directors or in any way related to matters arising from their role as Directors; or
>
> (b) claims in any way related to any matters arising from the appointment of such individuals by and on behalf of the Applicant to any corporation, partnership or venture, including their appointment or election by or on behalf of the Applicant to any other board of directors or other governing body or committee;
>
> that arose prior to the date of this Order, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no shareholder of the Applicant or any other Person may commence or continue any Proceeding or Enforcement or claim any relief in relation to losses or damages that such Person alleges they have suffered in their capacity as shareholder or in relation to derivative rights of that shareholder against any Director, in either case, without first obtaining leave of this Court granting such Person permission to do so.

[14] A review of the CCAA court file indicates that on August 17, 2005 Justice Ball made a further order which lifted the July 5, 2005 stay of proceedings order against the directors of WWP, in limited circumstances. The relevant portions of that order lifting the stay are as follows:

> 1. Paragraph 12 of the July 5, 2005 Initial Order (since extended) is amended by adding the following paragraph:
>
> > "The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to the corporations and individuals described below in respect of any Proceeding or Enforcement against one or more of the Directors in regard to or in respect of:
> >
> > (a) claims that relate to contractual rights of one or more of the creditors; or
> >
> > (b) claims based on allegations of misrepresentations made by Directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by Directors;
> >
> > as described in the draft Statement of Claim attached as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Paul J. Harasen sworn July 29, 2005, and leave is granted to those corporations and individuals who produced and shipped hogs to Worldwide Pork Company Limited that are named as Plaintiffs in the Statement of Claim

> when it is issued, and those Plaintiffs may assert the allegations asserted in the draft Statement of Claim, and may commence and continue the claims contained in the draft Statement of Claim."

[15] This August 17, 2005 order lifting the stay only applied to the specified claims of the creditors who produced and shipped hogs to WWP, as referred to in a draft statement of claim filed in support of the application to lift the stay. It did not apply to the plaintiffs' statement of claim here.

[16] The CCAA proceedings continued. A claims proving process was put into place on September 27, 2005, by court order. Under that order, the Monitor was to assess all claims and accept or reject them. Those creditors whose claims were rejected by the Monitor were entitled to apply to Justice Ball for a hearing as to the validity of that creditor's claim. The status and the amount of a creditor's claim was relevant for the purposes of voting on the restructuring plan that was to be submitted to the court by WWP.

[17] Cheng filed a Proof of Claim alleging that WWP was indebted to Cheng for various claims in the total amount of $2,602,000.00. The Monitor disallowed the Cheng CCAA claims. Cheng then applied to the court for an order determining the amount of the Cheng claims. Cheng appended the within statement of claim (without the proposed amendments) to the affidavit in support of the application to determine the amount of the plaintiffs' claim. On January 5, 2006 Justice Ball issued a fiat in respect of the Cheng claims. Justice Ball concluded that the total value of the Cheng CCAA claims was $197,500.00.

[18] On January 4, 2006 WWP filed its Plan of Compromise and Arrangement (the "Plan"). The Plan was amended on January 20, 2006 (the "Amended Plan"). That Amended Plan dealt specifically with the issue of what creditors' rights would be extinguished, settled or compromised if the Amended Plan were approved by the creditors and the court. Relevant portions of that Amended Plan include the following:

> ...
>
> **2.3 Unaffected Claims**
>
> The Plan does not affect or compromise the Claims of the following Creditors and other Persons;
>
> (a) Post-Filing Claims of any Person;
>
> (b) Claims of the Monitor, its counsel and WWP's counsel and professional advisors for amounts that would comprise all or part of the Administrative Charge as defined in the Initial Order;
>
> (c) Claims of the DIP Lender for any amount owing in respect of the DIP Loan approved by the Court from time to time;
>
> (d) Claims of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada or of any Province or Territory or any other taxation authority;
>
> (i) for any statutory deemed trust amounts which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including amounts in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan and income taxes;
>
> (ii) for goods and services or other applicable sales taxes payable by WWP or their customers in connections with the sale of goods and services by WWP to such customers; and
>
> (e) Claims of the Excluded Secured Creditors.
>
> For further certainty and to avoid any confusion, the Contingent Employee Claims shall not be a Post-Filing Claim and shall be compromised as set forth in this Plan.
>
> ...
>
> **4.1 WWP's Creditors**
>
> **(b) Settlement of Claims of Creditors**

Each Creditor, other than Employees of WWP in respect of any claims as employees of WWP and the Excluded Secured Creditors, and subject to paragraph 4.1(c) hereof, shall receive in full satisfaction of its Claim as determined in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order;

(i) Where the Claim of the Creditor does not exceed $500, or where the Creditor has elected to reduce the amount of its claim to $500, such Creditor shall receive an amount equal to the lesser of the amount of its Claim and $500, which amount shall be paid within 90 days of the Effective Date;

(ii) Where the claim of the Creditor exceeds $500 and the Creditor has not elected to reduce the amount of its claim to $500, such Creditor shall receive common shares in NewCo. Shares in NewCo. will be issued on the basis of one share for each one hundred dollars (or part thereof) owing pursuant to the Accepted Claim for Voting Purposes of that Creditor.

WWP shall amend its articles and bylaws or cause them to be amended, so that from and after the Effective Date, it shall, subject to the provisions of *The Business Corporations Act* (Saskatchewan) and any other applicable legislation and subject to compliance with financial covenants in agreements with its lenders, be required to annually declare and pay out in dividends such amounts of funds as it has generated annually from operations, after provision is made by WWP for its ongoing operational requirements, after any provision required for debt servicing has been made in compliance with any agreements with third party lenders, after provision is made for any preferred share redemption that is required and subject to any amounts to be paid in priority to any payment of dividends to the holders of common shares of WWP.

(c) Settlement of Shareholders Claims

Notwithstanding each Shareholders:

(a) Accepted Claim for Voting Purposes or Disputed Claim, if any;

(b) number of existing shares in WWP; and

(c) outstanding shareholders loans to WWP;

the Shareholders' Claims shall be compromised by the Shareholders receiving a combined total of 10% of the shares of NewCo. to be allocated amongst such Shareholders on a pro rata basis based upon the common share shareholdings of such parties in WWP on the Filing Date, and all other amounts owing to such Shareholders by WWP shall be extinguished.

The existing shares of such Shareholders in WWP, and the preferred share of ACS in WWP, shall be cancelled as at the Effective Date.

...

(d) Settlement of Employee Claims

The Claims of the Employees of WWP will be compromised under this Plan as follows:

(i) On or after the Effective Date the Employees will be paid 95% of the Admitted Wage Claims;

(ii) The Admitted Vacation Entitlement Claims of the Employees shall be maintained by WWP for the Employees. For those Employees that return to employment with WWP, they shall retain their unused vacation entitlements that form part of the Admitted Vacation Entitlement Claims. In respect of any Employee that does not return to employment with WWP within 12 months of the Effective Date, WWP shall pay to that Employee 85% of the value of the Admitted Vacation Entitlement Claims of that Employee as such existed at the Filing Date, with such amounts to be paid within 18 months of the Effective Date; and

(iii) The Contingent Employee Claims shall be extinguished upon the Effective Date.

(e) Establishing NewCo. and Issuance of Shares to Creditors

On or prior to the Effective Date, WWP shall cause NewCo. to be incorporated or established by WWP (at the expense of WWP). The Monitor, or his designate, shall be appointed as the interim director of NewCo., until the first meeting of the shareholders of NewCo. referred to below. On the Effective Date, NewCo. will issue in favour of the participating Creditors the appropriate number of common voting shares in the capital stock of NewCo. on the bases set forth in sections 4.1(b) and 4.1(c) above, provided that no fractional shares shall be issued. The rights of the holders of these common voting shares shall be consistent with the rights of the holders of common voting equity shares, including the right to receive dividends as and when declared. A meeting of shareholders of NewCo. will be convened within 6 months of the Effective Date to elect a board of directors of NewCo. and to conduct such other business as may be required or determined by the shareholders of NewCo. and the interim acting director of NewCo.

...

(i) Extent of Release

For greater certainty: each of

(a) **the payments to a Creditor under subparagraph 4(1)(b)(i) above;**

(b) **the issuance of shares in NewCo pursuant to subparagraph 4(1)(b)(ii) above;**

(c) **the issuance of shares in NewCo pursuant to paragraph 4(1)(c) above; and**

(d) **the settlement of the Employee Claims pursuant to paragraph 4(1)(d) above.**

shall settle in full all claims, causes of action, demands, rights, indebtedness, obligations and liability (collectively, "Rights") of the Creditor holding such Rights whether such Rights are made or asserted against WWP or are capable of being asserted against any other Person, including whether pursuant to a joint and several obligation with WWP, a several obligation, a guarantee obligation, an absolute obligation, a contingent obligation or any obligation of any nature derived directly or indirectly from or through or in relation to any Rights, including any Rights that may be asserted under or pursuant to any livestock dealer bond or any livestock dealer regulations, whether against WWP or any other Person, other than the Rights of the DIP Lender in respect of the DIP Loan.

[Emphasis Added]

...

4.12 **Releases**

Except as provided hereafter, on the Effective Date, WWP and each and every present and former shareholder, officer, director, employee, financial advisor, legal counsel and agent of WWP and the Monitor and their respective legal counsel (individually, a "Released Party") and any person claimed to be liable derivatively through any Released Party **(including any Person described in paragraph 4.1(i) above, with respect to all rights of such Person),** shall be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, liens and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Person may be entitled to assert including, without limitation, any and all claims in respect of potential statutory liabilities of the former and present directors and officers of WWP, and any alleged fiduciary or other duty, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or

hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to, arising out of or in connection with Claims or Post-Filing Claims, the business and affairs of WWP, this Plan and the CCAA Proceedings to the full extent permitted by law, and all claims arising out of such actions or omissions shall be forever waived and released (other than the right to enforce WWP's obligations under the Plan or any related document), provide that nothing herein:

(a) shall release or discharge a Released Party from a Claim which cannot be compromised under the CCAA; or

(b) shall affect the rights of any Person to pursue any recoveries for a Claim against a Released Party that may be obtained against a third-party insurer or other entity not released under this Plan (but, for certainty, any such Claim to which an insurer may be subrogated shall be released hereunder); provided, further, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing releases under the Plan, any Claim asserted against WWP pursuant to Article 2.3(c) of this Plan shall remain subject to any right of set-off that otherwise would be available to WWP in the absence of such releases; or

(c) shall release the directors and former directors of WWP in respect of any claims that may be made against them by creditors pursuant to the Order of Mr. Justice D. Ball, granted on August 17, 2005 in the CCAA proceedings.

...

6.2 Application for Court Sanction Order

If Creditor approval is obtained, WWP shall forthwith apply for the Court Sanction Order. Unless otherwise provided in the Order, the Court Sanction Order shall not become effective until the Effective Date. On the Effective Date, subject to the satisfaction of the conditions contained in Sections 6.1 and 6.4 hereof, the Plan will be implemented by WWP and shall be binding upon all Creditors having Claims or Rights affected by this Plan and Post-Filing Claims affected by this Plan to the extent of such Claims or Rights or Post-Filing Claims and upon all other Persons. If the conditions contained in Sections 6.1 or 6.4 are not satisfied, the Effective Date will not occur and this Plan and the Court Sanction Order shall cease to have any further force or effect, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

...

8.4 **Compromise Effective for All Purposes**

> The compromise or other satisfaction of any Claim under this Plan, if sanctioned and approved by the Court under the Court Sanction Order shall be binding on the Effective Date on all Creditors in accordance with the term of this Plan and such Creditor's heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns, for all purposes.
>
> 8.5 **Consents, Waivers and Agreements**
>
> On the Effective Date, each Creditor affected by this Plan shall be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of this Plan in their entirety. In particular, each such Creditor (for greater certainty, except for the DIP Lender in respect of the DIP Loan) and other affected Persons shall be deemed:
>
> ...
>
> (d) to have released any and all Claims and Rights, save and except the Unaffected Claims and all payments or other Distributions to be made to such Creditor pursuant to the provisions of this Plan or any agreement or arrangement contemplated by this Plan.
>
> [Emphasis in Original]

[19] The effect of the Amended Plan was that all debts owing to secured and unsecured creditors of WWP were to be compromised, by converting the dollar value of such debts into shares of NewCo., a holding company that was to hold a specified percentage of the common shares of WWP. As well, all claims of shareholders, whether they were in respect of shareholder loans or any other amounts owed to them by WWP, were to be compromised by such shareholders receiving a pro rata share of 10% of the NewCo. shares. That is, 10% of the NewCo. shares were to be allocated among the existing shareholders of WWP. As well, all employee claims were settled, in general, by a payment of 95% of the admitted wage claim.

[20] On January 25, 2006 at the creditors' meeting, the majority of creditors voted to accept the Amended Plan.

[21] The Amended Plan was sanctioned by the court on February 6, 2006. The February 6, 2006 Court Sanction Order of Justice Ball stated the following at paras. 10 and 12:

> **10. Upon the Effective Date, all Claims and Rights, except Unaffected Claims, of Creditors of the Applicant be and they are hereby forever discharged and extinguished, subject to payment of any amounts to be paid under the Plan, the issuance of the shares in the Applicant to NewCo. and the issuance of shares in NewCo. to the Creditors entitled to receive same, as provided in the Plan.**
>
> ...
>
> 12. Upon the occurrence of the Effective Date, subject to:
>
> (a) the repayment of the DIP Loan to the DIP Lender;
>
> (b) the payment of the amounts to be paid under the Plan;
>
> (c) the issuance of the shares of the Applicant to NewCo. as provided in the Plan;
>
> (d) the issuance of shares in NewCo. to the Creditors entitled to receive same, as provided in the Plan; and
>
> (e) the payment of 95% of the Admitted Wage Claims to the Employees;
>
> **all Charges held by any Creditors of the Applicant shall be released and discharged**, except the Administrative Charge (as that term is defined in the Initial Order), and the Post-Application Creditors Charge (as that term is defined in the Order Extending the CCAA Proceedings made July 18, 2005 by Justice D. Ball). In the event that the Creditor holding such released and discharged Charge does not deliver to the Applicant's counsel, Balfour Moss LLP, a withdrawal and discharge respecting such Charge to be utilized on or after the Effective date, the Applicant may apply to the Court for an Order releasing or discharging such Charge, at the cost and expense of such Creditor.
>
> [Emphasis Added]

[22] Following the effective date of the Amended Plan, the Monitor issued shares to all creditors of WWP in accordance with the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order.

Cheng was issued 1,521 shares in NewCo., representing 1.7% of the common shares in NewCo., in accordance with the Court Sanction Order.

[23] The plaintiffs now apply to amend their statement of claim and applies to add Amos Skinner, Ernie Donnawell and the Government of Saskatchewan as defendants. The relevant portions of the plaintiffs' proposed amended claim include the following (the proposed amendments are underlined):

> 1. This is an action for breach of contract, shareholder oppression, breach of a director's fiduciary duty to his company, and wrongful dismissal.
>
> 2. The Plaintiff, Tom King Tong Cheng ("Tom"), resides in Richmond, British Columbia. Tom is a shareholder and director of Worldwide Pork Company Ltd.
>
> 3. The Plaintiff, Cheng Family Trust, is a trust located in Saskatchewan. Tom is the Trustee and also a director of Cheng Family Trust. Tom and Cheng Family Trust are minority shareholders of Worldwide.
>
> ...
>
> 5. The Defendant, Kenji Nose ("Nose"), resides in Vancouver, British Columbia. Nose is a shareholder, officer, and director of Worldwide. Nose is the Trustee and ~~also is also~~ the managing director of the Defendant, Nose Family Trust. Nose Family Trust is liable for any and all damage suffered by reason of any actions taken by Nose while acting as its trustee.
>
> ...
>
> 6.1 The Defendant, The Government of Saskatchewan, represents the Crown in right of the Province of Saskatchewan. The Plaintiffs plead and rely on *The Proceedings against the Crown Act*. The Government of Saskatchewan, is vicariously liable for the actions and inactions of its employees, agents, and principals, including the Minister and Department of Agriculture and Food of Saskatchewan, Amos Skinner, and Ernie Donnawell.
>
> 6.2 The Defendant Ernie Donnawell resides in Regina, Saskatchewan.
>
> 6.3 The Defendant Amos Skinner resides in Wilkie, Saskatchewan.

...

8. The current Directors of Worldwide are Ernie Donnawell, Tom and Nose. Amos Skinner was a Director from Worldwides creation in 1999 until about May 2001.

...

9. The shareholders of Worldwide are Tom, Cheng Family Trust, Nose, Nose Family Trust, Okonomi House Limited ("Okonomi"), Yamato Development Canada Inc. ("Yamato"), and the Minister of Agriculture and Food of Saskatchewan. The Minister is involved through a government program called the Agri Food Equity Fund ("AFEF").

11. The Director Ernie Donnawell is an employee of the Government of Saskatchewan and currently represents the interests of AFEF. Prior to Ernie Donnawell, AFEF was represented by Amos Skinner.

...

22. On February 18, 2000, Okonomi and Cita Foods Inc. ("Cita") signed a five year contract for the sale of pork products ("the Purchase Agreement"). Tom signed the Purchase Agreement on behalf of Cita. Cita was to provide the pork products to Okonomi. Cita's contract was then assigned to Worldwide.

23. Since the Purchase Agreement was assigned to Worldwide Nose has caused Okonomi to fail or refuse to acquire and pay for pork from Worldwide as required under the Purchase Agreement. Instead the Defendants have caused Worldwide to sell pork at a lower price to Rocky Japan. Rocky Japan is a company owned and controlled by Nose.

24. Furthermore, Worldwide and Nose, Ernie Donnawell and The Government of Saskatchewan have failed to commence and [sic] action against Okonomi for breach of contract or take any other action to rectify the breach of the Purchase Agreement.

...

26. As a director of Worldwide, Nose, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan has not acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.

27. Nose and The Government of Saskatchewan, through its agents, including Amos Skinner and Ernie Donnawell, has breached the

fiduciary duties he owed to Worldwide in his capacity of director.

...

34. Nose and Worldwide have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom by failing to make any payment on account of deferred start up costs and shareholder loan, contrary to the agreements between Nose and Tom, contrary to Nose's representations, and contrary to Tom's reasonable expectations.

35. The Defendants, including The Government of Saskatchewan, have failed to provide notice to Tom of both director's and shareholder's meetings. Director's meetings have been held without providing notice to Tom and Tom has received no notice of shareholder's meetings, including the annual shareholder's meeting. The Defendants, including The Government of Saskatchewan, have also failed to advise Tom of material changes to Worldwide.

36. Nose and Worldwide, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom and Cheng Family Trust by failing to enforce the Purchase Agreement, failing to try to make any profits, failing to pay dividends, failing to provide notice of director's meetings, failing to provide notice of shareholders meetings, and failing to employ Tom.

37. As a result of the actions, inactions, and breach of fiduciary duty of Nose, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan, Worldwide and its shareholders, including Tom and Cheng Family Trust, have suffered damages, including monetary loss.

...

39. Prior to Purchase Agreement being closed, Amos Skinner (who represented AFEF and the Minister) and Nose colluded to force Tom to accept a management contract which was not satisfactory to Tom. Tom signed his management contract under duress.

42. Tom had a significant interest in and expectation of management of Worldwide. Tom had a reasonable expectation of a fair management package. Nose and The Government of Saskatchewan, and Worldwide have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom by terminating his employment as President and Chief Executive Officer.

...

49. THE PLAINTIFFS THEREFORE claim against the Defendants, jointly and severally:

(a) Payment on account of the deferred start up costs, ie. the time, effort and expenses of Tom incurred to get Worldwide up and running;

(b) Buyout of their shares by the company at fair market value;

(c) Compensation for unpaid past and future dividends;

(d) Appointment of an interim receiver-manager;

(e) In the alternative, an order removing the existing Directors and appointing new Directors;

(f) General Damages, for wrongful dismissal, and shareholder oppression, and breach of a director's fiduciary duty, including pay in lieu of notice;

(g) Monetary Damages, including special damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

(h) Vacation pay and other such payments and benefits as Tom may be entitled to;

(i) Pre-Judgment interest pursuant to The Pre-Judgment Interest Act;

(j) Aggravated and Punitive Damages;

(k) Costs of and incidental to the within action on a solicitor-client basis;

(l) A stay of the BC action;

(m) In the alternative, Set Off for any damages awarded in the BC action;

(n) Other such relief as counsel may request and this Honourable Court may award.

[24] It is clear that the claims that Cheng seeks to advance against the proposed defendants Donnawell, Skinner and the Government in the proposed amended claim are the identical claims advanced against WWP and the defendant Kenji Nose, when the claim was issued in December 2002. Cheng advised the Monitor of these claims against

WWP when Cheng's proof of claim, alleging that WWP was indebted to Cheng in the amount of $2,602,000.00 was filed. When Cheng was requested to provide particulars of the claim, Cheng filed a copy of the within statement of claim (without the amendments adding the proposed defendants) with the Monitor. The allegations in the statement of claim were the basis upon which Cheng suggested WWP was indebted to Cheng, and the statement of claim was incorporated by reference into the Cheng proof of claim.

[25] The only cause of action that might possibly be viewed as a new cause of action in the proposed amended claim is the proposed amendment to paragraph one, which amendment states that this is an action for "breach of directors' fiduciary duty to his company". Otherwise the causes of action in the proposed amended claim are the same as they existed at the time Cheng filed the proof of claim under the CCAA proceedings.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[26] The plaintiffs now seek an order which would permit them to amend the statement of claim to add the proposed defendants Amos Skinner, Ernie Donnawell and the Government as parties. Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs indicated, in chambers, that the Monitor in the CCAA action told him that the claims against the directors or other liable parties would not be extinguished by the CCAA court order which sanctioned the Amended Plan.

[27] The plaintiffs seek, in the alternative the stated disclosure from the Government and the ability to discover Government officials.

[28] The defendants assert that the court should not allow the amendments to the statement of claim, because the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order clearly compromised and extinguished all of the Cheng claims against the directors, officers, shareholders and employees of WWP. The defendants assert further that the amendments assert no reasonable cause of action, are vexatious and frivolous and/or an abuse of process.

[29] The defendants take the further position that the plaintiffs have not established entitlement to disclosure nor to cross-examine Government officials.

ISSUES

1. **Did the CCAA Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order compromise, extinguish or settle the proposed claims of the plaintiffs against the proposed defendants Skinner, Donnawell and the Government?**

2. **If the plaintiffs' proposed claims were not extinguished by the CCAA Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order, should the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their statement of claim as proposed?**

3. Should the requested disclosure be ordered against the Government?

4. Should the plaintiffs be granted leave to examine the Government's officer currently in charge of AFEF?

ANALYSIS

1. Did the CCAA Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order compromise, extinguish or settle the claims of the plaintiffs against the proposed defendants Skinner, Donnawell and the Government?

(a) The Law

[30] Section 5.1 of the CCAA provides for the release of a petitioning debtor company's directors in a compromise arrangement in respect of a debtor company in limited circumstances. Specifically s. 5.1 states:

> **5.1**(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> (3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

...

[31] A plan of compromise respecting a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of a debtor company, where the directors are legally liable, in their capacity as directors, for the payment of such claims. The right to compromise such claims is limited by the provision of s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA. To facilitate the making of such compromises, s. 11.5(1) of the CCAA permits a stay order to be made against creditors with claims against directors.

[32] The Ontario Court of Appeal in the *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)* 2008 ONCA 587 confirmed that a bankruptcy court also has jurisdiction to sanction the release of third parties (which would include parties other than directors referred to in s.5.1 of the CCAA) in circumstances that are deemed appropriate for the success of the plan. The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Metcalfe, supra* said at para. 43:

> [43] On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on <u>all</u> creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. ...

[33] The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to comment on this issue of releasing potentially liable parties further at paras. 61-63 and 70 and 74:

[61] The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and arrangement." I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

[62] A proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S. 1985, c.B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 at 349; *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000, 50 O.R. (3d) 688 at para. 11 (C.A.). In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes, and therefore is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Re Air Canada* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J.)at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Gen. Div.) at 518.

[63] There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan — including the provision for releases — becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

> [70] The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan. This nexus exists here in my view.

...

[74] Third party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructuring since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 265 A.R. 201, leave to appeal refused

> by *Resurgence Asset Management LLC v. Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 266 A.R. 131 (C.A.), and [2001] 293 AR. 351 (S.C.C.). In *Re Muscle Tech Research and Development Inc.* (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):
>
> > [It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.
> >
> > [Emphasis Added]

[34] It is clear that a plan of compromise or arrangement which releases directors and/or third parties and which is sanctioned by the court is binding on all creditors.

[35] There is one relevant exception to the release of a director. Under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA, a release may not relate to a claim against a director which cannot be compromised under the CCAA. Those claims that cannot be compromised under the CCAA are set out in s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA, which I repeat here for ease of reference:

> **5.1** **...**
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:
>
> (a) relate to the contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

[36] The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Metcalfe, supra* discussed the right of a creditor to pursue a claim for misrepresentation against a director, one of the excepted type of claims under s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA. In doing so, the Ontario Court of Appeal commented on the case of *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.*, (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.) which allowed a creditor to pursue a claim against a director for negligent

misrepresentation. The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Metcalfe, supra* court said the following at paras. 83 and 84:

> [83] Nor is the decision of this Court in the *NBD Bank* case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The Bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors." Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the Bank. On appeal, he argued that since the Bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process — in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.
>
> [84] Rosenberg J.A., writing for this Court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations at paras. 53-54:
>
> > 53 In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at 297, the *CCAA* is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.
> >
> > 54 In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the *CCAA* and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and*

> *Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Footnote omitted.]

[37] The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in *BlueStar Battery Systems International Corp. (Re)* (2000), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (QL), in considering an application by a creditor for a declaration that its claim against directors had not been compromised, said the following about s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA at para. 14:

> 14 What then if RevCan here had in fact perfected its claim against the directors? Would the directors have been able to utilize s. 5.1 of the CCAA as a safe haven? It would appear to me that the directors would have been entitled (s.5.1(1)) to have included in the Plan a compromise of their liability included in the Plan and would not be disqualified (s. 5.1(2)) from doing so. This disqualification from utilizing s. 5.1(1) as is found in s. 5.1(2) relates to (a) contractual rights of a creditor, such as a guarantee by a director for example, or (b) claims based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors. Firstly there was nothing in this case to suggest that there was any sort of a contract (including a guarantee) from any of the directors. Secondly there was no allegation of any misrepresentation by any director nor was there any allegation of wrongful or oppressive conduct by any director. It would seem to me that while the reference in s. 5.1(2) is to "directors", it would seem that the disqualification should relate to those of the directors who may fall within (a) or (b) thereof. As to the (b) category, there was no allegation against any director in the RevCan material; it appears that all of the RevCan dealing and difficulties with respect to either promises or getting information were

> restricted to non-directors at BSCC. However it seems to me that the directors of any corporation in difficulty and contemplating a CCAA plan would be unwise to engage in a game of hide and go seek since the language of s. 5.1(2)(b) appears wide enough to encompass those situations where the directors stand idly by and do nothing to correct any misstatements or other wrongful or oppressive conduct of others in the corporation (either other directors acting qua directors, or officers or underlings). There was no evidence presented that the directors here had knowledge or ought to have had knowledge of such here. One may have the greatest of suspicion that they did or ought to have had such knowledge. This could have been crystallized if RevCan had put the directors on notice of the promises to pay GST. It would seem to me at first glance that the oppression claims cases which arise pursuant to corporate legislation such as the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) would be of assistance in defining "oppressive conduct". Similarly it would appear that "wrongful conduct" would be conduct which would be tortious (or akin thereto) as well as any conduct which was illegal.

[38] The law is clear that a plan of compromise and the bankruptcy court has the authority to release directors and third parties from claims of creditors, except claims which come under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA. The claims against directors that cannot be compromised under a CCAA plan include claims that relate to contractual rights of creditors (such as guarantees by directors to a creditor), or claims based on misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or claims for wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

(b) The WWP Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order

[39] Here, the CCAA Amended Plan compromised the claims of creditors. Section 4.1(c) of WWP's Amended Plan states that each shareholders' claim was compromised by the shareholders receiving a combined total of 10% of the shares of NewCo. The debts owing to all secured and unsecured creditors of WWP were compromised by converting the dollar value of such debts into shares of NewCo.

[40] Section 8.4 of the Amended Plan provided that the compromise under the Amended Plan was effective for all purposes. That section states:

> **8.4 Compromise Effective for All Purposes**
>
> The compromise or other satisfaction of any Claim under this Plan, if sanctioned and approved by the Court under the Court Sanction Order shall be binding on the Effective Date on all Creditors in accordance with the term of this Plan and such Creditor's heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns, for all purposes.

[41] Under s. 6(a) of the CCAA, the effect of court approval of the Amended Plan was to make the compromise or arrangement binding on all WPP's creditors or class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured. Further, s. 4.1(i) of the Amended Plan here indicated that the issuance of the shares in New Co. settled, in full, all claims of each creditor, whether such rights were made or asserted against WWP or were capable of being asserted against any other person, including whether pursuant to a joint and several obligation with WWP, a several obligation, a guarantee obligation, an absolute obligation, a contingent obligation or any obligation of any nature derived directly or indirectly from or through or in relation to any rights. Specifically I repeat s. 4.1(i):

> **(i) Extent of Release**
>
> **For greater certainty: each of**
>
> **(a) the payments to a Creditor under subparagraph 4(1)(b)(i) above;**
>
> **(b) the issuance of shares in NewCo pursuant to subparagraph 4(1)(b)(ii) above;**
>
> **(c) the issuance of shares in NewCo pursuant to paragraph 4(1)(c) above; and**

> **(d) the settlement of the Employee Claims pursuant to paragraph 4(1)(d) above.**
>
> **shall settle in full all claims, causes of action, demands, rights, indebtedness, obligations and liability (collectively, "Rights") of the Creditor holding such Rights whether such Rights are made or asserted against WWP or are capable of being asserted against any other Person, including whether pursuant to a joint and several obligation with WWP, a several obligation, a guarantee obligation, an absolute obligation, a contingent obligation or any obligation of any nature derived directly or indirectly from or through or in relation to any Rights, including any Rights that may be asserted under or pursuant to any livestock dealer bond or any livestock dealer regulations, whether against WWP or any other Person, other than the Rights of the DIP Lender in respect of the DIP Loan.**
>
> [Emphasis Added]

[42] Section 4.12 of the Amended Plan provided that all directors were released and discharged from all claims except, (for our purposes), those that cannot be compromised under the CCAA:

> **4.12 Releases**
>
> Except as provided hereafter, on the Effective Date, WWP and each and every present and former shareholder, officer, director, employee, financial advisor, legal counsel and agent of WWP and the Monitor and their respective legal counsel (individually, a "Released Party") and any person claimed to be liable derivatively through any Released Party **(including any Person described in paragraph 4.1(i) above, with respect to all rights of such Person),** shall be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, liens and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Person may be entitled to assert including, without limitation, any and all claims in respect of potential statutory liabilities of the former and present directors and officers of WWP, and any alleged fiduciary or other duty, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to, arising out of or in connection with Claims or Post-Filing Claims, the business and affairs of WWP, this Plan and the CCAA Proceedings to the full extent permitted by law, and all

> claims arising out of such actions or omissions shall be forever waived and released (other than the right to enforce WWP's obligations under the Plan or any related document), provide that nothing herein:
>
> (a) shall release or discharge a Released Party from a Claim which cannot be compromised under the CCAA; or
>
> (b) shall affect the rights of any Person to pursue any recoveries for a Claim against a Released Party that may be obtained against a third-party insurer or other entity not released under this Plan (but, for certainty, any such Claim to which an insurer may be subrogated shall be released hereunder); provided, further, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing releases under the Plan, any Claim asserted against WWP pursuant to Article 2.3(c) of this Plan shall remain subject to any right of set-off that otherwise would be available to WWP in the absence of such releases; or
>
> (c) shall release the directors and former directors of WWP in respect of any claims that may be made against them by creditors pursuant to the Order of Mr. Justice D. Ball, granted on August 17, 2005 in the CCAA proceedings.
>
> [Emphasis in Original]

[43] Paragraph 16 of the Court Sanction Order tracks the wording of s. 4.12 of the Amended Plan and confirms the release of all "released parties", which includes former shareholders and directors of WWP, as well as third parties. The release extended to include a release for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The only limitations on the release are set out in paras. 4.12(a), (b) and (c) of the Amended Plan, which I have referred to above. Paragraph 4.12(1)(a) confirms that the Amended Plan and Court Sanctioned Order does not release a party from a claim which could not be released under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA. Paragraph 4.12(b) stated that the Amended Plan did not affect the rights of any person to proceed against a third party insurer or other entity not released under the Plan, (which is not applicable here). Paragraph 4.12(c) did not release the

directors of WWP in respect of the claims of those specified creditors pursuant to the court's August 17, 2005 interim order, (which is not applicable here).

[44] Following the effective date of the Amended Plan, the Monitor of WWP issued shares to all creditors of WWP in accordance with the Plan and Court Sanction Order. Cheng was issued shares in NewCo. in accordance with the order. Cheng was a shareholder and director. The Cheng Family Trust was a shareholder. The plaintiffs received shares in NewCo. under the terms of the Amended Plan.

[45] In the plaintiffs' proposed amended claim the claims originally asserted by Cheng against WWP in the statement of claim are now being asserted against Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner and the Government. The plaintiffs proposed to assert these claims both jointly and severally against these proposed defendants, when previously they were asserted only against WWP and Kenji Nose.

[46] Mr. Skinner is a former director, officer and employee of WWP. Mr. Donnawell is a former director of WWP. The Government, through AFEF and ACS, is a former shareholder of WWP. Each of these proposed defendants is a "released party" under the Amended Plan, by virtue of s. 4.12 of the Amended Plan and paragraph 16 of the Court Sanction Order.

[47] It is easy to ascertain that the releases of the former shareholders and directors of WWP, were reasonably connected to the restructuring of WWP. The reason for such a broad release is obvious. WWP was insolvent. The restructuring plan provided a method by which it might be possible for the business to continue, albeit in a new form, without the constraints of the former obligations. The Amended Plan provided a

structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between WWP and its creditors, for the benefit of both. A compromise of claims provides for the successful reorganization of the company and avoids a liquidation that might yield little for creditors. Here, the creditors agreed to grant a release to WWP's officers, directors, shareholders and employees. The directors or officers who might be alleged to be liable to creditors for their actions as directors, would not be able to claim against WWP for indemnification, if they were entitled to such indemnification, because of the insolvency. Hence the releases of the directors. The creditors voted on this broad release when they approved the Amended Plan. The court assessed the fairness and reasonableness of the release, as a term of a complex restructuring arrangement, and confirmed the Amended Plan (including the release of directors) by order of the court.

[48] It is clear that (with the exception of the type of claims referred to in s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA, which I will deal with in due course) the Amended Plan and Court Order conclusively settled all rights of the plaintiffs against the proposed defendants in this action. In this case the only claims against the proposed defendants which were not compromised, discharged or released are those claims which cannot be compromised under s.5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[49] At this point then it is necessary to turn to the proposed amendments to determine whether or not the pleadings, as proposed to be amended, include claims which cannot be compromised by reason of paragraphs 4.12(a), (b) or (c) of the Amended Plan and s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[50] Firstly, it is clear that the plaintiffs' proposed amendments do not fall within the exceptions to the releases in paragraph 4.12(b) (third party insurer) or 4.12(c) (those specified creditors referred to in the August 17, 2005 order) of the Amended Plan.

[51] The question is whether the plaintiffs' proposed amendments fall within paragraph 4.12(a) of the Amended Plan, which paragraph precludes a release from a claim which cannot be compromised under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA. None of the plaintiffs' proposed amendments include claims relating to the contractual rights of a creditor (s. 5.1(2)(a) of the CCAA), such as a claim by a creditor for a guarantee executed by a director to a creditor. As a result, the only question is whether the plaintiffs' proposed amendments include a claim of the nature referred to in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA such as a claim for misrepresentation by a director to a creditor or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by a director.

(c) Do the Proposed Amendments Fall Within S. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA?

[52] I will deal with each of the allegations in the proposed amendments, as they relate to the exceptions in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA to determine if any of the proposed amended claims fall within the exception outlined in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA.

(i) The Proposed Addition of the Government as a Defendant

[53] The plaintiffs seek to add the Government as a defendant. The original pleadings, in paragraph 9, assert that the Government, through AFEF, was a shareholder in WWP. There is no assertion that the Government, AFEF or ACS was a director of WWP. In fact, none of these entities were directors of WWP. The Government, through AFEF and ACS was a shareholder in WWP.

[54] The exception under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA relates only to claims against directors. The CCAA does not limit a release or a compromise of a claim against a shareholder. Here, the release provisions in the Court Sanction Order released all shareholders. The release applies to AFEF and ACS (the Government) as shareholders. The Government was released, as a shareholder, from any claims as a result of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order. The plaintiffs, as a result of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order, have no right to add the Government as a defendant to this action.

(ii) Paragraph 6.1 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[55] Paragraph 6.1 as proposed to be amended states:

> 6.1 The Defendant, The Government of Saskatchewan, represents the Crown in right of the Province of Saskatchewan. The Plaintiffs plead and rely on *The Proceedings against the Crown Act*. The Government of Saskatchewan, is vicariously liable for the actions and inactions of its employees, agents, and principals, including the Minister and Department of Agriculture and Food of Saskatchewan, Amos Skinner, and Ernie Donnawell.

[56] The claim proposed in paragraph 6.1 asserts the Government is vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees, Ernie Donnawell and Amos Skinner as well as the

Minister of and Department of Agriculture and Food (who are not proposed defendants). As I stated, the Government as a shareholder was released from liability under the CCAA proceedings. Further, an allegation of vicarious liability does not come within the exception of s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA. As a result of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order the plaintiffs have no right to assert a claim of vicarious liability against the Government. The plaintiffs are not entitled to amend this claim as proposed in paragraph 6.1.

(iii) Paragraph 24 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[57] Para. 24 as proposed to be amended states:

> 24. Furthermore, Worldwide and Nose, Ernie Donnawell and The Government of Saskatchewan have failed to commence and [sic] action against Okonomi for breach of contract or take any other action to rectify the breach of the Purchase Agreement.

[58] This proposed amendment asserts a cause of action for failure to commence an action for breach of contract. As stated, the plaintiffs have no right to assert a claim against the Government, as the claims against the shareholders were compromised by the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order.

[59] This proposed amendment, as it relates to Skinner and Donnawell, does not assert a cause of action that falls within the exceptions set out in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA. The plaintiffs' right to assert this claim against Donnawell and Skinner have been compromised by the Amended Plan and Court Order. The plaintiffs are not entitled to amend their claim as proposed in paragraph 24.

(iv) Paragraph 26 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[60] Paragraph 26 as proposed to be amended states :

> 26. As a director of Worldwide, Nose, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan has not acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.

[61] The claim here asserts an action for lack of good faith and honesty to ensure the best interests of WWP. As I have stated, the Government was not a director of WWP. It was a shareholder, through AFEF and ACS. The plaintiffs have no right to assert the claim against the Government, as the claims against the shareholders were compromised by the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order.

[62] The allegation contained in the proposed amendment in paragraph 26 against Amos Skinner and Ernie Donnawell, does not allege any cause of action like misrepresentation by Skinner or Donnawell to Cheng, nor does it allege any wrongful or oppressive conduct by Skinner or Donnawell to Cheng. The plaintiffs, as a result of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order have no right to assert this cause of action against Skinner or Donnawell. The plaintiffs are not entitled to amend the claim as proposed in paragraph 26.

(v) Paragraph 27 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[63] Paragraph 27 as proposed to be amended states:

> 27. Nose and The Government of Saskatchewan, through its agents, including Amos Skinner and Ernie Donnawell, has breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Worldwide in his capacity of director.

The pleading in paragraph 27 relates, it seems, to the proposed amended paragraph 1 which states:

> 1. This is an action for breach of contract, shareholder oppression, breach of a director's fiduciary duty to his company, and wrongful dismissal.

[64] The pleadings allege that the Government is liable, for Skinner and Donnawell's alleged breach of their fiduciary duties to WWP. Again, the Government, as a shareholder, is not subject to the exception set out in s. 5.2(2) of the CCAA. The plaintiffs have no right to assert the claim against the Government.

[65] Paragraph 4.12 of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order specifically released all parties from any claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Amended Plan and Court Sanctioned Order extinguished all claims against Skinner and Donnawell, except those precluded from extinguishment under s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty to WWP does not come within the exception set out in s.5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA. The plaintiffs do not have the right to pursue this claim against Skinner and Donnawell. The plaintiffs are not entitled to amend the claim as proposed in paragraph 27 and paragraph 1.

(vi) Paragraph 35 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[66] Paragraph 35 as proposed to be amended states:

> 35. The Defendants, including The Government of Saskatchewan, have failed to provide notice to Tom of both director's and shareholder's meetings. Director's meetings have been held without providing notice to Tom and Tom has received no notice of shareholder's meetings, including the annual shareholder's meeting. The Defendants, including The Government of Saskatchewan, have also failed to advise Tom of material changes to Worldwide.

[67] Paragraph 35 alleges that the defendants, including the Government, failed to provide Tom Cheng with notice of directors' meetings and failed to advise him of material changes to WWP. The proposed amendment to paragraph 35 asserts these allegations against the Government, which was a shareholder. The restriction on compromise of claims contained in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA, as I have stated, does not extend to shareholders. The plaintiffs are precluded from bringing those actions against the Government. The plaintiffs may not amend paragraph 35 to add the Government.

[68] If the plaintiffs are allowed to amend to add Skinner and Donnawell as defendants, both individuals would be defendants under paragraph 35 (although they were not specifically referred to in paragraph 35). The pleading here, if allowed against Skinner and Donnawell, of failure to give notice of directors and shareholders meetings is one which could, arguably, potentially, be characterized as oppressive conduct by directors. This same allegation is repeated in paragraph 36.

(vii) Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[69] Paragraph 36 and 37 as proposed to be amended claim state:

> 36. Nose and Worldwide, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom and Cheng Family Trust by failing to enforce the Purchase Agreement, failing to try to make any profits, failing to pay dividends, failing to provide notice of director's meetings, failing to provide notice of shareholders meetings, and failing to employ Tom.
>
> 37. As a result of the actions, inactions, and breach of fiduciary duty of Nose, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner, and The Government of Saskatchewan, Worldwide and its shareholders, including Tom and Cheng Family Trust, have suffered damages, including monetary loss.

[70] As stated earlier, the plaintiffs do not have a right to assert these claims against the Government as a shareholder. The plaintiffs may not add the Government as defendants in paragraphs 36 and 37.

[71] The proposed amendments in paragraph 36, and the alleged damages flowing therefrom claimed in paragraph 37, again, as against Skinner and Donnawell could potentially be characterized as a claim which comes under the exception of 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA, as allegations of oppressive conduct.

[72] A more in depth analysis of the claims proposed to be asserted against Skinner and Donnawell contained in paragraphs 35 and 36 is necessary to determine if they do come within the exception (which I will turn to in due course).

(viii) Paragraph 42 of the Proposed Amended Claim

[73] Paragraph 42 of the proposed amended claim asserts:

> 42. Tom had a significant interest in and expectation of management of Worldwide. Tom had a reasonable expectation of a fair management package. Nose and The Government of Saskatchewan, and Worldwide have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom by terminating his employment as President and Chief Executive Officer.

[74] Again, the plaintiffs have no right to assert this claim against the Government, as shareholder, as a result of the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order. The plaintiffs are not entitled to amend paragraph 42 to add the Government in paragraph 42.

(d) Proposed Amendments which are Claims which Could Potentially Come within the Exception in S. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA

[75] In the end, the only proposed amendments which might come within the exception set out in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA, are contained in the proposed amendments to paragraphs 35,36 and 37 as they relate to Skinner and Donnawell. The balance of the claims, as the plaintiffs propose to amend the claim, have been compromised or extinguished by the Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order and the plaintiffs do not have leave to amend in regard to those claims.

[76] As stated, a more in depth analysis of the proposed amendments to paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 needs to be undertaken to determine if the proposed amended pleadings are claims for wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors. I repeat the proposed amendments here for ease of reference.

> 35. The Defendants have failed to provide notice to Tom of both director's and shareholder's meetings. Director's meetings have been held without providing notice to Tom and Tom has received no notice of shareholder's meetings. The Defendants have also failed to advise Tom of material changes to Worldwide.
>
> 36. Nose and Worldwide, Ernie Donnawell and Amos Skinner have acted in an oppressive manner and unfairly disregarded the interests of Tom and Cheng Family Trust by failing to enforce the Purchase Agreement, failing to try to make any profits, failing to pay dividends, failing to provide notice of director's meetings, failing to provide notice of shareholders meetings, and failing to employ Tom.
>
> 37. As a result a result of the actions, inactions, and breach of fiduciary duty of Nose, Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner and Worldwide and its shareholders, including Tom and Cheng Family Trust, have suffered damages, including monetary loss.

[77] Justice Gabrielson reviewed the law relating to oppressive conduct under s. 234 of *The Business Corporations Act*, R.S.S. 1978, c.B-10, as am. in *Smith v. Dawgs Canada Distribution Ltd.*, 2008 SKQB 219, [2008] 11 W.W.R. 342, commencing at para. 18 and said the following:

> 18 In the case of *Wind Ridge Farms Ltd. v. Quadra Group Investments Ltd.*, [1999] 12 W.W.R. 203, 180 Sask. R. 231 (Sask. C.A.), the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal listed a number of points to be considered when relief is requested against oppression pursuant to s. 234 of BCA. At para. 30, Vancise J.A. stated:
>
> > 30 The primary issue on this appeal is a narrow one — did the chambers judge err in finding that the conduct of the respondents was not oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the interests of the appellants pursuant to s. 234 of the *Act*? The approach to be taken in an application under s. 234 of the *Act* was described by this court in *347883 Albert Ltd. v. Producers Pipeline Inc.* [(1991), 92 Sask. R. 81 (C.A.)]. Section 234 of the *Act* was interpreted by this court in *Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd. and Eiserman* [(1989), 67 Sask. R. 1 C.A.)]. Sherstobitoff, J.A., speaking for the court set out the legislative history and jurisprudential development of the remedies available

> under s. 234 of the *Act*. A number of points emerge from his analysis:
>
> ...
>
> 2. Oppressive conduct is at the lowest a visible departure from the standard of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which shareholders who entrust their money to a company are entitled to rely. See: *Elder v. Elderand Watson Ltd.*, [[1952] S.C. 49 (Scot. Sess. Ct.)]. Oppressive conduct has also been described as a lack of probity and fair dealings in the affairs of the company to the prejudice of some portion of its members. See: *Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Mayer* [[1958] 3 All E.R. 66];
>
> 3. The terms "unfair" and "prejudice" are defined as conduct that is unjust and inequitable and unfairly prejudicial. See: *Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd.* (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C.); *Miller and Miller v. Mendel (F.) Holdings Ltd. and Mitchell* [(1984), 30 Sask. R. 298 (Q.B.)];
>
> 4. Section 234 is remedial legislation for the relief of minority shareholders and is to be given a broad interpretation;
>
> 5. Relief may be given upon proof of unfair prejudice to, or disregard of a shareholder's interests. See: *Mason v. Intercity Properties Ltd.* [(1987), 22 O.A.C. 161 (C.A.)];
>
> 6. The section should be interpreted broadly to carry out its purpose. See: *Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp.* [(1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (Ont. C.A.)];
>
> 7. Each case will be decided on its own facts: what is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial in one case may not necessarily be so in a different set of circumstances.

[78] It can be noted from the *Smith v. Dawgs, supra* case that there is a contextual aspect to the allegation of oppressive conduct. The jurisprudence has stated, that what is oppressive in one situation may not be oppressive in another situation. Here, the claim in paras. 35, 36 and 37 were originally asserted against WWP and Kenji Nose. The plaintiffs now seek to add Skinner and Donnawell as defendants, but do not seek to

amend paras. 35, 36 or 37 to add any particulars which are asserted against Skinner or Donnawell. The pleadings as presently proposed make only general and inexact allegations against all defendants and proposed defendants.

[79] The pleadings are insufficient to determine whether they disclose material facts which would give rise to such a cause of action against Skinner or Donnawell under the s. 5.1(2)(b) exception. The pleadings just make broad accusations. The pleadings do not indicate when it is alleged that each or either of the proposed defendants acted in the alleged wrongful or oppressive manner. The pleadings do not indicate with sufficient particularity the material facts alleged which amount to wrongful or oppressive conduct. The pleadings do not indicate with sufficient particularity what liability, loss or prejudice it is alleged that flows from the alleged conduct of each director to Cheng.

[80] I am unable to determine that the proposed amendments come within the s. 5.1(2)(b) exception of the CCAA as the pleadings are insufficient to make such a determination. They fail to provide sufficient particulars for me to conclude that the claims are claims that do come within the s. 5.1(2)(b) exception of the CCAA.

[81] While it was my initial inclination to dismiss the plaintiffs' application to add Skinner and Donnawell, as I could not be satisfied that the claims against them come within the exception in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CAA, upon reflection, I am of the view that the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to more particularly plead the causes of action as they relate to paragraphs 35 and 36. It is possible that the insufficiency here relates to the drafting inadequacy in the pleadings, and not the substance of the claim. As such, I am of the view it would be appropriate to allow the plaintiffs to provide whatever particulars they choose in relation to paragraphs 35 and 36 before I determine whether

or not the proposed causes of action come within the exception set out in s. 5.1(2)(b) of the CCAA.

(e) Conclusion

[82] The plaintiffs' application to amend the statement of claim and to add Ernie Donnawell, Amos Skinner and the Government is dismissed, except in relation to the claims asserted in paras. 35 and 36 of the statement of claim.

[83] In relation to the claims asserted in paras. 35 and 36 of the statement of claim and the loss allegedly flowing therefrom asserted in para. 37, the plaintiffs are not allowed to amend the pleadings or to add Amos Skinner or Ernie Donnawell in the form of the amendments as proposed.

[84] However, the plaintiffs have leave to file a motion to amend and to add Skinner and Donnawell in relation to the claims asserted in paras. 35 and 36 within 60 days of the date of this judgment. The plaintiffs must attach and file the draft proposed amended pleadings which more particularly set out the proposed causes of action as they relate to Skinner and Donnawell and paras. 35 and 36 at the time of the filing of the motion.

[85] In the event that the plaintiffs do not bring such a motion with the draft proposed amended pleading attached within 60 days of this judgment, the plaintiffs' application to amend the claim and to Add Skinner and Donnawell is dismissed.

2. If the plaintiffs' proposed claims were not extinguished by the CCAA Amended Plan and Court Sanction Order, should the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their statement of claim as proposed?

[86] As I have indicated earlier, the pleadings as they relate to the proposed defendants Skinner and Donnawell are inadequate to determine whether there is a claim which falls within the exception set out in s. 5.2(1)(b) of the CCAA. Further, the pleadings in paras. 35, 36 and 37 are inadequate for me to determine whether or not the proposed amendments should be allowed under Rule 38 and 165 of *The Queen's Bench Rules of Court*. As I have allowed the plaintiffs to come back within 60 days, if they choose to, with more particularized pleadings, the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their pleadings having regard to Rule 38 and Rule 165 will be determined at that stage.

[87] If the plaintiffs choose not to bring a further motion to amend the pleadings within the 60 days, the plaintiffs application will be dismissed. If the plaintiffs choose to bring a motion back before me within the 60 days, with further amendments to paragraph 35, 36 and 37, I will consider their application to amend and add defendants as it relates to Rule 38 and Rule 165 and the jurisprudence at that time.

3. Should the requested disclosure be ordered against the Government?

[88] The plaintiffs seek an order pursuant to Rule 236 that the Government produce those documents in its possession that relate to WWP and the directors of WWP that the Government appointed.

[89] There is nothing in the notice of motion which sets out the grounds for such relief. More importantly, there is no evidence contained in the affidavit filed in support of the application to set out the basis for the order. There is no evidence which would indicate why the documents are required, what attempts have been made to obtain them from the present parties to the litigation, and no indication whether examinations for discovery have yet occurred.

[90] As no evidentiary basis has been made to order the relief requested, and as it appears to be premature having regard to the fact that neither Ernie Donnawell or Amos Skinner has yet been added as defendants, the application is dismissed at this time.

4. Should the plaintiffs be granted leave to examine the Government's officer currently in charge at AFEF?

[91] The plaintiffs seek an order, pursuant to Rule 222A of *The Queen's Bench Rules of Court* for leave to examine that officer of the Government that is currently in charge of AFEF. Nothing in the affidavit filed in support of this application indicates the basis upon which the plaintiffs might be entitled to an order under Rule 222A. The Cheng affidavit states at paragraph 19 that the parties are currently at the discovery of documents stage. There is no evidence to suggest that examinations for discovery of any of the defendants have yet occurred. Rule 222A states that an order should not be made under this Rule unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is unable to obtain the information from other persons. In *D.K. v. Miazga* 2002 SKQB 521; 2002] S.J. No. 775 (Sask. Q.B.), this Court held that where there has been no attempt to obtain information directly from a non-party, and where examinations of a party would perhaps make it possible to obtain the information, the conditions precedent for this rule have not been met and the court

should not order the examination of a non-party. It is my view that the relief requested by the plaintiffs here is premature, and I decline to make the order at this time.

COSTS

[92] The defendant shall have taxable costs of the application, which costs shall be paid in any event of the cause and are payable forthwith.

J.
C.L. Dawson

TAB 7

Re Canadian Airlines Corporation, 2000 ABQB 442

Date: 20000627

Action No. 0001-05071

IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED;

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT* (ALBERTA) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, AS AMENDED, SECTION 185

AND IN THE MATTER OF CANADIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION AND CANADIAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL LTD.

REASONS FOR DECISION

of the

HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE M. S. PAPERNY

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAIL") seek the court's sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the ***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*** ("CCAA") and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation ("Air Canada"). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

[2] The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value. Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada's financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

[3] Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. BACKGROUND

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

[4] CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the ***Business Corporations Act*** of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 ("ABCA"). 82% of CAC's shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd.("853350") and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC's principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited ("CRAL"). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as "Canadian" in these reasons.

[5] In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines ("PWA") to one of Canada's two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited ("CP Air"), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. ("Nordair") and Eastern Provincial Airways ("Eastern"). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, "Canadian Airlines International Ltd.", which was launched in April, 1987.

[6] By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

[7] CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. (“CRAL 98") provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

[8] CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

Events Leading up to the CCAA Proceedings

[9] Canadian’s financial difficulties significantly predate these proceedings.

[10] In the early 1990s, Canadian experienced significant losses from operations and deteriorating liquidity. It completed a financial restructuring in 1994 (the "1994 Restructuring") which involved employees contributing $200,000,000 in new equity in return for receipt of entitlements to common shares. In addition, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc. ("Aurora"), a subsidiary of AMR Corporation ("AMR"), subscribed for $246,000,000 in preferred shares of CAIL. Other AMR subsidiaries entered into comprehensive services and marketing arrangements with CAIL. The governments of Canada, British Columbia and Alberta provided an aggregate of $120,000,000 in loan guarantees. Senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders of CAC and CAIL and its subsidiaries converted approximately $712,000,000 of obligations into common shares of CAC or convertible notes issued jointly by CAC and CAIL and/or received warrants entitling the holder to purchase common shares.

[11] In the latter half of 1994, Canadian built on the improved balance sheet provided by the 1994 Restructuring, focussing on strict cost controls, capacity management and aircraft utilization. The initial results were encouraging. However, a number of factors including higher than expected fuel costs, rising interest rates, decline of the Canadian dollar, a strike by

pilots of Time Air and the temporary grounding of Inter-Canadien's ATR-42 fleet undermined this improved operational performance. In 1995, in response to additional capacity added by emerging charter carriers and Air Canada on key transcontinental routes, CAIL added additional aircraft to its fleet in an effort to regain market share. However, the addition of capacity coincided with the slow-down in the Canadian economy leading to traffic levels that were significantly below expectations. Additionally, key international routes of CAIL failed to produce anticipated results. The cumulative losses of CAIL from 1994 to 1999 totalled $771 million and from January 31, 1995 to August 12, 1999, the day prior to the issuance by the Government of Canada of an Order under Section 47 of the *Canada Transportation Act* (relaxing certain rules under the *Competition Act* to facilitate a restructuring of the airline industry and described further below), the trading price of Canadian's common shares declined from $7.90 to $1.55.

[12] Canadian's losses incurred since the 1994 Restructuring severely eroded its liquidity position. In 1996, Canadian faced an environment where the domestic air travel market saw increased capacity and aggressive price competition by two new discount carriers based in western Canada. While Canadian's traffic and load factor increased indicating a positive response to Canadian's post-restructuring business plan, yields declined. Attempts by Canadian to reduce domestic capacity were offset by additional capacity being introduced by the new discount carriers and Air Canada.

[13] The continued lack of sufficient funds from operations made it evident by late fall of 1996 that Canadian needed to take action to avoid a cash shortfall in the spring of 1997. In November 1996, Canadian announced an operational restructuring plan (the "1996 Restructuring") aimed at returning Canadian to profitability and subsequently implemented a payment deferral plan which involved a temporary moratorium on payments to certain lenders and aircraft operating lessors to provide a cash bridge until the benefits of the operational restructuring were fully implemented. Canadian was able successfully to obtain the support of its lenders and operating lessors such that the moratorium and payment deferral plan was able to proceed on a consensual basis without the requirement for any court proceedings.

[14] The objective of the 1996 Restructuring was to transform Canadian into a sustainable entity by focussing on controllable factors which targeted earnings improvements over four years. Three major initiatives were adopted: network enhancements, wage concessions as supplemented by fuel tax reductions/rebates, and overhead cost reductions.

[15] The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring were reflected in Canadian's 1997 financial results when Canadian and its subsidiaries reported a consolidated net income of $5.4 million, the best results in 9 years.

[16] In early 1998, building on its 1997 results, Canadian took advantage of a strong market for U.S. public debt financing in the first half of 1998 by issuing U.S. $175,000,000 of senior secured notes in April, 1998 (“Senior Secured Notes”) and U.S. $100,000,000 of unsecured notes in August, 1998 (“Unsecured Notes”).

[17] The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring continued in 1998 but were not sufficient to offset a number of new factors which had a significant negative impact on financial

performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of $137.6 million for 1998.

[18] As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the **oneworldTM** Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL 's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

[19] Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

[20] Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

[21] Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

[22] Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

[23] Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity

investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

[24] In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

[25] On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. ("AirCo") (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

[26] On or about September 20, 1999 the Board of Directors of Air Canada recommended against the AirCo offer. On or about October 19, 1999, Air Canada announced its own proposal to its shareholders to repurchase shares of Air Canada. Air Canada's announcement also indicated Air Canada's intention to make a bid for CAC and to proceed to complete a merger with Canadian subject to a restructuring of Canadian's debt.

[27] There were several rounds of offers and counter-offers between AirCo and Air Canada. On November 5, 1999, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the AirCo offer for Air Canada violated the provisions of the *Air Canada Public Participation Act*. AirCo immediately withdrew its offers. At that time, Air Canada indicated its intention to proceed with its offer for CAC.

[28] Following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer to purchase CAC, and notwithstanding Air Canada's stated intention to proceed with its offer, there was a renewed uncertainty about Canadian's future which adversely affected operations. As described further below, Canadian lost significant forward bookings which further reduced the company's remaining liquidity.

Offer by 853350

[29] On November 11, 1999, 853350 (a corporation financed by Air Canada and owned as to 10% by Air Canada) made a formal offer for all of the common and non-voting shares of CAC. Air Canada indicated that the involvement of 853350 in the take-over bid was necessary in order to protect Air Canada from the potential adverse effects of a restructuring of Canadian's debt and that Air Canada would only complete a merger with Canadian after the completion of a debt restructuring transaction. The offer by 853350 was conditional upon, among other things, a satisfactory resolution of AMR's claims in respect of Canadian and a satisfactory resolution of certain regulatory issues arising from the announcement made on

October 26, 1999 by the Government of Canada regarding its intentions to alter the regime governing the airline industry.

[30] As noted above, AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates had certain agreements with Canadian arising from AMR's investment (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc.) in CAIL during the 1994 Restructuring. In particular, the Services Agreement by which AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates provided certain reservations, scheduling and other airline related services to Canadian provided for a termination fee of approximately $500 million (as at December 31, 1999) while the terms governing the preferred shares issued to Aurora provided for exchange rights which were only retractable by Canadian upon payment of a redemption fee in excess of $500 million (as at December 31, 1999). Unless such provisions were amended or waived, it was practically impossible for Canadian to complete a merger with Air Canada since the cost of proceeding without AMR's consent was simply too high.

[31] Canadian had continued its efforts to seek out all possible solutions to its structural problems following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer on November 5, 1999. While AMR indicated its willingness to provide a measure of support by allowing a deferral of some of the fees payable to AMR under the Services Agreement, Canadian was unable to find any investor willing to provide the liquidity necessary to keep Canadian operating while alternative solutions were sought.

[32] After 853350 made its offer, 853350 and Air Canada entered into discussions with AMR regarding the purchase by 853350 of AMR's shareholding in CAIL as well as other matters regarding code sharing agreements and various services provided to Canadian by AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The parties reached an agreement on November 22, 1999 pursuant to which AMR agreed to reduce its potential damages claim for termination of the Services Agreement by approximately 88%.

[33] On December 4, 1999, CAC's Board recommended acceptance of 853350's offer to its shareholders and on December 21, 1999, two days before the offer closed, 853350 received approval for the offer from the Competition Bureau as well as clarification from the Government of Canada on the proposed regulatory framework for the Canadian airline industry.

[34] As noted above, Canadian's financial condition deteriorated further after the collapse of the AirCo Arrangement transaction. In particular:

> a) the doubts which were publicly raised as to Canadian's ability to survive made Canadian's efforts to secure additional financing through various sale-leaseback transactions more difficult;
> b) sales for future air travel were down by approximately 10% compared to 1998;
> c) CAIL's liquidity position, which stood at approximately $84 million (consolidated cash and available credit) as at September 30, 1999, reached a critical point in late December, 1999 when it was about to go negative.

[35] In late December, 1999, Air Canada agreed to enter into certain transactions designed to ensure that Canadian would have enough liquidity to continue operating until the scheduled completion of the 853350 take-over bid on January 4, 2000. Air Canada agreed to purchase rights to the Toronto-Tokyo route for $25 million and to a sale-leaseback arrangement involving certain unencumbered aircraft and a flight simulator for total proceeds of approximately $20 million. These transactions gave Canadian sufficient liquidity to continue operations through the holiday period.

[36] If Air Canada had not provided the approximate $45 million injection in December 1999, Canadian would likely have had to file for bankruptcy and cease all operations before the end of the holiday travel season.

[37] On January 4, 2000, with all conditions of its offer having been satisfied or waived, 853350 purchased approximately 82% of the outstanding shares of CAC. On January 5, 1999, 853350 completed the purchase of the preferred shares of CAIL owned by Aurora. In connection with that acquisition, Canadian agreed to certain amendments to the Services Agreement reducing the amounts payable to AMR in the event of a termination of such agreement and, in addition, the unanimous shareholders agreement which gave AMR the right to require Canadian to purchase the CAIL preferred shares under certain circumstances was terminated. These arrangements had the effect of substantially reducing the obstacles to a restructuring of Canadian's debt and lease obligations and also significantly reduced the claims that AMR would be entitled to advance in such a restructuring.

[38] Despite the $45 million provided by Air Canada, Canadian's liquidity position remained poor. With January being a traditionally slow month in the airline industry, further bridge financing was required in order to ensure that Canadian would be able to operate while a debt restructuring transaction was being negotiated with creditors. Air Canada negotiated an arrangement with the Royal Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") to purchase a participation interest in the operating credit facility made available to Canadian. As a result of this agreement, Royal Bank agreed to extend Canadian's operating credit facility from $70 million to $120 million in January, 2000 and then to $145 million in March, 2000. Canadian agreed to supplement the assignment of accounts receivable security originally securing Royal's $70 million facility with a further Security Agreement securing certain unencumbered assets of Canadian in consideration for this increased credit availability. Without the support of Air Canada or another financially sound entity, this increase in credit would not have been possible.

[39] Air Canada has stated publicly that it ultimately wishes to merge the operations of Canadian and Air Canada, subject to Canadian completing a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to complete the acquisition on a financially sound basis. This pre-condition has been emphasized by Air Canada since the fall of 1999.

[40] Prior to the acquisition of majority control of CAC by 853350, Canadian's management, Board of Directors and financial advisors had considered every possible alternative for restoring Canadian to a sound financial footing. Based upon Canadian's extensive efforts over the past year in particular, but also the efforts since 1992 described

above, Canadian came to the conclusion that it must complete a debt restructuring to permit the completion of a full merger between Canadian and Air Canada.

[41] On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders. As a result of this moratorium Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases. Absent the assistance provided by this moratorium, in addition to Air Canada's support, Canadian would not have had sufficient liquidity to continue operating until the completion of a debt restructuring.

[42] Following implementation of the moratorium, Canadian with Air Canada embarked on efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. The further damage to public confidence which a CCAA filing could produce required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection.

[43] Before the Petitioners started these CCAA proceedings, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

[44] Canadian and Air Canada have also been able to reach agreement with the remaining affected secured creditors, being the holders of the U.S. $175 million Senior Secured Notes, due 2005, (the "Senior Secured Noteholders") and with several major unsecured creditors in addition to AMR, such as Loyalty Management Group Canada Inc.

[45] On March 24, 2000, faced with threatened proceedings by secured creditors, Canadian petitioned under the CCAA and obtained a stay of proceedings and related interim relief by Order of the Honourable Chief Justice Moore on that same date. Pursuant to that Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc. was appointed as the Monitor, and companion proceedings in the United States were authorized to be commenced.

[46] Since that time, due to the assistance of Air Canada, Canadian has been able to complete the restructuring of the remaining financial obligations governing all aircraft to be retained by Canadian for future operations. These arrangements were approved by this Honourable Court in its Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000, as described in further detail below under the heading "The Restructuring Plan".

[47] On April 7, 2000, this court granted an Order giving directions with respect to the filing of the plan, the calling and holding of meetings of affected creditors and related matters.

[48] On April 25, 2000 in accordance with the said Order, Canadian filed and served the plan (in its original form) and the related notices and materials.

[49] The plan was amended, in accordance with its terms, on several occasions, the form of Plan voted upon at the Creditors' Meetings on May 26, 2000 having been filed and served on May 25, 2000 (the "Plan").

The Restructuring Plan

[50] The Plan has three principal aims described by Canadian:

(a) provide near term liquidity so that Canadian can sustain operations;
(b) allow for the return of aircraft not required by Canadian; and
(c) permanently adjust Canadian's debt structure and lease facilities to reflect the current market for asset values and carrying costs in return for Air Canada providing a guarantee of the restructured obligations.

[51] The proposed treatment of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Unaffected Secured Creditors- Royal Bank, CAIL's operating lender, is an unaffected creditor with respect to its operating credit facility. Royal Bank holds security over CAIL's accounts receivable and most of CAIL's operating assets not specifically secured by aircraft financiers or the Senior Secured Noteholders. As noted above, arrangements entered into between Air Canada and Royal Bank have provided CAIL with liquidity necessary for it to continue operations since January 2000.

Also unaffected by the Plan are those aircraft lessors, conditional vendors and secured creditors holding security over CAIL's aircraft who have entered into agreements with CAIL and/or Air Canada with respect to the restructuring of CAIL's obligations. A number of such agreements, which were initially contained in the form of letters of intent ("LOIs"), were entered into prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, while a total of 17 LOIs were completed after that date. In its Second and Fourth Reports the Monitor reported to the court on these agreements. The LOIs entered into after the proceedings commenced were reviewed and approved by the court on April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000.

The basis of the LOIs with aircraft lessors was that the operating lease rates were reduced to fair market lease rates or less, and the obligations of CAIL under the leases were either assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. Where the aircraft was subject to conditional sale agreements or other secured indebtedness, the value of the secured debt was reduced to the fair market value of the aircraft, and the interest rate payable was reduced to current market rates reflecting Air Canada's credit. CAIL's obligations under those agreements have also been assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. The claims of these creditors for reduced principal and interest amounts, or reduced lease payments, are Affected Unsecured Claims under the Plan. In a number of cases these claims have been assigned to Air Canada and Air Canada disclosed that it would vote those claims in favour of the Plan.

2. Affected Secured Creditors- The Affected Secured Creditors under the Plan are the Senior Secured Noteholders with a claim in the amount of US$175,000,000. The Senior Secured Noteholders are secured by a diverse package of Canadian's assets, including its inventory of aircraft spare parts, ground equipment, spare engines, flight simulators, leasehold interests at Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary airports, the shares in CRAL 98 and a $53 million note payable by CRAL to CAIL.

The Plan offers the Senior Secured Noteholders payment of 97 cents on the dollar. The deficiency is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditor class and the Senior Secured Noteholders advised the court they would be voting the deficiency in favour of the Plan.

3. Unaffected Unsecured Creditors-In the circular accompanying the November 11, 1999 853350 offer it was stated that:

> The Offeror intends to conduct the Debt Restructuring in such a manner as to seek to ensure that the unionized employees of Canadian, the suppliers of new credit (including trade credit) and the members of the flying public are left unaffected.
> The Offeror is of the view that the pursuit of these three principles is essential in order to ensure that the long term value of Canadian is preserved.

Canadian's employees, customers and suppliers of goods and services are unaffected by the CCAA Order and Plan.
Also unaffected are parties to those contracts or agreements with Canadian which are not being terminated by Canadian pursuant to the terms of the March 24, 2000 Order.

4. Affected Unsecured Creditors- CAIL has identified unsecured creditors who do not fall into the above three groups and listed these as Affected Unsecured Creditors under the Plan. They are offered 14 cents on the dollar on their claims. Air Canada would fund this payment.

The Affected Unsecured Creditors fall into the following categories:

a. Claims of holders of or related to the Unsecured Notes (the "Unsecured Noteholders");
b. Claims in respect of certain outstanding or threatened litigation involving Canadian;
c. Claims arising from the termination, breach or repudiation of certain contracts, leases or agreements to which Canadian is a party other than aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
d. Claims in respect of deficiencies arising from the termination or re-negotiation of aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
e. Claims of tax authorities against Canadian; and
f. Claims in respect of the under-secured or unsecured portion of amounts due to the Senior Secured Noteholders.

[52] There are over $700 million of proven unsecured claims. Some unsecured creditors have disputed the amounts of their claims for distribution purposes. These are in the process of determination by the court-appointed Claims Officer and subject to further appeal to the court. If the Claims Officer were to allow all of the disputed claims in full and this were confirmed by the court, the aggregate of unsecured claims would be approximately $1.059 million.

[53] The Monitor has concluded that if the Plan is not approved and implemented, Canadian will not be able to continue as a going concern and in that event, the only foreseeable

alternative would be a liquidation of Canadian's assets by a receiver and/or a trustee in bankruptcy. Under the Plan, Canadian's obligations to parties essential to ongoing operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights and statutory priorities, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if Canadian were to cease operations as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would be in excess of $1.1 billion.

[54] In connection with its assessment of the Plan, the Monitor performed a liquidation analysis of CAIL as at March 31, 2000 in order to estimate the amounts that might be recovered by CAIL's creditors and shareholders in the event of disposition of CAIL's assets by a receiver or trustee. The Monitor concluded that a liquidation would result in a shortfall to certain secured creditors, including the Senior Secured Noteholders, a recovery by ordinary unsecured creditors of between one cent and three cents on the dollar, and no recovery by shareholders.

[55] There are two vociferous opponents of the Plan, Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence") who acts on behalf of its and/or its affiliate client accounts and four shareholders of CAC. Resurgence is incorporated pursuant to the laws of New York, U.S.A. and has its head office in White Plains, New York. It conducts an investment business specializing in high yield distressed debt. Through a series of purchases of the Unsecured Notes commencing in April 1999, Resurgence clients hold $58,200,000 of the face value of or 58.2% of the notes issued. Resurgence purchased 7.9 million units in April 1999. From November 3, 1999 to December 9, 1999 it purchased an additional 20,850,000 units. From January 4, 2000 to February 3, 2000 Resurgence purchased an additional 29,450,000 units.

[56] Resurgence seeks declarations that: the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 constitute an amalgamation, consolidation or merger with or into Air Canada or a conveyance or transfer of all or substantially all of Canadian's assets to Air Canada; that any plan of arrangement involving Canadian will not affect Resurgence and directing the repurchase of their notes pursuant to the provisions of their trust indenture and that the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 are oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to it pursuant to section 234 of the Business Corporations Act.

[57] Four shareholders of CAC also oppose the plan. Neil Baker, a Toronto resident, acquired 132,500 common shares at a cost of $83,475.00 on or about May 5, 2000. Mr. Baker sought to commence proceedings to "remedy an injustice to the minority holders of the common shares". Roger Midiaty, Michael Salter and Hal Metheral are individual shareholders who were added as parties at their request during the proceedings. Mr. Midiaty resides in Calgary, Alberta and holds 827 CAC shares which he has held since 1994. Mr. Metheral is also a Calgary resident and holds approximately 14,900 CAC shares in his RRSP and has held them since approximately 1994 or 1995. Mr. Salter is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona and is the beneficial owner of 250 shares of CAC and is a joint beneficial owner of 250 shares with his wife. These shareholders will be referred in the Decision throughout as the "Minority Shareholders".

[58] The Minority Shareholders oppose the portion of the Plan that relates to the reorganization of CAIL, pursuant to section 185 of the ***Alberta Business Corporations Act*** ("ABCA"). They characterize the transaction as a cancellation of issued shares unauthorized by section 167 of the ABCA or alternatively is a violation of section 183 of the ABCA. They submit the application for the order of reorganization should be denied as being unlawful, unfair and not supported by the evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

[59] Section 6 of the CCAA provides that:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

[60] Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

> (1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;
> (2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
> (3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

[61] A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in ***Re Northland Properties Ltd.*** (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.) at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example ***Re Sammi Atlas Inc***. (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172 and ***Re T. Eaton Co.***, [1999] O.J. No. 5322 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

[62] Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

> (a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000;
(c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;
(d) the creditors were properly classified;
(e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;
(f) the voting was properly carried out; and
(g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

[63] I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

(a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

(b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000.

(c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.

(d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.

(e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC (“Resurgence”), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading “Fair and Reasonable”.

2. Matters Unauthorized

[64] This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in ***Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* v. *Royal Trust Co.*** (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in ***Cadillac Fairview (Re)*** (1995), 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 305 (Ont. Gen. Div.), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

[65] In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario

Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly, certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

[66] Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

> (2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

[67] Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

> a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for $1.00; and
> b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

[68] The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles of Incorporation to effect the proposed reorganization:

> (a) consolidating all of the issued and outstanding common shares into one common share;
> (b) redesignating the existing common shares as "Retractable Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Retractable Shares so that the Retractable Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital;
> (c) cancelling the Non-Voting Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are currently issued and outstanding, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Non-Voting Shares;
> (d) changing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Preferred Shares of the corporation into Class A Preferred Shares, on the basis of one (1) Class A Preferred Share for each one (1) Class B Preferred Share presently issued and outstanding;
> (e) redesignating the existing Class A Preferred Shares as "Common Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Common Shares so that the Common Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital; and
> (f) cancelling the Class B Preferred Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are issued and outstanding after the change in paragraph (d) above, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Class B Preferred Shares;

Section 167 of the ABCA

[69] Reorganizations under section 185 of the ABCA are subject to two preconditions:
a. The corporation must be "subject to an order for re-organization"; and
b. The proposed amendments must otherwise be permitted under section 167 of the ABCA.

[70] The parties agreed that an order of this court sanctioning the Plan would satisfy the first condition.

[71] The relevant portions of section 167 provide as follows:

> 167(1) Subject to sections 170 and 171, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to
> (e) change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued,
> (f) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series,
> (g.1) cancel a class or series of shares where there are no issued or outstanding shares of that class or series,

[72] Each change in the proposed CAIL Articles of Reorganization corresponds to changes permitted under s. 167(1) of the ABCA, as follows:

Proposed Amendment in Schedule "D"	Subsection 167(1), ABCA
(a) – consolidation of Common Shares	167(1)(f)
(b) – change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(c) – cancellation	167(1)(g.1)
(d) – change in shares	167(1)(f)
(e) – change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(f) – cancellation	167(1)(g.1)

[73] The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

[74] In R. Dickerson et al, ***Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada***, Vol.1: Commentary (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

[75] The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

> For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

[76] The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

[77] The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of ***Royal Oak Mines Inc.***, [1999] O.J. No. 4848 and ***Re T Eaton Co.,*** *supra* in which Farley J.of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

[78] Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

[79] In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

[80] The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for $1.00.

[81] I disagree with this creative characterization. The proposed transaction is a reorganization as contemplated by section 185 of the ABCA. As recognized in ***Savage v.***

Amoco Acquisition Company Ltd, [1988] A.J. No. 68 (Q.B.), aff'd, 68 C.B.R. (3d) 154 (Alta. C.A.), the fact that the same end might be achieved under another section does not exclude the section to be relied on. A statute may well offer several alternatives to achieve a similar end.

Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1

[82] The Minority Shareholders also submitted the proposed reorganization constitutes a "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission. Under the Policy, transactions are subject to disclosure, minority approval and formal valuation requirements which have not been followed here. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the Petitioners were therefore in breach of the Policy unless and until such time as the court is advised of the relevant requirements of the Policy and grants its approval as provided by the Policy.

[83] These shareholders asserted that in the absence of evidence of the going concern value of CAIL so as to determine whether that value exceeds the rights of the Preferred Shares of CAIL, the Court should not waive compliance with the Policy.

[84] To the extent that this reorganization can be considered a "related party transaction", I have found, for the reasons discussed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", that the Plan, including the proposed reorganization, is fair and reasonable and accordingly I would waive the requirements of Policy 9.1.

b. Release

[85] Resurgence argued that the release of directors and other third parties contained in the Plan does not comply with the provisions of the CCAA.

[86] The release is contained in section 6.2(2)(ii) of the Plan and states as follows:

> As of the Effective Date, each of the Affected Creditors will be deemed to forever release, waive and discharge all claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts, rights, causes of action and liabilities...that are based in whole or in part on any act, omission, transaction, event or other occurrence taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to the Applicants and Subsidiaries, the CCAA Proceedings, or the Plan against:(i) The Applicants and Subsidiaries; (ii) The Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries in each case as of the date of filing (and in addition, those who became Officers and/or Directors thereafter but prior to the Effective Date); (iii) The former Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries, or (iv) the respective current and former professionals of the entities in subclauses (1) to (3) of this s.6.2(2) (including, for greater certainty, the Monitor, its counsel and its current Officers and Directors, and current and former Officers, Directors, employees, shareholders and professionals of the released parties) acting in such capacity.

[87] Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

(3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[88] Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly. Resurgence relied on ***Barrette v. Crabtree Estate,*** [1993], 1 S.C.R. 1027 at 1044 and ***Bruce Agra Foods Limited v. Proposal of Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of)*** (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 5 in this regard.

[89] With respect to Resurgence's complaint regarding the breadth of the claims covered by the release, the Petitioners asserted that the release is not intended to override section 5.1(2). Canadian suggested this can be expressly incorporated into the form of release by adding the words **"excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA"** immediately prior to subsection (iii) and clarifying the language in Section 5.1 of the Plan. Canadian also acknowledged, in response to a concern raised by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, that in accordance with s. 5.1(1) of the CCAA, directors of CAC and CAIL could only be released from liability arising before March 24, 2000, the date these proceedings commenced. Canadian suggested this was also addressed in the proposed amendment. Canadian did not address the propriety of including individuals in addition to directors in the form of release.

[90] In my view it is appropriate to amend the proposed release to expressly comply with section 5. 1(2) of the CCAA and to clarify Section 5.1 of the Plan as Canadian suggested in its brief. The additional language suggested by Canadian to achieve this result shall be included in the form of order. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is apparently satisfied with the Petitioners' acknowledgement that claims against directors can only be released to the date of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA, having appeared at this hearing to strongly support the sanctioning of the Plan, so I will not address this concern further.

[91] Resurgence argued that its claims fell within the categories of excepted claims in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and accordingly, its concern in this regard is removed by this amendment. Unsecured creditors JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2 suggested there may be possible wrongdoing in the acts of the directors during the restructuring process which should not be immune from scrutiny and in my view this complaint would also be caught by the exception captured in the amendment.

[92] While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception.

[93] Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

3. Fair and Reasonable

[94] In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in ***Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.***, *supra*, at page 9:

> "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity - and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

[95] The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: ***Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* v. *Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.***, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 at 574 (Alta.Q.B.); ***Northland Properties Ltd.* v. *Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada***, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 at 368 (B.C.C.A.).

[96] The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
d. Oppression;
e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and
f. The public interest.

a. Composition of the unsecured vote

[97] As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position then the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of ***Olympia & York Developments Ltd.,*** *supra**:***

> As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

[98] However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example ***Quintette Coal Ltd.,*** (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3rd) 14 (B.C.S.C) and ***Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co.*** (1890) 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior Secured Noteholders, who voted their deficiency in the unsecured class, were decisive.

[99] The results of the unsecured vote, as reported by the Monitor, are:

1. For the resolution to approve the Plan: 73 votes (65% in number) representing $494,762,304 in claims (76% in value);
2. Against the resolution: 39 votes (35% in number) representing $156,360,363 in claims (24% in value); and
3. Abstentions: 15 representing $968,036 in value.

[100] The voting results as reported by the Monitor were challenged by Resurgence. That application was dismissed.

[101] The members of each class that vote in favour of a plan must do so in good faith and the majority within a class must act without coercion in their conduct toward the minority. When asked to assess fairness of an approved plan, the court will not countenance secret agreements to vote in favour of a plan secured by advantages to the creditor: see for example, ***Hochberger* v. *Rittenberg*** (1916), 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.)

[102] ***In Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)*** (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 192-3 (B.C.S.C) aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.), dissenting priority mortgagees argued the plan violated the principle of equality due to an agreement between the debtor company and another priority mortgagee which essentially amounted to a preference in exchange for voting in favour of the plan. Trainor J. found that the agreement was freely disclosed and commercially reasonable and went on to approve the plan, using the three part test. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld this result and in commenting on the minority complaint McEachern J.A. stated at page 206:

> In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at p.29:
>
> > I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an order absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.
> > Certainly, those minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

[103] Resurgence submitted that Air Canada manipulated the indebtedness of CAIL to assure itself of an affirmative vote. I disagree. I previously ruled on the validity of the deficiency when approving the LOIs and found the deficiency to be valid. I found there was consideration for the assignment of the deficiency claims of the various aircraft financiers to Air Canada, namely the provision of an Air Canada guarantee which would otherwise not have been available until plan sanction. The Monitor reviewed the calculations of the deficiencies and determined they were calculated in a reasonable manner. As such, the court approved those transactions. If the deficiency had instead remained with the aircraft financiers, it is reasonable to assume those claims would have been voted in favour of the plan. Further, it would have been entirely appropriate under the circumstances for the aircraft financiers to have retained the deficiency and agreed to vote in favour of the Plan, with the same result to Resurgence. That the financiers did not choose this method was explained by the testimony of Mr. Carty and Robert Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for Air Canada; quite simply it amounted to a desire on behalf of these creditors to shift the "deal risk" associated with the Plan to Air Canada. The agreement reached with the Senior Secured Noteholders was also disclosed and the challenge by Resurgence regarding their vote in the unsecured class was dismissed There

is nothing inappropriate in the voting of the deficiency claims of Air Canada or the Senior Secured Noteholders in the unsecured class. There is no evidence of secret vote buying such as discussed in ***Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)***.

[104] If the Plan is approved, Air Canada stands to profit in its operation. I do not accept that the deficiency claims were devised to dominate the vote of the unsecured creditor class, however, Air Canada, as funder of the Plan is more motivated than Resurgence to support it. This divergence of views on its own does not amount to bad faith on the part of Air Canada. Resurgence submitted that only the Unsecured Noteholders received 14 cents on the dollar. That is not accurate, as demonstrated by the list of affected unsecured creditors included earlier in these Reasons. The Senior Secured Noteholders did receive other consideration under the Plan, but to suggest they were differently motivated suggests that those creditors did not ascribe any value to their unsecured claims. There is no evidence to support this submission.

[105] The good faith of Resurgence in its vote must also be considered. Resurgence acquired a substantial amount of its claim after the failure of the Onex bid, when it was aware that Canadian's financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Thereafter, Resurgence continued to purchase a substantial amount of this highly distressed debt. While Mr. Symington maintained that he bought because he thought the bonds were a good investment, he also acknowledged that one basis for purchasing was the hope of obtaining a blocking position sufficient to veto a plan in the proposed debt restructuring. This was an obvious ploy for leverage with the Plan proponents

[106] The authorities which address minority creditors' complaints speak of "substantial injustice" (***Keddy Motor Inns Ltd. (Re)*** (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S.C.A.), "confiscation" of rights (***Campeau Corp. (Re)*** (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.Div.); ***Skydome Corp. (Re)*** (1999), 87 A.C.W.S (3d) 421 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)) and majorities "feasting upon" the rights of the minority (***Quintette Coal Ltd. (Re)***, (1992), 13 C.B.R.(3d) 146 (B.C.S.C.). Although it cannot be disputed that the group of Unsecured Noteholders represented by Resurgence are being asked to accept a significant reduction of their claims, as are all of the affected unsecured creditors, I do not see a "substantial injustice", nor view their rights as having been "confiscated" or "feasted upon" by being required to succumb to the wishes of the majority in their class. No bad faith has been demonstrated in this case. Rather, the treatment of Resurgence, along with all other affected unsecured creditors, represents a reasonable balancing of interests. While the court is directed to consider whether there is an injustice being worked within a class, it must also determine whether there is an injustice with respect the stakeholders as a whole. Even if a plan might at first blush appear to have that effect, when viewed in relation to all other parties, it may nonetheless be considered appropriate and be approved: ***Algoma Steel Corp.* v. *Royal Bank*** (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.)and ***Northland Properties (Re)***, *supra* at 9.

[107] Further, to the extent that greater or discrete motivation to support a Plan may be seen as a conflict, the Court should take this same approach and look at the creditors as a whole and to the objecting creditors specifically and determine if their rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests and have the pain of compromise borne equally.

[108] Resurgence represents 58.2% of the Unsecured Noteholders or $96 million in claims. The total claim of the Unsecured Noteholders ranges from $146 million to $161 million. The

affected unsecured class, excluding aircraft financing, tax claims, the noteholders and claims under $50,000, ranges from $116.3 million to $449.7 million depending on the resolutions of certain claims by the Claims Officer. Resurgence represents between 15.7% - 35% of that portion of the class.

[109] The total affected unsecured claims, excluding tax claims, but including aircraft financing and noteholder claims including the unsecured portion of the Senior Secured Notes, ranges from $673 million to $1,007 million. Resurgence represents between 9.5% - 14.3% of the total affected unsecured creditor pool. These percentages indicate that at its very highest in a class excluding Air Canada's assigned claims and Senior Secured's deficiency, Resurgence would only represent a maximum of 35% of the class. In the larger class of affected unsecured it is significantly less. Viewed in relation to the class as a whole, there is no injustice being worked against Resurgence.

[110] The thrust of the Resurgence submissions suggests a mistaken belief that they will get more than 14 cents on liquidation. This is not borne out by the evidence and is not reasonable in the context of the overall Plan.

b. Receipts on liquidation or bankruptcy

[111] As noted above, the Monitor prepared and circulated a report on the Plan which contained a summary of a liquidation analysis outlining the Monitor's projected realizations upon a liquidation of CAIL ("Liquidation Analysis").

[112] The Liquidation Analysis was based on: (1) the draft unaudited financial statements of Canadian at March 31, 2000; (2) the distress values reported in independent appraisals of aircraft and aircraft related assets obtained by CAIL in January, 2000; (3) a review of CAIL's aircraft leasing and financing documents; and (4) discussions with CAIL Management.

[113] Prior to and during the application for sanction, the Monitor responded to various requests for information by parties involved. In particular, the Monitor provided a copy of the Liquidation Analysis to those who requested it. Certain of the parties involved requested the opportunity to question the Monitor further, particularly in respect to the Liquidation Analysis and this court directed a process for the posing of those questions.

[114] While there were numerous questions to which the Monitor was asked to respond, there were several areas in which Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders took particular issue: pension plan surplus, CRAL, international routes and tax pools. The dissenting groups asserted that these assets represented overlooked value to the company on a liquidation basis or on a going concern basis.

Pension Plan Surplus

[115] The Monitor did not attribute any value to pension plan surplus when it prepared the Liquidation Analysis, for the following reasons:

1) The summaries of the solvency surplus/deficit positions indicated a cumulative net deficit position for the seven registered plans, after consideration of contingent liabilities;
2) The possibility, based on the previous splitting out of the seven plans from a single plan in 1988, that the plans could be held to be consolidated for financial purposes, which would remove any potential solvency surplus since the total estimated contingent liabilities exceeded the total estimated solvency surplus;
3) The actual calculations were prepared by CAIL's actuaries and actuaries representing the unions could conclude liabilities were greater; and
4) CAIL did not have a legal opinion confirming that surpluses belonged to CAIL.

[116] The Monitor concluded that the entitlement question would most probably have to be settled by negotiation and/or litigation by the parties. For those reasons, the Monitor took a conservative view and did not attribute an asset value to pension plans in the Liquidation Analysis. The Monitor also did not include in the Liquidation Analysis any amount in respect of the claim that could be made by members of the plan where there is an apparent deficit after deducting contingent liabilities.

[117] The issues in connection with possible pension surplus are: (1) the true amount of any of the available surplus; and (2) the entitlement of Canadian to any such amount.

[118] It is acknowledged that surplus prior to termination can be accessed through employer contribution holidays, which Canadian has taken to the full extent permitted. However, there is no basis that has been established for any surplus being available to be withdrawn from an ongoing pension plan. On a pension plan termination, the amount available as a solvency surplus would first have to be further reduced by various amounts to determine whether there was in fact any true surplus available for distribution. Such reductions include contingent benefits payable in accordance with the provisions of each respective pension plan, any extraordinary plan wind up cost, the amounts of any contribution holidays taken which have not been reflected, and any litigation costs.

[119] Counsel for all of Canadian's unionized employees confirmed on the record that the respective union representatives can be expected to dispute all of these calculations as well as to dispute entitlement.

[120] There is a suggestion that there might be a total of $40 million of surplus remaining from all pension plans after such reductions are taken into account. Apart from the issue of entitlement, this assumes that the plans can be treated separately, that a surplus could in fact be realized on liquidation and that the Towers Perrin calculations are not challenged. With total pension plan assets of over $2 billion, a surplus of $40 million could quickly disappear with relatively minor changes in the market value of the securities held or calculation of liabilities. In the circumstances, given all the variables, I find that the existence of any surplus is doubtful at best and I am satisfied that the Monitor's Liquidation Analysis ascribing it zero value is reasonable in this circumstances.

CRAL

[121] The Monitor's liquidation analysis as at March 31, 2000 of CRAL determined that in a distress situation, after payments were made to its creditors, there would be a deficiency of approximately $30 million to pay Canadian Regional's unsecured creditors, which include a claim of approximately $56.5 million due to Canadian. In arriving at this conclusion, the Monitor reviewed internally prepared unaudited financial statements of CRAL as of March 31, 2000, the Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin, distress valuation dated January 21, 2000 and the Simat Helliesen and Eichner valuation of selected CAIL assets dated January 31, 2000 for certain aircraft related materials and engines, rotables and spares. The Avitas Inc., and Avmark Inc. reports were used for the distress values on CRAL's aircraft and the CRAL aircraft lease documentation. The Monitor also performed its own analysis of CRAL's liquidation value, which involved analysis of the reports provided and details of its analysis were outlined in the Liquidation Analysis.

[122] For the purpose of the Liquidation Analysis, the Monitor did not consider other airlines as comparable for evaluation purposes, as the Monitor's valuation was performed on a distressed sale basis. The Monitor further assumed that without CAIL's national and international network to feed traffic into and a source of standby financing, and considering the inevitable negative publicity which a failure of CAIL would produce, CRAL would immediately stop operations as well.

[123] Mr. Peterson testified that CRAL was worth $260 million to Air Canada, based on Air Canada being a special buyer who could integrate CRAL, on a going concern basis, into its network. The Liquidation Analysis assumed the windup of each of CRAL and CAIL, a completely different scenario.

[124] There is no evidence that there was a potential purchaser for CRAL who would be prepared to acquire CRAL or the operations of CRAL 98 for any significant sum or at all. CRAL has value to CAIL, and in turn, could provide value to Air Canada, but this value is attributable to its ability to feed traffic to and take traffic from the national and international service operated by CAIL. In my view, the Monitor was aware of these features and properly considered these factors in assessing the value of CRAL on a liquidation of CAIL.

[125] If CAIL were to cease operations, the evidence is clear that CRAL would be obliged to do so as well immediately. The travelling public, shippers, trade suppliers, and others would make no distinction between CAIL and CRAL and there would be no going concern for Air Canada to acquire.

International Routes

[126] The Monitor ascribed no value to Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis. In discussions with CAIL management and experts available in its aviation group, the Monitor was advised that international routes are unassignable licenses and not property rights. They do not appear as assets in CAIL's financials. Mr. Carty and Mr. Peterson explained that routes and slots are <u>not</u> treated as assets by airlines, but rather as rights in the control of the Government of Canada. In the event of bankruptcy/receivership of CAIL, CAIL's trustee/receiver could not sell them and accordingly they are of no value to CAIL.

[127] Evidence was led that on June 23, 1999 Air Canada made an offer to purchase CAIL's international routes for $400 million cash plus $125 million for aircraft spares and inventory, along with the assumption of certain debt and lease obligations for the aircraft required for the international routes. CAIL evaluated the Air Canada offer and concluded that the proposed purchase price was insufficient to permit it to continue carrying on business in the absence of its international routes. Mr. Carty testified that something in the range of $2 billion would be required.

[128] CAIL was in desperate need of cash in mid December, 1999. CAIL agreed to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route for $25 million. The evidence, however, indicated that the price for the Toronto - Tokyo route was not derived from a valuation, but rather was what CAIL asked for, based on its then-current cash flow requirements. Air Canada and CAIL obtained Government approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

[129] Resurgence complained that despite this evidence of offers for purchase and actual sales of international routes and other evidence of sales of slots, the Monitor did not include Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis and only attributed a total of $66 million for all intangibles of Canadian. There is some evidence that slots at some foreign airports may be bought or sold in some fashion. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute any value to other slots which CAIL has at foreign airports. It would appear given the regulation of the airline industry, in particular, the ***Aeronautics Act*** and the ***Canada Transportation Act***, that international routes for a Canadian air carrier only have full value to the extent of federal government support for the transfer or sale, and its preparedness to allow the then-current license holder to sell rather than act unilaterally to change the designation. The federal government was prepared to allow CAIL to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route to Air Canada in light of CAIL's severe financial difficulty and the certainty of cessation of operations during the Christmas holiday season in the absence of such a sale.

[130] Further, statements made by CAIL in mid-1999 as to the value of its international routes and operations in response to an offer by Air Canada, reflected the amount CAIL needed to sustain liquidity without its international routes and was not a representation of market value of what could realistically be obtained from an arms length purchaser. The Monitor concluded on its investigation that CAIL's Narida and Heathrow slots had a realizable value of $66 million , which it included in the Liquidation Analysis. I find that this conclusion is supportable and that the Monitor properly concluded that there were no other rights which ought to have been assigned value.

Tax Pools

[131] There are four tax pools identified by Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders that are material: capital losses at the CAC level, undepreciated capital cost pools, operating losses incurred by Canadian and potential for losses to be reinstated upon repayment of fuel tax rebates by CAIL.

Capital Loss Pools

[132] The capital loss pools at CAC will not be available to Air Canada since CAC is to be left out of the corporate reorganization and will be severed from CAIL. Those capital losses

can essentially only be used to absorb a portion of the debt forgiveness liability associated with the restructuring. CAC, who has virtually all of its senior debt compromised in the plan, receives compensation for this small advantage, which cost them nothing.

Undepreciated capital cost ("UCC")

[133] There is no benefit to Air Canada in the pools of UCC unless it were established that the UCC pools are in excess of the fair market value of the relevant assets, since Air Canada could create the same pools by simply buying the assets on a liquidation at fair market value. Mr. Peterson understood this pool of UCC to be approximately $700 million . There is no evidence that the UCC pool, however, could be considered to be a source of benefit. There is no evidence that this amount is any greater than fair market value.

Operating Losses

[134] The third tax pool complained of is the operating losses. The debt forgiven as a result of the Plan will erase any operating losses from prior years to the extent of such forgiven debt.

Fuel tax rebates

[135] The fourth tax pool relates to the fuel tax rebates system taken advantage of by CAIL in past years. The evidence is that on a consolidated basis the total potential amount of this pool is $297 million. According to Mr. Carty's testimony, CAIL has not been taxable in his ten years as Chief Financial Officer. The losses which it has generated for tax purposes have been sold on a 10 - 1 basis to the government in order to receive rebates of excise tax paid for fuel. The losses can be restored retroactively if the rebates are repaid, but the losses can only be carried forward for a maximum of seven years. The evidence of Mr. Peterson indicates that Air Canada has no plan to use those alleged losses and in order for them to be useful to Air Canada, Air Canada would have to complete a legal merger with CAIL, which is not provided for in the plan and is not contemplated by Air Canada until some uncertain future date. In my view, the Monitor's conclusion that there was no value to any tax pools in the Liquidation Analysis is sound.

[136] Those opposed to the Plan have raised the spectre that there may be value unaccounted for in this liquidation analysis or otherwise. Given the findings above, this is merely speculation and is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

c. Alternatives to the Plan

[137] When presented with a plan, affected stakeholders must weigh their options in the light of commercial reality. Those options are typically liquidation measured against the plan proposed. If not put forward, a hope for a different or more favourable plan is not an option and no basis upon which to assess fairness. On a purposive approach to the CCAA, what is fair and reasonable must be assessed against the effect of the Plan on the creditors and their various claims, in the context of their response to the plan. Stakeholders are expected to decide their fate based on realistic, commercially viable alternatives (generally seen as the prime motivating factor in any business decision) and not on speculative desires or hope for the

future. As Farley J. stated in ***Re T. Eaton Co.*** (1999) O.J. No. 4216 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 6:

> One has to be cognizant of the function of a balancing of their prejudices. Positions must be realistically assessed and weighed, all in the light of what an alternative to a successful plan would be. Wishes are not a firm foundation on which to build a plan; nor are ransom demands.

[138] The evidence is overwhelming that all other options have been exhausted and have resulted in failure. The concern of those opposed suggests that there is a better plan that Air Canada can put forward. I note that significant enhancements were made to the plan during the process. In any case, this is the Plan that has been voted on. The evidence makes it clear that there is not another plan forthcoming. As noted by Farley J. in ***T. Eaton Co,*** *supra*, "no one presented an alternative plan for the interested parties to vote on" (para. 8).

d. Oppression

Oppression and the CCAA

[139] Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders originally claimed that the Plan proponents, CAC and CAIL and the Plan supporters 853350 and Air Canada had oppressed, unfairly disregarded or unfairly prejudiced their interests, under Section 234 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders (for reasons that will appear obvious) have abandoned that position.

[140] Section 234 gives the court wide discretion to remedy corporate conduct that is unfair. As remedial legislation, it attempts to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and management to ensure adequate investor protection and maximum management flexibility. The Act requires the court to judge the conduct of the company and the majority in the context of equity and fairness: ***First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd.***, (1988) 40 B.L.R.28 (Alta. Q.B.). Equity and fairness are measured against or considered in the context of the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of the complainants: ***Re Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna*** (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C).

[141] The starting point in any determination of oppression requires an understanding as to what the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations are and what the damaging or detrimental effect is on them. MacDonald J. stated in ***First Edmonton Place,*** *supra* at 57***:***

> In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

[142] While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: ***Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.*** (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.).

[143] Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: ***Re Royal Oak Mines Ltd.***, *supra*, para. 4., ***Re Cadillac Fairview***, [1995] O.J. 707 (Ont. Sup. Ct), and ***Re T. Eaton Company,*** *supra*.

[144] To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

[145] It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

[146] Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

[147] The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this

moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

[148] The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

[149] It is asserted that because the Plan proponents engaged in a restructuring of Canadian's debt before the filing under the CCAA, that its use of the Act for only a small group of creditors, which includes Resurgence is somehow oppressive.

[150] At the outset, it cannot be overlooked that the CCAA does not require that a compromise be proposed to all creditors of an insolvent company. The CCAA is a flexible, remedial statute which recognizes the unique circumstances that lead to and away from insolvency.

[151] Next, Air Canada made it clear beginning in the fall of 1999 that Canadian would have to complete a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to acquire CAIL on a financially sound basis and as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following the implementation of the moratorium, absent which Canadian could not have continued to operate, Canadian and Air Canada commenced efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. They perceived that further damage to public confidence that a CCAA filing could produce, required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection. Before the Petitioners started the CCAA proceedings on March 24, 2000, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

[152] The purpose of the CCAA is to create an environment for negotiations and compromise. Often it is the stay of proceedings that creates the necessary stability for that process to unfold. Negotiations with certain key creditors in advance of the CCAA filing, rather than being oppressive or conspiratorial, are to be encouraged as a matter of principle if their impact is to provide a firm foundation for a restructuring. Certainly in this case, they were of critical importance, staving off liquidation, preserving cash flow and allowing the Plan to proceed. Rather than being detrimental or prejudicial to the interests of the other stakeholders, including Resurgence, it was beneficial to Canadian and all of its stakeholders.

[153] Resurgence complained that certain transfers of assets to Air Canada and its actions in consolidating the operations of the two entities prior to the initiation of the CCAA proceedings were unfairly prejudicial to it.

[154] The evidence demonstrates that the sales of the Toronto - Tokyo route, the Dash 8s and the simulators were at the suggestion of Canadian, who was in desperate need of operating cash. Air Canada paid what Canadian asked, based on its cash flow requirements. The

evidence established that absent the injection of cash at that critical juncture, Canadian would have ceased operations. It is for that reason that the Government of Canada willingly provided the approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

[155] Similarly, the renegotiation of CAIL's aircraft leases to reflect market rates supported by Air Canada covenant or guarantee has been previously dealt with by this court and found to have been in the best interest of Canadian, not to its detriment. The evidence establishes that the financial support and corporate integration that has been provided by Air Canada was not only in Canadian's best interest, but its only option for survival. The suggestion that the renegotiations of these leases, various sales and the operational realignment represents an assumption of a benefit by Air Canada to the detriment of Canadian is not supported by the evidence.

[156] I find the transactions predating the CCAA proceedings, were in fact Canadian's life blood in ensuring some degree of liquidity and stability within which to conduct an orderly restructuring of its debt. There was no detriment to Canadian or to its creditors, including its unsecured creditors. That Air Canada and Canadian were so successful in negotiating agreements with their major creditors, including aircraft financiers, without resorting to a stay under the CCAA underscores the serious distress Canadian was in and its lenders recognition of the viability of the proposed Plan.

[157] Resurgence complained that other significant groups held negotiations with Canadian. The evidence indicates that a meeting was held with Mr. Symington, Managing Director of Resurgence, in Toronto in March 2000. It was made clear to Resurgence that the pool of unsecured creditors would be somewhere between $500 and $700 million and that Resurgence would be included within that class. To the extent that the versions of this meeting differ, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr. Carty. Resurgence wished to play a significant role in the debt restructuring and indicated it was prepared to utilize the litigation process to achieve a satisfactory result for itself. It is therefore understandable that no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, the original offer to affected unsecured creditors has been enhanced since the filing of the plan on April 25, 2000. The enhancements to unsecured claims involved the removal of the cap on the unsecured pool and an increase from 12 to 14 cents on the dollar.

[158] The findings of the Commissioner of Competition establishes beyond doubt that absent the financial support provided by Air Canada, Canadian would have failed in December 1999. I am unable to find on the evidence that Resurgence has been oppressed. The complaint that Air Canada has plundered Canadian and robbed it of its assets is not supported but contradicted by the evidence. As described above, the alternative is liquidation and in that event the Unsecured Noteholders would receive between one and three cents on the dollar. The Monitor's conclusions in this regard are supportable and I accept them.

e. Unfairness to Shareholders

[159] The Minority Shareholders essentially complained that they were being unfairly stripped of their only asset in CAC - the shares of CAIL. They suggested they were being squeezed out by the new CAC majority shareholder 853350, without any compensation or any

vote. When the reorganization is completed as contemplated by the Plan , their shares will remain in CAC but CAC will be a bare shell.

[160] They further submitted that Air Canada's cash infusion, the covenants and guarantees it has offered to aircraft financiers, and the operational changes (including integration of schedules, "quick win" strategies, and code sharing) have all added significant value to CAIL to the benefit of its stakeholders, including the Minority Shareholders. They argued that they should be entitled to continue to participate into the future and that such an expectation is legitimate and consistent with the statements and actions of Air Canada in regard to integration. By acting to realign the airlines before a corporate reorganization, the Minority Shareholders asserted that Air Canada has created the expectation that it is prepared to consolidate the airlines with the participation of a minority. The Minority Shareholders take no position with respect to the debt restructuring under the CCAA, but ask the court to sever the corporate reorganization provisions contained in the Plan.

[161] Finally, they asserted that CAIL has increased in value due to Air Canada's financial contributions and operational changes and that accordingly, before authorizing the transfer of the CAIL shares to 853350, the current holders of the CAIL Preferred Shares, the court must have evidence before it to justify a transfer of 100% of the equity of CAIL to the Preferred Shares.

[162] That CAC will have its shareholding in CAIL extinguished and emerge a bare shell is acknowledged. However, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that those shares, CAC's "only asset", have no value. That the Minority Shareholders are content to have the debt restructuring proceed suggests by implication that they do not dispute the insolvency of both Petitioners, CAC and CAIL.

[163] The Minority Shareholders base their expectation to remain as shareholders on the actions of Air Canada in acquiring only 82% of the CAC shares before integrating certain of the airlines' operations. Mr. Baker (who purchased <u>after</u> the Plan was filed with the Court and almost six months after the take over bid by Air Canada) suggested that the contents of the bid circular misrepresented Air Canada's future intentions to its shareholders. The two dollar price offered and paid per share in the bid must be viewed somewhat skeptically and in the context in which the bid arose. It does not support the speculative view that some shareholders hold, that somehow, despite insolvency, their shares have some value on a going concern basis. In any event, any claim for misrepresentation that Minority Shareholders might have arising from the take over bid circular against Air Canada or 853350 , if any, is unaffected by the Plan and may be pursued after the stay is lifted.

[164] In considering Resurgence's claim of oppression I have already found that the financial support of Air Canada during this restructuring period has benefited Canadian and its stakeholders. Air Canada's financial support and the integration of the two airlines has been critical to keeping Canadian afloat. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that without this support Canadian would have ceased operations. However it has not transformed CAIL or CAC into solvent companies.

[165] The Minority Shareholders raise concerns about assets that are ascribed limited or no value in the Monitor's report as does Resurgence (although to support an opposite proposition). Considerable argument was directed to the future operational savings and profitability forecasted for Air Canada, its subsidiaries and CAIL and its subsidiaries. Mr. Peterson estimated it to be in the order of $650 to $800 million on an annual basis, commencing in 2001. The Minority Shareholders point to the tax pools of a restructured company that they submit will be of great value once CAIL becomes profitable as anticipated. They point to a pension surplus that at the very least has value by virtue of the contribution holidays that it affords. They also look to the value of the compromised claims of the restructuring itself which they submit are in the order of $449 million. They submit these cumulative benefits add value, currently or at least realizable in the future. In sharp contrast to the Resurgence position that these acts constitute oppressive behaviour, the Minority Shareholders view them as enhancing the value of their shares. They go so far as to suggest that there may well be a current going concern value of the CAC shares that has been conveniently ignored or unquantified and that the Petitioners must put evidence before the court as to what that value is.

[166] These arguments overlook several important facts, the most significant being that CAC and CAIL are insolvent and will remain insolvent until the debt restructuring is fully implemented. These companies are not just technically or temporarily insolvent, they are massively insolvent. Air Canada will have invested upward of $3 billion to complete the restructuring, while the Minority Shareholders have contributed nothing. Further, it was a fundamental condition of Air Canada's support of this Plan that it become the sole owner of CAIL. It has been suggested by some that Air Canada's share purchase at two dollars per share in December 1999 was unfairly prejudicial to CAC and CAIL's creditors. Objectively, any expectation by Minority Shareholders that they should be able to participate in a restructured CAIL is not reasonable.

[167] The Minority Shareholders asserted the plan is unfair because the effect of the reorganization is to extinguish the common shares of CAIL held by CAC and to convert the voting and non-voting Preferred Shares of CAIL into common shares of CAIL. They submit there is no expert valuation or other evidence to justify the transfer of CAIL's equity to the Preferred Shares. There is no equity in the CAIL shares to transfer. The year end financials show CAIL's shareholder equity at a deficit of $790 million. The Preferred Shares have a liquidation preference of $347 million. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Canada's interim support has rendered either of these companies solvent, it has simply permitted operations to continue. In fact, the unaudited consolidated financial statements of CAC for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 show total shareholders equity went from a deficit of $790 million to a deficit of $1.214 million, an erosion of $424 million.

[168] The Minority Shareholders' submission attempts to compare and contrast the rights and expectations of the CAIL preferred shares as against the CAC common shares. This is not a meaningful exercise; the Petitioners are not submitting that the Preferred Shares have value and the evidence demonstrates unequivocally that they do not. The Preferred Shares are merely being utilized as a corporate vehicle to allow CAIL to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Air Canada. For example, the same result could have been achieved by issuing new shares rather than changing the designation of 853350's Preferred Shares in CAIL.

[169] The Minority Shareholders have asked the court to sever the reorganization from the debt restructuring, to permit them to participate in whatever future benefit might be derived from the restructured CAIL. However, a fundamental condition of this Plan and the expressed intention of Air Canada on numerous occasions is that CAIL become a wholly owned subsidiary. To suggest the court ought to sever this reorganization from the debt restructuring fails to account for the fact that it is not two plans but an integral part of a single plan. To accede to this request would create an injustice to creditors whose claims are being seriously compromised, and doom the entire Plan to failure. Quite simply, the Plan's funder will not support a severed plan.

[170] Finally, the future profits to be derived by Air Canada are not a relevant consideration. While the object of any plan under the CCAA is to create a viable emerging entity, the germane issue is what a prospective purchaser is prepared to pay in the circumstances. Here, we have the one and only offer on the table, Canadian's last and only chance. The evidence demonstrates this offer is preferable to those who have a remaining interest to a liquidation. Where secured creditors have compromised their claims and unsecured creditors are accepting 14 cents on the dollar in a potential pool of unsecured claims totalling possibly in excess of $1 billion , it is not unfair that shareholders receive nothing.

e. The Public Interest

[171] In this case, the court cannot limit its assessment of fairness to how the Plan affects the direct participants. The business of the Petitioners as a national and international airline employing over 16,000 people must be taken into account.

[172] In his often cited article, ***Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*** (1947), 25 Can.Bar R.ev. 587 at 593 Stanley Edwards stated:

> Another reason which is usually operative in favour of reorganization is the interest of the public in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if it employs large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions of the creditors and shareholders of the company and is undoubtedly a factor which a court would wish to consider in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C.C.A.A.

[173] In ***Re Repap British Columbia Inc.*** (1998), 1 C.B.R. 449 (B.C.S.C.) the court noted that the fairness of the plan must be measured against the overall economic and business environment and against the interests of the citizens of British Columbia who are affected as "shareholders" of the company, and creditors, of suppliers, employees and competitors of the company. The court approved the plan even though it was unable to conclude that it was necessarily fair and reasonable. In ***Re Quintette Coal Ltd.,*** *supra,* Thackray J. acknowledged the significance of the coal mine to the British Columbia economy, its importance to the people who lived and worked in the region and to the employees of the company and their families. Other cases in which the court considered the public interest in determining whether to sanction a plan under the CCAA include ***Canadian Red Cross Society (Re)***, (1998),5

C.B.R.(4th) (Ont. Gen. Div.) and ***Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada (Trustee of***), [1992] O.J. No. 795 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

[174] The economic and social impacts of a plan are important and legitimate considerations. Even in insolvency, companies are more than just assets and liabilities. The fate of a company is inextricably tied to those who depend on it in various ways. It is difficult to imagine a case where the economic and social impacts of a liquidation could be more catastrophic. It would undoubtedly be felt by Canadian air travellers across the country. The effect would not be a mere ripple, but more akin to a tidal wave from coast to coast that would result in chaos to the Canadian transportation system.

[175] More than sixteen thousand unionized employees of CAIL and CRAL appeared through counsel. The unions and their membership strongly support the Plan. The unions represented included the Airline Pilots Association International, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Transportation District 104, Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union. They represent pilots, ground workers and cabin personnel. The unions submit that it is essential that the employee protections arising from the current restructuring of Canadian not be jeopardized by a bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation. Liquidation would be devastating to the employees and also to the local and national economies. The unions emphasize that the Plan safeguards the employment and job dignity protection negotiated by the unions for their members. Further, the court was reminded that the unions and their members have played a key role over the last fifteen years or more in working with Canadian and responsible governments to ensure that Canadian survived and jobs were maintained.

[176] The Calgary and Edmonton Airport authorities, which are not for profit corporations, also supported the Plan. CAIL's obligations to the airport authorities are not being compromised under the Plan. However, in a liquidation scenario, the airport authorities submitted that a liquidation would have severe financial consequences to them and have potential for severe disruption in the operation of the airports.

[177] The representations of the Government of Canada are also compelling. Approximately one year ago, CAIL approached the Transport Department to inquire as to what solution could be found to salvage their ailing company. The Government saw fit to issue an order in council, pursuant to section 47 of the ***Transportation Act*** , which allowed an opportunity for CAIL to approach other entities to see if a permanent solution could be found. A standing committee in the House of Commons reviewed a framework for the restructuring of the airline industry, recommendations were made and undertakings were given by Air Canada. The Government was driven by a mandate to protect consumers and promote competition. It submitted that the Plan is a major component of the industry restructuring. Bill C-26, which addresses the restructuring of the industry, has passed through the House of Commons and is presently before the Senate. The Competition Bureau has accepted that Air Canada has the only offer on the table and has worked very closely with the parties to ensure that the interests of consumers, employees, small carriers, and smaller communities will be protected.

[178] In summary, in assessing whether a plan is fair and reasonable, courts have emphasized that perfection is not required: see for example ***Wandlyn Inns Ltd. (Re)*** (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d)

316 (N.BQ.B), ***Quintette Coal***, *supra* and ***Repap***, *supra*. Rather, various rights and remedies must be sacrificed to varying degrees to result in a reasonable, viable compromise for all concerned. The court is required to view the "big picture" of the plan and assess its impact as a whole. I return to ***Algoma Steel v. Royal Bank of Canada***., *supra* at 9 in which Farley J. endorsed this approach:

> What might appear on the surface to be unfair to one party when viewed in relation to all other parties may be considered to be quite appropriate.

[179] Fairness and reasonableness are not abstract notions, but must be measured against the available commercial alternatives. The triggering of the statute, namely insolvency, recognizes a fundamental flaw within the company. In these imperfect circumstances there can never be a perfect plan, but rather only one that is supportable. As stated in ***Re Sammi Atlas Inc***., (1998), 3C.B.R. (4th) 171 at 173 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at 173:

> A plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment.

[180] I find that in all the circumstances, the Plan is fair and reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

[181] The Plan has obtained the support of many affected creditors, including virtually all aircraft financiers, holders of executory contracts, AMR, Loyalty Group and the Senior Secured Noteholders.

[182] Use of these proceedings has avoided triggering more than $1.2 billion of incremental claims. These include claims of passengers with pre-paid tickets, employees, landlords and other parties with ongoing executory contracts, trade creditors and suppliers.

[183] This Plan represents a solid chance for the continued existence of Canadian. It preserves CAIL as a business entity. It maintains over 16,000 jobs. Suppliers and trade creditors are kept whole. It protects consumers and preserves the integrity of our national transportation system while we move towards a new regulatory framework. The extensive efforts by Canadian and Air Canada, the compromises made by stakeholders both within and without the proceedings and the commitment of the Government of Canada inspire confidence in a positive result.

[184] I agree with the opposing parties that the Plan is not perfect, but it is neither illegal nor oppressive. Beyond its fair and reasonable balancing of interests, the Plan is a result of bona fide efforts by all concerned and indeed is the only alternative to bankruptcy as ten years of struggle and creative attempts at restructuring by Canadian clearly demonstrate. This Plan is one step toward a new era of airline profitability that hopefully will protect consumers by promoting affordable and accessible air travel to all Canadians.

[185] The Plan deserves the sanction of this court and it is hereby granted. The application pursuant to section 185 of the ABCA is granted. The application for declarations sought by Resurgence are dismissed. The application of the Minority Shareholders is dismissed.

HEARD on the 5th day of June to the 19th day of June, 2000.
DATED at Calgary, Alberta this 27th day of June, 2000.

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J.C.Q.B.A.

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TAB 8

Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)

92 O.R. (3d) 513

Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Laskin, Cronk and Blair JJ.A.
August 18, 2008

Debtor and creditor -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act permitting inclusion of third-party releases in plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by court where those releases are reasonably connected to proposed restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

In response to a liquidity crisis which threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"), a creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement was crafted. The Plan called for the release of third parties from any liability associated with ABCP, including, with certain narrow exceptions, liability for claims relating to fraud. The "double majority" required by s. 6 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") approved the Plan. The respondents sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The application judge made the following findings: (a) the parties to be released were necessary and essential to the restructuring; (b) the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it; (c) the Plan could not succeed without the releases; (d) the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and (e) the Plan would benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor noteholders generally. The application judge sanctioned the Plan. The appellants were holders of ABCP notes who opposed the Plan. On appeal, they argued that the CCAA does

not permit a release of claims against third parties and that the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

On a proper interpretation, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. That conclusion is supported by (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself; (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the CCAA; and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the CCAA in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to interpretation. The second provides the entre to negotiations between the parties [page514] affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity to fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

While the principle that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -- in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect is an important one, Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself.

Interpreting the CCAA as permitting the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement is not unconstitutional under the division-of-powers doctrine and does not contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. The CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power, and the power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. To the extent that the provisions of the CCAA are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount.

The application judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence. His conclusion that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole and to the debtor companies outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases was reasonable.

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APPEAL from the sanction order of C.L. Campbell J., [2008] O.J. No. 2265, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (S.C.J.) under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

See Schedule "C" -- Counsel for list of counsel.

The judgment of the court was delivered by

BLAIR J.A.: --

A. Introduction

[1] In August 2007, a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

[2] By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the $32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007, pending an attempt to resolve the crisis

through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

[3] Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("CCAA"): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the [page517] application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to appeal

[4] Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument, we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

[5] The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and -- given the expedited timetable -- the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as Cineplex Odeon Corp. (Re) (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.) and Re Country Style Food Services, [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.) are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

[6] For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The parties

[7] The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third-party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a pharmaceuticals retailer and several holding companies and energy companies.

[8] Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP -- in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants -- slightly over $1 billion -- represent only a small fraction of the more than $32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

[9] The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways. [page518]

The ABCP market

[10] Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment -- usually 30 to 90 days -- typically with a low-interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be "asset backed" because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

[11] ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

[12] The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over $116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately $32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP, the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

[13] As I understand it, prior to August 2007, when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

[14] Various corporations (the "Sponsors") would arrange for entities they control ("Conduits") to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through "Dealers" (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

[15] The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits ("Issuer Trustees") and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as "Asset Providers". To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, "Liquidity Providers" agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes ("Noteholders"). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

[16] When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP

[page519] Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The liquidity crisis

[17] The types of assets and asset interests acquired to "back" the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature, there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP Notes.

[18] When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the "liquidity crisis" in the ABCP market.

[19] The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes -- partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

[20] The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze -- the result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement -- known as the Montreal Protocol -- the parties committed [page520] to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

[21] The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two-thirds of the $32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

[22] Mr. Crawford was named the Committee's chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge's understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

[23] Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian

ABCP market.

The Plan

(a) Plan overview

[24] Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution". The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper -- which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months -- into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

[25] The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan [page521] adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

[26] Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

[27] The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than $1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the $1 million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be

designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

(b) The releases

[28] This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in art. 10.

[29] The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers and other market participants -- in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" -- from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

[30] The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

[31] The releases, in effect, are part of a quid pro quo. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in [page522] the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

(a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are

designed to make the notes more secure;
(b) Sponsors -- who in addition have co-operated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including by sharing certain proprietary information -- give up their existing contracts;
(c) the Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility; and
(d) other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

[32] According to Mr. Crawford's affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation".

The CCAA proceedings to date

[33] On March 17, 2008, the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan -- 96 per cent of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors' Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan -- 99 per cent of those connected with the development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80 per cent of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

[34] The vote thus provided the Plan with the "double majority" approval -- a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims -- required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

[35] Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 [page523] and 13. On May 16, the application judge

issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan's failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

[36] The result of this renegotiation was a "fraud carve-out" -- an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan's releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

[37] A second sanction hearing -- this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) -- was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

[38] The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

[39] There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

(1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its

directors?
(2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it? [page524]
(1) Legal authority for the releases

[40] The standard of review on this first issue -- whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases -- is correctness.

[41] The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company. [See Note 1 below] The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:
(a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;
(b) the court is not entitled to "fill in the gaps" in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
(c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;
(d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
(e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

[42] I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, "gap filling" and inherent jurisdiction

[43] On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of

(a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including [page525] those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entre to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

[44] The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: Canadian Red Cross Society (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Gen. Div.). As Farley J. noted in Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.), at p. 111 C.B.R., "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation".

[45] Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

[46] These issues have recently been canvassed by the

Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", [See Note 2 below] and there was considerable argument on these issues before the application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors' suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools -- statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction [page526] -- it is not necessary, in my view, to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no "gap-filling" to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

[47] The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally -- and in the insolvency context particularly -- that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger's modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, at para. 26.

[48] More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes -- particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature -- is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, supra, at p. 56:

The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to

be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in Qubec as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

[49] I adopt these principles. [page527]

[50] The remedial purpose of the CCAA -- as its title affirms -- is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.), at p. 318 C.B.R., Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a

reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

[51] The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary -- as the then secretary of state noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading-- "because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression" and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, House of Commons Debates (Hansard) (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as "the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment". Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, [1990] O.J. No. 2180 (C.A.), per Doherty J.A. in dissent; Skydome Corp. v. Ontario, [1998] O.J. No. 6548, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Gen. Div.); Anvil Range Mining Corp. (Re) (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[52] In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in Elan, supra, at pp. 306-307 O.R.:

> [T]he Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees". [See Note 3 below] Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest.

(Emphasis added)

Application of the principles of interpretation

[53] An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the [page528] application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian

ABCP market itself.

[54] The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

[55] This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP Dealers, the releasee financial institutions are "third-parties" to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as Asset Providers and Liquidity Providers, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore -- as the application judge found -- in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by "foregoing immediate rights to assets and . . . providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes" (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge's remark, at para. 50, that the restructuring "involves the commitment and participation of all parties" in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments, at paras. 48-49:

> Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.
>
> In these circumstances, it is unduly technical to classify

the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring.
(Emphasis added)

[56] The application judge did observe that "[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper . . ." (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring as between debtor [page529] and creditors. His focus was on the effect of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible perspective given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that "what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada" (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated, at para. 142: "Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal".

[57] I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The statutory wording

[58] Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:
(a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;

(b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in

(c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

[59] Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

> 4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs. [page530]
>
> . . . . .
>
> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
>
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the Bankruptcy and

> Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or arrangement

[60] While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, looseleaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 10A-12.2, N10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": Reference re Timber Regulations, [1935] A.C. 184, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at p. 197 A.C., affg [1933] S.C.R. 616, [1933] S.C.J. No. 53. See also Guardian Assurance Co. (Re), [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (C.A.), at pp. 448, 450 Ch.; T&N Ltd. and Others (No. 3) (Re), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2006] E.W.H.C. 1447 (Ch.).

[61] The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement". I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

[62] A proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, [1976] S.C.J. No. 114, at p. 239 S.C.R.; [page531] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688,

[2000] O.J. No. 3993 (C.A.), at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes and, therefore, is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See Air Canada (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1909, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (S.C.J.), at para. 6; Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Gen. Div.), at p. 518 O.R.

[63] There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan -- including the provision for releases -- becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

[64] T&N Ltd. and Others (Re), supra, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focusing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. Companies Act 1985, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA -- including the concepts of compromise or arrangement. [See Note 4 below]

[65] T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the EL claimants)

would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the EL claimants) agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of [page532] compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

[66] Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence -- cited earlier in these reasons -- to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example. [See Note 5 below] Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

> In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many

> years to give the term its widest meaning. Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party.

(Emphasis added)

[67] I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in T&N were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial [page533] third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The binding mechanism

[68] Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind all creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes [See Note 6 below] and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The required nexus

[69] In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be

made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

[70] The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third-party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

[71] In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

(a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor; [page534]

(b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;

(c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;

(d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and

(e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

[72] Here, then -- as was the case in T&N -- there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being

released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77, he said:

> I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.
>
> This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

[73] I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA -- construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation -- supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The jurisprudence

[74] Third-party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's [page535] Bench in Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re), [2000] A.J. No. 771, 265 A.R. 201 (Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by Resurgence Asset Management LLC v. Canadian Airlines Corp., [2000] A.J. No. 1028, 266 A.R. 131 (C.A.), and [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60, 293 A.R. 351. In Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (S.C.J.), Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

> [It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

[75] We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of Canadian Airlines (Re), however, the releases in those restructurings -- including Muscletech -- were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

[76] In Canadian Airlines (Re) the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the wellspring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

[77] Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation, at para. 87, that "[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company". It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Michaud v. Steinberg, [See Note 7 below] of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument -- dealt with later in these reasons -- that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92). [page536]

[78] Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive

principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court-sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

[79] The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are Michaud v. Steinberg, supra; NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514, [1999] O.J. No. 4749 (C.A.); Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (S.C.); and Stelco Inc. (Re) (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241, [2005] O.J. No. 4883 (C.A.) ("Stelco I"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of Steinberg, they do not involve third-party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that Steinberg does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

[80] In Pacific Coastal Airlines, Tysoe J. made the following comment, at para. 24:

> [The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

[81] This statement must be understood in its context, however. Pacific Coastal Airlines had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question, it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to

certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of res judicata or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

[82] The facts in Pacific Coastal are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal's separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian -- at a contractual level -- may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. [page537] Here, however, the disputes that are the subject matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

[83] Nor is the decision of this court in the NBD Bank case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors". Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the bank. On appeal, he argued that since the bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process -- in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

[84] Rosenberg J.A., writing for this court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations, at paras. 53-54:

> In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that

allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at p. 297, . . . the CCAA is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.

In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may [page538] not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. (Footnote omitted)

[85] Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third-party releases was not under consideration at all. What the court was determining in NBD Bank was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in NBD to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in NBD Bank the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release -- as is the situation here. Thus, NBD Bank is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third-party releases.

[86] The appellants also rely upon the decision of this court in Stelco I. There, the court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement, one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

> [Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis--vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company.

(Citations omitted; emphasis added)
See Stelco Inc. (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (S.C.J.), at para. 7.

[87] This court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the [page539] need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

[88] Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third-party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and, therefore, that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 1996, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (C.A.) ("Stelco II"). The court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The court said (para. 11):

> In [Stelco I] -- the classification case -- the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company . . . [H]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process.

(Emphasis added)

[89] The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third-party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

[90] Some of the appellants -- particularly those represented by Mr. Woods -- rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec

Court of Appeal in Michaud v. Steinberg, supra. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In Steinberg, the court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 -- English translation):

> Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.
>
> . . . . .
>
> The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with is creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.
>
> . . . . . [page540]
>
> The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

[91] Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third-party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

> In short, the Act will have become the Companies' and Their Officers and Employees Creditors Arrangement Act -- an awful mess -- and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of its creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of

> operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

[92] Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature -- they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company -- rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para., 90 he said:

> The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself . . .

(Emphasis added)

[93] The decision of the court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself", however. On occasion, such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in Steinberg, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision [page541] appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analyzing the Act -- an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

[94] Finally, the majority in Steinberg seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases -- as I have concluded it does -- the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

[95] Accordingly, to the extent Steinberg stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in Steinberg considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 amendments

[96] Steinberg led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

> 5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances. [page542]

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

[97] Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third-party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

[98] The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there may be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted: [See Note 8 below]

Far from being a rule, [the maxim expressio unius] is not

even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes its does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

[99] As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Steinberg. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden and Morawetz, vol. 1, supra, at 2-144, E11A; Dans l'affaire de la proposition de: Le Royal Penfield inc. et Groupe Thibault Van Houtte et Associs lte), [2003] J.Q. no. 9223, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S.), at paras. 44-46.

[100] Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the [page543] BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third-party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The deprivation of proprietary rights

[101] Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -- in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44(1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., supra, at 183; E.A. Driedger and Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed., (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The division of powers and paramountcy

[102] Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the Constitution Act, 1867, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. [page544]

[103] I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: Reference re: Constitutional Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] S.C.J. No. 46. As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p.

661 S.C.R.), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [1928] A.C. 187 (J.C.P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament". Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

> Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

[104] That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action -- normally a matter of provincial concern -- or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion with respect to legal authority

[105] For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "fair and reasonable"

[106] The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

[107] Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In [page545] the absence of a demonstrable error, an appellate court will not interfere: see Ravelston Corp. Ltd. (Re), [2007] O.J. No. 1389, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (C.A.).

[108] I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties -- including leading Canadian financial institutions -- that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end, he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

[109] The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

[110] The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers; (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example); (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order; and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

[111] The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is, therefore, some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: Fotini's Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd., [1998] B.C.J. No. 598, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (S.C.), at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings -- the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud -- and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

[112] The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, [page546] that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that . . . would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

[113] At para. 71, above, I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here -- with two additional findings -- because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

(a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
(b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
(c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
(d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the

Plan;
(e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
(f) the voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
(g) the releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

[114] These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

[115] The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they -- as individual creditors -- make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, [page547] Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

[116] All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only

acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

[117] In insolvency restructuring proceedings, almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices", inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

[118] Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than $32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of all Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3 per cent of that total. That is what he did.

[119] The application judge noted, at para. 126, that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out [page548] specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized, at para. 134, that:

> No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity

among all stakeholders.

[120] In my view, we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

[121] For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

SCHEDULE "A" -- CONDUITS

Apollo Trust
Apsley Trust
Aria Trust
Aurora Trust
Comet Trust
Encore Trust
Gemini Trust
Ironstone Trust
MMAI-I Trust
Newshore Canadian Trust
Opus Trust
Planet Trust
Rocket Trust
Selkirk Funding Trust
Silverstone Trust
Slate Trust
Structured Asset Trust
Structured Investment Trust III
Symphony Trust
Whitehall Trust

SCHEDULE "B" -- APPLICANTS

ATB Financial
Caisse de dpt et placement du Qubec
Canaccord Capital Corporation [page549]
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
Canada Post Corporation
Credit Union Central Alberta Limited
Credit Union Central of BC
Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario
Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan
Desjardins Group
Magna International Inc.
National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.
NAV Canada
Northwater Capital Management Inc.
Public Sector Pension Investment Board
The Governors of the University of Alberta

SCHEDULE "C" -- COUNSEL

(1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers, for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
(2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman, for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.
(3) Peter F.C. Howard, and Samaneh Hosseini, for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
(4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, and Max Starnino, for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
(5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos, for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
(6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin, for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
(7) Mario J. Forte, for Caisse de Dpt et Placement du Qubec
(8) John B. Laskin, for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada [page550]
(9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques, for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al.)
(10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
(11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank
(12) Jeffrey S. Leon, for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees

(13) Usman Sheikh, for Coventree Capital Inc.
(14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso, for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
(15) Neil C. Saxe, for Dominion Bond Rating Service
(16) James A. Woods, Sbastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette, for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aroports de Montral, Aroports de Montral Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Mtropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP
(17) Scott A. Turner, for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
(18) R. Graham Phoenix, for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Notes

Note 1: Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.

Note 2: Georgina R. Jackson and Janis P. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters" in Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007 (Vancouver, B.C.: Carswell, 2007).

Note 3: Citing Gibbs J.A. in Chef Ready Foods, supra, at pp. 319-20 C.B.R.

Note 4: The legislative debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the Companies Act 1985 (U.K.): see House of Commons Debates (Hansard), supra.

Note 5: See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.

Note 6: A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6).

Note 7: Steinberg was originally reported in French: Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud, [1993] J.Q. no. 1076, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A.). All paragraph references to Steinberg in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at 1993 CarswellQue 2055.

Note 8: Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1975) at pp. 234-35, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at p. 621.
