Court File No. 19-CV- 615862-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **JTI-MACDONALD CORP.**

Applicant

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT

March 8, 2019

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TAB 1

COURT FILE NO.: 04-CL-5306
DATE: 20040322

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(Commercial List)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BEFORE: FARLEY J.

COUNSEL: *Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage* and *Geoff R. Hall*, for the Applicants

David Jacobs and *Michael McCreary*, for Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 of the United Steel Workers of America

Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and *Rob Centa*, for United Steelworkers of America

Bob Thornton and *Kyla Mahar*, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants

Kevin J. Zych, for the Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders

David R. Byers, for CIT

Kevin McElcheran, for GE

Murray Gold and *Andrew Hatnay*, for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries

Lewis Gottheil, for CAW Canada and its Local 523

Virginie Gauthier, for Fleet

H. Whiteley, for CIBC

Gail Rubenstein, for FSCO

Kenneth D. Kraft, for EDS Canada Inc.

HEARD: March 5, 2004

ENDORSEMENT

[1] As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

[2] Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

> 12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

[3] For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed – addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

[4] The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

[5] The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

[6] If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I.C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

[7] S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

> "debtor company" means any company that:
>
> (a) is bankrupt or insolvent;
>
> (b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;
>
> (c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or
>
> (d) is in the course of being wound-up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

[8] Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

[9] This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Re Kenwood Hills Development Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where at p. 45 I observed:

> The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

[10] Anderson J. in *Re MGM Electric Co. Ltd.* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This

common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *Re TDM Software Systems Inc.* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

[11] The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring – which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

[12] It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

[13] There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

> Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last* gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

[14] It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Re Cumberland Trading Inc.* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

> I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if “success” may have been available with earlier spade work.

[15] I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101; 1 O.R. (3d) 280 (C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J.) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

[16] In *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.) I observed at p. 32:

> One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

[17] In *Re Anvil Range Mining Corp.* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

> The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

[18] Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

[19] I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the *Bankruptcy Act* was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least $5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of $5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

[20] Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Pepplar Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

> The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

[21] The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

> In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of “insolvent person” in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* …
>
> To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, 16 C.B.R. 1 [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

[22] It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1)…

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

[23] Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of “debtor company” as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership* v. *Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at p. 580:

> Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[24] I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy – and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former *Bankruptcy Act* unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt’s assets (not likely involving the business carried on – and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor *prior* to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist,

albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

[25] It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on “rescues” as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

[26] Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union’s affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

[27] On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

[28] The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Re Optical Recording Laboratories Inc.* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Re Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

[29] In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx,* [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *Re King Petroleum Ltd.* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

> With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past.* I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

[30] *King* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

[31] Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

> The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:
>
> (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
>
> (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
>
> (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
>
> (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;

(e) developing restructuring alternatives; and

(f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

[32] I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

> With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was $514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was $599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of $575, and average contract business sales price per ton of $611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

[33] I note that $145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of $350 million had increased from $241 million on November 30, 2003 to $293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of $75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Re Pacific Mobile Corporation; Robitaille v. Les Industries l'Islet Inc. and Banque Canadienne Nationale* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (Que. S.C.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of $80 million now to a projected loss of $192 million and cash has gone from a positive $209 million to a negative $114 million.

[34] Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

> 8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

> 36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.
>
> 37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

[35] But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

[36] I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil*, *supra* at p. 162.

[37] The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

> The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing $74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

> (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
>
> (b) that assets exceed liabilities.
>
> On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

[38] As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run…eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

[39] I have not given any benefit to the $313 - $363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

[40] It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the say and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

[41] What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Reglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Gen. Div.) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may

be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (S.C.J.) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

> 33…They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

[42] The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

> 24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.
>
> 25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

[43] Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

> to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

[44] In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Div Ct.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

[45] The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I. M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

> "11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and is text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

[46] In *Barsi v. Farcas*, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stanton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

[47] Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ont. Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

[48] There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

[49] In *King, supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

> To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

[50] To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

[51] S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

> S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.
>
> (2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

[52] *Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra* at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

> The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

[53] In *Garden v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *In re A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992)*, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Ch. D) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Re Leo Gagnier* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store – in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

[54] It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

[55] I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

[56] All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King, supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Proviseuers Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S.S.C.) at p. 29; *Re Challmie* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C.S.C.) at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

> Mr. MacAdam argues also that the $4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

[57] With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital, supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

> It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.
>
> There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:
>
> > A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.
>
> Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due"

> for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re* 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

[58] There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

[59] It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway* below at pp. 163-4 – at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical supra* at pp. 756-7; *Re Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C.S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Re Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed,* Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

> In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its

> obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. …
>
> The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

[60] The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

[61] I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

> 70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged – the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."
>
> 71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over $600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

[62] Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

> 74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

> 75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

[63] Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

[64] As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as $804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 – January 2004 of $17 million to arrive at an equity position of $787.2 million as at the date of filing.

[65] From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) $294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) $57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the captialized deferred debt issue expense of $3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals $354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be $433 million.

[66] On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of $1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of $656 million. If the $1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of $198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as $909.3 million but only $684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of $225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total $1080 million.

[67] Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of ($433 million minus $1080 million) or *negative* $647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

[68] In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible

assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the $773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that $773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a $155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

[69] In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

[70] I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace – and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

J.M. Farley

Released: March 22, 20004

TAB 2

2005 CarswellOnt 1188
Ontario Court of Appeal

Stelco Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 1188, [2005] O.J. No. 1171, 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 222, 196 O.A.C. 142, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended

And In the Matter of a proposed plan of compromise or arrangement
with respect to Stelco Inc. and the other Applicants listed in Schedule "A"

Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

Goudge, Feldman, Blair JJ.A.

Heard: March 18, 2005
Judgment: March 31, 2005
Docket: CA M32289

Proceedings: reversed *Stelco Inc., Re* ((2005)), 2005 CarswellOnt 742, [2005] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])); reversed *Stelco Inc., Re* ((2005)), 2005 CarswellOnt 743, [2005] O.J. No. 730, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 310 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])); additional reasons to *Stelco Inc., Re* ((2005)), 2005 CarswellOnt 742, [2005] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]))

Counsel: Jeffrey S. Leon, Richard B. Swan for Appellants, Michael Woollcombe, Roland Keiper
Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Robert A. Centa for Respondent, United Steelworkers of America
Murray Gold, Andrew J. Hatnay for Respondent, Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd., Welland Pipe Ltd.
Michael C.P. McCreary, Carrie L. Clynick for USWA Locals 5328, 8782
John R. Varley for Active Salaried Employee Representative
Michael Barrack for Stelco Inc.
Peter Griffin for Board of Directors of Stelco Inc.
K. Mahar for Monitor
David R. Byers (Agent) for CIT Business Credit, DIP Lender

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Business associations --- Specific corporate organization matters — Directors and officers — Appointment — General principles

Corporation entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — K and W were involved with companies who made capital proposal regarding corporation — Companies held approximately 20 per cent of corporation's shares — K and W, allegedly with support of over 30 per cent of shareholders, requested to fill two vacant directors' positions of corporation, and be appointed to review committee — K and W claimed that their interest as shareholders would not be represented in proceedings — K and W appointed directors by board, and made members of review committee —

Employees' motion for removal of K and W as directors was granted and appointments were voided — Trial judge found possibility existed that K and W would not have best interests of corporation at heart, and might favour certain shareholders — Trial judge found interference with business judgment of board was appropriate, as issue touched on constitution of corporation — Trial judge found reasonable apprehension of bias existed, although no evidence of actual bias had been shown — K and W appealed — Appeal allowed — K and W reinstated to board — Court's discretion under s. 11 of Act does not give authority to remove directors, which is not part of restructuring process — Trial judge erred in not deferring to corporation's business judgment — Trial judge erred in adopting principle of reasonable apprehension of bias.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Corporation entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — K and W were involved with companies who made capital proposal regarding corporation — Companies held approximately 20 per cent of corporation's shares — K and W, allegedly with support of over 30 per cent of shareholders, requested to fill two vacant directors' positions of corporation and be appointed to review committee — K and W claimed that their interest as shareholders would not be represented in proceedings — K and W appointed directors by board, and made members of review committee — Employees' motion for removal of K and W as directors was granted and appointments were voided — Trial judge found possibility existed that K and W would not have best interests of corporation at heart, and might favour certain shareholders — Trial judge found interference with business judgment of board was appropriate, as issue touched on constitution of corporation — Trial judge found reasonable apprehension of bias existed, although no evidence of actual bias had been shown — K and W appealed — Appeal allowed — K and W reinstated to board — Court's discretion under s. 11 of Act does not give authority to remove directors, which is not part of restructuring process — Trial judge erred in not deferring to corporation's business judgment — Trial judge erred in adopting principle of reasonable apprehension of bias.

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s. 109(1) — referred to

s. 111 — referred to

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s. 122(1)(a) — referred to

s. 122(1)(b) — referred to

s. 145 — referred to

s. 145(2)(b) — referred to

s. 241 — referred to

s. 241(3)(e) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

s. 11(4) — considered

s. 11(6) — considered

s. 20 — considered

APPEAL by potential board members from judgments reported at *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 742, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and at *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 743, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 310 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), granting motion by employees for removal of certain directors from board of corporation under protection of *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act*.

***Blair J.A.*:**

Part I — Introduction

1 Stelco Inc. and four of its wholly owned subsidiaries obtained protection from their creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* [1] on January 29, 2004. Since that time, the Stelco Group has been engaged in a high profile, and sometimes controversial, process of economic restructuring. Since October 2004, the restructuring has revolved around a court-approved capital raising process which, by February 2005, had generated a number of competitive bids for the Stelco Group.

2 Farley J., an experienced judge of the Superior Court Commercial List in Toronto, has been supervising the CCAA process from the outset.

3 The appellants, Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper, are associated with two companies — Clearwater Capital Management Inc., and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. — which, respectively, hold approximately 20% of the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Most of these shares have been acquired while the CCAA process has been ongoing, and Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper have made it clear publicly that they believe there is good shareholder value in Stelco in spite of the restructuring. The reason they are able to take this position is that there has been a solid turn around in worldwide steel markets, as a result of which Stelco, although remaining in insolvency protection, is earning annual operating profits.

4 The Stelco board of directors ("the Board") has been depleted as a result of resignations, and in January of this year Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper expressed an interest in being appointed to the Board. They were supported in this request by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represent about 40% of the Stelco common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board appointed the appellants directors. In announcing the appointments publicly, Stelco said in a press release:

> After careful consideration, and given potential recoveries at the end of the company's restructuring process, the Board responded favourably to the requests by making the appointments announced today.
>
> Richard Drouin, Chairman of Stelco's Board of Directors, said: "I'm pleased to welcome Roland Keiper and Michael Woollcombe to the Board. Their experience and their perspective will assist the Board as it strives to serve the best interests of all our stakeholders. We look forward to their positive contribution."

5 On the same day, the Board began its consideration of the various competing bids that had been received through the capital raising process.

6 The appointments of the appellants to the Board incensed the employee stakeholders of Stelco ("the Employees"), represented by the respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco and the respondent United Steelworkers of America ("USWA"). Outstanding pension liabilities to current and retired employees are said to be Stelco's largest long-term liability — exceeding several billion dollars. The Employees perceive they do not have the same, or very much, economic leverage in what has sometimes been referred to as 'the bare knuckled arena' of the restructuring process. At the same time, they are amongst the most financially vulnerable stakeholders in the piece. They see the appointments of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper to the Board as a threat to their well being in the restructuring process, because the appointments provide the appellants, and the shareholders they represent, with direct access to sensitive information relating to the competing bids to which other stakeholders (including themselves) are not privy.

7 The Employees fear that the participation of the two major shareholder representatives will tilt the bid process in favour of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of bids that might be more favourable to the interests of the Employees. They sought and obtained an order from Farley J. removing Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from their short-lived position of directors, essentially on the basis of that apprehension.

8 The Employees argue that there is a reasonable apprehension the appellants would not be able to act in the best interests of the corporation — as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders — in considering the bids. They say this is so because of prior public statements by the appellants about enhancing shareholder value in Stelco, because of the appellants' linkage

to such a large shareholder group, because of their earlier failed bid in the restructuring, and because of their opposition to a capital proposal made in the proceeding by Deutsche Bank (known as "the Stalking Horse Bid"). They submit further that the appointments have poisoned the atmosphere of the restructuring process, and that the Board made the appointments under threat of facing a potential shareholders' meeting where the members of the Board would be replaced en masse.

9 On the other hand, Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper seek to set aside the order of Farley J. on the grounds that (a) he did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test applied by the motion judge has no application to the removal of directors, (c) the motion judge erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) the facts do not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court in any event.

10 For the reasons that follow, I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal, and order the reinstatement of the applicants to the Board.

Part II — Additional Facts

11 Before the initial CCAA order on January 29, 2004, the shareholders of Stelco had last met at their annual general meeting on April 29, 2003. At that meeting they elected eleven directors to the Board. By the date of the initial order, three of those directors had resigned, and on November 30, 2004, a fourth did as well, leaving the company with only seven directors.

12 Stelco's articles provide for the Board to be made up of a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty directors. Consequently, after the last resignation, the company's corporate governance committee began to take steps to search for new directors. They had not succeeded in finding any prior to the approach by the appellants in January 2005.

13 Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper had been accumulating shares in Stelco and had been participating in the CCAA proceedings for some time before their request to be appointed to the Board, through their companies, Clearwater and Equilibrium. Clearwater and Equilibrium are privately held, Ontario-based, investment management firms. Mr. Keiper is the president of Equilibrium and associated with Clearwater. Mr. Woollcombe is a consultant to Clearwater. The motion judge found that they "come as a package".

14 In October 2004, Stelco sought court approval of its proposed method of raising capital. On October 19, 2004, Farley J. issued what has been referred to as the Initial Capital Process Order. This order set out a process by which Stelco, under the direction of the Board, would solicit bids, discuss the bids with stakeholders, evaluate the bids, and report on the bids to the court.

15 On November 9, 2004, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced they had formed an investor group and had made a capital proposal to Stelco. The proposal involved the raising of $125 million through a rights offering. Mr. Keiper stated at the time that he believed "the value of Stelco's equity would have the opportunity to increase substantially if Stelco emerged from CCAA while minimizing dilution of its shareholders." The Clearwater proposal was not accepted.

16 A few days later, on November 14, 2004, Stelco approved the Stalking Horse Bid. Clearwater and Equilibrium opposed the Deutsche Bank proposal. Mr. Keiper criticized it for not providing sufficient value to existing shareholders. However, on November 29, 2004, Farley J. approved the Stalking Horse Bid and amended the Initial Capital Process Order accordingly. The order set out the various channels of communication between Stelco, the monitor, potential bidders and the stakeholders. It provided that members of the Board were to see the details of the different bids before the Board selected one or more of the offers.

17 Subsequently, over a period of two and a half months, the shareholding position of Clearwater and Equilibrium increased from approximately 5% as at November 19, to 14.9% as at January 25, 2005, and finally to approximately 20% on a fully diluted basis as at January 31, 2005. On January 25, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced that they had reached an understanding jointly to pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco. A press release stated:

> Such efforts will include seeking to ensure that the interests of Stelco's equity holders are appropriately protected by its board of directors and, ultimately, that Stelco's equity holders have an appropriate say, by vote or otherwise, in determining the future course of Stelco.

18 On February 1, 2005, Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe and others representatives of Clearwater and Equilibrium, met with Mr. Drouin and other Board members to discuss their views of Stelco and a fair outcome for all stakeholders in the proceedings. Mr. Keiper made a detailed presentation, as Mr. Drouin testified, "encouraging the Board to examine how Stelco might improve its value through enhanced disclosure and other steps". Mr. Keiper expressed confidence that "there was value to the equity of Stelco", and added that he had backed this view up by investing millions of dollars of his own money in Stelco shares. At that meeting, Clearwater and Equilibrium requested that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper be added to the Board and to Stelco's restructuring committee. In this respect, they were supported by other shareholders holding about another 20% of the company's common shares.

19 At paragraphs 17 and 18 of his affidavit, Mr. Drouin, summarized his appraisal of the situation:

> 17. It was my assessment that each of Mr. Keiper and Mr. Woollcombe had personal qualities which would allow them to make a significant contribution to the Board in terms of their backgrounds and their knowledge of the steel industry generally and Stelco in particular. In addition I was aware that their appointment to the Board was supported by approximately 40% of the shareholders. In the event that these shareholders successfully requisitioned a shareholders meeting they were in a position to determine the composition of the entire Board.
>
> 18. I considered it essential that there be continuity of the Board through the CCAA process. I formed the view that the combination of existing Board members and these additional members would provide Stelco with the most appropriate board composition in the circumstances. The other members of the Board also shared my views.

20 In order to ensure that the appellants understood their duties as potential Board members and, particularly that "they would no longer be able to consider only the interests of shareholders alone but would have fiduciary responsibilities as a Board member to the corporation as a whole", Mr. Drouin and others held several further meetings with Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper. These discussions "included areas of independence, standards, fiduciary duties, the role of the Board Restructuring Committee and confidentiality matters". Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper gave their assurances that they fully understood the nature and extent of their prospective duties, and would abide by them. In addition, they agreed and confirmed that:

> a) Mr. Woollcombe would no longer be an advisor to Clearwater and Equilibrium with respect to Stelco;
>
> b) Clearwater and Equilibrium would no longer be represented by counsel in the CCAA proceedings; and
>
> c) Clearwater and Equilibrium then had no involvement in, and would have no future involvement, in any bid for Stelco.

21 On the basis of the foregoing — and satisfied "that Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe would make a positive contribution to the various issues before the Board both in [the] restructuring and the ongoing operation of the business" — the Board made the appointments on February 18, 2005.

22 Seven days later, the motion judge found it "appropriate, just, necessary and reasonable to declare" those appointments "to be of no force and effect" and to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board. He did so not on the basis of any actual conduct on the part of the appellants as directors of Stelco but because there was some risk of anticipated conduct in the future. The gist of the motion judge's rationale is found in the following passage from his reasons (at para. 23):

> In these particular circumstances and aside from the Board feeling coerced into the appointments for the sake of continuing stability, I am not of the view that it would be appropriate to wait and see if there was any explicit action on behalf of K and W while conducting themselves as Board members which would demonstrate that they had not lived up to their obligations to be "neutral". They may well conduct themselves beyond reproach. But if they did not, the fallout would

be very detrimental to Stelco and its ability to successfully emerge. What would happen to the bids in such a dogfight? I fear that it would be trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. The same situation would prevail even if K and W conducted themselves beyond reproach but with the Board continuing to be concerned that they not do anything seemingly offensive to the bloc. The risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence is simply too great to risk the wait and see approach.

Part III — Leave to Appeal

23 Because of the "real time" dynamic of this restructuring project, Laskin J.A. granted an order on March 4, 2005, expediting the appellants' motion for leave to appeal, directing that it be heard orally and, if leave be granted, directing that the appeal be heard at the same time. The leave motion and the appeal were argued together, by order of the panel, on March 18, 2005.

24 This court has said that it will only sparingly grant leave to appeal in the context of a CCAA proceeding and will only do so where there are "serious and arguable grounds that are of real and significant interest to the parties": *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re* (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30, [2002] O.J. No. 1377 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 15. This criterion is determined in accordance with a four-pronged test, namely,

a) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice;

b) whether the point is of significance to the action;

c) whether the appeal is *prima facie* meritorious or frivolous;

d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action.

25 Counsel agree that (d) above is not relevant to this proceeding, given the expedited nature of the hearing. In my view, the tests set out in (a) - (c) are met in the circumstances, and as such, leave should be granted. The issue of the court's jurisdiction to intervene in corporate governance issues during a CCAA restructuring, and the scope of its discretion in doing so, are questions of considerable importance to the practice and on which there is little appellate jurisprudence. While Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper are pursuing their remedies in their own right, and the company and its directors did not take an active role in the proceedings in this court, the Board and the company did stand by their decision to appoint the new directors at the hearing before the motion judge and in this court, and the question of who is to be involved in the Board's decision making process continues to be of importance to the CCAA proceedings. From the reasons that follow it will be evident that in my view the appeal has merit.

26 Leave to appeal is therefore granted.

Part IV — The Appeal

The Positions of the Parties

27 The appellants submit that,

a) in exercising its discretion under the CCAA, the court is not exercising its "inherent jurisdiction" as a superior court;

b) there is no jurisdiction under the CCAA to remove duly elected or appointed directors, notwithstanding the broad discretion provided by s. 11 of that Act; and that,

c) even if there is jurisdiction, the motion judge erred:

(i) by relying upon the administrative law test for reasonable apprehension of bias in determining that the directors should be removed;

(ii) by rejecting the application of the "business judgment" rule to the unanimous decision of the Board to appoint two new directors; and,

(iii) by concluding that Clearwater and Equilibrium, the shareholders with whom the appellants are associated, were focussed solely on a short-term investment horizon, without any evidence to that effect, and therefore concluding that there was a tangible risk that the appellants would not be neutral and act in the best interests of Stelco and all stakeholders in carrying out their duties as directors.

28 The respondents' arguments are rooted in fairness and process. They say, first, that the appointment of the appellants as directors has poisoned the atmosphere of the CCAA proceedings and, secondly, that it threatens to undermine the even-handedness and integrity of the capital raising process, thus jeopardizing the ability of the court at the end of the day to approve any compromise or arrangement emerging from that process. The respondents contend that Farley J. had jurisdiction to ensure the integrity of the CCAA process, including the capital raising process Stelco had asked him to approve, and that this court should not interfere with his decision that it was necessary to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board in order to ensure the integrity of that process. A judge exercising a supervisory function during a CCAA proceeding is owed considerable deference: *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8.

29 The crux of the respondents' concern is well-articulated in the following excerpt from paragraph 72 of the factum of the Retired Salaried Beneficiaries:

> The appointments of Keiper and Woollcombe violated every tenet of fairness in the restructuring process that is supposed to lead to a plan of arrangement. One stakeholder group — particular investment funds that have acquired Stelco shares during the CCAA itself — have been provided with privileged access to the capital raising process, and voting seats on the Corporation's Board of Directors and Restructuring Committee. No other stakeholder has been treated in remotely the same way. To the contrary, the salaried retirees have been completely excluded from the capital raising process and have no say whatsoever in the Corporation's decision-making process.

30 The respondents submit that fairness, and the perception of fairness, underpin the CCAA process, and depend upon effective judicial supervision: see *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2004), 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para.15-16. The motion judge reasonably decided to remove the appellants as directors in the circumstances, they say, and this court should not interfere.

Jurisdiction

31 The motion judge concluded that he had the power to rescind the appointments of the two directors on the basis of his "inherent jurisdiction" and "the discretion given to the court pursuant to the *CCAA*". He was not asked to, nor did he attempt to rest his jurisdiction on other statutory powers imported into the CCAA.

32 The CCAA is remedial legislation and is to be given a liberal interpretation to facilitate its objectives: *Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re,* [2000] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 11. See also, *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.), at p. 320; *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). Courts have adopted this approach in the past to rely on inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively on the broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA, as the source of judicial power in a CCAA proceeding to "fill in the gaps" or to "put flesh on the bones" of that Act: see *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); and *Westar Mining Ltd., Re* (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (B.C. S.C.).

33 It is not necessary, for purposes of this appeal, to determine whether inherent jurisdiction is excluded for all supervisory purposes under the CCAA, by reason of the existence of the statutory discretionary regime provided in that Act. In my opinion, however, the better view is that in carrying out his or her supervisory functions under the legislation, the judge is not exercising

inherent jurisdiction but rather the statutory discretion provided by s. 11 of the CCAA and supplemented by other statutory powers that may be imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion from other statutes through s. 20 of the CCAA.

Inherent Jurisdiction

34 Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived "from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law", permitting the court "to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused". It embodies the authority of the judiciary to control its own process and the lawyers and other officials connected with the court and its process, in order "to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner". See I.H. Jacob, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 27-28. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: Lexis-Nexis UK, 1973 -) vol. 37, at para. 14, the concept is described as follows:

> In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particularly to ensure the observation of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.

35 In spite of the expansive nature of this power, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the Legislature has acted. As Farley J. noted in *Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, *supra*, inherent jurisdiction is "not limitless; if the legislative body has not left a functional gap or vacuum, then inherent jurisdiction should not be brought into play" (para. 4). See also, *Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd.* (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.) at 480; *Richtree Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 251 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

36 In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme, and that for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. In that regard, I agree with the comment of Newbury J.A. in *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 46, that:

> . . . the court is not exercising a power that arises from its nature as a superior court of law, but is exercising the discretion given to it by the CCAA. . . . This is the discretion, given by s. 11, to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion, given by s. 6, to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair, to be in accord with the requirements and objects of the statute, and to make possible the continuation of the corporation as a viable entity. It is these considerations the courts have been concerned with in the cases discussed above, [2] rather than the integrity of their own process.

37 As Jacob observes, in his article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", *supra*, at p. 25:

> The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion. These two concepts resemble each other, particularly in their operation, and they often appear to overlap, and are therefore sometimes confused the one with the other. There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always be observed.

38 I do not mean to suggest that inherent jurisdiction can never apply in a CCAA context. The court retains the ability to control its own process, should the need arise. There is a distinction, however — difficult as it may be to draw — between the *court's* process with respect to the restructuring, on the one hand, and the course of action involving the negotiations and corporate actions accompanying them, which are the *company's* process, on the other hand. The court simply supervises the latter process through its ability to stay, restrain or prohibit proceedings against the company during the plan negotiation period "on such terms as it may impose". [3] Hence the better view is that a judge is generally exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it is designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

The Section 11 Discretion

39 This appeal involves the scope of a supervisory judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process and, in particular, whether that discretion extends to the removal of directors in that environment. In my view, the s. 11 discretion — in spite of its considerable breadth and flexibility — does not permit the exercise of such a power in and of itself. There may be situations where a judge in a CCAA proceeding would be justified in ordering the removal of directors pursuant to the oppression remedy provisions found in s. 241 of the CBCA, and imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion through s. 20 of the CCAA. However, this was not argued in the present case, and the facts before the court would not justify the removal of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper on oppression remedy grounds.

40 The pertinent portions of s. 11 of the CCAA provide as follows:

> **Powers of court**
>
> 11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy* and Insolvency Act or the Winding-up Act, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.
>
> **Initial application court orders**
>
> (3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days.
>
> > (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> >
> > (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> >
> > (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.
>
> **Other than initial application court orders**
>
> (4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose.
>
> > (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> >
> > (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> >
> > (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.
>
> **Burden of proof on application**
>
> (6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless
>
> > (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfied the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

41 The rule of statutory interpretation that has now been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada, in such cases as *R. v. Sharpe*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.), at para. 33, and *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.), at para. 21 is articulated in E.A. Driedger, *The Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) as follows:

> Today, there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

See also Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at page 262.

42 The interpretation of s. 11 advanced above is true to these principles. It is consistent with the purpose and scheme of the CCAA, as articulated in para. 38 above, and with the fact that corporate governance matters are dealt with in other statutes. In addition, it honours the historical reluctance of courts to intervene in such matters, or to second-guess the business decisions made by directors and officers in the course of managing the business and affairs of the corporation.

43 Mr. Leon and Mr. Swan argue that matters relating to the removal of directors do not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11 because they fall outside of the parameters of the court's role in the restructuring process, in contrast to the company's role in the restructuring process. The court's role is defined by the "on such terms as may be imposed" jurisdiction under subparagraphs 11(3)(a)-(c) and 11(4)(a)-(c) of the CCAA to stay, or restrain, or prohibit proceedings against the company during the "breathing space" period for negotiations and a plan. I agree.

44 What the court does under s. 11 is to establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. In the course of acting as referee, the court has great leeway, as Farley J. observed in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., supra*, at para 5, "to make order[s] so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors". But the s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. Moreover, the court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance *the company's* restructuring efforts.

45 With these principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of the various factors underlying the interpretation of the s. 11 discretion.

46 I start with the proposition that at common law directors could not be removed from office during the term for which they were elected or appointed: *London Finance Corp. v. Banking Service Corp.* (1922), 23 O.W.N. 138 (Ont. H.C.); *Stephenson v. Vokes* (1896), 27 O.R. 691 (Ont. H.C.). The authority to remove must therefore be found in statute law.

47 In Canada, the CBCA and its provincial equivalents govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, as well as providing for their duties and responsibilities. Shareholders elect directors, but the directors may fill vacancies that occur on the board of directors pending a further shareholders meeting: CBCA, ss. 106(3) and 111.[4] The specific power *to remove* directors is vested in the shareholders by s. 109(1) of the CBCA. However, s. 241 empowers the court — where it finds that oppression as therein defined exists — to "make any interim or final order it thinks fit", including (s. 241(3)(e)) "an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office". This power has been utilized to remove directors, but in very rare cases, and only in circumstances where there has been actual conduct rising to the level of

misconduct required to trigger oppression remedy relief: see, for example, *Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc.*, [2004] O.J. No. 4722 (Ont. S.C.J.).

48 There is therefore a statutory scheme under the CBCA (and similar provincial corporate legislation) providing for the election, appointment, *and removal* of directors. Where another applicable statute confers jurisdiction with respect to a matter, a broad and undefined discretion provided in one statute cannot be used to supplant or override the other applicable statute. There is no legislative "gap" to fill. See *Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd.*, *supra*, at p. 480; *Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re)*, *supra*; and *Richtree Inc. (Re)*, *supra*.

49 At paragraph 7 of his reasons, the motion judge said:

> The board is charged with the standard duty of "manage[ing], [*sic*] or supervising the management, of the business and affairs of the corporation": s. 102(1) CBCA. *Ordinarily the Court will not interfere with the composition of the board of directors. However, if there is good and sufficient valid reason to do so, then the Court must not hesitate to do so to correct a problem.* The directors should not be required to constantly look over their shoulders for this would be the sure recipe for board paralysis which would be so detrimental to a restructuring process; thus interested parties should only initiate a motion where it is reasonably obvious that there is a problem, actual or poised to become actual.
>
> [emphasis added]

50 Respectfully, I see no authority in s. 11 of the CCAA for the court to interfere with the composition of a board of directors on such a basis.

51 Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy, and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. This reluctance is rooted in the historical unwillingness of courts to interfere with the internal management of corporate affairs and in the court's well-established deference to decisions made by directors and officers in the exercise of their business judgment when managing the business and affairs of the corporation. These factors also bolster the view that where the CCAA is silent on the issue, the court should not read into the s. 11 discretion an extraordinary power — which the courts are disinclined to exercise in any event — except to the extent that that power may be introduced through the application of other legislation, and on the same principles that apply to the application of the provisions of the other legislation.

The Oppression Remedy Gateway

52 The fact that s. 11 does not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors does not mean that the supervising judge is powerless to make such an order, however. Section 20 of the CCAA offers a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes. Section 20 states:

> The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

53 The CBCA is legislation that "makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them". Accordingly, the powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute. I do not read s. 20 as limiting the application of outside legislation to the provisions of such legislation dealing specifically with the sanctioning of compromises and arrangements between the company and its shareholders. The grammatical structure of s. 20 mandates a broader interpretation and the oppression remedy is, therefore, available to a supervising judge in appropriate circumstances.

54 I do not accept the respondents' argument that the motion judge had the authority to order the removal of the appellants by virtue of the power contained in s. 145(2)(b) of the CBCA to make an order "declaring the result of the disputed election or appointment" of directors. In my view, s. 145 relates to the procedures underlying disputed elections or appointments, and not to disputes over the composition of the board of directors itself. Here, it is conceded that the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe

and Keiper as directors complied with all relevant statutory requirements. Farley J. quite properly did not seek to base his jurisdiction on any such authority.

The Level of Conduct Required

55 Colin Campbell J. recently invoked the oppression remedy to remove directors, without appointing anyone in their place, in *Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc.*, *supra* The bar is high. In reviewing the applicable law, C. Campbell J. said (para. 68):

> Director removal is *an extraordinary remedy* and certainly should be *imposed most sparingly*. As a starting point, I accept the basic proposition set out in Peterson, "Shareholder Remedies in Canada" [5]:
>
> > SS. 18.172 *Removing and appointing directors to the board is an extreme form of judicial intervention*. The board of directors is elected by the shareholders, vested with the power to manage the corporation, and appoints the officers of the company who undertake to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. [Footnote omitted.] It is clear that the board of directors has control over policymaking and management of the corporation. *By tampering with a board, a court directly affects the management of the corporation*. If a reasonable balance between protection of corporate stakeholders and the freedom of management to conduct the affairs of the business in an efficient manner is desired, altering the board of directors should be *a measure of last resort*. The order could be suitable where the continuing presence of the incumbent directors is harmful to both the company and the interests of corporate stakeholders, and where the appointment of a new director or directors would remedy the oppressive conduct without a receiver or receiver-manager.
> >
> > [emphasis added]

56 C. Campbell J. found that the continued involvement of the Ravelston directors in the *Hollinger* situation would "significantly impede" the interests of the public shareholders and that those directors were "motivated by putting their interests first, not those of the company" (paras. 82-83). The evidence in this case is far from reaching any such benchmark, however, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought.

57 Everyone accepts that there is no evidence the appellants have conducted themselves, as directors — in which capacity they participated over two days in the bid consideration exercise — in anything but a neutral fashion, having regard to the best interests of Stelco and all of the stakeholders. The motion judge acknowledged that the appellants "may well conduct themselves beyond reproach". However, he simply decided there was a risk — a reasonable apprehension — that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper would not live up to their obligations to be neutral in the future.

58 The risk or apprehension appears to have been founded essentially on three things: (1) the earlier public statements made by Mr. Keiper about "maximizing shareholder value"; (2) the conduct of Clearwater and Equilibrium in criticizing and opposing the Stalking Horse Bid; and (3) the motion judge's opinion that Clearwater and Equilibrium — the shareholders represented by the appellants on the Board — had a "vision" that "usually does not encompass any significant concern for the long-term competitiveness and viability of an emerging corporation", as a result of which the appellants would approach their directors' duties looking to liquidate their shares on the basis of a "short-term hold" rather than with the best interests of Stelco in mind. The motion judge transposed these concerns into anticipated predisposed conduct on the part of the appellants as directors, despite their apparent understanding of their duties as directors and their assurances that they would act in the best interests of Stelco. He therefore concluded that "the risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence [was] simply too great to risk the wait and see approach".

59 Directors have obligations under s. 122(1) of the CBCA (a) to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interest of the corporation (the "statutory fiduciary duty" obligation), and (b) to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (the "duty of care" obligation). They are also subject to control under the oppression remedy provisions of s. 241. The general nature of these duties does not change when the company

approaches, or finds itself in, insolvency: *People's Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re*, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64 (S.C.C.) at paras. 42-49.

60 In *Peoples* the Supreme Court noted that "the interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders" (para. 43), but also accepted "as an accurate statement of the law that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, *inter alia*, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment" (para. 42). Importantly as well — in the context of "the shifting interest and incentives of shareholders and creditors" — the court stated (para. 47):

> In resolving these competing interests, it is incumbent upon the directors to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. In using their skills for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors must be careful to attempt to act in its best interests by creating a "better" corporation, and not to favour the interests of any one group of stakeholders.

61 In determining whether directors have fallen foul of those obligations, however, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. Although the motion judge concluded that there was a risk of harm to the Stelco process if Messrs Woollcombe and Keiper remained as directors, he did not assess the level of that risk. The record does not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of sufficient misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. The motion judge was not asked to make such a finding, and he did not do so.

62 The respondents argue that this court should not interfere with the decision of the motion judge on grounds of deference. They point out that the motion judge has been case-managing the restructuring of Stelco under the CCAA for over fourteen months and is intimately familiar with the circumstances of Stelco as it seeks to restructure itself and emerge from court protection.

63 There is no question that the decisions of judges acting in a supervisory role under the CCAA, and particularly those of experienced commercial list judges, are entitled to great deference: see *Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd.* (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16. The discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the principles governing its operation. Here, respectfully, the motion judge misconstrued his authority, and made an order that he was not empowered to make in the circumstances.

64 The appellants argued that the motion judge made a number of findings without any evidence to support them. Given my decision with respect to jurisdiction, it is not necessary for me to address that issue.

The Business Judgment Rule

65 The appellants argue as well that the motion judge erred in failing to defer to the unanimous decision of the Stelco directors in deciding to appoint them to the Stelco Board. It is well-established that judges supervising restructuring proceedings — and courts in general — will be very hesitant to second-guess the business decisions of directors and management. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in *Peoples*, *supra*, at para. 67:

> Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making . . .

66 In *Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at 320, this court adopted the following statement by the trial judge, Anderson J.:

> Business decisions, honestly made, should not be subjected to microscopic examination. There should be no interference simply because a decision is unpopular with the minority. [6]

67 McKinlay J.A then went on to say:

> There can be no doubt that on an application under s. 234 [7] the trial judge is required to consider the nature of the impugned acts and the method in which they were carried out. That does not meant that the trial judge should substitute his own business judgment for that of managers, directors, or a committee such as the one involved in assessing this transaction. Indeed, it would generally be impossible for him to do so, regardless of the amount of evidence before him. He is dealing with the matter at a different time and place; it is unlikely that he will have the background knowledge and expertise of the individuals involved; he could have little or no knowledge of the background and skills of the persons who would be carrying out any proposed plan; and it is unlikely that he would have any knowledge of the specialized market in which the corporation operated. In short, he does not know enough to make the business decision required.

68 Although a judge supervising a CCAA proceeding develops a certain "feel" for the corporate dynamics and a certain sense of direction for the restructuring, this caution is worth keeping in mind. See also *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, *supra*, *Sammi Atlas Inc., Re* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)*, *supra*; *Alberta-Pacific Terminals Ltd., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (B.C. S.C.). The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors, or into the seat of the chair of the board, when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

69 Here, the motion judge was alive to the "business judgment" dimension in the situation he faced. He distinguished the application of the rule from the circumstances, however, stating at para. 18 of his reasons:

> With respect I do not see the present situation as involving the "management of the business and affairs of the corporation", but rather as a quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation entrusted albeit to the Board pursuant to s. 111(1) of the CBCA. I agree that where a board is actually engaged in the business of a judgment situation, the board should be given appropriate deference. However, to the contrary in this situation, I do not see it as a situation calling for (as asserted) more deference, but rather considerably less than that. With regard to this decision of the Board having impact upon the capital raising process, as I conclude it would, then similarly deference ought not to be given.

70 I do not see the distinction between the directors' role in "the management of the business and affairs of the corporation" (CBCA, s. 102) — which describes the directors' overall responsibilities — and their role with respect to a "quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation" (i.e. in filling out the composition of the board of directors in the event of a vacancy). The "affairs" of the corporation are defined in s. 1 of the CBCA as meaning "the relationships among a corporation, it affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by such bodies corporate". Corporate governance decisions relate directly to such relationships and are at the heart of the Board's business decision-making role regarding the corporation's business *and* affairs. The dynamics of such decisions, and the intricate balancing of competing interests and other corporate-related factors that goes into making them, are no more within the purview of the court's knowledge and expertise than other business decisions, and they deserve the same deferential approach. Respectfully, the motion judge erred in declining to give effect to the business judgment rule in the circumstances of this case.

71 This is not to say that the conduct of the Board in appointing the appellants as directors may never come under review by the supervising judge. The court must ultimately approve and sanction the plan of compromise or arrangement as finally negotiated and accepted by the company and its creditors and stakeholders. The plan must be found to be fair and reasonable before it can be sanctioned. If the Board's decision to appoint the appellants has somehow so tainted the capital raising process that those criteria are not met, any eventual plan that is put forward will fail.

72 The respondents submit that it makes no sense for the court to have jurisdiction to declare the process flawed only after the process has run its course. Such an approach to the restructuring process would be inefficient and a waste of resources. While there is some merit in this argument, the court cannot grant itself jurisdiction where it does not exist. Moreover, there are a plethora of checks and balances in the negotiating process itself that moderate the risk of the process becoming irretrievably tainted in this fashion — not the least of which is the restraining effect of the prospect of such a consequence. I do not think that this argument can prevail. In addition, the court at all times retains its broad and flexible supervisory jurisdiction — a

jurisdiction which feeds the creativity that makes the CCAA work so well — in order to address fairness and process concerns along the way. This case relates only to the court's exceptional power to order the removal of directors.

The Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Analogy

73 In exercising what he saw as his discretion to remove the appellants as directors, the motion judge thought it would be useful to "borrow the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias . . .with suitable adjustments for the nature of the decision making involved" (para. 8). He stressed that "there was absolutely no allegation against [Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper] of any actual 'bias' or its equivalent" (para. 8). He acknowledged that neither was alleged to have done anything wrong since their appointments as directors, and that at the time of their appointments the appellants had confirmed to the Board that they understood and would abide by their duties and responsibilities as directors, including the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation and not in their own interests as shareholders. In the end, however, he concluded that because of their prior public statements that they intended to "pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco", and because of the nature of their business and the way in which they had been accumulating their shareholding position during the restructuring, and because of their linkage to 40% of the common shareholders, there was a risk that the appellants would not conduct themselves in a neutral fashion in the best interests of the corporation as directors.

74 In my view, the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias is foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, and to corporate governance considerations in general. Apprehension of bias is a concept that ordinarily applies to those who preside over judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making bodies, such as courts, administrative tribunals or arbitration boards. Its application is inapposite in the business decision-making context of corporate law. There is nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisages the screening of directors in advance for their ability to act neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment.

75 Instead, the conduct of directors is governed by their common law and statutory obligations to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, and to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (CBCA, s. 122(1)(a) and (b)). The directors also have fiduciary obligations to the corporation, and they are liable to oppression remedy proceedings in appropriate circumstances. These remedies are available to aggrieved complainants — including the respondents in this case — but they depend for their applicability on the director having engaged in conduct justifying the imposition of a remedy.

76 If the respondents are correct, and reasonable apprehension that directors may not act neutrally because they are aligned with a particular group of shareholders or stakeholders is sufficient for removal, all nominee directors in Canadian corporations, and all management directors, would automatically be disqualified from serving. No one suggests this should be the case. Moreover, as Iacobucci J. noted in *Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp.*, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.) at para. 35, "persons are assumed to act in good faith unless proven otherwise". With respect, the motion judge approached the circumstances before him from exactly the opposite direction. It is commonplace in corporate/commercial affairs that there are connections between directors and various stakeholders and that conflicts will exist from time to time. Even where there are conflicts of interest, however, directors are not removed from the board of directors; they are simply obliged to disclose the conflict and, in appropriate cases, to abstain from voting. The issue to be determined is not whether there is a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there has been some conduct on the part of the director that will justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach does not fit this sort of analysis.

Part V — Disposition

77 For the foregoing reasons, then, I am satisfied that the motion judge erred in declaring the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect.

78 I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and set aside the order of Farley J. dated February 25, 2005.

79 Counsel have agreed that there shall be no costs of the appeal.

***Goudge J.A.*:**

I agree.

***Feldman J.A.*:**

I agree.

Appeal allowed.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.

2 The reference is to the decisions in *Dyle*, *Royal Oak Mines*, *and Westar*, cited above.

3 See paragraph 43, *infra*, where I elaborate on this distinction.

4 It is the latter authority that the directors of Stelco exercised when appointing the appellants to the Stelco Board.

5 Dennis H. Peterson, Shareholder Remedies in Canada (Markham: LexisNexis — Butterworths — Looseleaf Service, 1989) at 18-47.

6 Or, I would add, unpopular with other stakeholders.

7 Now s. 241.

TAB 3

COURT FILE NO.: 09-CL-7950
DATE: 20090723

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: **IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

APPLICANTS

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BEFORE: **MORAWETZ J.**

COUNSEL: **Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al**

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and Administrator of PBGF

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees

K. Zych, for Noteholders

Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM

HEARD &
DECIDED: JUNE 29, 2009

E N D O R S E M E N T

INTRODUCTION

[1] On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

[2] I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[3] An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

[4] The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

[5] The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

[6] The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CMDA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

[7] The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is $650 million.

BACKGROUND

[8] The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

[9] At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

[10] The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

[11] In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

[12] On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

[13] In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

[14] Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

(a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;

(b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and

(c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

[15] Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

[16] In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

[17] The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

[18] The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

[19] The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

[20] The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

[21] Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

[22] Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

[23] The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

[24] The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

[25] The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

[26] Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

[27] Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

[28] The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

[29] The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp*. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] SCCA 337. ("ATB Financial").

[30] The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial*, *supra*, at paras. 43-52.

[31] However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

> Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

[32] In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc*. (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

[33] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

> The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc*. (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

[34] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

[35] Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, *Re PSINet, supra*, *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, *Re Stelco Inc*. (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co.* (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar*

Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[36] In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

> The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.
>
> …we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

[37] Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

[38] Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

> [If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

[39] In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

> I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring – and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not

> feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

[40] I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

[41] Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc*. (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc*. (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

[42] Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale…be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp*. (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

[43] In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

[44] I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

[45] The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership* (2009) B.C.C.A. 319.

[46] At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

> 24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the

Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"…Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

> The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal – thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged…

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act – to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned – will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act – a compromise or arrangement – can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary…

[47] It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

[48] I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

[49] I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

(a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?

(b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?

(c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?

(d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

[50] It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

[51] Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;

(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;

(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;

(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;

(e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;

(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

[52] The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

[53] Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

DISPOSITION

[54] The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

[55] Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

[56] I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[57] Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

[58] In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

[59] Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

MORAWETZ J.

Heard and Decided: June 29, 2009

Reasons Released: July 23, 2009

TAB 4

2010 SCC 60
Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010
Judgment: December 16, 2010
Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Tax --- Goods and Services Tax — Collection and remittance — GST held in trust

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount

held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222(1), (1.1).

Tax --- General principles — Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown.

Taxation --- Taxe sur les produits et services — Perception et versement — Montant de TPS détenu en fiducie

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Taxation --- Principes généraux — Priorité des créances fiscales dans le cadre de procédures en faillite

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant

à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

The debtor company owed the Crown under the Excise Tax Act (ETA) for GST that was not remitted. The debtor commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). Under an order by the B.C. Supreme Court, the amount of the tax debt was placed in a trust account, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets were paid to the major secured creditor. The debtor's application for a partial lifting of the stay of proceedings in order to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while the Crown's application for the immediate payment of the unremitted GST was dismissed.

The Crown's appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower court was bound by the ETA to give the Crown priority once bankruptcy was inevitable. The Court of Appeal ruled that there was a deemed trust under s. 222 of the ETA or that an express trust was created in the Crown's favour by the court order segregating the GST funds in the trust account.

The creditor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): A purposive and contextual analysis of the ETA and CCAA yielded the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the CCAA when it amended the ETA in 2000. Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law under both the CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). Unlike for source deductions, there was no express statutory basis in the CCAA or BIA for concluding that GST claims enjoyed any preferential treatment. The internal logic of the CCAA also militated against upholding a deemed trust for GST claims.

Giving the Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would, in practice, deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive CCAA regime. It seemed likely that Parliament had inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly, which could be resolved by giving precedence to s. 18.3 of the CCAA. Section 222(3) of the ETA could no longer be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of the CCAA by being passed subsequently to the CCAA, given the recent amendments to the CCAA. The legislative context supported the conclusion that s. 222(3) of the ETA was not intended to narrow the scope of s. 18.3 of the CCAA.

The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA, so there was authority under the CCAA to partially lift the stay of proceedings to allow the debtor's entry into liquidation. There should be no gap between the CCAA and BIA proceedings that would invite a race to the courthouse to assert priorities.

The court order did not have the certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary of the funds sufficient to support an express trust, as the funds were segregated until the dispute between the creditor and the Crown could be resolved. The amount collected in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada was not subject to a deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of the Crown.

Per Fish J. (concurring): Parliament had declined to amend the provisions at issue after detailed consideration of the insolvency regime, so the apparent conflict between s. 18.3 of the CCAA and s. 222 of the ETA should not be treated as a drafting anomaly. In the insolvency context, a deemed trust would exist only when two complementary elements co-existed: first, a statutory provision creating the trust; and second, a CCAA or BIA provision confirming its effective operation. Parliament had created the Crown's deemed trust in the Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance Act and then confirmed in clear and unmistakable terms its continued operation under both the CCAA and the BIA regimes. In contrast, the ETA created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, purportedly notwithstanding any contrary legislation, but Parliament did not expressly provide for its continued operation in either the BIA or the CCAA. The absence of this confirmation reflected Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings, and so s. 222 of the ETA mentioned the BIA so as to exclude it from its ambit, rather than include it as the other statutes did. As none of these statutes mentioned the CCAA expressly, the specific reference to the BIA had no bearing on the interaction with the CCAA. It was the confirmatory provisions in the insolvency statutes that would determine whether a given deemed trust would subsist during insolvency proceedings.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): The appellate court properly found that s. 222(3) of the ETA gave priority during CCAA proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. The failure to exempt the CCAA from the operation of this provision was a reflection of clear legislative intent. Despite the requests of various constituencies and case law confirming that the ETA took precedence over the CCAA, there was no responsive legislative revision and the BIA remained the only exempted statute. There was no policy justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention and, in any event, the application of other principles of interpretation reinforced this conclusion. Contrary to the majority's view, the "later in time" principle did not favour the precedence of the CCAA, as the CCAA was merely re-enacted without significant substantive changes. According to the Interpretation Act, in such circumstances, s. 222(3) of the ETA remained the later provision. The chambers judge was required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA and so did not have the authority to deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La compagnie débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA). La débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs de la débitrice a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal. La demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement immédiat des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée.

L'appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli. La Cour d'appel a conclu que le tribunal se devait, en vertu de la LTA, de donner priorité à la Couronne une fois la faillite inévitable. La Cour d'appel a estimé que l'art. 222 de la LTA établissait

une fiducie présumée ou bien que l'ordonnance du tribunal à l'effet que les montants de TPS soient détenus dans un compte en fiducie créait une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Le créancier a formé un pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Une analyse téléologique et contextuelle de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000. Le législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité, sous le régime de la LACC et celui de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI). Contrairement aux retenues à la source, aucune disposition législative expresse ne permettait de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou celui de la LFI. La logique interne de la LACC allait également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée à l'égard des créances découlant de la TPS.

Le fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet, dans les faits, de priver les compagnies de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC. Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle, laquelle pouvait être corrigée en donnant préséance à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. On ne pouvait plus considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC parce qu'il avait été adopté après la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC. Le contexte législatif étayait la conclusion suivant laquelle l'art. 222(3) de la LTA n'avait pas pour but de restreindre la portée de l'art. 18.3 de la LACC.

L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC était suffisant pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI, de sorte qu'il avait, en vertu de la LACC, le pouvoir de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation. Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse, puisque les fonds étaient détenus à part jusqu'à ce que le litige entre le créancier et la Couronne soit résolu. Le montant perçu au titre de la TPS mais non encore versé au receveur général du Canada ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Fish, J. (souscrivant aux motifs des juges majoritaires) : Le législateur a refusé de modifier les dispositions en question suivant un examen approfondi du régime d'insolvabilité, de sorte qu'on ne devrait pas qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre l'art. 18.3 de la LACC et l'art. 222 de la LTA d'anomalie rédactionnelle. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, on ne pourrait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée que lorsque deux éléments complémentaires étaient réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui crée la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI qui confirme l'existence de la fiducie. Le législateur a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi puis, il a confirmé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir cette fiducie présumée produire ses effets sous le régime de la LACC et de la LFI. Dans le cas de la LTA, il a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne, sciemment et sans égard pour toute législation à l'effet contraire, mais n'a pas expressément prévu le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci sous le régime de la LFI ou celui de la LACC. L'absence d'une telle confirmation témoignait de l'intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie présumée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité. L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies présumées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité et, par conséquent, l'art. 222 de la LTA mentionnait la LFI de manière à l'exclure de son champ d'application, et non de l'y inclure, comme le faisaient les autres lois. Puisqu'aucune de ces lois ne mentionnait spécifiquement la LACC, la mention

explicite de la LFI n'avait aucune incidence sur l'interaction avec la LACC. C'était les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouvait dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité qui déterminaient si une fiducie présumée continuerait d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

Abella, J. (dissidente) : La Cour d'appel a conclu à bon droit que l'art. 222(3) de la LTA donnait préséance à la fiducie présumée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Le fait que la LACC n'ait pas été soustraite à l'application de cette disposition témoignait d'une intention claire du législateur. Malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes et la jurisprudence ayant confirmé que la LTA l'emportait sur la LACC, le législateur n'est pas intervenu et la LFI est demeurée la seule loi soustraite à l'application de cette disposition. Il n'y avait pas de considération de politique générale qui justifierait d'aller à l'encontre, par voie d'interprétation législative, de l'intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur et, de toutes manières, cette conclusion était renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Contrairement à l'opinion des juges majoritaires, le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » ne militait pas en faveur de la présance de la LACC, celle-ci ayant été simplement adoptée à nouveau sans que l'on ne lui ait apporté de modifications importantes. En vertu de la Loi d'interprétation, dans ces circonstances, l'art. 222(3) de la LTA demeurait la disposition postérieure. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi à l'art. 222(3) de la LTA, et il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

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Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp. (1997), 193 A.R. 321, 135 W.A.C. 321, [1997] 2 W.W.R. 457, 208 N.R. 161, 12 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 68, 1997 CarswellAlta 112, 1997 CarswellAlta 113, 46 Alta. L.R. (3d) 87, *(*sub nom. *R. v. Royal Bank)* 97 D.T.C. 5089, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 44 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) — considered

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Solid Resources Ltd., Re (2002), [2003] G.S.T.C. 21, 2002 CarswellAlta 1699, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

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Cases considered by *Fish J.*:

Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — not followed

Cases considered by *Abella J.* (dissenting):

Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board) (1977), [1977] 2 F.C. 663, 14 N.R. 257, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 307, 1977 CarswellNat 62, 1977 CarswellNat 62F (Fed. C.A.) — referred to

Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité) (1997), *(*sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City))* [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, *(*sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville))* 215 N.R. 81, *(*sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City))* 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1997 CarswellQue 159, 1997 CarswellQue 850 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

R. v. Tele-Mobile Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 1588, 2008 CarswellOnt 1589, 2008 SCC 12, *(*sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario)* 372 N.R. 157, 55 C.R. (6th) 1, *(*sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.)* 229 C.C.C. (3d) 417, *(*sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario)* 235 O.A.C. 369, *(*sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario)* [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, *(*sub nom. *R. v. Tele-Mobile Company (Telus Mobility))* 92 O.R. (3d) 478 (note), *(*sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.)* 291 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) — considered

Statutes considered by *Deschamps J.*:

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46
Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — referred to

s. 67(3) — referred to

s. 81.1 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 81.2 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 86(1) — considered

s. 86(3) — referred to

Bankruptcy Act and to amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, Act to amend the, S.C. 1992, c. 27
Generally — referred to

s. 39 — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, Act to amend the, S.C. 1997, c. 12
s. 73 — referred to

s. 125 — referred to

s. 126 — referred to

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8
Generally — referred to

s. 23(3) — referred to

s. 23(4) — referred to

Cités et villes, Loi sur les, L.R.Q., c. C-19
en général — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64
en général — referred to

art. 2930 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Act to Amend, S.C. 1952-53, c. 3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.09 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 18.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — referred to

s. 18.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 20 — considered

s. 21 — considered

s. 37 — considered

s. 37(1) — referred to

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23
Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
Generally — referred to

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — referred to

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Fairness for the Self-Employed Act, S.C. 2009, c. 33
Generally — referred to

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
s. 227(4) — referred to

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — referred to

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21
s. 44(f) — considered

Personal Property Security Act, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05
Generally — referred to

Sales Tax and Excise Tax Amendments Act, 1999, S.C. 2000, c. 30
Generally — referred to

Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1
Generally — referred to

s. 69 — referred to

s. 128 — referred to

s. 131 — referred to

Statutes considered *Fish J.*:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — considered

s. 67(3) — considered

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8
Generally — referred to

s. 23 — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23
Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3)(a) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
Generally — referred to

s. 227(4) — considered

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

s. 227(4.1)(a) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

Statutes considered *Abella J.* (dissenting):

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21
s. 2(1)"enactment" — considered

s. 44(f) — considered

Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11
Generally — referred to

APPEAL by creditor from judgment reported at 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.) (B.C. C.A.), allowing Crown's appeal from dismissal of application for immediate payment of tax debt.

***Deschamps J.*:**

1 For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the *CCAA* and not the *ETA* that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the *CCAA* and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

2 Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("LeRoy Trucking") commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

3 Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("GST") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

4 On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding $5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of $305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 270 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.)). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)*, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

(1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?

(2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?

(3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

3.1 Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing $1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of $5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

15 As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

16 Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

17 Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

18 Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA's* remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic

challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA's* objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA*'s predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA*'s new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

> They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy*

Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (C.S. Que.), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (C.A. Que.)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at § 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the Alberta *Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.), this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

> **222.** (3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed ....

35 The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

36 The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

37 Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

> **37.** (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

38 An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

> **18.3** (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions *(CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

> **18.4** (3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of
>
> (a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,
>
> (b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution ....

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219, [2003] G.S.T.C. 21 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

> The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.), and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("*C.C.Q.*"), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(*f*) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

55 In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA's* override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

56 My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers

in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization

57 Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

58 *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

59 Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA's* purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

> The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.
>
> (*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

60 Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g (1999),

12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see Metcalfe & Mansfield). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA's* supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

68 In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means

it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA's* purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA's* objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA*

to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy *Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*. This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

3.4 Express Trust

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferrable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

86 The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

87 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

4. Conclusion

88 I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA.*

89 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the $305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

***Fish J. (concurring)*:**

I

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

> **227 (4) Trust for moneys deducted** — Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

> **(4.1) Extension of trust** — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed
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> > (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...
> >
> > ...
>
> ... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.
>
> (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

101 The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

> **67** (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(*a*) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.
>
> (3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

102 Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation of* the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

103 The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

104 As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

105 The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

106 The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

> **222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected** — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).
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> ...
>
> **(3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed
>
> > (a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...
> >
> > ...
>
> ... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

107 Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

108 In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

109 With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the

near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

110 Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the $305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

***Abella J. (dissenting)*:**

114 The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*EIA*"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCAA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11 [1] of the *CCAA* stated:

> **11**. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

> **222 (3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed
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> (a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and
>
> (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

> and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

116 Century Services argued that the *CCAA's* general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCAA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

> **18.3** (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

117 As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

118 By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

> The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* .... The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

119 MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

120 The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

121 Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 (S.C.C.), where this Court stated:

> While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

> I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogani*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be "overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.)).

127 The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

> [T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ...:
>
> > The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

128 I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant)*. But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

129 It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005, [2] s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663 (Fed. C.A.), dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

> **44.** Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,
>
> ...
>
> (f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or *any portion of an Act or regulation*".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

> **37.**(1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.
>
> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(*f*) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to reorder the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

> On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the CCAA, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the CCAA.
>
> (*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA.*

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act.* That includes the *ETA.* The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA.* Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

Appendix

***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)**

11. (1) Powers of court — Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

...

(3) Initial application court orders — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (i);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) Other than initial application court orders — A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.4 (1) Her Majesty affected — An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiration of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and\

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (*a*)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

18.3 (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

18.4 (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Operation of similar legislation — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

...

20. [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts] — The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)**

11. General power of court — Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

...

11.02 (1) Stays, etc. — initial application — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application — A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

11.09 (1) Stay — Her Majesty — An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiry of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (*a*)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*) or (*b*) cease to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*) or (*b*), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

37. (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

***Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)**

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) Amounts collected before bankruptcy — Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn

in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)**

67. (1) Property of bankrupt — The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(*a*) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

Footnotes

1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

TAB 5

2016 ONSC 5429
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Pacific Exploration & Production Corp., Re

2016 CarswellOnt 13733, 2016 ONSC 5429, 270 A.C.W.S. (3d) 243, 40 C.B.R. (6th) 64

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PACIFIC EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CORPORATION, PACIFIC E&P HOLDINGS CORP., META PETROLEUM CORP., PACIFIC STRATUS INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LTD., PACIFIC STRATUS ENERGY COLOMBIA CORP., PACIFIC STRATUS ENERGY S.A., PACIFIC OFF SHORE PERU S.R.L., PACIIFC RUBIALES GUATEMALA S.A., PACIFIC GUATEMALA ENERGY CORP., PRE-PSIE COÖPERATIF U.A., PETROMINERALES COLOMBIA CORP., and GRUPO C&C ENERGIA (BARBADOS) LTD. (Applicants)

Hainey J.

Heard: August 23, 2016
Judgment: August 29, 2016
Docket: CV-16-11363-00CL

Counsel: Tony Reyes, Virginie Gauthier, Alexander Schmitt, Orestes Pasparakis, for Applicants
John Finnigan, Rebecca Kennedy, for Monitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.
Scott Bomhof, Lily Coodin, for Bank of America (Agent), for certain Bank Lenders
Brendan O'Neill, Celia Rhea, Ryan Baulke, for Ad Hoc Committee
Timothy Pinos, Joseph Bellissimo, for Shareholder Consortium
Jennifer Whincup, for BNY Mellon
Michael Rotsztain, for Wilmington Trust, N.A. & Bank Syndicate
Caitlin Fell, Andy Kent, for Plan Sponsor, Catalyst Capital Group Inc.
Mark Gelowitz, for Independent Committee
John Salmas, for Blackhill Advisors, CRO George Michailopoulos, unrepresented shareholder

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iii Creditor approval

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Corporate debtors formed plan of compromise and arrangement and restructuring for corporation and its subsidiaries — Plan involved reducing corporation's indebtedness by $5.1 billion and annual interest by $258 million, and maintaining operation as going concern — Debtors brought motion for order sanctioning plan of compromise and arrangement and extending stay period — Motion granted — Plan was supported by approximately 98 per cent of creditors — Debtors had acted in good faith and with due diligence and had strictly complied with requirements of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and court orders — Plan was fair and reasonable because it represented reasonable and fair balancing of interests of all parties in light of other commercial alternatives available — Plan was in public interest as it continued corporation and subsidiaries as going-concern thereby preserving employment for thousands of people and generating economic activity in many local communities — Approval was granted for third-party releases, stay for non-applicant parties and extension of stay period.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Creditor approval

Corporate debtors formed plan of compromise and arrangement and restructuring for corporation and its subsidiaries — Plan involved reducing corporation's indebtedness by $5.1 billion and annual interest by $258 million, and maintaining operation as going concern — Debtors brought motion for order sanctioning plan of compromise and arrangement and extending stay period — Motion granted — Plan was supported by approximately 98 per cent of creditors — Debtors had acted in good faith and with due diligence and had strictly complied with requirements of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and court orders — Plan was fair and reasonable because it represented reasonable and fair balancing of interests of all parties in light of other commercial alternatives available — Plan was in public interest as it continued corporation and subsidiaries as going-concern thereby preserving employment for thousands of people and generating economic activity in many local communities — Approval was granted for third-party releases, stay for non-applicant parties and extension of stay period.

Table of Authorities

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 11 — considered

s. 22 — considered

MOTION by corporate debtors for order sanctioning plan of compromise and arrangement and order extending stay period.

***Hainey J.*:**

Background

1 The applicants seek an order (the "Plan Sanction Order") [1] :

(a) sanctioning the applicants' Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated June 27, 2016, as amended to August 17, 2016 (the "Plan") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "*CCAA*"); and

(b) extending the Stay Period to and including October 31, 2016.

2 According to the applicants, the Plan and the restructuring of Pacific Exploration & Production Corporation ("Pacific") and its subsidiaries ("Pacific Group") to be implemented thereby (the "Restructuring Transaction") results from significant efforts by the applicants to achieve a resolution of their financial condition. If implemented, the Restructuring Transaction will reduce Pacific's indebtedness by approximately US $5.1 billion, reduce its annual interest expense by approximately US $258 million and leave the US $250 million of Exit Notes as the only long-term debt in Pacific's capital structure other than facilities to support letters of credit or oil and gas hedging. The Plan will maintain Pacific Group as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders, preserving employment and economic activity in the many communities in which it operates.

3 The applicants and their boards of directors believe that the Restructuring Transaction achieves the best possible outcome for the Pacific Group and its stakeholders in the circumstances and achieves results that are not attainable under any other scenario.

4 The Plan is supported by the Catalyst Capital Group Inc., the Plan Sponsor, the Ad Hoc Committee, the Consenting Lenders, the other parties to the Support Agreement (who together with the Ad Hoc Committee and supporting Bank Lenders, hold approximately 84% by value of all Bank Claims and Noteholder Claims) and the Monitor.

5 At a creditors' meeting held on August 17, 2016, the Plan was approved by 98.4% (by number) and 97.2% (by dollar value) of Affected Creditors voting in person or by proxy at the meeting.

6 The Monitor supports the sanctioning of the Plan and believes it is fair and reasonable and that it represents the best option available to the Pacific Group and the Affected Creditors.

7 For these reasons the applicants submit that the Plan should be sanctioned pursuant to s. 6 of the *CCAA*.

Adjournment Request

8 On August 16, 2016, one week before the scheduled hearing of this motion, a group of stakeholders (the "Shareholder Consortium") put forward a recapitalization and refinancing proposal (the "Alternative Proposal") which the Shareholder Consortium submits provides the applicants and its stakeholders with a superior alternative to the Plan sought to be sanctioned on this motion.

9 The applicants disagree that the Alternative Proposal is superior to the Plan and have formally rejected it.

10 The Shareholder Consortium requested that I adjourn the motion to permit further consideration of the Alternative Proposal.

11 The applicants and all other interested parties and stakeholders appearing on the motion strongly opposed the adjournment request and characterized it as a "last minute effort to de-rail the Restructuring Transaction".

12 I agree with this characterization of the Alternative Proposal. There was a process in place to obtain proposals that contained a clear timetable for the submission of proposals which the Shareholder Consortium was well aware of. This last minute Alternative Proposal ignores the timelines that have been in place for many months. Further, the Alternative Proposal has been considered and rejected by the applicants. The adjournment request is denied because I am satisfied that the Plan, which results from extraordinary efforts by the applicants and the other interested parties to arrive at the

best result for the Pacific Group and its stakeholders, should not be de-railed at this late stage of the process by the Shareholder Consortium's Alternative Proposal.

Issues

13 I must decide the following issues:

a) Should the Plan be sanctioned?

b) Should the third party releases be approved?

c) Should there be a stay of proceedings in favour of the other Non-Applicant parties?

d) Should the Stay Period be extended to October 31, 2016?

Should the Plan be sanctioned?

14 Section 6 of the *CCAA* provides that a compromise or arrangement is binding on a debtor company and all of its creditors if a majority in number, representing two-thirds in value of the creditors present and voting at a meeting of creditors, approve the compromise or arrangement and the compromise or arrangement has been sanctioned by the court.

15 Pacific's Affected Creditors, in both number and value, voted in favour of the Plan thereby satisfying the first requirement of s. 6 of the *CCAA*. The Monitor has confirmed that 98.4% in number and 97.2% in value of the Affected Creditors voted in favour of the Plan.

16 As the voting requirement under s. 6 of the *CCAA* has been satisfied, I must determine whether to approve and sanction the Plan.

17 The criteria I must consider in determining whether to sanction a *CCAA* plan are as follows:

a) There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

b) All materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

c) The plan must be fair and reasonable.

18 I am satisfied on the record before me that there has been strict compliance with the statutory requirements of the *CCAA*.

19 I am also satisfied that throughout the course of these proceedings the applicants have acted in good faith and with due diligence and they have strictly complied with the requirements of the *CCAA* and the orders of this Court. This is confirmed in the reports of the Monitor.

20 I have concluded that the Plan is fair and reasonable because it represents a reasonable and fair balancing of the interests of all parties in light of the other commercial alternatives available. In assessing the Plan's fairness and reasonableness I am guided by the objectives of the *CCAA* which are "to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and of the company, particularly to keep a company in financial difficulties alive and out of the hands of liquidators". Reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable to liquidation.

21 The factors that I have considered in concluding that the Plan is fair and reasonable include the following:

a) The claims were properly classified pursuant to s. 22 of the *CCAA*;

b) The Plan received overwhelming support from the applicants' creditors;

c) The Monitor is of the view that the applicants' creditors would be worse off if the Plan is not sanctioned;

d) The Plan appears to be the best alternative available under the current circumstances;

e) There is no oppression of the rights of the applicants' creditors under the Plan;

f) Since the applicants' creditors are not being paid in full there is no unfairness to the applicants' shareholders. Their treatment is consistent with the provisions of the *CCAA*;

g) The Plan is in the public interest as it continues the Pacific Group as a going-concern thereby preserving employment for thousands of people and generating economic activity in the many local communities in which it operates.

22 For all of these reasons I am satisfied that the Plan should be sanctioned.

Should the third party releases be approved?

23 It is well established that courts have jurisdiction to sanction plans pursuant to the *CCAA* that contain releases in favour of third parties. Courts will generally approve third party releases in the context of plans of arrangement where the releases are rationally tied to the resolution of the debtor's claims and will benefit creditors generally. I am satisfied in this case that the third party releases should be approved. In arriving at this conclusion I have considered the following factors:

a) Whether the parties to be released from claims are necessary to the Restructuring Transaction;

b) Whether the claims released are rationally connected to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it to succeed;

c) Whether the Plan would fail without the releases;

d) Whether the third parties being released contributed in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;

e) Whether the releases benefit the debtors as well as the creditors generally;

f) Whether the creditors who voted on the Plan had knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and

g) Whether the releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad.

24 The releases were negotiated as part of the overall framework of the compromises contained in the Plan. They facilitate the successful completion of the Plan and the Restructuring Transaction. The releases are a significant part of the various compromises that were required to achieve the Plan and are a necessary element of the global consensual restructuring of the applicants. The releases are therefore rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and are necessary for the successful restructuring of the applicants. They were also well-publicized and there does not appear to be any objections to them.

25 For these reasons the third party releases are approved.

Should there be a stay of proceedings of the other Non-Applicant parties?

26 Section 11 of the *CCAA* provides the court with authority to impose a stay of proceedings with respect to non-applicant parties. In determining whether to grant the Non-Applicant Stay requested I must be satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. I am satisfied that I should grant the Non-Applicant Stay for the following reasons:

a) A significant portion of the value of the Pacific Group is held in the Non-Applicants and their business and operations are significantly intertwined and integrated with those of the applicants.

b) The exercise of the rights stayed by the Non-Applicant Stay which arise out of the applicants' insolvency or the implementation of the Plan would have a negative impact on the applicants' ability to restructure, potentially jeopardizing the success of the Plan and the continuance of the Pacific Group;

c) The granting of the Non-Applicant Stay is a condition of the Plan. If the applicants are prevented from concluding a successful restructuring with their creditors, the economic harm would be far-reaching and significant;

d) Failure of the Plan would be even more harmful to customers, suppliers, landlords and other counterparties whose rights would otherwise be stayed under the Non-Applicant Stay; and

e) If the Plan is approved, the applicants will continue to operate for the benefit of all of their stakeholders, and their stakeholders will retain all of their remedies in the event of future breaches by the applicants or breaches that are not related to the released claims.

27 For these reasons the Non-Applicant Stay is granted.

Should the stay period be extended to October 31, 2016?

28 The applicants have requested an extension of the stay period until and including October 31, 2016. The applicants anticipate that this extension will give them sufficient time to complete all of the transactions, documents and steps required to implement the Plan and to emerge successfully from these *CCAA* proceedings.

29 I am satisfied that under the circumstances the stay extension requested is appropriate. I am prepared to grant the requested stay extension for the following reasons:

a) The applicants have made substantial progress towards completion of the Restructuring Transaction;

b) The applicants require the ongoing benefit of the stay proceedings in order to complete the *CCAA* proceedings including the implementation of the Plan;

c) The applicants intend to implement the Plan as expeditiously as possible;

d) The requested extension is not overly lengthy and avoids the additional time and expense that would be incurred if the applicants are required to return to court in the interim;

e) The applicants' cash flow forecast projects that they will have access to all necessary financing during the extended stay period;

f) The applicants have acted in good faith and with due diligence towards the completion of the Restructuring Transaction and the implementation of the Plan; and

g) The Monitor, the Ad Hoc Committee, the steering committee of Bank Lenders and the Plan Sponsor all support the requested stay extension.

30 A stay is therefore granted up to and including October 31, 2016.

Conclusion

31 For the reasons outlined above the applicants' motion is granted.

32 It should be noted that the parties to the Restructuring Support Agreement reserve whatever rights they may have under that agreement following the sanction of the Plan. Nothing contained in the orders granted today, or s. 6.3 (a) of the Indemnity Agreement approved thereby, is a determination of what those rights may be.

Motion granted.

Footnotes

1 I have used the same defined terms in my reasons for judgment as are contained in the applicants' factum.

TAB 6

2013 ONSC 5461
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Tamerlane Ventures Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 12213, 2013 ONSC 5461, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 32, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 328

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Tamerlane Ventures Inc. and Pine Point Holding Corp.

Newbould J.

Heard: August 23, 2013
Judgment: August 28, 2013
Docket: CV-13-10228-00CL

Counsel: S. Richard Orzy, Derek J. Bell, Sean H. Zweig for Applicants
Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for Proposed Monitor, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc.
Joseph Bellissimo for Renvest Mercantile Bankcorp Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Contracts; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.viii Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous

Terms of order — T Inc. and its subsidiaries were engaged in mining activity in Canada and Peru — T Inc. defaulted on loan from secured lender — Parties negotiated consensual filing under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), under which secured lender agreed to provide DIP financing and to forbear from exercising its rights — DIP loan was to mature approximately four months after date application at bar was heard — Order drafted by parties contained clause preventing extension of stay beyond maturity date of DIP loan unless secured debt and DIP loan were repaid or secured lender and monitor consented (original sunset clause) — T Inc. and one of its subsidiaries brought application for initial order and stay under s. 11 of CCAA — Application granted — There was no doubt that applicants were insolvent and qualified for filing under CCAA and obtaining stay — It was appropriate that stay extend to T Inc.'s American subsidiary, which had guaranteed secured loans, and to T Inc.'s Peruvian subsidiary, which held valuable mining property — Courts have inherent jurisdiction to impose stays against non-applicant third parties where it is important to reorganization and restructuring process, and where it is just and reasonable to do so — Proposed sale and solicitation process and its terms were appropriate, and it was approved — Proposed charges of $300,000 for monitor, its counsel and applicants' counsel, $300,000 for financial advisor and $45,000 for directors were reasonable and were approved — DIP facility and charge was supported by factors listed in s. 11.2(4) of CCAA — At court's direction, parties modified original sunset clause by adding clause

that order was subject in all respects to discretion of court — Original sunset clause removed discretion of court to do what it considered appropriate, and counsel were unable to provide any case in which such order had been made.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd. (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 2011 ONSC 1007, 2011 CarswellOnt 896 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cinram International Inc., Re (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Crystallex International Corp., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 7329, 2012 ONCA 404, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207, 293 O.A.C. 102, 4 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10
s. 63 — considered

APPLICATION by insolvent corporations for initial order and stay under s. 11 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Newbould J.*:**

1 The applicants applied on August 23, 2013 for protection under the CCAA, at which time an Initial Order was granted containing several provisions. These are my reasons for the granting of the order.

Tamerlane business

2 At the time of the application, Tamerlane Ventures Inc. ("Tamerlane") was a publicly traded company whose shares were listed and posted for trading on the TSX Venture Exchange. Tamerlane and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Tamerlane Group"), including Pine Point Holding Corp. ("Tamerlane Pine Point"), Tamerlane Ventures USA Inc. ("Tamerlane USA") and Tamerlane Ventures Peru SAC ("Tamerlane Peru") are engaged in the acquisition, exploration and development of base metal projects in Canada and Peru.

3 The applicants' flagship property is the Pine Point Property, a project located near Hay River in the South Slave Lake area of the Northwest Territories of Canada. It at one time was an operating mine. The applicants firmly believe that there is substantial value in the Pine Point Property and have completed a NI 43-101 Technical Report which shows 10.9 million tonnes of measured and indicated resources in the "R-190" zinc-lead deposit. The project has been determined to be feasible and licences have been obtained to put the first deposit into production. All of the expensive infrastructure, such as roads, power lines and railheads, are already in place, minimizing the capital cost necessary to commence operations. The applicants only need to raise the financing necessary to be able to exploit the value of the project, a task made more difficult by, among other things, the problems experienced generally in the mining sector thus far in 2013.

4 The Tamerlane Group's other significant assets are the Los Pinos mining concessions south of Lima in Peru, which host a historic copper resource. The Tamerlane Group acquired the Los Pinos assets in 2007 through one of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Peru, and it currently holds the mining concessions through another of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Minera.

5 The Los Pinos deposit is a 790 hectare porphyry (a type of igneous rock) copper deposit. Originally investigated in the 1990s when the price of copper was a quarter of its price today, Los Pinos has historically been viewed as a valuable property. With rising copper prices, it is now viewed as being even more valuable.

6 The exploration and development activities have been generally carried out by employees of Tamerlane USA. The applicants' management team consists of four individuals who are employees of Tamerlane USA, which provides management services by contract to the applicants.

7 As at March 31, 2013 the Tamerlane Group had total consolidated assets with a net book value of $24,814,433. The assets included consolidated current assets of $2,007,406, and consolidated non-current assets with a net book value of $22,807,027. Non-current assets included primarily the investment in the Pine Point property of $20,729,551 and the Los Pinos property of $1,314,936.

8 Tamerlane has obtained valuations of Los Pinos and the Pine Point Property. The Los Pinos valuation was completed in May 2013 and indicates a preliminary valuation of $12 to $15 million using a 0.3% copper cut-off grade, or $17 to $21 million using a 0.2% copper cut-off grade. The Pine Point valuation was completed in July 2013 and indicates a valuation of $30 to $56 million based on market comparables, with a value as high as $229 million considering precedent transactions.

Secured and unsecured debt

9 Pursuant to a credit agreement between Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund, a fund managed by Renvest Mercantile Bancorp Inc. ("Global Resource Fund" or "secured lender") made as of December 16, 2010, as amended by a first amending agreement dated June 30, 2011 and a second amending agreement dated July 29, 2011, Tamerlane became indebted to the Secured Lender for USD $10,000,000. The secured indebtedness under the credit agreement is guaranteed by both Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA, and each of Tamerlane, Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA has executed a general security agreement in favour of the secured lender in respect of the secured debt.

10 The only other secured creditors are the applicants' counsel, the Monitor and the Monitor's counsel in respect of the fees and disbursements owing to each.

11 The applicants' unsecured creditors are principally trade creditors. Collectively, the applicants' accounts payable were approximately CAD $850,000 as at August 13, 2013, in addition to accrued professional fees in connection with issues related to the secured debt and this proceeding.

Events leading to filing

12 Given that the Tamerlane Group is in the exploration stage with its assets, it does not yet generate cash flow from operations. Accordingly, its only potential source of cash is from financing activities, which have been problematic in light of the current market for junior mining companies.

13 It was contemplated when the credit agreement with Global Resource Fund was entered into that the take-out financing would be in the form of construction financing for Pine Point. However Tamerlane was unsuccessful in arranging that. Tamerlane was successful in late 2012 in arranging a small flow-through financing from a director and in early 2013 a share issuance for $1.7 million dollars. Negotiations with various parties for to raise more funds by debt or asset sales have so far been unsuccessful.

14 As a result of liquidity constraints facing Tamerlane in the fall of 2012, it failed to make regularly scheduled monthly interest payments in respect of the secured debt beginning on September 25, 2012 and failed to repay the principal balance on the maturity date of October 16, 2012, each of which was an event of default under the credit agreement with the secured lender Global Resource Fund.

15 Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund then entered into a forbearance agreement made as of December 31, 2012 in which Tamerlane agreed to make certain payments to Global Resource Fund, including a $1,500,000 principal repayment on March 31, 2013. As a result of liquidity constraints, Tamerlane was unable to make the March 31 payment, an event of default under the credit and forbearance agreements. On May 24, 2013, Tamerlane failed to make the May interest payment, and on May 29, 2013, the applicants received a letter from Global Resource Fund's counsel enclosing a NITES notice under the BIA and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 of the PPSA. The total secured debt was $11,631,948.90.

16 On June 10, 2013, Global Resource Fund and Tamerlane entered into an amendment to the forbearance agreement pursuant to which Global Resource Fund withdrew its statutory notices and agreed to capitalize the May interest payment in exchange for Tamerlane agreeing to pay certain fees to the Global Resource Fund that were capitalized and resuming making cash interest payments to the Secured Lender with the June 25, 2013 interest payment. Tamerlane was unable to make the July 25 payment, which resulted in an event of default under the credit and forbearance amendment agreements.

17 On July 26, 2013, Global Resource Fund served a new NITES notice and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 the PPSA, at which time the total of the secured debt was $12,100,254.26.

18 Thereafter the parties negotiated a consensual CCAA filing, under which Global Resource Fund has agreed to provide DIP financing and to forbear from exercising its rights until January 7, 2014. The terms of the stay of proceedings and DIP financing are unusual, to be discussed.

Discussion

19 There is no doubt that the applicants are insolvent and qualify for filing under the CCAA and obtaining a stay of proceedings. I am satisfied from the record, including the report from the proposed Monitor, that an Initial Order and a stay under section 11 of the CCAA should be made.

20 The applicants request that the stay apply to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru, non-parties to this application. The business operations of the applicants, Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru are intertwined, and the request to extend the stay of proceedings to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru is to maintain stability and value during the CCAA process.

21 Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings against non-applicant third parties where it is important to the reorganization and restructuring process, and where it is just and reasonable to do so. See Farley J. in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). Recently Morawetz J. has made such orders in *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the stay of proceedings extend to Tamerlane USA, which has guaranteed the secured loans and to Tamerlane Peru, which holds the valuable Los Pinos assets in Peru.

22 Under the Initial Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Finance Inc. is to be appointed a financial advisor. PWC is under the oversight of the Monitor to implement a Sale and Solicitation Process, under which PWC will seek to identify one or more financiers or purchasers of, and/or investors in, the key entities that comprise the Tamerlane Group. The SISP will include broad marketing to all potential financiers, purchasers and investors and will consider offers for proposed financing to repay the secured debt, an investment in the applicants' business and/or a purchase of some or all of the applicants' assets. The proposed Monitor supports the SIST and is of the view that it is in the interests of the applicants' stakeholders. The SISP and its terms are appropriate and it is approved.

23 The Initial Order contains provisions for an administration charge for the Monitor, its counsel and for counsel to the applicants in the amount of $300,000, a financial advisor charge of $300,000, a directors' charge of $45,000 to the extent the directors are not covered under their D&O policy and a subordinated administration charge subordinated to the secured loans and the proposed DIP charge for expenses not covered by the administration and financial advisor charges. These charges appear reasonable and the proposed Monitor is of the same view. They are approved.

DIP facility and charge

24 The applicants' principal use of cash during these proceedings will consist of the payment of ongoing, but minimized, day-to-day operational expenses, such as regular remuneration for those individuals providing services to the applicants, office related expenses, and professional fees and disbursements in connection with these *CCAA* proceedings. The applicants will require additional borrowing to do this. It is apparent that given the lack of alternate financing, any restructuring will not be possible without DIP financing.

25 The DIP lender is Global Resource Fund, the secured lender to the applicants. The DIP loan is for a net $1,017,500 with simple 12% interest. It is to mature on January 7, 2014, by which time it is anticipated that the SISP process will have resulted in a successful raising of funds to repay the secured loan and the DIP facility.

26 Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA lists factors, among other things, that the court is to consider when a request for a DIP financing charge is made. A review of those factors in this case supports the DIP facility and charge. The facility is required to continue during the CCAA process, the assets are sufficient to support the charge, the secured lender supports the applicants' management remaining in possession of the business, albeit with PWC being engaged to run the SISP, the loan is a fraction of the applicants' total assets and the proposed Monitor is of the view that the DIP facility and charge are fair and reasonable. The one factor that gives me pause is the first listed in section 11.2(4), being the period during which the applicants are expected to be subject to the CCAA proceedings. That involves the sunset clause, to which I now turn.

Sunset clause

27 During the negotiations leading to this consensual CCAA application, Global Resource Fund, the secured lender, expressed a willingness to negotiate with the applicants but firmly stated that as a key term of consenting to any CCAA initial order, it required (i) a fixed "sunset date" of January 7, 2014 for the CCAA proceeding beyond which stay extensions could not be sought without the its consent and the consent of the Monitor unless both the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan had been repaid in full, and (ii) a provision in the initial order directing that a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund would be appointed after that date.

28 The Initial Order as drafted contains language preventing the applicants from seeking or obtaining any extension of the stay period beyond January 7, 2014 unless it has repaid the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan or received the consent of Global Resource Fund and the Monitor, and that immediately following January 7, 2013 (i) the CCAA proceedings shall terminate, (ii) the Monitor shall be discharged, (iii) the Initial Order (with some exceptions) shall be of no force and effect and (iv) a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund shall be appointed.

29 Ms. Kent, the executive chair and CFO of Tamerlane, has sworn in her affidavit that Global Resource Fund insisted on these terms and that given the financial circumstances of the applicants, there were significant cost-savings and other benefits to them and all of the stakeholders for this proceeding to be consensual rather than contentious. Accordingly, the directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment to agree to the terms. The proposed Monitor states its understanding as well is that the consent of Global Resource Fund to these CCAA proceedings is conditional on these terms.

30 Section 11 of the CCAA authorizes a court to make any order "that it considers appropriate in the circumstances." In considering what may be appropriate, Deschamps J. stated in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.):

> 70. ...Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

31 There is no doubt that CCAA proceedings can be terminated when the prospects of a restructuring are at an end. In *Century Services*, Deschamps J. recognized this in stating:

> 71. It is well established that efforts to reorganize under the CCAA can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the CCAA's purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a CCAA court.

32 The fact that the board of directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment in agreeing to the terms imposed by Global Resource Fund in order to achieve a consensual outcome is a factor I can and do take into account,

with the caution that in the case of interim financing, the court must make an independent determination, and arrive at an appropriate order, having regard to the factors in s. 11.2(4). The court may consider, but not defer to or be fettered by, the recommendation of the board. See *Crystallex International Corp., Re* (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. C.A.) at para 85.

33 It is apparent from looking at the history of the matter that Global Resource Fund had every intention of exercising its rights under its security to apply to court to have a receiver appointed, and with the passage of time during which there were defaults, including defaults in forbearance agreements, the result would likely have been inevitable. See *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.* (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300 (Ont. S.C.J.) and the authorities therein discussed. Thus it is understandable that the directors agreed to the terms required by Global Resource Fund. If Global Resource Fund had refused to fund the DIP facility or had refused to agree to any further extension for payment of the secured loan, the prospects of financing the payout of Global Resource Fund through a SISP process would in all likelihood not been available to the applicants or its stakeholders.

34 What is unusual in the proposed Initial Order is that the discretion of the court on January 7, 2014 to do what it considers appropriate is removed. Counsel have been unable to provide any case in which such an order has been made. I did not think it appropriate for such an order to be made. At my direction, the parties agreed to add a clause that the order was subject in all respects to the discretion of the Court. With that change, I approved the Initial Order.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 7

2012 ONSC 3767
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Cinram International Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Cinram International Inc., Cinram International Income Fund, CII Trust and The Companies Listed in Schedule "A" (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 25, 2012
Judgment: June 26, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9767-00CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner, Caroline Descours for Applicants
Steven Golick for Warner Electra-Atlantic Corp.
Steven Weisz for Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent and DIP Agent
Tracy Sandler for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
David Byers for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — C group brought application seeking initial order under Act, and relief including stay of proceedings against third party non-applicant; authorization to make pre-filing payments; and approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing, administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, Key Employee Retention Plan, and consent consideration — Application granted — Applicants met all qualifications established for relief under Act — Charges referenced in initial order were approved — Relief requested in initial order was extensive and went beyond what court usually considers on initial hearing; however, in circumstances, requested relief was appropriate — Applicants spent considerable time reviewing their alternatives and did so in consultative manner with their senior secured lenders — Senior secured lenders supported application, notwithstanding that it was clear that they would suffer significant shortfall on their positions.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Miscellaneous

C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group brought application seeking initial order

under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and other relief, including authorization for C International to act as foreign representative in within proceedings to seek recognition order under Chapter 15 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code on basis that Ontario, Canada was Centre of Main Interest (COMI) of applicants — Application granted on other grounds — It is function of receiving court, in this case, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for District of Delaware, to make determination on location of COMI and to determine whether present proceeding is foreign main proceeding for purposes of Chapter 15.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous

Stay against third party non-applicant — C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — C LP was not applicant in proceedings; however, C LP formed part of C group's income trust structure with C Fund, ultimate parent of C group — C group brought application seeking initial order under Act, including stay of proceedings against C LP — Application granted — Applicants met all qualifications established for relief under Act — Charges referenced in initial order were approved — Relief requested in initial order was extensive and went beyond what court usually considers on initial hearing; however, in circumstances, requested relief was appropriate.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

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Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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Fraser Papers Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3658, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 194 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

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Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, *(*sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada)* [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

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Statutes considered:

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s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

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Chapter 15 — referred to

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Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "company" — considered

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — considered

s. 3(1) — considered

s. 3(2) — considered

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

APPLICATION by group of debtor companies for initial order and other relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 Cinram International Inc. ("CII"), Cinram International Income Fund ("Cinram Fund"), CII Trust and the Companies listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Applicants") brought this application seeking an initial order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). The Applicants also request that the court exercise its jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings and other benefits under the Initial Order to Cinram International Limited Partnership ("Cinram LP", collectively with the Applicants, the "CCAA Parties").

2 Cinram Fund, together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, "Cinram" or the "Cinram Group") is a replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs. Cinram has a diversified operational footprint across North America and Europe that enables it to meet the replication and logistics demands of its customers.

3 The evidentiary record establishes that Cinram has experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, which, according to Cinram, are a result of the economic downturn in Cinram's primary markets of North America and Europe, which impacted consumers' discretionary spending and adversely affected the entire industry.

4 Cinram advises that over the past several years it has continued to evaluate its strategic alternatives and rationalize its operating footprint in order to attempt to balance its ongoing operations and financial challenges with its existing debt levels. However, despite cost reductions and recapitalized initiatives and the implementation of a variety of restructuring alternatives, the Cinram Group has experienced a number of challenges that has led to it seeking protection under the CCAA.

5 Counsel to Cinram outlined the principal objectives of these CCAA proceedings as:

(i) to ensure the ongoing operations of the Cinram Group;

(ii) to ensure the CCAA Parties have the necessary availability of working capital funds to maximize the ongoing business of the Cinram Group for the benefit of its stakeholders; and

(iii) to complete the sale and transfer of substantially all of the Cinram Group's business as a going concern (the "Proposed Transaction").

6 Cinram contemplates that these CCAA proceedings will be the primary court supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. Cinram has operations in the United States and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States. Cinram, however, takes the position that Canada is the nerve centre of the Cinram Group.

7 The Applicants also seek authorization for Cinram International ULC ("Cinram ULC") to act as "foreign representative" in the within proceedings to seek a recognition order under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15"). Cinram advises that the proceedings under Chapter 15 are intended to ensure that the CCAA Parties are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction to be undertaken pursuant to these CCAA proceedings.

8 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Cinram is one of the world's largest providers of pre-recorded multi-media products and related logistics services. It has facilities in North America and Europe, and it:

(i) manufactures DVDs, blue ray disks and CDs, and provides distribution services for motion picture studios, music labels, video game publishers, computer software companies, telecommunication companies and retailers around the world;

(ii) provides various digital media services through One K Studios, LLC; and

(iii) provides retail inventory control and forecasting services through Cinram Retail Services LLC (collectively, the "Cinram Business").

9 Cinram contemplates that the Proposed Transaction could allow it to restore itself as a market leader in the industry. Cinram takes the position that it requires CCAA protection to provide stability to its operations and to complete the Proposed Transaction.

10 The Proposed Transaction has the support of the lenders forming the steering committee with respect to Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Steering Committee"), the members of which have been subject to confidentiality agreements and represent 40% of the loans under Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Initial Consenting Lenders"). Cinram also anticipates further support of the Proposed Transaction from additional lenders under its credit facilities following the public announcement of the Proposed Transaction.

11 Cinram Fund is the direct or indirect parent and sole shareholder of all of the subsidiaries in Cinram's corporate structure. A simplified corporate structure of the Cinram Group showing all of the CCAA Parties, including the designation of the CCAA Parties' business segments and certain non-filing entities, is set out in the Pre-Filing Report of FTI Consulting Inc. (the "Monitor") at paragraph 13. A copy is attached as Schedule "B".

12 Cinram Fund, CII, Cinram International General Partner Inc. ("Cinram GP"), CII Trust, Cinram ULC and 1362806 Ontario Limited are the Canadian entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "Canadian Applicants"). Cinram Fund and CII Trust are both open-ended limited purpose trusts, established under the laws of Ontario, and each of the remaining Canadian Applicants is incorporated pursuant to Federal or Provincial legislation.

13 Cinram (US) Holdings Inc. ("CUSH"), Cinram Inc., IHC Corporation ("IHC"), Cinram Manufacturing, LLC ("Cinram Manufacturing"), Cinram Distribution, LLC ("Cinram Distribution"), Cinram Wireless, LLC ("Cinram Wireless"), Cinram

Retail Services, LLC ("Cinram Retail") and One K Studios, LLC ("One K") are the U.S. entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "U.S. Applicants"). Each of the U.S. Applicants is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with the exception of One K, which is incorporated under the laws of California. On May 25, 2012, each of the U.S. Applicants opened a new Canadian-based bank account with J.P. Morgan.

14 Cinram LP is not an Applicant in these proceedings. However, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other relief under the CCAA extended to Cinram LP as it forms part of Cinram's income trust structure with Cinram Fund, the ultimate parent of the Cinram Group.

15 Cinram's European entities are not part of these proceedings and it is not intended that any insolvency proceedings will be commenced with respect to Cinram's European entities, except for Cinram Optical Discs SAC, which has commenced insolvency proceedings in France.

16 The Cinram Group's principal source of long-term debt is the senior secured credit facilities provided under credit agreements known as the "First-Lien Credit Agreement" and the "Second-Lien Credit Agreement" (together with the First-Lien Credit Agreement, the "Credit Agreements").

17 All of the CCAA Parties, with the exception of Cinram Fund, Cinram GP, CII Trust and Cinram LP (collectively, the "Fund Entities"), are borrowers and/or guarantors under the Credit Agreements. The obligations under the Credit Agreements are secured by substantially all of the assets of the Applicants and certain of their European subsidiaries.

18 As at March 31, 2012, there was approximately $233 million outstanding under the First-Lien Term Loan Facility; $19 million outstanding under the First-Lien Revolving Credit Facilities; approximately $12 million of letter of credit exposure under the First-Lien Credit Agreement; and approximately $12 million outstanding under the Second-Lien Credit Agreement.

19 Cinram advises that in light of the financial circumstances of the Cinram Group, it is not possible to obtain additional financing that could be used to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

20 Mr. John Bell, Chief Financial Officer of CII, stated in his affidavit that in connection with certain defaults under the Credit Agreements, a series of waivers was extended from December 2011 to June 30, 2012 and that upon expiry of the waivers, the lenders have the ability to demand immediate repayment of the outstanding amounts under the Credit Agreements and the borrowers and the other Applicants that are guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Mr. Bell further stated that there is no reasonable expectation that Cinram would be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012, fiscal 2013, and fiscal 2014. The cash flow forecast attached to his affidavit indicates that, without additional funding, the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

21 The Applicants request a stay of proceedings. They take the position that in light of their financial circumstances, there could be a vast and significant erosion of value to the detriment of all stakeholders. In particular, the Applicants are concerned about the following risks, which, because of the integration of the Cinram business, also apply to the Applicants' subsidiaries, including Cinram LP:

(a) the lenders demanding payment in full for money owing under the Credit Agreements;

(b) potential termination of contracts by key suppliers; and

(c) potential termination of contracts by customers.

22 As indicated in the cash flow forecast, the Applicants do not have sufficient funds available to meet their immediate cash requirements as a result of their current liquidity challenges. Mr. Bell states in his affidavit that the Applicants require access to Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") Financing in the amount of $15 millions to continue operations while they implement their restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction. Cinram has negotiated a DIP Credit Agreement with the lenders forming

the Steering Committee (the "DIP Lenders") through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA as Administrative Agent (the "DIP Agent") whereby the DIP Lenders agree to provide the DIP Financing in the form of a term loan in the amount of $15 million.

23 The Applicants also indicate that during the course of the CCAA proceedings, the CCAA Parties intend to generally make payments to ensure their ongoing business operations for the benefit of their stakeholders, including obligations incurred prior to, on, or after the commencement of these proceedings relating to:

(a) the active employment of employees in the ordinary course;

(b) suppliers and service providers the CCAA Parties and the Monitor have determined to be critical to the continued operation of the Cinram business;

(c) certain customer programs in place pursuant to existing contracts or arrangements with customers; and

(d) inter-company payments among the CCAA Parties in respect of, among other things, shared services.

24 Mr. Bell states that the ability to make these payments relating to critical suppliers and customer programs is subject to a consultation and approval process agreed to among the Monitor, the DIP Agent and the CCAA Parties.

25 The Applicants also request an Administration Charge for the benefit of the Monitor and Moelis and Company, LLC ("Moelis"), an investment bank engaged to assist Cinram in a comprehensive and thorough review of its strategic alternatives.

26 In addition, the directors (and in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, the Trustees, referred to collectively with the directors as the "Directors/Trustees") requested a Director's Charge to provide certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Bell states that in order to complete a successful restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of their Directors/Trustees and officers. Further, Cinram's insurers have advised that if Cinram was to file for CCAA protection, and the insurers agreed to renew the existing D&O policies, there would be a significant increase in the premium for that insurance.

27 Cinram has also developed a key employee retention program (the "KERP") with the principal purpose of providing an incentive for eligible employees, including eligible officers, to remain with the Cinram Group despite its financial difficulties. The KERP has been reviewed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the Cinram Fund. The KERP includes retention payments (the "KERP Retention Payments") to certain existing employees, including certain officers employed at Canadian and U.S. Entities, who are critical to the preservation of Cinram's enterprise value.

28 Cinram also advises that on June 22, 2012, Cinram Fund, the borrowers under the Credit Agreements, and the Initial Consenting Lenders entered into a support agreement pursuant to which the Initial Consenting Lenders agreed to support the Proposed Transaction to be pursued through these CCAA proceedings (the "Support Agreement").

29 Pursuant to the Support Agreement, lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement or Consent Agreement prior to July 10, 2012 (the "Consent Date") are entitled to receive consent consideration (the "Early Consent Consideration") equal to 4% of the principal amount of loans under the First-Lien Credit Agreement held by such consenting lenders as of the Consent Date, payable in cash from the net sale proceeds of the Proposed Transaction upon distribution of such proceeds in the CCAA proceedings.

30 Mr. Bell states that it is contemplated that the CCAA proceedings will be the primary court-supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. He states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Mr. Bell further states that although Cinram has operations in the United States, and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States, it is Ontario that is Cinram's home jurisdiction and the nerve centre of the CCAA Parties' management, business and operations.

31 The CCAA Parties have advised that they will be seeking a recognition order under Chapter 15 to ensure that they are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction. Thus, the Applicants seek authorization in the Proposed Initial Order for:

> Cinram ULC to seek recognition of these proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" and to seek such additional relief required in connection with the prosecution of any sale transaction, including the Proposed Transaction, as well as authorization for the Monitor, as a court-appointed officer, to assist the CCAA Parties with any matters relating to any of the CCAA Parties' subsidiaries and any foreign proceedings commenced in relation thereto.

32 Mr. Bell further states that the Monitor will be actively involved in assisting Cinram ULC as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the Chapter 15 proceedings and will assist in keeping this court informed of developments in the Chapter 15 proceedings.

33 The facts relating to the CCAA Parties, the Cinram business, and the requested relief are fully set out in Mr. Bell's affidavit.

34 Counsel to the Applicants filed a comprehensive factum in support of the requested relief in the Initial Order. Part III of the factum sets out the issues and the law.

35 The relief requested in the form of the Initial Order is extensive. It goes beyond what this court usually considers on an initial hearing. However, in the circumstances of this case, I have been persuaded that the requested relief is appropriate.

36 In making this determination, I have taken into account that the Applicants have spent a considerable period of time reviewing their alternatives and have done so in a consultative manner with their senior secured lenders. The senior secured lenders support this application, notwithstanding that it is clear that they will suffer a significant shortfall on their positions. It is also noted that the Early Consent Consideration will be available to lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement prior to July 10, 2012. Thus, all of these lenders will have the opportunity to participate in this arrangement.

37 As previously indicated, the Applicants' factum is comprehensive. The submissions on the law are extensive and cover all of the outstanding issues. It provides a fulsome review of the jurisprudence in the area, which for purposes of this application, I accept. For this reason, paragraphs 41-96 of the factum are attached as Schedule "C" for reference purposes.

38 The Applicants have also requested that the confidential supplement — which contains the KERP summary listing the individual KERP Payments and certain DIP Schedules — be sealed. I am satisfied that the KERP summary contains individually identifiable information and compensation information, including sensitive salary information, about the individuals who are covered by the KERP and that the DIP schedules contain sensitive competitive information of the CCAA Parties which should also be treated as being confidential. Having considered the principals of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I accept the Applicants' submission on this issue and grant the requested sealing order in respect of the confidential supplement.

39 Finally, the Applicants have advised that they intend to proceed with a Chapter 15 application on June 26, 2012 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. I am given to understand that Cinram ULC, as proposed foreign representative, will be seeking recognition of the CCAA proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" on the basis that Ontario, Canada is the Centre of Main Interest or "COMI" of the CCAA Applicants.

40 In his affidavit at paragraph 195, Mr. Bell states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects and that, as a result of the following factors, the Applicants submit the COMI of the CCAA Parties is Ontario, Canada:

> (a) the Cinram Group is managed on a consolidated basis out of the corporate headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, where corporate-level decision-making and corporate administrative functions are centralized;

(b) key contracts, including, among others, major customer service agreements, are negotiated at the corporate level and created in Canada;

(c) the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of CII, who are also directors, trustees and/or officers of other entities in the Cinram Group, are based in Canada;

(d) meetings of the board of trustees and board of directors typically take place in Canada;

(e) pricing decisions for entities in the Cinram Group are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in Toronto, Ontario;

(f) cash management functions for Cinram's North American entities, including the administration of Cinram's accounts receivable and accounts payable, are managed from Cinram's head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(g) although certain bookkeeping, invoicing and accounting functions are performed locally, corporate accounting, treasury, financial reporting, financial planning, tax planning and compliance, insurance procurement services and internal audits are managed at a consolidated level in Toronto, Ontario;

(h) information technology, marketing, and real estate services are provided by CII at the head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(i) with the exception of routine maintenance expenditures, all capital expenditure decisions affecting the Cinram Group are managed in Toronto, Ontario;

(j) new business development initiatives are centralized and managed from Toronto, Ontario; and

(k) research and development functions for the Cinram Group are corporate-level activities centralized at Toronto, Ontario, including the Cinram Group's corporate-level research and development budget and strategy.

41 Counsel submits that the CCAA Parties are highly dependent upon the critical business functions performed on their behalf from Cinram's head office in Toronto and would not be able to function independently without significant disruptions to their operations.

42 The above comments with respect to the COMI are provided for informational purposes only. This court clearly recognizes that it is the function of the receiving court — in this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware — to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15.

43 In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications established for relief under the CCAA and I have signed the Initial Order in the form submitted, which includes approvals of the Charges referenced in the Initial Order.

Schedule "A"

Additional Applicants

Cinram International General Partner Inc.

Cinram International ULC

1362806 Ontario Limited

Cinram (U.S.) Holdings Inc.

Cinram, Inc.

IHC Corporation

Cinram Manufacturing LLC

Cinram Distribution LLC

Cinram Wireless LLC

Cinram Retail Services, LLC

One K Studios, LLC

Schedule "B"



Graphic 1

Schedule "C"

A. The Applicants Are "Debtor Companies" to Which the CCAA Applies

41. The CCAA applies in respect of a "debtor company" (including a foreign company having assets or doing business in Canada) or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total of claims against such company or companies exceeds $5 million.

CCAA, Section 3(1).

42. The Applicants are eligible for protection under the CCAA because each is a "debtor company" and the total of the claims against the Applicants exceeds $5 million.

(1) The Applicants are Debtor Companies

43. The terms "company" and "debtor company" are defined in Section 2 of the CCAA as follows:

> "company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies.
>
> "debtor company" means any company that:
>
> (a) is bankrupt or insolvent;
>
> (b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;
>
> (c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or
>
> (d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.
>
> CCAA, Section 2 ("company" and "debtor company").

44. The Applicants are debtor companies within the meaning of these definitions.

(2) The Applicants are "companies"

45. The Applicants are "companies" because:

> a. with respect to the Canadian Applicants, each is incorporated pursuant to federal or provincial legislation or, in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, is an income trust; and
>
> b. with respect to the U.S. Applicants, each is an incorporated company with certain funds in bank accounts in Canada opened in May 2012 and therefore each is a company having assets or doing business in Canada.
>
> Bell Affidavit at paras. 4, 80, 84, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 212; Application Record, Tab 2.

46. The test for "having assets or doing business in Canada" is disjunctive, such that either "having assets" in Canada or "doing business in Canada" is sufficient to qualify an incorporated company as a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA.

47. Having only nominal assets in Canada, such as funds on deposit in a Canadian bank account, brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company". In order to meet the threshold statutory requirements of the CCAA, an applicant need only be in technical compliance with the plain words of the CCAA.

> *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 30 [*Canwest Global*]; Book of Authorities of the Applicants ("*Book of Authorities*"), Tab 1.
>
> *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 17 [*Global Light*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

48. The Courts do not engage in a quantitative or qualitative analysis of the assets or the circumstances in which the assets were created. Accordingly, the use of "instant" transactions immediately preceding a CCAA application, such as the creation

of "instant debts" or "instant assets" for the purposes of bringing an entity within the scope of the CCAA, has received judicial approval as a legitimate device to bring a debtor within technical requirements of the CCAA.

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, *supra* at para. 17; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5-6; Book of Authorities, Tab 3.

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 74, 83; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.

(3) The Applicants are insolvent

49. The Applicants are "debtor companies" as defined in the CCAA because they are companies (as set out above) and they are insolvent.

50. The insolvency of the debtor is assessed as of the time of filing the CCAA application. The CCAA does not define insolvency. Accordingly, in interpreting the meaning of "insolvent", courts have taken guidance from the definition of "insolvent person" in Section 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), which defines an "insolvent person" as a person (i) who is not bankrupt; and (ii) who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada; (iii) whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under the BIA amount to one thousand dollars; and (iv) who is "insolvent" under one of the following tests:

a. is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due;

b. has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or

c. the aggregate of his property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

BIA, Section 2 ("insolvent person").

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), at para.4 [*Stelco*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

51. These tests for insolvency are disjunctive. A company satisfying any one of these tests is considered insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.

Stelco Inc., Re, *supra* at paras. 26 and 28; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

52. A company is also insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if, at the time of filing, there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they generally become due if a stay of proceedings and ancillary protection are not granted by the court.

Stelco Inc., Re, *supra* at para. 40; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

53. The Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the BIA and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition as a result of the following:

a. The Applicants are unable to comply with certain financial covenants under the Credit Agreements and have entered into a series of waivers with their lenders from December 2011 to June 30, 2012.

b. Were the Lenders to accelerate the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements, the Borrowers and the other Applicants that are Guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Cinram Fund would be the ultimate parent of an insolvent business.

d. The Applicants have been unable to repay or refinance the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements or find an out-of-court transaction for the sale of the Cinram Business with proceeds that equal or exceed the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

e. Reduced revenues and EBITDA and increased borrowing costs have significantly impaired Cinram's ability to service its debt obligations. There is no reasonable expectation that Cinram will be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012 and for fiscal 2013 and 2014.

f. The decline in revenues and EBITDA generated by the Cinram Business has caused the value of the Cinram Business to decline. As a result, the aggregate value of the Property, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to allow for payment of all of the Applicants' obligations due and accruing due.

g. The Cash Flow Forecast indicates that without additional funding the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 23, 179-181, 183, 197-199; Application Record, Tab 2.

(4) The Applicants are affiliated companies with claims outstanding in excess of $5 million

54. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims exceeding 5 million dollars. Therefore, the CCAA applies to the Applicants in accordance with Section 3(1).

55. Affiliated companies are defined in Section 3(2) of the CCAA as follows:

a. companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each is controlled by the same person; and

b. two companies are affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

CCAA, Section 3(2).

56. CII, CII Trust and all of the entities listed in Schedule "A" hereto are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Cinram Fund; thus, the Applicants are "affiliated companies" for the purpose of the CCAA.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 3, 71; Application Record, Tab 2.

57. All of the CCAA Parties (except for the Fund Entities) are each a Borrower and/or Guarantor under the Credit Agreements. As at March 31, 2012 there was approximately $252 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the First Lien Credit Agreement (plus approximately $12 million in letter of credit exposure) and approximately $12 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Second Lien Credit Agreement. The total claims against the Applicants far exceed $5 million.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 75; Application Record, Tab 2.

B. The Relief is Available under The CCAA and Consistent with the Purpose and Policy of the CCAA

(1) The CCAA is Flexible, Remedial Legislation

58. The CCAA is remedial legislation, intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy. In particular during periods of financial hardship, debtors turn to the Court so that the Court may apply the CCAA in a flexible manner in order to accomplish the statute's goals. The Court should give the CCAA a broad and liberal interpretation so as to encourage and facilitate successful restructurings whenever possible.

> *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, *supra* at paras. 22 and 56-60; Book of Authorities, Tab 4. *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
>
> *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 4 and 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 7.

59. On numerous occasions, courts have held that Section 11 of the CCAA provides the courts with a broad and liberal power, which is at their disposal in order to achieve the overall objective of the CCAA. Accordingly, an interpretation of the CCAA that facilitates restructurings accords with its purpose.

> *Sulphur Corp. of Canada Ltd., Re* (2002), 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta. Q.B.) ("*Sulphur*") at para. 26; Book of Authorities, Tab 8.

60. Given the nature and purpose of the CCAA, this Honourable Court has the authority and jurisdiction to depart from the Model Order as is reasonable and necessary in order to achieve a successful restructuring.

(2) The Stay of Proceedings Against Non-Applicants is Appropriate

61. The relief sought in this application includes a stay of proceedings in favour of Cinram LP and the Applicants' direct and indirect subsidiaries that are also party to an agreement with an Applicant (whether as surety, guarantor or otherwise) (each, a "Subsidiary Counterparty"), including any contract or credit agreement. It is just and reasonable to grant the requested stay of proceedings because:

> a. the Cinram Business is integrated among the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties;
>
> b. if any proceedings were commenced against Cinram LP, or if any of the third parties to such agreements were to commence proceedings or exercise rights and remedies against the Subsidiary Counterparties, this would have a detrimental effect on the Applicants' ability to restructure and implement the Proposed Transaction and would lead to an erosion of value of the Cinram Business; and
>
> c. a stay of proceedings that extends to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties is necessary in order to maintain stability with respect to the Cinram Business and maintain value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders.
>
> Bell Affidavit, paras. 185-186; Application Record, Tab 2.

62. The purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the *status quo* to enable a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed and considered by the creditors:

> In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.
>
> *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re*, *supra* at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6. *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, *supra* at para. 27; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
>
> CCAA, Section 11.

63. The Court has broad inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings that supplement the statutory provisions of Section 11 of the CCAA, providing the Court with the power to grant a stay of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to non-applicant parties.

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, *supra* at paras. 5 and 16; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 6; Book of Authorities, Tab 9.

64. The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA, such as partnerships that do not qualify as "companies" within the meaning of the CCAA;

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 10. *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re*, *supra* at para. 21; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, *supra* at paras. 28 and 29; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Sino-Forest Corp., Re, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 11.

Re MAAX Corp, Initial Order granted June 12, 2008, Montreal 500-11-033561-081, (Que. Sup. Ct. [Commercial Division]) at para. 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 12.

65. The Applicants submit the balance of convenience favours extending the relief in the proposed Initial Order to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties. The business operations of the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties are intertwined and the stay of proceedings is necessary to maintain stability and value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders, as well as allow an orderly, going-concern sale of the Cinram Business as an important component of its reorganization process.

(3) Entitlement to Make Pre-Filing Payments

66. To ensure the continued operation of the CCAA Parties' business and maximization of value in the interests of Cinram's stakeholders, the Applicants seek authorization (but not a requirement) for the CCAA Parties to make certain pre-filing payments, including: (a) payments to employees in respect of wages, benefits, and related amounts; (b) payments to suppliers and service providers critical to the ongoing operation of the business; (c) payments and the application of credits in connection with certain existing customer programs; and (d) intercompany payments among the Applicants related to intercompany loans and shared services. Payments will be made with the consent of the Monitor and, in certain circumstances, with the consent of the Agent.

67. There is ample authority supporting the Court's general jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor companies. This jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by Section 11.4 of the CCAA, which became effective as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA and codified the Court's practice of declaring a person to be a critical supplier and granting a charge on the debtor's property in favour of such critical

supplier. As noted by Pepall J. in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the recent amendments, including Section 11.4, do not detract from the inherently flexible nature of the CCAA or the Court's broad and inherent jurisdiction to make such orders that will facilitate the debtor's restructuring of its business as a going concern.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at paras. 41 and 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

68. There are many cases since the 2009 amendments where the Courts have authorized the applicants to pay certain pre-filing amounts where the applicants were not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers. In granting this authority, the Courts considered a number of factors, including:

a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;

b. the applicants' dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the Monitor;

d. the Monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;

e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

f. the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Brainhunter Inc., Re, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 21 [*Brainhunter*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 13.

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 29-34; Book of Authorities, Tab 14.

69. The CCAA Parties rely on the efficient and expedited supply of products and services from their suppliers and service providers in order to ensure that their operations continue in an efficient manner so that they can satisfy customer requirements. The CCAA Parties operate in a highly competitive environment where the timely provision of their products and services is essential in order for the company to remain a successful player in the industry and to ensure the continuance of the Cinram Business. The CCAA Parties require flexibility to ensure adequate and timely supply of required products and to attempt to obtain and negotiate credit terms with its suppliers and service providers. In order to accomplish this, the CCAA Parties require the ability to pay certain pre-filing amounts and post-filing payables to those suppliers they consider essential to the Cinram Business, as approved by the Monitor. The Monitor, in determining whether to approve pre-filing payments as critical to the ongoing business operations, will consider various factors, including the above factors derived from the caselaw.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 226, 228, 230; Application Record, Tab 2.

70. In addition, the CCAA Parties' continued compliance with their existing customer programs, as described in the Bell Affidavit, including the payment of certain pre-filing amounts owing under certain customer programs and the application of certain credits granted to customers pre-filing to post-filing receivables, is essential in order for the CCAA Parties to maintain their customer relationships as part of the CCAA Parties' going concern business.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 234; Application Record, Tab 2.

71. Further, due to the operational integration of the businesses of the CCAA Parties, as described above, there is a significant volume of financial transactions between and among the Applicants, including, among others, charges by an Applicant providing shared services to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of those services, and charges by a

Applicant that manufactures and furnishes products to another Applicant of inter-company accounts due from the receiving entity.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 225; Application Record, Tab 2.

72. Accordingly, the Applicants submit that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the CCAA Parties the authority to make the pre-filing payments described in the proposed Initial Order subject to the terms therein.

(4) The Charges Are Appropriate

73. The Applicants seek approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing (defined below), administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, KERP and Support Agreement. The Lenders and the Administrative Agent under the Credit Agreements, the senior secured facilities that will be primed by the charges, have been provided with notice of the within Application. The proposed Initial Order does not purport to give the Court-ordered charges priority over any other validly perfected security interests.

(A) DIP Lenders' Charge

74. In the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek approval of the DIP Credit Agreement providing a debtor-in-possession term facility in the principal amount of $15 million (the "DIP Financing"), to be secured by a charge over all of the assets and property of the Applicants that are Borrowers and/or Guarantors under the Credit Agreements (the "Charged Property") ranking ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge.

75. Section 11.2 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court the statutory jurisdiction to grant a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing charge:

> 11.2(1) *Interim financing* - On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.
>
> 11.2(2) *Priority* — secured creditors — The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
>
> *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [2012 CarswellOnt 1466] at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 15. CCAA, Section 11.2(1) and (2).

76. Section 11.2 of the CCAA sets out the following factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether to grant a DIP financing charge:

> 11.2(4) Factors to be considered — In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
>
> (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
>
> (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
>
> (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
>
> (e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(*b*), if any.

CCAA, Section 11.2(4).

77. The above list of factors is not exhaustive, and it may be appropriate for the Court to consider additional factors in determining whether to grant a DIP financing charge. For example, in circumstances where funds to be borrowed pursuant to a DIP facility were not expected to be immediately necessary, but applicants' cash flow statements projected the need for additional liquidity, the Court in granting the requested DIP charge considered the fact that the applicants' ability to borrows funds that would be secured by a charge would help retain the confidence of their trade creditors, employees and suppliers.

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 42-43 [*Canwest Publishing*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

78. Courts in recent cross-border cases have exercised their broad power to grant charges to DIP lenders over the assets of foreign applicants. In many of these cases, the debtors have commenced recognition proceedings under Chapter 15.

Re Catalyst Paper Corporation, Initial Order granted on January 31, 2012, Court File No. S-120712 (B.C.S.C.) [*Catalyst Paper*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 17.

Angiotech, *supra*, Initial Order granted on January 28, 2011, Court File No. S-110587; Book of Authorities, Tab 18

Fraser Papers Inc., Re [2009 CarswellOnt 3658 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], Initial Order granted on June 18, 2009, Court File No. CV-09-8241-00CL; Book of Authorities, Tab 19.

79. As noted above, pursuant to Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, a DIP financing charge may not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The requested DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations.

80. The following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in Section 11.2(4) listed above:

a. the Cash Flow Forecast indicates the Applicants will need additional liquidity afforded by the DIP Financing in order to continue operations through the duration of these proposed CCAA Proceedings;

b. the Cinram Business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during these CCAA Proceedings under the direction of the current management with the assistance of the Applicants' advisors and the Monitor;

c. the DIP Financing is expected to provide the Applicants with sufficient liquidity to implement the Proposed Transaction through these CCAA Proceedingsand implement certain operational restructuring initiatives, which will materially enhance the likelihood of a going concern outcome for the Cinram Business;

d. the nature and the value of the Applicants' assets as set out in their consolidated financial statements can support the requested DIP Lenders' Charge;

e. members of the Steering Committee under the First Lien Credit Agreement, who are senior secured creditors of the Applicants, have agreed to provide the DIP Financing;

f. the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Financing if the DIP Lenders' Charge is not approved;

g. the DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations;

h. the senior secured lenders under the Credit Agreements affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings;and

i. the proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility, including the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 199-202, 205-208; Application Record, Tab 2.

(B) Administration Charge

81. The Applicants seek a charge over the Charged Property in the amount of CAD$3.5 million to secure the fees of the Monitor and its counsel, the Applicants' Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Applicants' Investment Banker, the Canadian and U.S. Counsel to the DIP Agent, the DIP Lenders, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements, and the financial advisor to the DIP Lenders and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements (the "Administration Charge"). This charge is to rank in priority to all of the other charges set out in the proposed Initial Order.

82. Prior to the 2009 amendments, administration charges were granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Section 11.52 of the CCAA now expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an administration charge:

11.52(1) *Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs*

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) *Priority*

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

CCAA, Section 11.52(1) and (2).

82. Administration charges were granted pursuant to Section 11.52 in, among other cases, *Timminco Ltd., Re*, *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* and *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, *supra*; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Canwest Publishing, *supra*; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco Ltd., Re, 2012 ONSC 106 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Timminco*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

84. In *Canwest Publishing*, the Court noted Section 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provided a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. These factors were also considered by the Court in *Timminco*. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

f. the position of the Monitor.

Canwest Publishing supra, at para. 54; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra, at paras. 26-29; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

85. The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Administration Charge, given:

a. the proposed restructuring of the Cinram Business is large and complex, spanning several jurisdictions across North America and Europe, and will require the extensive involvement of professional advisors;

b. the professionals that are to be beneficiaries of the Administration Charge have each played a critical role in the CCAA Parties' restructuring efforts to date and will continue to be pivotal to the CCAA Parties' ability to pursue a successful restructuring going forward, including the Investment Banker's involvement in the completion of the Proposed Transaction;

c. there is no unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and

e. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Administration Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 188, 190; Application Record, Tab 2.

(C) Directors' Charge

86. The Applicants seek a Directors' Charge in an amount of CAD$13 over the Charged Property to secure their respective indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed on the Applicants' trustees, directors and officers (the "Directors and Officers"). The Directors' Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lenders' Charge but in priority to the KERP Charge and the Consent Consideration Charge.

87. Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the Court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis:

11.51(1) *Security or charge relating to director's indemnification*

On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

11.51(2) *Priority*

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditors of the company

11.51(3) *Restriction* — indemnification insurance

> The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
>
> 11.51(4) *Negligence, misconduct or fault*
>
> The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.
>
> CCAA, Section 11.51.

88. The Court has granted director and officer charges pursuant to Section 11.51 in a number of cases. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the Court outlined the test for granting such a charge:

> I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.
>
> *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, *supra* at paras 46-48; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
>
> *Canwest Publishing*, *supra* at paras. 56-57; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.
>
> *Timminco*, *supra* at paras. 30-36; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

89. The Applicants submit that the D&O Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the D&O Charge in the amount of CAD$13 million, given:

> a. the Directors and Officers of the Applicants may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with these CCAA proceedings with respect to which the Directors and Officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;
>
> b. renewal of coverage to protect the Directors and Officers is at a significantly increased cost due to the imminent commencement of these CCAA proceedings;
>
> c. the Directors' Charge would cover obligations and liabilities that the Directors and Officers, as applicable, may incur after the commencement of these CCAA Proceedings and is not intended to cover wilful misconduct or gross negligence;
>
> d. the Applicants require the continued support and involvement of their Directors and Officers who have been instrumental in the restructuring efforts of the CCAA Parties to date;
>
> e. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and
>
> f. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Directors' Charge.
>
> Bell Affidavit, paras. 249, 250, 254-257; Application Record, Tab 2.

(D) KERP Charge

90. The Applicants seek a KERP Charge in an amount of CAD$3 million over the Charged Property to secure the KERP Retention Payments, KERP Transaction Payments and Aurora KERP Payments payable to certain key employees of the CCAA Parties crucial for the CCAA Parties' successful restructuring.

91. The CCAA is silent with respect to the granting of KERP charges. Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters within the discretion of the Court. The Court in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);

b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;

c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;

d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;

e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;

f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;

g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and

h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8-24 [*Grant Forest*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re supra, at paras 59; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 49; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 95 C.C.P.B. 48 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 72-75; Book of Authorities, Tab 22.

92. The purpose of a KERP arrangement is to retain key personnel for the duration of the debtor's restructuring process and it is logical for compensation under a KERP arrangement to be deferred until after the restructuring process has been completed, with "staged bonuses" being acceptable. KERP arrangements that do not defer retention payments to completion of the restructuring may also be just and fair in the circumstances.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, *supra* at para. 22-23; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

93. The Applicants submit that the KERP Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the KERP Charge in the amount of CAD$3 million, given:

a. the KERP was developed by Cinram with the principal purpose of providing an incentive to the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers, and the Aurora Employees to remain with the Cinram Group while the company pursued its restructuring efforts;

b. the Eligible Employees and the Eligible Officers are essential for a restructuring of the Cinram Group and the preservation of Cinram's value during the restructuring process;

c. the Aurora Employees are essential for an orderly transition of Cinram Distribution's business operations from the Aurora facility to its Nashville facility;

d. it would be detrimental to the restructuring process if Cinram were required to find replacements for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and/or the Aurora Employees during this critical period;

e. the KERP, including the KERP Retention Payments, the KERP Transaction Payments and the Aurora KERP Payments payable thereunder, not only provides appropriate incentives for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and the Aurora Employees to remain in their current positions, but also ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in Cinram's restructuring process;

f. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

g. the KERP has been reviewed and approved by the board of trustees of Cinram Fund and is supported by the Monitor.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 236-239, 245-247; Application Record, Tab 2.

(E) Consent Consideration Charge

94. The Applicants request the Consent Consideration Charge over the Charged Property to secure the Early Consent Consideration. The Consent Consideration Charge is to be subordinate in priority to the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Charge and the KERP Charge.

95. The Courts have permitted the opportunity to receive consideration for early consent to a restructuring transaction in the context of CCAA proceedings payable upon implementation of such restructuring transaction. In *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, the Court ordered that any noteholder wishing to become a consenting noteholder under the support agreement and entitled to early consent consideration was required to execute a joinder agreement to the support agreement prior to the applicable consent deadline. Similarly, in these proceedings, lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement (or a joinder thereto) and thereby agree to support the Proposed Transaction on or before July 10, 2012, are entitled to Early Consent Consideration earned on consummation of the Proposed Transaction to be paid from the net sale proceeds.

Sino-Forest Corp., Re, *supra*, Initial Order granted on March 30, 2012, Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL at para. 15; Book of Authorities, Tab 23. Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

96. The Applicants submit it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Consent Consideration Charge, given:

a. the Proposed Transaction will enable the Cinram Business to continue as a going concern and return to a market leader in the industry;

b. Consenting Lenders are only entitled to the Early Consent Consideration if the Proposed Transaction is consummated; and

c. the Early Consent Consideration is to be paid from the net sale proceeds upon distribution of same in these proceedings.

Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

Application granted.

TAB 8

2010 ONSC 222
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010
Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate
Peter Griffin for Management Directors
Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately $1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by creditors

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately $1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business — In circumstances, it was appropriate to allow CPI to file and present plan only to secured creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2003), 310 N.R. 200 (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 730, 2003 CarswellOnt 731, 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Philip Services Corp., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 159, 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43
s. 137(2) — considered

APPLICATION by entity of company already protected under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for similar protection.

***Pepall J.*:**

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* [1] ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009. [2] Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

4 I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 non-daily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

Background Facts

(i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately $10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of $68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank pari passu with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

10 On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately $953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

11 The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately $644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of $182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately $462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately $1.719 billion (increased from $1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of $1.612 billion and consolidated non-current liabilities of $107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by $181.7 million or 15% to $1.021 billion as compared to $1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of $66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of $143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

(ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

> (a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed

by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable. [3] As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled $953.4 million exclusive of interest. [4]

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling $68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to $75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US $400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

(iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately $1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

18 An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of $250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

(iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

21 As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

23 The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their *pro rata* shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less $25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of $25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

24 The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

25 In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase 1 process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

27 The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

> The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

28 It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

29 As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have provided up to $250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*[5]. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

Proposed Monitor

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

Proposed Order

31 As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately $1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

(a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed $5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

(b) Limited Partnership

33 The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [6] and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* [7] .

34 In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

(c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

35 The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

> s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, it the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.
>
> s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

37 Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in *Philip Services Corp., Re* [8] : " There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups." [9] Similarly, in *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* [10] , the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors." [11]

38 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

39 In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

(D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of $25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances.

42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [12], I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the requirements contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the $25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

44 Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for

various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

46 Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

(e) Critical Suppliers

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

> 11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.
>
> (2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.
>
> (3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.
>
> (4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

49 Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

50 Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

51 The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the pre-filing provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint

and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

(f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of $3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order. [13] The LP Entities also request a $10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Financial Advisor is providing investment banking services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

53 In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

> On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of
>
> (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
>
> (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
>
> (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.
>
> (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

54 I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

> (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
>
> (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
>
> (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
>
> (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
>
> (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
>
> (f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

55 There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

(g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of $35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank pari passu with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [14] as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities that may be incurred by the directors and officers. The charge will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

(h) Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements

58 The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of $3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [15], I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [16] and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the

restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

61 In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

62 In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested.

(i) Confidential Information

63 The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* [17] to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

64 The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [18]. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

65 In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [19] I applied the *Sierra Club* test and approved a similar request by the Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the *Sierra Club* test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the *Sierra Club* test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the unredacted Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.

2 On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.

3 Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.

4 Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently $382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with $458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.

5 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

6 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.

7 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

8 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

9 Ibid at para. 16.

10 (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6,2003) [2003 CarswellOnt 730 (S.C.C.)].

11 Ibid at para. 34.

12 Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.

13 This exception also applies to the other charges granted.

14 Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.

15 Supra note 7.

16 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

17 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.

18 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

19 Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

TAB 9

2009 CarswellOnt 6184
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants
Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Edmond Lamek for Asper Family
Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada
Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia
Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Debtor companies experienced financial problems due to deteriorating economic environment in Canada — Debtor companies took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets — Economic conditions did not improve nor did financial circumstances of debtor companies — They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees — Application was brought for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Proposed monitor was appointed — Companies qualified as debtor companies under Act — Debtor companies were in default of their obligations — Required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under s. 11(2) were filed — Stay of proceedings was granted to create stability and allow debtor companies to pursue their restructuring — Partnerships in application carried on operations that were integral and closely interrelated to business of debtor companies — It was just and convenient to grant relief requested with respect to partnerships — Debtor-in-possession financing was approved — Administration charge was granted — Debtor companies' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers was granted — Directors' and officers' charge was granted — Key employee retention plans were approved — Extension of time for calling of annual general meeting was granted.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

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Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

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Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 71, 2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

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Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
Chapter 15 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
Generally — referred to

s. 106(6) — referred to

s. 133(1) — referred to

s. 133(1)(b) — referred to

s. 133(3) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(2) — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 23 — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43
s. 137(2) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194
R. 38.09 — referred to

APPLICATION for relief pursuant to *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.*

***Pepall J.*:**

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.* [1] The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Backround Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*[2]. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

10 In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to $75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of $4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of $5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling $2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately $954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by $272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by $253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of $1.578 billion compared to $22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by $8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was $21 million compared to $39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

14 On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of $75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to $23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of $100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately $634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of $10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of $187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of $430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities

making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than $2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

21 The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of $13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of $32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

Proposed Order

23 I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

24 This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshhold Issues

25 Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding $5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment

either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* [3] definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc., Re* [4] . Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* [5] ; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re* [6] ; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* [7] . In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re* [8] and *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re* [9]

(C) DIP Financing

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

> (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

32 In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to $100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately $10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

34 Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is $10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

35 Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage

the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

> (1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of
>
> > (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
> >
> > (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
> >
> > (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.
>
> (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

39 As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to $15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods

and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

> (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.
>
> (2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.
>
> (3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.
>
> (4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

44 The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of $20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first $85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

46 I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of $20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for $30 million in coverage and $10 million in excess coverage for a total of $40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re*[10] Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of $5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the

Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [11] have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [12] provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from $1000 to $5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended

2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.

4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).

5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).

8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).

10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).

11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.

12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

TAB 10

2014 ONSC 494
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Jaguar Mining Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 18630, 2014 ONSC 494, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 290, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 820

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Jaguar Mining Inc., Applicant

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: December 23, 2013
Judgment: December 23, 2013
Written reasons: January 16, 2014
Docket: CV-13-10383-00CL

Counsel: Tony Reyes, Evan Cobb for Applicant, Jaguar Mining Inc.
Robert J. Chadwick, Caroline Descours for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Joseph Bellissimo for Secured Lender, Global Resource Fund
Jeremy Dacks for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Robin B. Schwill for Special Committee of the Board of Directors

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous

Effect of stay on subsidiaries — Debtor company was holding company for gold mining business Debtor brought application for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for itself and subsidiaries Application granted — Debtor wished to affect recapitalization — Recapitalization was supported by 93 per cent of noteholders, which formed bulk of debt — Debtor was insolvent and facing liquidity crisis — Extending stay to subsidiaries was reasonable as debtor was dependant on them for income — Director's charge granted .

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 150 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 10(2) — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 22(2) — considered

APPLICATION by debtor for prection under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Morawetz J.* (orally):**

1 On December 23, 2013, I heard the CCAA application of Jaguar Mining Inc. ("Jaguar") and made the following three endorsements:

> 1. CCAA protection granted. Initial Order signed. Reasons will follow. It is expected that parties will utilize the e-Service Protocol which can be confirmed on comeback motion. Sealing Order of confidential exhibits granted.
>
> 2. Meeting Order granted in form submitted.
>
> 3. Claims Procedure Order granted in form submitted.

2 These are my reasons.

3 Jaguar sought protection from its creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and requested authorization to commence a process for the approval and implementation of a plan of compromise and arrangement affecting its unsecured creditors.

4 Jaguar also requested certain protections in favour of its wholly-owned subsidiaries that are not applicants (the "Subsidiaries" and, together with the Applicant, the "Jaguar Group").

5 Counsel to Jaguar submits that the principal objective of these proceedings is to effect a recapitalization and financing transaction (the "Recapitalization") on an expedited basis through a plan of compromise and arrangement (the "Plan") to provide a financial foundation for the Jaguar Group going forward and additional liquidity to allow the Jaguar Group to continue to work towards its operational and financial goals. The Recapitalization, if implemented, is expected to result in a reduction of over $268 million of debt and new liquidity upon exit of approximately $50 million.

6 Jaguar's senior unsecured convertible notes (the "Notes") are the primary liabilities affected by the Recapitalization. Any other affected liabilities of Jaguar, which is a holding company with no active business operations, are limited and identifiable.

7 The Recapitalization is supported by an Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders of the Notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders") and other Consenting Noteholders, who collectively represent approximately 93% of the Notes.

8 The background facts are set out in the affidavit of David M. Petrov sworn December 23, 2013 (the "Petrov Affidavit"), the important points of which are summarized below.

9 Jaguar is a corporation existing under the *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990 c. B.16, with a registered office in Toronto, Ontario. Jaguar has assets in Canada.

10 Jaguar is the public parent corporation of other corporations in the Jaguar Group that carry on active gold mining and exploration in Brazil, employing in excess of 1,000 people. Jaguar itself does not carry on active gold mining operations.

11 Jaguar has three wholly-owned Brazilian operating subsidiaries: MCT Mineração Ltda. ("MCT"), Mineração Serras do Oeste Ltda. ("MSOL") and Mineração Turmalina Ltda. ("MTL") (and, together with MCT and MSOL, the "Subsidiaries"), all incorporated in Brazil.

12 The Subsidiaries' assets include properties in the development stage and in the production stage.

13 Jaguar has been the main corporate vehicle through which financing has been raised for the operations of the Jaguar Group. The Subsidiaries have guaranteed repayment of certain funds borrowed by Jaguar.

14 Jaguar has raised debt financing by (a) issuing notes, and (b) borrowing from Renvest Mercantile Bank Corp. Inc., through its global resource fund ("Renvest").

15 In aggregate, Jaguar has issued a principal amount of $268.5 million of Notes through two transactions, known as the "2014 Notes" and the "2016 Notes".

16 Interest is paid semi-annually on the 2014 Notes and the 2016 Notes. Jaguar has not paid the last interest payment due on November 1, 2013. Under the 2014 Notes, the grace period has lapsed and an event of default has occurred.

17 Jaguar is also the borrower under a fully drawn $30 million secured facility (the "Renvest Facility") with Renvest. The obligations under the Renvest Facility are secured by a general security agreement from Jaguar as well as guarantees and collateral security granted by each of the Subsidiaries.

18 Jaguar has identified another potential liability. Mr. Daniel Titcomb, former chief executive officer of Jaguar, and certain other associated parties, have instituted a legal proceeding against Jaguar and certain of its current and former directors that is currently proceeding in the United States Federal Court. Counsel to Jaguar submits that this lawsuit alleges certain employment-related claims and other claims in respect of equity interests in Jaguar that are held by Mr. Titcomb and others. Counsel to Jaguar advises that Jaguar and its board of directors believe this lawsuit to be without merit.

19 Counsel also advises that, aside from the lawsuit and professional service fees incurred by Jaguar, the unsecured liabilities of Jaguar are not material.

20 The Jaguar Group's mines are not low-cost gold producers and the recent decline in the price of gold has negatively impacted the Jaguar Group.

21 Based on current world prices and Jaguar Group's current level of expenditures, the Jaguar Group is expected to cease to have sufficient cash resources to continue operations early in the first quarter of 2014.

22 Counsel also submits that, as a result of Jaguar's event of default under the 2014 Notes, certain remedies have become available, including the possible acceleration of the principal amount and accrued and unpaid interest on the 2014 Notes. As of November 13, 2013, that principal and accrued interest totalled approximately $169.3 million.

23 Jaguar's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the nine months ending September 30, 2013 show that Jaguar had an accumulated deficit of over $317 million and a net loss of over $82 million for the nine months ending September 30, 2013. Jaguar's current liabilities (at book value) exceed Jaguar's current assets (at book value) by approximately $40 million.

24 I accept that Jaguar faces a liquidity crisis and is insolvent.

25 Jaguar has been involved in a strategic review over the past two years. Counsel submits that the efforts of Jaguar and its advisors have shown that a comprehensive restructuring plan involving a debt-to-equity exchange and an investment of new money is the best available alternative to address Jaguar's financial issues.

26 Counsel to Jaguar advises that the board of directors of Jaguar has determined that the Recapitalization is the best available option to Jaguar and, further, that the plan cannot be implemented outside of a CCAA proceeding. Counsel emphasizes that without the protection of the CCAA, Jaguar is exposed to the immediate risk that enforcement steps may be taken under a variety of debt instruments. Further, Jaguar is not in a position to satisfy obligations that may result from such enforcement steps.

27 Jaguar requests a stay of proceedings in favour of non-applicant Subsidiaries contending that, because of Jaguar's dependence upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity, the commencement of any proceedings or the exercise of rights or remedies against these Subsidiaries would be detrimental to Jaguar's restructuring efforts and would undermine a process that would otherwise benefit Jaguar Group's stakeholders as a whole.

28 Jaguar also seeks a charge on its current and future assets (the "Property") in the maximum amount of $5 million (a $500,000 first-ranking charge (the "Primary Administration Charge") and a $4.5 million fourth-ranking charge (the "Subordinated Administration Charge") (together, the "Administration Charge")). The purpose of the charge is to secure the fees and disbursements incurred in connection with services rendered both before and after the commencement of the CCAA proceedings by various professionals, as well as Canaccord Genuity and Houlihan Lokey, as financial advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee (collectively, the "Financial Advisors").

29 Counsel advises that the Financial Advisors' monthly work fees (but not their success fees) will be secured by the Primary Administration Charge, while the Financial Advisors' success fees will be secured solely by the Subordinated Administration Charge.

30 Counsel further advises that the Proposed Initial Order contemplates the establishment of a charge on Jaguar's Property in the amount of $150,000 (the "Director's Charge") to protect the directors and officers. Counsel further advises that the benefit of the Director's Charge will only be available to the extent that a liability is not covered by existing directors and officers insurance. The directors and officers have indicated that, due to the potential for personal liability, they may not continue their service in this restructuring unless the Initial Order grants the Director's Charge.

31 Counsel to Jaguar further advises that the proposed monitor is of the view that the Director's Charge and the Administration Charge are reasonable in these circumstances.

32 Jaguar is unaware of any secured creditors, other than those who have received notice of the application, who are likely to be affected by the court-ordered charges.

33 In addition to the Initial Order, Jaguar also seeks a Claims Procedure Order and a Meeting Order, submitting that it must complete the Recapitalization on an expedited timeline.

34 Each of the Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order include a comeback provision.

35 Having reviewed the record and upon hearing submissions, I am satisfied the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies. It is insolvent and faces a looming liquidity crisis. The Applicant is subject to claims in excess of $5 million and has assets in Canada. I am also satisfied that the application is properly before me as the Applicant's registered office and certain of its assets are situated in Toronto, Ontario.

36 I am also satisfied that the Applicant has complied with the obligations of s. 10(2) of the CCAA.

37 I am also satisfied that an extension of the stay of proceedings to the Subsidiaries of Jaguar is appropriate in the circumstances. Further, I am also satisfied that it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the Administration Charge and the Director's Charge over the Property of the Applicant. In these circumstances, I am also prepared to approve the Engagement Letters and to seal the terms of the Engagement Letters. In deciding on the sealing provision, I have taken into account that the Engagement Letters contain sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the parties at issue. However, as I indicated at the hearing, this issue should be revisited at the comeback hearing.

38 I am also satisfied that Jaguar should be authorized to comply with the pre-filing obligations to the extent provided in the Initial Order.

39 In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, I reviewed the argument submitted by counsel to Jaguar that the stay of proceedings against non-applicants is appropriate. The Jaguar Group operates in a fully integrated manner and depends upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity. Absent a stay of proceedings not only in favour of Jaguar but also in favour of the Subsidiaries, various creditors would be in a position to take enforcement steps which could conceivably lead to a failed restructuring, which would not be in the best interests of Jaguar's stakeholders.

40 The court has jurisdiction to extend the stay in favour of Jaguar's Subsidiaries. See *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*, 2006 ABQB 153, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.); *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 1500, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 150 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

41 The authority to grant the court-ordered Administration Charge and Director's Charge is contained in ss. 11.51 and 11.52 of the CCAA.

42 In granting the Administration Charge, I am satisfied that:

(i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;

(ii) the amount is appropriate; and

(iii) the charges should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

43 In considering both the amount of the Administration Charge and who should be entitled to its benefit, the following factors can also be considered:

(a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured; and

(b) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles.

See *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

44 In this case, the proposed restructuring involves the proposed beneficiaries of the charge. I accept that many have played a significant role in the negotiation of the Recapitalization to date and will continue to play a role in the implementation of the Recapitalization. I am satisfied that there is no unwarranted duplication of roles among those who benefit from the proposed Administration Charge.

45 With respect to the Director's Charge, the court must be satisfied that:

> (i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
>
> (ii) the amount is appropriate;
>
> (iii) the applicant could not obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost; and
>
> (iv) the charge does not apply in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

46 A review of the evidence satisfies me that it is appropriate to grant the Director's Charge as requested.

47 Jaguar requested that the Initial Order authorize it to perform certain pre-filing obligations in respect of professional service providers and third parties who provide services in respect of Jaguar's public listing agreement. In the circumstances, I find it to be reasonable that Jaguar be authorized to perform these pre-filing obligations.

48 In view of Jaguar's desire to move quickly to implement the Recapitalization, I have also been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Claims Procedure Order and the Meeting Order at this time. These are procedural steps in the CCAA process and do not require any assessment by the court as to the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan at this stage.

49 Counsel to Jaguar submits that Jaguar's approach to classification of the affected unsecured creditors is appropriate in these circumstances, citing a commonality of interest. Counsel also references s. 22(2) of the CCAA. For the purposes of today's motion, I am prepared to accept this argument. However, this is an issue that can, if raised, be reviewed at the comeback hearing.

50 In the result, an Initial Order is granted together with a Meeting Order and Claims Procedure Order. All orders have been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 11

2017 ONSC 4944
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Index Energy Mills Road Corporation (Re)

2017 CarswellOnt 13040, 2017 ONSC 4944, 283 A.C.W.S. (3d) 694, 51 C.B.R. (6th) 216

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT INDEX ENERGY MILLS ROAD CORPORATION

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: August 16, 2017
Judgment: August 23, 2017
Docket: CV-17-580840-00CL

Counsel: Shane Kukulowicz, for Index Energy Mills Road Corporation
Brian Empey, Melaney Wagner, for Grant Thornton Ltd., Proposed Monitor
Grant Moffat, for National Bank of Canada, as Agent for Syndicate of Lenders
David Bish, for DIP Lender (Index Equity US LLC), Index Equity Sweden AB and Index Residence AB

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.vi Maintenance of status quo

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Maintenance of status quo

Debtor was incorporated to own and operate electrical co-generation facility and encountered difficulties retrofitting its facility, which resulted in energy output being lower and costlier than expected — Debtor was in default on various obligations and in litigation with former contractor — Debtor believed its underlying business was strong, but it required restructuring to inject new funds into its operations — Debtor was in negotiations with proposed DIP lender and creditor to reach agreement on SISP — Debtor brought application for initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), with appointment of monitor, authorization to borrow $5,000,000 pursuant to DIP facility as interest financing, with maximum of $1.6 million advanced prior to comeback hearing, and sealing order — Application granted — Applicant was debtor company with over $5,000,000 in debts and was entitled to relief under CCAA — Debtor was insolvent and met threshold requirements under s. 10 of CCAA — It was necessary and appropriate to grant stay of proceedings to preserve status quo among stakeholders and allow SISP to unfold — It was necessary and appropriate to allow debtor to pay certain amounts, including pre-filing amounts to suppliers — Monitor requested by debtor consented to appointment and was appropriate — DIP lenders charge satisfied relevant criteria and was integral part of credit facility — Coverage for liability was extended to directors and officers since they did not have insurance — To protect integrity and fairness of process, sealing order was made.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Cinram International Inc., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 3767, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 391, 50 C.B.R. (5th) 71 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 10 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.03 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.7 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

APPLICATION by debtor corporation for initial order staying proceedings and permitting it to restructure.

***G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

Overview

1 This application is brought by Index Energy Mills Road Corporation ("Index Energy Ajax" or the "Applicant") for an order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA").

2 In addition to requesting a stay of proceedings and authorization to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its property, the Applicant also requests that Grant Thornton Ltd. ("GTL") be appointed as monitor (the "Monitor"); authorization for the Applicant to borrow $5 million pursuant to a credit facility (the "DIP Facility") as interim financing from Index Equity US LLC ("Index US"), in such capacity, (the "DIP Lender") with a maximum amount of $1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA comeback hearing (the "Comeback Hearing"); and a sealing order with respect to certain confidential information described in the pre-filing report of the Monitor (the "Pre-Filing Report").

3 Index Energy Ajax owns and operates an electrical co-generation facility located in Ajax, Ontario that generates electricity by burning wood waste from the construction industry to produce steam to drive turbine generators (the "Biomass Facility").

4 Index Energy Ajax has encountered difficulties in retrofitting the Biomass Facility and energy output has been lower and operational costs higher than anticipated. Index Energy Ajax has also been engaged in litigation with its former engineering, procurement and construction contractor, HMI Construction Inc. ("HMI"), and has also been forced to deal with numerous liens arising from the construction associated with the Biomass Facility, including a lien claim of

approximately $31.3 million registered by HMI (the "HMI Lien Claim"). The sum of $7,053,890 plus HST has been paid into court as an agreed upon holdback (the "Holdback Funds").

5 Index Energy Ajax is in default on various obligations to a syndicate of lenders comprised of National Bank of Canada, Canadian Western Bank, Laurentian Bank of Canada and Business Development Bank of Canada (collectively, the "Syndicate"). National Bank of Canada is the agent of the Syndicate (in that capacity, the "Agent"). The Syndicate has made demand for payment of amounts in excess of $45 million. Mr. Rickard Haraldsson, a Director of Index Energy Ajax has stated in his affidavit that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent.

6 The Applicant is of the view that its underlying business remains strong, but that it ultimately requires a restructuring to inject new funds into its operations to address the various deficiencies in the Biomass Facility. Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax states that it requires protection under the CCAA to allow it a period of time to develop and implement a sales and investment solicitation process ("SISP") and to access interim financing on a priority basis to preserve value for all stakeholders and ensure its viability as a going concern.

7 The Applicant has advised that it is currently in negotiations with Index US and the Syndicate to reach agreement on terms of a mutually acceptable SISP, which would include a stalking-horse bid, and to allow further advances under the DIP Facility beyond the initial permitted draw amount.

The Facts

8 The facts have been set out in detail in the affidavit of Rickard Haraldsson (the "Haraldsson Affidavit").

9 Index Energy Ajax was incorporated pursuant to the laws of Ontario on November 7, 2006. Its registered office is located at 170 Mills Road, Ajax, Ontario.

10 Index Energy Ajax is owned by three shareholders. Index Energy Sweden is the owner of 70% of the common shares, R. Andrews Investment Company, LLC ("R. Andrews") is the owner of 10% of the common shares and Jacqueline Kerr ("J. Kerr") is the owner of 20% of the common shares.

11 Index Energy Ajax was incorporated to retrofit the existing energy plant located in Ajax (the "Property") to become the Biomass Facility.

12 Index Energy Ajax entered into a feed-in-tariff with the Ontario Power Authority in 2010 (the "FIT Contract"). In order to retrofit the Biomass Facility, Index Energy Ajax entered into a construction contract with HMI in 2012 (the "EPC Contract"). Since 2015, there has been substantial litigation between Index Energy Ajax and HMI with regard to the HMI Lien Claim.

13 In March 2017 Index Energy Ajax paid an agreed holdback amount of $7,053,890 plus HST (the "Holdback Funds") into court and all subcontractor lien claims were vacated from title to the Property

Index Energy Ajax's Creditors

14 In 2013, Index Energy Ajax entered into a credit agreement (the "Syndicate Credit Agreement") with the Syndicate. Pursuant to the Syndicate Credit Agreement, the Syndicate agreed to provide a non-revolving construction facility in the maximum sum of $60 million and a non-revolving term facility once the retrofit was satisfactorily completed (collectively, the "Syndicate Facilities").

15 Index Energy Ajax has been in default of the Syndicate Agreement since at least May 2015.

16 On January 18, 2017, the Agent sent Index Energy Ajax a demand letter (the "Demand Letter") demanding full payment of all amounts owing to the Syndicate under the Syndicate Facilities, which at that date totaled $49,427,871.94, with interest.

17 Other creditors include Index Residence for an amount in excess of $102 million and trade creditors for an amount in excess of $4 million.

18 The proposed monitor has filed a pre-filing report which details the efforts Index Energy Ajax has taken, with the assistance of the Monitor, to solicit an appropriate DIP financier. After consulting with Index Sweden and Index Residence, one party was selected as a potential DIP lender, however, after protracted negotiations, the parties were not able to come to terms. As an alternative, Index US has agreed to act as DIP Lender with the consent of the Syndicate, on terms more favourable to Index Energy Ajax than those offered by this potential lender. Details are provided in the Pre-Filing Report at paragraphs 46-53 and in the Haraldsson Affidavit at paragraph 94.

19 The DIP Lender has agreed to provide Index Energy Ajax with a DIP Facility in order for Index Energy Ajax to meet its immediate funding requirements.

20 The DIP Facility, extended by the DIP Lender is the maximum amount of $5 million (the "Principal Amount") with a maximum amount of $1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA Comeback Hearing pursuant to the DIP Credit Agreement.

21 The DIP Facility requires that the DIP Lender receive a court ordered priority charge over the assets of Index Energy Ajax (the "DIP Lender's Charge") which Charge will attach to all of the Index Energy Ajax Property other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of Index Energy Ajax other than Caterpillar Financial Services Limited, who has a specific security interest over a construction loader (the "Loader").

The Law

22 The CCAA applies to a "debtor company" with total claims against it for more than $5 million. I am satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is such a "debtor company" and is entitled to relief under the CCAA.

23 I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent. Index Energy Ajax's liabilities exceed the current value of its assets and Index Energy Ajax has insufficient funds to pay its debts and has ceased to meet its obligations as they become due.

24 I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax has met the other threshold requirements include the filing of cash-flow statements required by Section 10 of the CCAA. Further, since the chief place of business of Index Energy Ajax is Ajax, Ontario, this court has jurisdiction to hear this application.

25 I am also satisfied that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant a stay of proceedings to Index Energy Ajax. The stay is crucial as it preserves the status quo among the stakeholders while Index Energy Ajax stabilizes operations and considers its alternatives. Index Energy Ajax has indicated that it wishes to embark on a SISP and a stay is necessary to allow the time for the SISP to unfold.

26 Index Energy Ajax also seeks authorization to pay pre-filing expenses up to the amount of $450,000 if it is determined, in consultation with the Monitor, to be necessary for the continued operation of the business or preservation of the Property.

27 Index Energy Ajax takes the position that the continued availability of supplies is necessary to ensure a successful SISP and ultimate emergence of a restructured business in some form. Mr. Haraldsson states that a number of the suppliers to Index Energy Ajax are vital to its ongoing operations and it may be necessary for them to be paid all or a portion of the obligations arising prior to the date of the Initial Oder to ensure their survival and their continued ability to provide supplies to Index Energy Ajax.

28 Mr. Haraldsson states that the operation of the Biomass Facility, and the maximizing of value for the stakeholders would be materially prejudiced if the required suppliers ceased to carry on business and ceased to supply.

29 Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax seeks authority to pay such amounts as they are required, including amounts owing prior to the date of the Initial Order, to ensure continued supply and successful restructuring.

30 There is authority to authorize an applicant to pay certain amounts, including pre-filing amounts to suppliers where the applicant is not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers (see: *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 68 of Schedule "C", ("Cinram") and *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2009 CanLII 2493 (at para. 21 ("Smufit-Stone")).

31 In granting this authority, the courts have considered a number of factors, including:

(a) whether the goods and services are integral to the business of the applicants;

(b) the applicants dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

(c) the fact that no payments would be made with the consent of the monitor;

(d) the monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicant to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;

(e) whether the applicant has sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet its needs; and

(f) the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if it were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

32 In these circumstances, I have been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to provide the requested authorization to Index Energy Ajax.

33 Pursuant to section 11.7 of the CCAA, the court is required to appoint a monitor. GTL has consented to its appointment as Monitor in this case and I am satisfied that it is appropriate to appoint GTL as Monitor.

34 The proposed Initial Order provides for the following charges, in the following priority:

(a) First - the Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $1 million);

(b) Second — the DIP Lender's Charge; and

(c) Third — the Director's Charge (to the maximum amount of $250,000).

35 The Applicant proposes that the Administration Charge rank in priority to the DIP Lender's Charge. The Applicant proposes that the Charge attach to all of its Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to the extent they are valid claims to rank in priority to all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof.

36 With respect to the DIP Facility, Index Energy Ajax is seeking approval of a $5 million DIP Facility. The DIP Facility would be secured by a DIP Lender's Charge, which would attach to all of the Applicant's Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof and subject only to the Administration Charge.

37 As previously noted, the granting of the DIP Lender's Charge is condition precedent under the DIP Credit Agreement and I am satisfied that it is an integral part of the negotiating consideration of the DIP Facility.

38 The court has jurisdiction to grant a priority DIP financing charge pursuant to section 11.2 of the CCAA.

39 Subsection 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to grant a priority DIP financing charge. The factors are not exhaustive and in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("Canwest"), Pepall J. (as she then was) stressed the importance of meeting the following three criteria:

(a) whether notice has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security of the charge;

(b) whether the amount to be granted under the DIP financing is appropriate and required having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement; and

(c) whether the DIP charge secures an obligation that existed before the order was made (which it should not).

40 In this case, I have concluded that the proposed DIP Lender's Charge satisfies the relevant criteria and should be granted. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the following:

(i) The secured creditors who would be primed by the proposed DIP Lender's Charge, namely the Syndicate, Index Residence and HMI were given notice of the proposed DIP Lender's Charge. Caterpillar, the secured creditor who will not be primed, was not given notice;

(ii) The maximum amount of the DIP Facility is appropriate based on the anticipated cash requirements, as reflected in the cash-flow projections prepared with the assistance of GTL. The amount advanced under the DIP Facility is limited to $1.6 million until the Comeback Hearing, when more comprehensive service will have occurred;

(iii) Management of Index Energy Ajax's business and affairs will have the benefit of additional oversight and consultation provided by the Monitor;

(iv) It is conceivable that the DIP Facility will enhance the value expected to be available for all stakeholders.

41 The Proposed Initial Order, contemplates the indemnification of the Applicant's directors and officers, the creation of a Directors' Charge and a related stay of proceedings in respect of claims against the directors and officers. The statutory authority for the granting of this relief is found in sections 11.03 and 11.51 of the CCAA.

42 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend coverage to the directors and officers and that it is necessary to grant the requested Charge as Index Energy Ajax does not have any directors' and officers' insurance. This relief is accordingly granted.

43 The Pre-Filing Report contains certain appendices which the Applicant regards as sensitive commercial information relating to the process undertaken to obtain DIP financing and the optimization plan of the Applicant. The Applicant is of the view that if publically available, this information could have a material detrimental effect on the Applicant's restructuring. Having considered the guidance provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate, in order to protect the integrity and fairness of the process, to grant an order sealing the confidential appendices.

Summary

44 In the result, the Initial Order is granted in the form requested by Index Energy Ajax. The Comeback Hearing has been scheduled before me on Monday, September 11, 2017 at 8:30 a.m.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 12

2012 ONSC 6403
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Futura Loyalty Group Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 14263, 2012 ONSC 6403, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 14, 99 C.B.R. (5th) 128

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. Applicant

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: November 13, 2012
Judgment: November 13, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9882-00CL

Counsel: S. Reid for Applicant
G. Azeff, A. Iqbal for Monitor, Harris & Partners Limited
J. Desjardins for DirectCash Payments Inc.
D. Pearlman for Aimia Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.a Procedure
XIX.2.a.iii Notice
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous
Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied for order permitting it to honour merchant prepayments made prior to initial order — Application granted — Order was consistent with and fostered objectives of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Ongoing resale of Miles was essential to debtor's viability as going concern — Honouring prepayments would assist debtor's reorganization efforts to maintain merchants as customers — Order was not opposed by monitor or secured creditors.
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Notice
Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied to vary order by deferring notice to prepaying merchants — Application dismissed — Transparency was foundation upon which Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act rested — Initial order had already been posted on monitor's website and notice was published in newspaper — There was no principled basis upon which to exclude one group of creditors — Risk that some merchants would cancel their participation in reward programme was inherent in proceedings under Act — It was up to debtor to persuade its customers that it was in their long-term interests not to abandon it.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *D.M. Brown J.*:

EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re (2009), 1 Alta. L.R. (5th) 311, 2009 ABQB 78, 2009 CarswellAlta 142 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Futura Loyalty Group Inc., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 12842, 2012 ONSC 5896 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 23 — considered

s. 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) — considered

APPLICATION by debtor to vary initial order under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and for additional relief.

***D.M. Brown J.*:**

I. Overview of orders sought under the CCAA

1 By Initial Order made October 16, 2012 [2012 CarswellOnt 12842 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], the applicant, The Futura Loyalty Group Inc., obtained the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. By order made October 26, 2012, another judge of this Court approved a proposed Sale and Investor Solicitation Process and granted other relief. Futura now moves for orders (i) extending the Stay Period until January 18, 2013, (ii) increasing the DIP Facility from $175,000 to $300,000, (iii) permitting it to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers, and (iv) varying the Initial Order to defer giving notice under section 23 of the *CCAA* to Prepaying Merchant Customers.

II. Extending the Stay Period and increasing the DIP Facility

2 Futura seeks an extension of the Stay Period in order to enable it to work on the SISP which, it hopes, will result in either a going-concern sale or new investment implemented through a plan of compromise or arrangement. The Monitor supports the request and, in its Second Report dated November 9, 2012, expressed the view that Futura has acted and continues to act in good faith and with due diligence. DirectCash Payments Inc., which holds first ranking secured debt of about $300,000, also supported the extension, as did Aimia Canada. I am satisfied that the evidence disclosed that Futura has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence and the requested extension is necessary to implement the SISP. The updated cash flow forecast filed by Futura shows that with the increase in the DIP Facility, the applicant has sufficient cash to carry on its operations until January 18, 2013. Pursuant to *CCAA* s. 11.02(2) I grant the extension of the Stay Period until January 18, 2013.

3 As to the proposed increased in the DIP Facility, Futura has demonstrated the need for such an increase in order to maintain its operations until the end of the Stay Period. The parties present, including the secured creditor, supported

the proposed increase. The evidence filed by the applicant and the Monitor satisfies the requirements of *CCAA* s. 11.2, and I approve the requested increase in the DIP Facility.

III. Prepaying Merchant Customers: request to honour prepayments made prior to the Initial Order

4 As described by David Campbell, Futura's CEO, in his affidavit sworn November 9, 2012, Futura provides "loyalty solutions" for its customers. Its major customer reward program involves selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants under an Aeroplan Coalition Program. Over 75% of the applicant's revenues are generated by the resale of Aeroplan Miles pursuant to the Aeroplan Coalition Program.

5 Under that Program, Merchant Customers of Futura typically pay the applicant monthly, in arrears, for Aeroplan Miles they have issued to their customers in that month. However, prior to the filing of its application under the *CCAA*, Futura on occasion offered Merchant Customers the opportunity of buying Aeroplan Miles at volume discounts. The Merchant Customers would purchase those discounted Aeroplan Miles by pre-paying Futura.

6 Mr. Campbell deposed that as of the date of the Initial Order ten (10) Prepaying Merchant Customers had prepaid to Futura approximately $108,000 for 2.5 million Aeroplan Miles. Futura has calculated that it pays out approximately $20,000 a month to Aeroplan on account of those pre-paid Miles.

7 Futura seeks an order of this Court permitting it to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by those Prepaying Merchant Customers. Mr. Campbell deposed:

> Although payment to Aeroplan on behalf of Prepaying Merchant Customers for prepayments made prior to the date of the Initial Order could be considered to be payment for the benefit of the Prepaying Merchant Customers as unsecured creditors of the Applicant, such payments are necessary in order to maintain the *status quo* and to ensure the continuous ongoing operations of the Applicant's business and the preservation of the Applicant's brand in the marketplace. This would enhance the likelihood of a going-concern sale by the Applicant that would maximize value for the benefit of all creditors.

Mr. Campbell also pointed out that Futura had made a similar request in its October 26 motion to allow the continuous payment of Futura Reward Payments; the court approved that request in its October 26 Order.

8 In its Second Report the Monitor supported Futura's request for an authorization order:

> Futura and the Monitor share the view that such payments are necessary in order to maintain the *status quo*, ensure the continuous ongoing operations of Futura's business and preserve its brand in the marketplace.

9 DirectCash and Aimia Canada supported the relief sought by Futura.

10 Section 11 of the *CCAA* authorizes a court to "make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances", "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act". As Morawetz J. observed in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, the "*CCAA* is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives..."[1] Although counsel could not point me to a case in which a court had permitted an applicant to satisfy a pre-filing credit or claim enjoyed by a customer outside of the *CCAA* claims process, some precedent exists for permitting the payment of pre-filing obligations in the case of non-critical suppliers.

11 In both *Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 3657 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])][2] and *EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re*[3] the courts considered requests to approve payments to creditors in respect of pre-filing obligations. In the *Eddie Bauer* case Morawetz J. granted the approval writing:

> [22] The proposed order also provides that the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay amounts owing for goods and services actually supplied to the Applicants prior to the date of the Order. The RSM Report comments

> on this point. *The Eddie Bauer Group is of the view that operations could be disrupted and its vendor relationships adversely impacted if it does not have the ability to pay pre-filing obligations to certain vendors and it further believes that the value of its business will be maximized if it can pay its pre-filing creditors. RSM has reviewed this issue and is supportive of this provision as the Eddie Bauer Group believes it is a necessary provision* and the DIP Lenders are supportive of the Restructuring Proceedings. The relief requested in these proceedings is consistent with the relief sought in the Chapter 11 Proceedings. This provision is unusual but, in the circumstances of this case, appears to be reasonable.
>
> (emphasis added)

12 In *EarthFirst Canada* Romaine J. approved the creation of a "hardship fund" to pay prefiling obligations owed to certain suppliers and contractors of the applicant. The evidence in that case revealed that some suppliers and contractors in a remote community had become quite dependent upon the applicant's wind farm project and, if they were not paid, they would "face immediate financial difficulty". Romaine J. wrote:

> [7] While the nature of payments from the hardship fund is different from the issue that was before Farley, J. in *Re Air Canada*, 2003 CarswellOnt. 5296 (at para. 4), and while EarthFirst is not suggesting that recipients of the fund are "critical suppliers" in the usual sense of the term, it appears to be the case that, as in *Air Canada*, the potential future benefit to the company of these relatively modest payments of pre-filing debt is considerable and of value to the estate as a whole. The decision to allow the hardship fund thus outweighs the prejudice to other creditors, justifying a departure from the usual rule.

13 In those two cases the courts were prepared to countenance the payment of pre-filing obligations to suppliers in order to prevent disruption to the operations of the applicant and to maximize the value of the business for purposes of the re-organization or realization process. In the *EarthFirst Canada* case the court engaged in a form of proportionality or cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of the pre-payments against the benefit to the estate as a whole.

14 The present case does not involve a request to make payments to suppliers for pre-filing obligations, but concerns a somewhat analogous request to make payments which would satisfy pre-filing credits enjoyed by some important customers. The kind of cost-benefit reasoning undertaken in the *Eddie Bauer* and *EarthFirst* cases offers some guidance. My Reasons granting the Initial Order stated that the book value of Futura's assets was approximately $1.35 million. The most recent cash-flow projection filed by the applicant made allowance for "payments to loyalty currency providers", which included the payments in respect of the Prepaying Merchant Customers. When compared against projected inflows from the collection of receivables through to January 18, 2013 of approximately $440,000 (the only source of cash apart from the increased DIP Financing), the honouring of $108,000 in pre-paid Aeroplan Miles for the Prepaying Merchant Customers is not an insignificant amount. However, on the other side of the scale is the evidence from Futura that 75% of its revenue comes from the resale of Aeroplan Miles and under its SISP it is seeking to secure a going-concern sale of the company's business.

15 Given the importance of the ongoing resale of Aeroplan Miles to the viability of Futura as a going-concern, the benefit to the company's re-organization efforts of trying to maintain the Prepaying Merchant customers as continuing customers, and the absence of any opposition to the order sought, I conclude that it is appropriate in the circumstances to grant an order "permitting the Applicant to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers" prior to the making of the Initial Order, as requested in paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion. Such authorization, in my view, is consistent with and fosters the objectives of the *CCAA*.

16 Futura submitted a draft order which contained different language of authorization. I informed counsel that the revised language was vague and imprecise, and I would not approve it. Paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion was short, sweet and to the point, so the language of the draft order Futura submits for my consideration must reflect that precision.

IV. Dispensing with notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers

17 The Prepaying Merchant Customers were not given notice of this motion. I have made the order authorizing the honouring of their prepayments in any event because it is to their benefit. Futura requests that I vary the *CCAA* s. 23 notice provision in my Initial Order in order to "defer notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers". Again, the Monitor, DirectCash Payments and Aimia Canada support the applicant's request.

18 Section 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) of the *CCAA* requires a monitor, within five days after the making of an initial order, to send, in the prescribed manner, "a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the company of more than $1,000 advising them that the order is publicly available". In this case the Monitor has not sent such notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers.

19 Why is that so? No explanation was offered by the Monitor in its Second Report. I am disappointed that none was. In oral submissions Monitor's counsel stated that the Monitor only learned from the applicant on October 27, 2012 that the Prepaying Merchant Customers were creditors of the applicant. Mr. Campbell, in his affidavit, did not explain why it took the applicant almost two weeks after the Initial Order to recognize the Prepaying Merchant Customers as creditors and to so inform the Monitor.

20 Why does the applicant not want the Monitor to give *CCAA* s. 23 notices to the creditor Prepaying Merchant Customers? In his affidavit Mr. Campbell deposed:

> Direct notification of the *CCAA* Proceedings to the Prepaying Merchant Customers could cause them to cancel their participation in the Aeroplan Coalition Program, which would have a detrimental effect on the ongoing operation and value of the Applicant's business.
>
> Since the Applicant is seeking an order allowing it to continue to honour prepayments made under the Aeroplan Coalition Program in the ordinary course, and since a going concern sale of this business may be achieved, it is not currently necessary, and could be detrimental to the Applicant's business, to provide such merchants with direct notice of the CCAA Proceedings at this time. If a going concern sale of its Aeroplan Coalition Program cannot be achieved, such that the Prepaying Merchant Customers may be affected by this proceeding, the Applicant will give notice to such merchants at the relevant time.

In its Second Report the Monitor echoed the position of Futura.

21 I recognize that the October 26 Order contained a variation of the paragraph 43 Initial Order notice provision to exempt, from the Monitor's statutory duty to give notice of this proceeding, "claimants under the Futura Rewards Program". No reasons accompanied that order, so I am unable to understand the basis for the granting of that variation.

22 I am not prepared to vary the Initial Order to excuse the Monitor from providing the requisite creditor notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers under section 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) of the *CCAA*. Transparency is the foundation upon which *CCAA* proceedings rest - a debtor company encounters financial difficulties; it seeks the protection of the *CCAA* to give it breathing space to fashion a compromise or arrangement for its creditors to consider; in order to secure that breathing space, the *CCAA* requires the debtor to provide its creditors, in a court proceeding, with the information they require in order to make informed decisions about the compromises or arrangements *of their rights* which the debtor may propose. As a general proposition, open windows, not closed doors, characterize *CCAA* proceedings.

23 In the present case the Monitor published, as ordered, a notice in the Globe and Mail shortly after the Initial Order was made and, as ordered, established a website to which the Initial Order was posted. Given that the Monitor has given general public notice of these proceedings as ordered by this Court, I cannot see any principled basis upon which to excuse the Monitor from giving specific notice to one group of creditors — the Prepaying Merchant Customers.

24 Mr. Campbell deposed that giving notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers "could cause them to cancel their participation in the Aeroplan Coalition Program". Initiating *CCAA* proceedings always carries some risk that the applicant's suppliers or customers may re-think doing business with the debtor. One of the tasks of a debtor's management is to persuade suppliers or customers that in the long-run it would be better to hang in with the debtor than to abandon it. Such persuasion must be done in every *CCAA* proceeding; this one is no different.

25 For those reasons I decline to grant the applicant's request to vary the notice provisions of the Initial Order.

V. Summary

26 By way of summary, I grant the applicant an extension of the Stay Period until January 18, 2013, an increase in the DIP Facility to $300,000, and permission to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers. I also approve the First and Second Reports of the Monitor and the actions and activities of the Monitor described therein.

Application granted in part.

Footnotes

1 (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 47.

2 2009 CanLII 32699

3 2009 ABQB 78 (Alta. Q.B.)

TAB 13

2013 ONSC 1500
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 641

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Skylink Aviation Inc. Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: March 8, 2013
Judgment: March 12, 2013
Docket: CV-13-1003300CL

Counsel: Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for Applicant
S.R. Orzy, Sean H. Zweig for Noteholders
M.P. Gottlieb for Proposed Monitor, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc.
C. Prophet for Royal Bank of Canada
R.S. Kukulowicz for Directors and Officers

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtors were related companies providing global aviation transportation and logistics services — Any disruption to debtors' ability to provide either core services or ancillary life-supporting functions could put safety and security of deployed personnel at risk — Debtors experienced financial challenge — Consensual going-concern recapitalization transaction was developed for implementation pursuant to plan of compromise and arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Debtors brought application for protection under Act — Application granted — It was appropriate to authorize certain pre-filing payments to be made — Granting of various charges including debtor-in-possession lenders' charge was appropriate — It was appropriate to appoint monitor as foreign representative of debtors — Postponement of annual shareholders' meeting was reasonable — Sealing order was granted for certain financial information — Claims procedure order and meetings order were granted in order to effectuate recapitalization on expeditious basis since proposed restructuring appeared to have achieved significant support.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1,

2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by debtors for protection.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 SkyLink Aviation Inc. ("SkyLink Aviation", the "Company" or the "Applicant"), together with the SkyLink Subsidiaries (collectively, "SkyLink"), is a provider of global aviation transportation and logistics services (the "SkyLink Business"). SkyLink specializes in providing non-combatant aviation services and supporting activities in conflict-associated regions around the world. The customers who rely on SkyLink's services include governmental agencies, intergovernmental agencies, commercial organizations and humanitarian relief organizations.

2 SkyLink is responsible for providing non-combat life-supporting functions to both its own personnel and those of its suppliers and clients in high-risk areas. Any disruption to SkyLink's ability to provide either its core services or its ancillary life-supporting functions to deployed personnel, could put the safety and security of those personnel at risk, including by potentially leaving them without life-supporting services in conflict zones.

3 As set out in the affidavit of Jan Ottens and, as summarized in the comprehensive factum filed by the Applicant, it is apparent that SkyLink Aviation has experienced financial challenges that have necessitated a recapitalization of the company. SkyLink has chosen to do this under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

4 At this time, SkyLink Aviation's secured debts significantly exceed the value of the SkyLink Business. SkyLink is in default of its first lien secured credit facility (the "Credit Facility") in favour of the first lien lenders (the "First Lien Lenders") and the Indenture in respect of its senior secured second lien notes (the "Secured Notes"). The indenture trustee in respect of the Secured Notes (the "Trustee") has accelerated all amounts owing under the Secured Notes and has issued a demand for payment by SkyLink Aviation and SkyLink Aviation USA II.

5 After an extended period of extensive negotiations with representatives of the Company's secured creditors regarding a recapitalization of the Company, a consensual going-concern recapitalization transaction (the "Recapitalization") has been developed for implementation pursuant to a plan of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA (the "Plan").

6 The Applicant takes the position that the Recapitalization is a positive development for the Company and its stakeholders. The Recapitalization involves:

> (i) the refinancing of the Company's first lien debt;
>
> (ii) the cancellation of the Secured Notes in exchange for the issuance by the Company of consideration that includes new common shares and new debt; and
>
> (iii) the compromise of certain unsecured liabilities, including the portion of the Noteholders' claims that is to be treated as unsecured under the Plan.

7 The Company also contends that if implemented, the Recapitalization would result in SkyLink Aviation having an improved capital structure, stable working capital liquidity and enhanced flexibility to respond to volatility in the industry.

8 The terms of the Recapitalization are supported by a significant majority of the creditors who have an economic interest in the Company. In particular, the First Lien Lenders have affirmed their support, and the holders of

approximately 64% of the value of the outstanding Secured Notes (the "Initial Consenting Noteholders") have signed the Support Agreement pursuant to which they have agreed to support the Recapitalization and to vote in favour of the Plan.

9 The remaining Noteholders will be entitled to sign a joinder to the Support Agreement following the commencement of these proceedings. SkyLink Aviation anticipates that additional Noteholders will execute a joinder to the Support Agreement.

10 It is noted that support of the First Lien Lenders and the Initial Consenting Noteholders is conditional upon the completion of the Recapitalization under the CCAA prior to April 23, 2013.

11 A detailed summary of the salient facts is set out at paragraphs 11-42 of the factum.

12 SkyLink Aviation is a privately held corporation under the laws of Ontario, with a registered head office located in Toronto, Ontario. Its central administrative functions are carried out at its Toronto headquarters.

13 SkyLink Aviation is the direct or indirect parent company of a number of subsidiaries as detailed in the organization chart attached to Mr. Ottens' affidavit.

14 The SkyLink Subsidiaries are non-applicants. However, SkyLink Aviation seeks to have a stay of proceedings under the Initial Order and certain other relief extended to those SkyLink Subsidiaries that are also party to contracts with SkyLink Aviation (the "Subsidiary Counterparties") so as to maintain the stability of the enterprise.

15 SkyLink Aviation's liabilities amount to approximately $149.42 million which includes the First Lien Indebtedness of $14.749 million, Secured Notes in the aggregate principal amount of $110 million, together with accrued but unpaid interest of approximately $6.4 million, and amounts owing to Noteholders under the Interest Payment Support Agreement totalling approximately $6.6 million.

16 Material claims against the Company of which SkyLink Aviation is aware of include:

> (i) approximately $3.45 million in respect of the exercise of various warrants and options issued to several members of the senior management team in May 2012; and
>
> (ii) six pending litigation claims against the Company that collectively allege approximately $16.6 million in contingent claims or damages.

17 As of March 6, 2013, SkyLink Aviation owed approximately $7.7 million in accounts payable relating to ordinary course trade and employee obligations.

18 As a result of the existing Events of Default, the First Lien Lenders are now in a position to terminate the Credit Facility and proceed to enforce their rights and remedies against SkyLink Aviation and Loan Guarantors, including the acceleration of all amounts owing under the Credit Facility. In addition, the Company does not have the funds required to make payments now due to the Participating Noteholders under the Interest Payment Support Agreement.

19 In light of its financial circumstances, SkyLink Aviation contends that it is not able to obtain additional or alternative financing and there is no reasonable expectation that the Company, in the near term, will be able to generate sufficient cash flow through its operations to support its existing debt obligations. In addition, the Company contends that as further evidenced by the valuation performed by Duff & Phelps Valuations, the aggregate value of the Company's assets, property and undertaking, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to enable payment of all of its obligations, due and accruing due. Consequently, the Applicant takes the position that it is insolvent.

20 The Applicant requests a stay of proceedings.

21 The Applicant also requests authorization to make payments in the ordinary course in respect of employee compensation, rent, procurement, utility services and other supplier obligations, all with a view to maintaining operations.

22 The Company has also negotiated for a DIP Loan and the concurrent granting of a DIP Lenders' Charge. Details in respect of the DIP Loan and the DIP Lenders' Charge are set out at paragraphs 29-32 of the factum. A proposed Monitor and Administration Charge as well as a Directors' and Officers' Charge is also requested. These requests are set out at paragraphs 33-37 of the factum. A KERP and a KERP Charge is also contemplated and the reasons for this are detailed at paragraphs 38 and 39 of the factum. There is no opposition to this requested relief.

23 The Applicant also seeks the appointment of the Monitor as the Foreign Representative, should recognition of these proceedings in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, become necessary.

24 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Applicant is a "debtor company" to which the CCAA applies. The basis for this finding is set out at paragraphs 43-52 of the factum.

25 For the reasons set out at paragraphs 56-60 of the factum, I have been persuaded that it is appropriate in this application to include a stay of proceedings in favour of the Subsidiary Companies.

26 I am also satisfied for the reasons set forth at paragraphs 61-65 of the factum that it is appropriate to authorize certain pre-filing payments to be made.

27 The basis for the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Administration Charge, Directors' Charge and KERP Charge is set out at paragraphs 66-84 of the factum. I have been persuaded that, in the circumstances, the granting of these charges on the terms set out is appropriate.

28 I have also been satisfied that it is appropriate to the appoint the Monitor as the Foreign Representative of the Applicant, for the reasons set out at paragraphs 85-87.

29 The Applicant also requests a postponement of the Annual Shareholders' Meeting. For the reasons set out at paragraphs 88-91 of the factum, I am in agreement that this request is reasonable in the circumstances.

30 The Applicant has requested that the "Confidential Supplement" to the Monitor's Prefiling Report be sealed. This Confidential Supplement contains copies of:

> (i) the financial statements of SkyLink containing the confidential financial information of SkyLink;
>
> (ii) the Duff & Phelps Valuation Report (the "Valuation Report") which the Company contends contains sensitive competitive and confidential information of the Applicant; and
>
> (iii) the KERP letters containing individually identifiable information and confidential information of eligible employees.

31 With respect to the financial information, I am satisfied that adequate information is contained in the public record that would enable the affected parties to make an informed decision as to the financial circumstances facing the Company.

32 For the reasons set out at paragraphs 92-100 of the factum, I have been persuaded that it is appropriate to issue a sealing order at this time. In arriving at this determination, I have taken into account the principals set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).

33 For the above reasons, I have been persuaded that an Initial Order should be granted in respect of the Applicant.

34 SkyLink also brought a motion for the Claims Procedure Order and Meetings Order. The Company is seeking these orders at this time because it wishes to effectuate the Recapitalization on an expeditious basis. The basis for the request for these two orders is set out in the second factum submitted by the Applicant. The basis for the requested relief is set out at paragraphs 11- 34 of the factum.

35 The legal basis for proceeding with the motion for the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order is set out at the factum commencing at paragraph 43. I recognize that it is unusual to request such relief at this stage of the proceeding. However, in the circumstances of this case, and considering the significant support that the proposed restructuring appears to have achieved, I accept the submissions and grant the requested relief. In doing so, I am mindful that a full come-back hearing has been scheduled for March 20, 2013, at which time these issues can be revisited.

36 The motions for the Claims Procedure Order and Meetings Order are granted and the orders have been signed.

Application granted.

TAB 14

Court File No. 04 CL 5530

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	TUESDAY, THE 24TH
	)	
JUSTICE FARLEY	)	DAY OF AUGUST, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF JTI – MACDONALD CORP.

Applicant

INITIAL ORDER

THIS APPLICATION made by JTI-MACDONALD CORP. (the "Applicant"), for an Order substantially in the form attached to the Notice of Application herein was heard this day, at 393 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Application, the Affidavit of Michel Poirier sworn August 24, 2004 and the Exhibits thereto (the "Poirier Affidavit"), and the consent of Ernst & Young Inc. as proposed Monitor, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant and counsel to the proposed Monitor and counsel to JTI Canada LLC Inc., but that no other person was served with the Application Record:

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Application and Application Record is abridged and that this Application is properly returnable today and further that service thereof upon any interested party not served is hereby dispensed with.

APPLICATION

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicant is a company to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA") applies.

STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remain in possession and control of its property, assets and undertaking, including without limitation any present or future property, rights, assets or undertaking of the Applicant wheresoever located, and whether held by the Applicant in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, as principal or nominee, beneficially or otherwise, whether in the possession of the Applicant, or subleased to another entity, any and all real property, personal property and intellectual property of the Applicant, and any and all securities, instruments, debentures, notes or bonds issued to, or held by or on behalf of the Applicant (the "Property"), and shall continue to carry on business in the ordinary course and in a manner consistent with the preservation of the Applicant's business (the "Business") and Property.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, until and including September 22, 2004, or such later date as the Court may Order (the "Stay Period"),

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph no suit, action, enforcement process, extra-judicial proceeding or other proceeding (including a proceeding in any court, statutory or otherwise), right or remedy (judicial or extra-judicial, statutory or non-statutory) (a "Proceeding") shall be commenced by any person, firm, corporation, government, administrative or regulatory body or other entity or organization (including, without limitation, creditors, customers, suppliers, employees, pensioners, unions, regulators, contracting parties, lessors, licensors, co-venturers or partners of the Applicant) (collectively, "Persons" and individually a "Person") against or in respect of the Applicant or the Property, and any and all Proceedings against or in respect of the Applicant or the Property

already commenced be and are hereby stayed and suspended and the continuation thereof is restrained unless the prior written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor is obtained or leave of this Court is granted, and

(b) unless the prior written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor is obtained or leave of this Court is granted, all Persons are enjoined and restrained from:

(i) commencing or continuing realization steps or Proceedings in respect of any security interest, encumbrance, lien, charge, mortgage or other security held in relation to, or any trust attaching to, any of the Property (including, without limitation, the right of any Person to take any step in asserting or perfecting any right or interest therein or to exercise any right of registration of securities, distress, seizure, repossession, revendication, stoppage in transit, foreclosure or sale); and

(ii) asserting, enforcing or exercising any right, option or remedy available to it arising by law, under any agreement or otherwise (including, without limitation, any right under section 224 (1.2) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) or substantially similar provision under provincial law (subject to section 11.4 of the CCAA) any right of dilution, buy-out, divestiture, forced sale, demand, acceleration, termination, suspension, modification, cancellation, set-off or consolidation of accounts; any right of first refusal; any right to give notice of assignment of a claim; or any right to revoke any qualification or registration), against or in respect of any of the Applicant or any of the Property or arising out of, relating to or triggered by the occurrence of any default or non-performance by or the insolvency of any of the Applicant, the making or filing of these proceedings or any allegation, admission or evidence in these proceedings (for greater certainty, rights under the *Loi sur le ministère du Revenu* of Quebec including the right to make demand for payment on third parties pursuant to section 15 thereof and similar remedies under the statutes of any province, and any such demands are, from the Effective Time, of no effect),

provided that nothing in this Order shall have the effect of staying, impairing or delaying the conduct of criminal proceedings commenced against the Applicant in the Province of Ontario on February 27, 2003, charging JTI-Macdonald Corp. and others with fraud, conspiring to commit the indictable offence of fraud contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada, and with the possession of property and/or proceeds of crime contrary to sections 354(1) and 355(a) (the "Criminal Proceedings"), however the taking of any Proceedings to enforce or collect any fines, restitution orders or other claims or awards resulting from such Criminal Proceedings shall by stayed as set out in paragraphs 4(a) and (b) above.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person, ~~firm, corporation, governmental authority, or other entity shall~~, without leave of this Court, ~~discontinue, fail to renew, renew on terms more onerous to those existing prior to the Effective Time, alter, suspend, modify, cancel, or~~ interfere with or terminate any right, contract, arrangement, agreement, licence or permit in favour of the Applicant or the Property or held by or on behalf of the Applicant, ~~including~~ as a result of any default or non-performance by the Applicant prior to the making of this Order, the making or filing of these proceedings or any allegation contained in these proceedings or the making of this Order.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, subject to the provisions of s.11.3 of the CCAA, during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicant or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation, the sale of inventory, all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation services, utility or other services to the Applicant or any of the Property are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, failing to renew on reasonable terms, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicant, and that the Applicant shall be entitled to the continued use of their current telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Applicant in

accordance with their current payment practices or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and the Applicant.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else contained in this Order, any persons who provided letters of credit, standby letters of credit, performance bonds or guarantees (the "Issuing Party") at the request of the Applicant (whether provided for the payment of suppliers of goods or services or otherwise) shall be required to continue honouring, in accordance with the terms thereof, any and all such letters of credit, standby letters of credit, performance bonds, payment bonds and/or guarantees, issued on or before the date of this Order subject to the Issuing Party being entitled to retain the bills of lading and/or shipping or other documents relating thereto until paid therefore. For greater certainty, the Issuing Party shall be prohibited from terminating, suspending, modifying, determining, refusing to honour (otherwise than in accordance with their terms) or cancelling any such letters of credit, standby letters of credit, performance bonds, payment bonds or guarantees, and the beneficiaries of such letters of credit, standby letters of credit, performance bonds, payment bonds or guarantees for the supply and delivery of goods shall be entitled to draw on such letters of credit, standby letters of credit, performance bonds, payment bonds or guarantees, as the case may be, in accordance with their respective terms and conditions, without the prior written consent of the Applicant or leave of this Court.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Persons may exercise only such rights of set-off as are permitted under Section 18.1 of the CCAA.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, subject to s. 11.3 of the CCAA, and without limiting the generality of paragraph 8 hereof, all banks and financial institutions at which the Applicant maintains a bank account are hereby restrained from stopping, withholding, redirecting, consolidating, combining accounts or otherwise interfering with any amount in such account(s) against any indebtedness owing to that bank or financial institution by the Applicant, or from discontinuing, failing to renew on terms no more onerous than those existing prior to these proceedings, altering, interfering with or terminating such banking arrangements.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by Subsection 11(2) of the CCAA, no action may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors of the Applicant with respect to any claim against the directors that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligations of the Applicant whereby the directors are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors for the payment or performance of such obligations.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no person shall commence or continue any proceeding against the Applicant's directors, officers, employees, legal counsel or financial advisors, without first obtaining leave of this Court, upon (7) seven days' written notice to the Applicant's counsel of record and to all those referred to in this paragraph whom it is proposed be named in such proceedings.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, for greater certainty, no person shall withhold or refuse to make all required payments as they become due to the Applicant in respect of Agreements with the Applicant, whether written or oral, solely by virtue of the Applicant's insolvency or the commencement of these proceedings.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else contained herein, the Applicant with the consent of the Monitor may, by written consent of its counsel of record herein, agree to waive any of the protections provided to it herein.

EFFECTIVE TIME

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, from 12:01 a.m. (Toronto time) on the date of this Order (the "Effective Time") to the time of the granting of this Order, any act or action taken or notice given by the Applicant's creditors or other persons in furtherance of their rights to commence or continue realization or to take or enforce any other step or remedy will be deemed not to have been taken or given, as the case may be, subject to the right of any such person to further apply to this Court on seven days' notice to the Applicant and the Monitor in respect of such step, act, action or notice given.

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ, and terminate the retention and employment of, the agents, advisors, contractors, employees, solicitors and other assistants, consultants and valuators currently in its employ, with liberty to retain such further agents, advisors, contractors, employees, solicitors, assistants, consultants and valuators including, without limitation, those who were formerly, are now or may in the future be retained, employed or paid by the Applicant or any person, firm, corporation or other entity related to or affiliated with the Applicant, as they deem reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, after the date hereof and except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein the Applicant shall be entitled to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course both prior to and after the Effective Time and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, operating the Business or preserving the Property, and which expenses, pending any further Order of this Court, include, without limitation, payment:

(a) of all expenses reasonably necessary for the operation and preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance), maintenance, security, and normal course individual capital expenditures of $2.5 million or less, and, with the Monitor's prior approval, individual capital expenditures exceeding $2.5 million;

(b) of all outstanding and future wages, salaries, employee, retirement and pension benefits, vacation pay, bonuses and expenses, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements, and retention and severance payments accruing due to employees, provided that any such retention or severance payments to be paid to

officers and directors of the Applicant may only be made upon further Order of this Court;

(c) of all rent payable under any lease (or as otherwise may be negotiated by the Applicant from time to time) including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord;

(d) of the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, including the reasonable fees and disbursements of any counsel retained by the Monitor;

(e) of the reasonable fees and disbursements of any auditor, financial advisor or other professional retained by the Applicant in respect of these proceedings, the operation of the Business or the preservation of the Property;

(f) of all of the reasonable fees and disbursements, of counsel retained by the Applicant in respect of these or any other proceedings (including the Criminal Proceedings), the operation of the Business, or the preservation of the Property;

(g) of all outstanding and future amounts due from any Applicant under any credit card arrangements; and

(h) of expenses incurred in relation to goods or services actually supplied to the Applicant either before or following the date of this Order, including payments in respect of outstanding documentary credits or deposits.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province or Territory thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation,

amounts in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, and income taxes;

(b) amounts accruing and payable by the Applicant in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, and any other public or private pension plans, workers compensation, employer health taxes and similar obligations of any jurisdiction with respect to employees; and

(c) all goods and services or other applicable duties or taxes payable or required to be paid by the Applicant on or in connection with the ordinary course manufacture and/or sale of goods and services by the Applicant, incurred or arising from and after the Effective Time.

18. THIS COURT ORDERS that, except as otherwise permitted herein, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon, or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of their creditors as of this date; (b) to grant no mortgages, charges, hypothecs, liens or other security upon or in respect of any of their present or future Property; and pending further order of this Court no payments of principal, interest, royalties or dividends to related parties shall be made, however payments in relation to transactions described in paragraph 20(d) of this Order are permitted.

19. THIS COURT ORDERS that nothing herein shall be construed as in any way limiting the terms and conditions of any licence, permit or approval granted to the Applicant.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall have the right, with the consent of the Monitor to:

(a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their businesses or operations;

(b) sell or otherwise dispose of redundant or non-material assets with an individual value of more than $1 million; and

(c) terminate or suspend such of its arrangements or agreements of any nature whatsoever, whether oral or written, as the Applicant deems appropriate; and

(d) engage in usual and ordinary course transactions with other related parties.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to any existing indemnities, the Applicant shall indemnify each of its directors and each Person who was or in the future is requested by the Applicant to act, and who is acting or did or does act or is deemed or treated by applicable legislation to be acting or to have acted, as a director, officer or person of a similar position (a "Responsible Person") of another entity in which the Applicant has a direct or indirect interest (an "Associated Entity") from and against the following:

(a) all costs (including, without limitation, full defence costs), charges, expenses, claims, liabilities and obligations of any nature whatsoever which may arise as a result of his or her association with the Applicant or Associated Entity as a director or Responsible Person in each case on or after the date hereof (including, without limitation, an amount paid to settle an action or satisfy a judgment in a civil, criminal, administrative or investigative action or proceeding to which such director or Responsible Person may be made a party by reason of being or having been a director or Responsible Person (as the case may be), provided that such director or Responsible Person (i) acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Applicant or Associated Entity (as the case may be) and (ii) in the case of a criminal or administrative action or proceeding that is enforced by monetary penalty, such director or Responsible Person had reasonable grounds for believing his or her conduct was lawful) except to the extent that such director or Responsible Person has actively participated in the breach of any related fiduciary duties or has been grossly negligent or guilty of wilful misconduct; and

(b) all costs (including without limitation, full defence costs), charges, expenses, claims, liabilities and obligations relating to the failure of the Applicant or an

Associated Entity at any time to make payments of the nature referred to in paragraphs 16 or 17 of this Order or to pay amounts in respect of employee or former employee entitlements to wages, vacation pay, termination pay, severance pay, pension or other benefits or any other amount for services performed, whether incurred or accruing prior to, on or after the date of this Order and that he or she sustains or incurs by reason of or in relation to his or her association with the Applicant or Associated Entity as a director or Responsible Person (as the case may be), except to the extent that such director or Responsible Person has actively participated in the breach of any related fiduciary duties or has been grossly negligent or guilty of wilful misconduct,

(collectively, "D&O Claims") provided that the foregoing shall not constitute a contract of insurance and shall not constitute other valid and collectible insurance as such term may be used in any existing policy of insurance issued in favour of the Applicant or Associated Entities or any of the directors or Responsible Persons. For greater certainty, no person shall be entitled by way of subrogation to enforce the indemnity contained in this paragraph.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that as security for the obligation of the Applicant to indemnify the directors and Responsible Persons pursuant to paragraph 21, the directors and Responsible Persons be and they are hereby granted a fixed lien on, mortgage and hypothec of, and security interest in the Property (the "Directors' Charge"), having the priority established by paragraphs 32 and 35. Such Directors' Charge, notwithstanding any language in any applicable policy of insurance to the contrary, shall only apply to the extent that the directors and Responsible Persons do not have coverage under the provisions of any applicable directors' and officers' insurance which shall not be excess insurance to the Directors' Charge. In respect of any D&O Claim that is asserted against any of the directors and Responsible Persons, if the directors and Responsible Persons against whom the D&O Claim is asserted (collectively, the "Respondent Directors") do not receive satisfactory confirmation from the applicable insurer within 21 days of delivery of notice of the D&O Claim to the applicable insurer confirming that the applicable insurer will provide coverage for and indemnify the Respondent Directors against the D&O Claim then, without prejudice to the subrogation rights hereinafter referred to, the

Applicant shall pay the amount of the D&O Claim as it becomes payable by the Respondent Directors and, failing such payment, the Respondent Directors shall be entitled to enforce the Directors' Charge; provided that the Respondent Directors shall reimburse the Applicant to the extent that they subsequently receive insurance proceeds in respect of the D&O Claim paid by the Applicant, and provided further that the Applicant shall, in the event of such payment being made, be subrogated to the rights of the Respondent Directors to pursue recovery thereof from the applicable insurer as if no such payment had been made.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall and does hereby indemnify the Monitor and the legal counsel and the financial advisors to the Applicant and the Monitor, of and from all claims, liabilities and obligations of any nature whatsoever, including, without limitation, legal fees and disbursements, which may arise out of their involvement with the Applicant from and after the date hereof, save and except such as may arise from wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of any of them.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Ernst & Young Inc. be and is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor and an officer of this Court, to monitor the Property and Business and the Applicant's conduct of the Business and affairs of the Applicant with the powers and obligations set forth in the CCAA and hereinafter set forth and that the Applicant and its shareholders, officers, directors, advisors, employees, servants, agents and representatives shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its power and discharge of its obligations, subject to the limitations contained in this Order.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) deliver to the Applicant and file with this Court, such reports as the Monitor considers appropriate or relevant to these proceedings or as the Court directs;

(b) monitor the Applicant's receipts and disbursements;

(c) have full and complete access to the books and records, management, employees, agents, and advisors of the Applicant and to the Property to the extent required to perform its duties arising under this Order, subject to the limitations contained in this Order;

(d) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel to advise and to represent the Monitor in relation to the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations under this Order;

(e) be at liberty to retain, engage, and utilize the services of such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary to perform its duties and obligations under this Order; and

(f) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in response to any reasonable request for information made in writing by the Applicant's creditors addressed to the Monitor, the Monitor shall request such information from the Applicant and shall provide such creditor with such information as may be supplied by the Applicant in response to the request. In the case of information which the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is or may be confidential (whether because it is subject to formal confidentiality obligations, because it represents sensitive business information, or otherwise), is privileged, or, whether or not confidential or privileged has been collected or assembled in relation to the defence of the Criminal Proceedings currently outstanding against the Applicant, the Monitor shall not provide such information to the requesting creditor unless otherwise directed by this Court or consented to by the Applicant.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is not empowered to take possession of the Property or to manage any part of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Property, or any part thereof. In addition, and notwithstanding anything else in this Order, the Monitor shall not, without leave of this Court, seek or obtain access to any information, documents or material in

subject to further order of this Court,

the possession of the Applicant or counsel for the Applicant which relate to the Criminal Proceedings, including individual docket entries in such counsel's accounts.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and counsel to the Monitor shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements by the Applicant as part of the cost of these proceedings, whether incurred before or after the making of this Order.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded to the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the fulfilment of its duties in the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except where it has been grossly negligent or wilfully misconducted itself, and no action or other proceeding shall be commenced against the Monitor in any Court or other tribunal as a result of or relating in any way to its appointment as Monitor, the fulfilment of its duties as Monitor or the carrying out of any of the Orders of this Court, unless the leave of this Court is first obtained on motion on at least seven (7) days' notice to the Monitor and the Applicant. Related entities of the Monitor shall also be entitled to the protections, benefits and privileges of this paragraph 29, *mutatis mutandis*.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the appointment of the Monitor shall not constitute the Monitor to be an employer, successor employer, sponsor or payor within the meaning of any agreement or other contract between the Applicant and any of its present or former employees or any legislation governing employment or labour standards or pension benefits or health and safety or any other statute, regulation or rule of law or equity for any purpose whatsoever and, further, that the Monitor shall be deemed not to be an owner or in possession, care, control, or management of the Property of the Applicant or of the Business and affairs of the Applicant, whether pursuant to any legislation enacted for the protection of the environment, health and safety, the regulations thereunder, or any other statute, regulation or rule of law or equity under any federal, provincial or other jurisdiction for any purpose whatsoever.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and counsel to the Applicant, shall be paid their fees and disbursements by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicant are hereby authorized and directed to pay the Monitor, any counsel to the Monitor and the Applicant's own counsel on a weekly basis and to pay retainers to the Monitor and to the Applicant's own counsel in the amount of up to $1 million each as security for payment of their fees and disbursements from time to time. The indemnity provided in paragraph 23 of this Order and the fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant shall be secured by a charge on the Property (the "Administrative Charge"), without the requirement to file, register, record or perfect the charge.

PRIORITY OF CHARGES

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Administrative Charge and the Directors' Charge shall have priority over all present and future charges, encumbrances and security in the Property, in the following priority:

(a) first, the Administrative Charge up to a maximum of $3 million; and

(b) second, the Directors' Charge up to a maximum of $10 million.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Directors' Charge or the Administrative Charge (collectively, the "Charges") shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicant shall not grant any encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, either of the Directors' Charge or the Administrative Charge, unless the Applicant obtains the prior written consent of the directors and the Monitor.

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Directors' Charge and the Administrative Charge (as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a fixed and floating charge, mortgage, hypothec, lien and security interest in all of the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to any and all other charges, mortgages, hypothecs, liens, security interests, encumbrances or security of whatever nature or kind affecting any of the Property.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Directors' Charge and the Administrative Charge shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "Chargees") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (i) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (ii) any petitions for receiving orders issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), or any receiving orders made pursuant to such petitions; (iii) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (iv) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (v) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of encumbrances, contained in any existing agreement, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other arrangement (collectively, an "Agreement") which binds the Applicant, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) the creation of the Charges shall not create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicant of any Agreement or to which it is a party;

(b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges; and

(c) the payments made by the Applicant pursuant to this Order and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute fraudulent preferences, fraudulent conveyances, oppressive conduct, settlements or other challengeable, voidable or reviewable transactions under any applicable law.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall, within ten (10) business days of the date of entry of this Order post the Order on a publicly available website and send notice of this Order to any known creditor or other party advancing a claim (contingent, disputed or otherwise) which will not be paid in the ordinary course pursuant to the terms of this Order, and the amount of whose claim might, in the reasonable estimation of the Applicant, exceed $10,000, at their addresses as they appear on the Applicant's records, and shall promptly send a copy of this Order (a) to all parties filing a Notice of Appearance in respect of this Application, and (b) to any other interested Person requesting a copy of this Order, and the Monitor is relieved of its obligation under Section 11(5) of the CCAA to provide similar notice, other than to supervise this process.

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the right to serve documents pursuant to the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, the Applicant shall be at liberty to serve all materials in these proceedings (including, without limitation, application records, motion material, and facta,) on all represented parties electronically, by e-mailing a PDF copy (other than any Book of Authorities) to counsel's e-mail addresses as recorded on the service list maintained by the Monitor and by posting a copy of the materials to its website as soon as practicable; and provided that the Applicant shall deliver hard copies of such material to any party requesting same as soon as practicable thereafter.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the right to serve documents pursuant to the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, any party in these proceedings (other than the Applicant) may serve all materials (including, without limitation, application records, motion material, facta and orders) electronically, by e-mailing a PDF copy (other than a Book of Authorities) to counsels' e-mail addresses as recorded on the service list maintained by the Monitor; provided that such party deliver both PDF and hard copies of full material to counsel of the Applicant and the Monitor and any other party requesting same and the Applicant shall post a copy on the website, all as soon as practicable thereafter.

MISCELLANEOUS

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the Applicant or the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder or to seek any further relief.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any provision of this Order, the Applicant may apply at any time to this Court to vary this Order or seek further relief including, without limitation, directions in respect of the proper execution of this Order.

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order any interested party may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order or seek other relief on seven (7) days' notice to the Applicant and the Monitor and to any other party likely to be affected by the Order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may Order.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant and the Monitor be at liberty and are hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any judicial, regulatory or administrative body or any other Court in any other jurisdiction, whether in Canada or elsewhere, for an Order recognizing this Order or these proceedings in such other forums and in such other jurisdictions or to take such steps, actions or proceedings as may be necessary or desirable for the receipt, preservation, protection and maintenance of the Property, including the seeking of an Order recognizing the Monitor as foreign representative of the Applicant. All Courts of other jurisdictions and all judicial, regulatory or administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such Orders and provide such other aid and assistance to the Applicant or to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as they may deem necessary or appropriate in furtherance of this Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:
AUG 24 2004
PER/PAR:

J.M. FARLEY

544281/1

Court File No: 04-CL-5530

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF JTI-MACDONALD CORP.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT TORONTO

INITIAL ORDER

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Solicitors for the Applicant

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TAB 15

2001 ABCA 209
Alberta Court of Appeal

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re

2001 CarswellAlta 1035, 2001 ABCA 209, [2001] 10 W.W.R. 204, [2001] A.J. No. 1006, 107 A.C.W.S. (3d) 724, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 266 W.A.C. 125, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 127, 299 A.R. 125, 95 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended; And In the Matter of Smoky River Coal Limited; Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Life Insurance Company, Security Life of Denver Insurance Company, Indiana Insurance Company, Peerless Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, AH (Michigan) Life Insurance Company, Northern Life Insurance Company, Reliastar Life Insurance Company, Modern Woodmen of America, Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Company, American International Life Assurance Company of New York and Phoenix American Life Insurance Company (Petitioners)

Montreal Trust Company of Canada Ltd. (Plaintiff) and Smoky River Coal Limited, Copton Excol Ltd. and 378419 Alberta Ltd. (Defendants)

Canadian National Railway Company, Municipal District of Greenview No. 16, Finning (Canada) - A Division of Finning International Inc., Coneco Equipment Inc., Atco Electric Ltd. and Ro-Dar Contracting Ltd. (Appellants / Not named parties to the Queen's Bench Action) and Montreal Trust Company of Canada (Respondent / Plaintiff) and Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as Interim Receiver of Smoky River Coal Limited, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Alberta as represented by the Department of Resource Development, Non-Union Employees of Smoky River Coal Limited and United Steelworkers of America Local 7621 (Respondents / Not named parties to the Queen's Bench Action)

Picard, Fruman, Wittmann JJ.A.

Heard: June 13-14, 2001
Judgment: August 2, 2001
Docket: Calgary Appeal 00-18924, 00-18944, 00-18947, 00-18950, 00-18957, 00-18958, 00-18975

Proceedings: reversing in part (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 830 (Alta. Q.B.)

Counsel: *T.M. Warner*, *D.R. Peskett*, *R.T.G. Reeson*, *Q.C.*, *J. Di Pinto*, for Appellants
D. LeGeyt, *K. McHugh*, *S. McDonough*, *B. Clapp*, *D.T. Williams*, for Respondents

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.1 General principles
XIX.1.c Application of Act
XIX.1.c.i Relationship between Act and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act

Company obtained protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, pursuant to court order — Court order provided that "post-petition trade creditors" who provided essential goods and services during re-organization would benefit from charge securing company's indebtedness in respect of same — Interim receiver was appointed under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and Arrangement Act proceedings were stayed, but obligations established throughout proceedings were preserved — Several creditors brought applications for recognition as post-petition trade creditors — Certain applications allowed, certain applications dismissed — Two lessees, municipality and employees appealed dismissal of applications — Certain applications allowed, certain applications dismissed — Lessees were entitled to cost of repairs to leased equipment as obligation to maintain equipment was set out in lease agreements with company — Municipality was not entitled to recognition as post-petition creditor for property taxes as services provided by community were not traded services — Employees were entitled to recognition as post-petition creditor for vacation pay and severance pay as entitlement to vacation pay had been arranged between counsel, and trial judge's decision deserved deference regarding severance pay — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Alberta v. Bank of Canada (1991), 82 Alta. L.R. (2d) 392, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 335, (sub nom. *Canadian Commercial Bank, Re*) 8 W.A.C. 128, (sub nom. *Canadian Commercial Bank, Re*) 120 A.R. 128 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703, 237 A.R. 326, 197 W.A.C. 326, 71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 734, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "date of the initial bankruptcy event" (a) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 1(4)] — considered

s. 244 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 89(1)] — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

Employment Standards Code, S.A. 1996, c. E-10.3

Generally — referred to

s. 109(3) — pursuant to

APPEAL by creditors from judgment reported at [2000] 10 W.W.R. 147, 83 Alta. L.R. (3d) 127, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 281, 2000 ABQB 621, 2000 CarswellAlta 830 (Alta. Q.B.), respecting designation as post-petition creditors.

***Per curiam*:**

1 The central issue in this appeal is determining which creditors of Smoky River Coal Ltd. are entitled to participate in a post-petition trade creditors' charge.

FACTS

2 The facts are set out in detail in the decision of LoVecchio, J.: *Re Smoky River Coal Ltd.*, [2000] A.J. No. 925 (Alta. Q.B.). They are briefly recapped here.

3 Until very recently, Smoky River operated a coal mine located in Grande Cache, Alberta. It had been experiencing financial difficulties since 1998. Effective July 31, 1998, Smoky River obtained the protection of the Companies' *Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") pursuant to an order of Cairns, J. dated August 10, 1998. This order stayed all proceedings against Smoky River and provided for the creation of charges.

4 On August 17, 1998, Prowse, J. issued an order creating an express charge and priority over Smoky River's assets in favour of what were termed in the order "post-petition trade creditors" ("PPTC Charge"). Paragraphs 2(c) and (d) of the August 17, 1998 order state (AB 32):

> (c) obligations incurred by Smoky to trade creditors after the date of filing of the Petition ("Post-Petition Trade Creditors") shall be paid in accordance with their terms of credit;
>
> (d) Post-Petition Trade Creditors shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge ("Post-Petition Trade Creditors' Charge") against, and security interest in, the Property, as security for indebtedness incurred to them [...].

5 The purpose of the PPTC Charge was to encourage the regular trade creditors of Smoky River to continue to provide essential goods and services to Smoky River during its reorganization period. The order did not define the term "post-petition trade creditor", but called for a special hearing as soon as possible to delineate post-petition trade creditors' entitlement to, and priority in, the PPTC Charge. That hearing was never held.

6 LoVecchio, J. was appointed the CCAA judge. On June 16, 1999, he capped the amount of the PPTC Charge at $7 million.

7 On March 17, 2000, the CCAA judge lifted the CCAA stay of proceedings, allowing the Petitioners, the holders of $75 million of secured notes, to accelerate their claims, make a demand for payment, and deliver a notice to Smoky River pursuant to s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,* R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. The order further stipulated that Smoky River should only operate and make expenditures as required in the ordinary course of business, or to preserve the status quo.

8 On March 22, 2000, the Petitioners applied to issue a Statement of Claim, and appoint a Receiver/Manager over Smoky River and its subsidiary corporations. They also proposed a "wind-down" of the mining operations, given the large number of employees involved. A plan for the "ramping down" of activities was created to ensure a smooth transition into receivership.

9 On March 25, 2000, Smoky submitted an "orderly Shutdown Plan" to the Monitor. On March 29, 2000, the CCAA judge limited the payments that could be made by Smoky River. Notwithstanding the provisions of the *Employment Standards Code*, S.A. 1996, c. E-10.3, Smoky River was ordered to pay only outstanding wage claims of employees. The order specified that "the rights of any employee shall not otherwise be prejudiced by this order, nor shall this order be used as a basis for an argument to alter the legal entitlement of employees" (AB 158).

10 On March 31, 2000, the Petitioners were granted leave to commence proceedings under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and the CCAA proceedings were stayed. By a second order on the same date, PricewaterhouseCoopers was appointed the interim receiver of Smoky River. The obligations established throughout the CCAA proceedings were preserved by the following provisions (AB 49):

> 7. The Receiver may without further order of the Court and on notice to the Noteholders make payments:
>
> (a) to employees of Smoky River Coal Limited up to the extent of their statutory priority; [...]
>
> (e) to creditors entitled to the benefit of the CCAA post-petition trade creditors' charge;

provided that the priority of such payments is in accordance with the priorities set out in previous orders of the Court relating to The CCAA proceedings of the Defendant Smoky River Coal Limited, and shall make no other distribution to the Plaintiff or other creditors of any class without first having obtained the leave of this Court.

19. The Receiver shall be bound by all the charges, priorities and obligations created or approved by this Court in The CCAA proceedings, and the Receiver is directed to:

(a) determine which creditors are entitled to the benefit of the post-petition trade creditors' charge; and

(b) determine what other charges, priorities and obligations need to be maintained;

and if necessary seek the direction of this Court within 45 days hereof. [...]

11 On May 9, 2000, the Receiver was authorized to send out notices to all creditors claiming refuge under the PPTC Charge, informing them whether or not their claims had been accepted. Creditors were provided with a mechanism for court review of the Receiver's decisions.

12 On July 4 and 5, 2000, the CCAA judge heard the applications of several creditors, including all the parties to this appeal, appealing the Receiver's determination of their entitlement, or lack of entitlement, to the PPTC Charge.

THE CCAA JUDGE'S DECISION

13 In his decision of July 31, 2000, *supra*, the CCAA judge set out two requirements for eligibility for the PPTC Charge. The first criteria was that the debt in question was incurred by Smoky River during the CCAA period, between July 31, 1998 and March 31, 2000.

14 The second criteria for eligibility was that the debt in question was incurred in connection with the daily operating activities of Smoky River, as opposed to debts that arose from the cessation or termination of services. As stated by the CCAA judge (*supra,* at para. 40):

The main purpose of the Charge was to encourage the creditors who supply Smoky with goods and services to continue to deal with Smoky during the reorganization period. The critical characteristic of the service provided by the creditors must have been that it was essential to keeping "the lights of the company on". Thus, the costs or expenses incurred must be essential to the continued day to day operations of the mine. Penalties or obligations associated with a breach are not expenses associated with continued operations.

We are in substantial agreement with the two eligibility criteria delimited by the CCAA judge.

15 After setting out these requirements, the CCAA judge applied them to the applications of the various creditors. His decisions are discussed below, in the analysis of the individual appeals.

CREATING CCAA CHARGES

16 CCAA orders become the roadmap for the proceedings and the litigation which may follow. Orders must therefore be drafted with clarity and precision. The purpose of the CCAA must be kept at the forefront in both drafting and interpreting a CCAA order. The CCAA is remedial legislation. As was stated in *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]):

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan *[sic]* of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court.

17 It is particularly important that the terms and scope of any charge created by an order be clearly defined. Creditors need to know from the outset whether or not they are entitled to benefit in any charge or other priority created by the order. Those extending credit, be it trade credit or otherwise, should not be forced to participate in litigation after the CCAA proceeding to discover whether or not they hold some form of security or are entitled to a super-priority. Similarly, secured creditors of a troubled company need to know from the outset the effect the CCAA process will have on their security. They should not be forced to wait until the end of the proceedings to discover that their security has been whittled away due to a broad judicial interpretation of qualification for super-priority status. A precise CCAA order will ensure commercial practicality by allowing all creditors of the debtor company to properly adjust the terms of their credit.

18 Terms for which there is no common and easily discernable meaning, such as "post-petition trade creditor", should be defined with as much precision as possible. In this case, the term was not defined in the original order, but was to be delineated in a special hearing to be "scheduled as soon as counsel can secure a special chambers date" to determine "whether or not and on what terms, including priority, if any, Post-Petition Trade Creditors shall be entitled to the benefit of and granted a charge against, and security interest in, the Property, as security for indebtedness incurred to them from and after the date of the Special Hearing" (AB 33-34). The parties charged with scheduling that hearing were Smoky River, the monitor, the Petitioners, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Canadian National Railway Company. Their failure to convene the hearing has led to costly litigation and the appeals before us.

19 Parties in a CCAA proceeding, with the supervision of a CCAA judge, may define a post-petition trade creditors' charge as they see fit. Because they failed to do so in this case, the court must attempt to balance the interests of the parties. Most secured creditors are already protected, as they obtained an order capping the PPTC Charge at $7 million. Creditors who extended credit to Smoky River under the PPTC Charge have no similar protection. However, they are taken to understand the purpose of the CCAA and to expect that the PPTC Charge would be interpreted to accord with the commercial reality that the insolvent business would operate in its ordinary course. Therefore, while we accept the CCAA judge's requirement that to qualify, a debt must have been incurred in connection with the daily operating activities of Smoky River, in the circumstances of this case, we interpret that requirement on commercially reasonable terms.

THE APPEALS

20 The appeals have been consolidated. The CCAA judge's decisions, grounds of appeal and our conclusions are as follows:

Appeal of Coneco Equipment Inc.

21 Coneco Equipment Inc. leased heavy equipment to Smoky River during the CCAA period. The CCAA judge decided that Coneco was a post-petition trade creditor, entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge for the rental fee. Coneco appeals, asking for a declaration that it is also entitled to participate in the PPTC Charge for the cost of repairs to the equipment.

22 Coneco argues that the provisions of the August 17, 1998 order creating the PPTC Charge must be interpreted in a commercially reasonable manner -- in the manner that an unsecured creditor or business person being asked to provide credit would interpret them. It contends that it was commercially reasonable to assume that repair costs to the equipment leased to Smoky River were part of the terms of credit, and would be included in the PPTC Charge. Conoco bases its argument on the lease agreements, which provided that Smoky River would pay the repair costs.

23 The application of commercially reasonable terms to Conoco's claim for repairs involves applying a legal test to a particular set of facts. We review on a standard of correctness.

24 Coneco was clearly a post-petition trade creditor. The covenant to repair the equipment was just as much a term of the lease and a term of credit as Smoky River's obligation to pay rent. The repair costs were not a damage claim, but a clear contractual obligation that arose during the CCAA period. It is not commercially reasonable that Coneco would lease valuable equipment to Smoky River unless Smoky River maintained it in good operating condition. Had there been no obligation to maintain the equipment, the rental rate would have been considerably higher. This interpretation is consistent with commercial reasonableness.

25 The order states that post-petition trade creditors will be paid in accordance with their terms of credit and will have the benefit of the PPTC Charge. The repair costs were part of Coneco's terms of credit and Coneco is entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge. Coneco's appeal is allowed.

Appeal of Finning (Canada)

26 Finning (Canada) also leased heavy equipment to Smoky River during the CCAA period. The CCAA judge decided that Finning was a post-petition trade creditor, and was entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge for rental only. Finning appeals, asking for a declaration that it is also entitled to participate in the PPTC Charge for the costs of the maintenance, repairs, servicing and required change-outs of the leased equipment.

27 Finning relies on the terms and conditions of its leases with Smoky River, which contained a clear obligation to maintain the equipment in good repair and operating condition. In addition, contemporaneous with the execution of the leases, Finning and Smoky River established a maintenance schedule for the equipment. The schedule outlined the number of operating hours the equipment could be used before maintenance, repairs and change-outs were required, and set out the fees Smoky River agreed to pay Finning for the change-outs.

28 Finning's appeal is similar to Coneco's, and the same analysis and standard of review apply. The cost of maintenance, repairs, servicing and required change-outs to the equipment were part of Finning's terms of credit and it is entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge. Finning's appeal is allowed.

Appeal of the Municipal District of Greenview No. 16

29 The CCAA judge ruled that property taxes owed to the Municipal District of Greenview No. 16 were not a "traded commodity" and were not entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge.

30 Greenview appeals, asking for a declaration that it is a post-petition trade creditor entitled to participate in the PPTC Charge for all of its 1999 property tax claim and for the pro-rated portion of its 2000 tax claim for the time period in which Smoky River continued to operate under the protection of the CCAA.

31 Greenview argues that it provided Smoky River with services which were a benefit to Smoky River. It submits that taxes were a necessary obligation incurred by Smoky River in connection with its daily operating activities during the CCAA period, and Greenview is therefore entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge.

32 Trade is defined in *Black's Law Dictionary*, 6 th ed., as "the act or the business of buying and selling for money." In fact, Greenview was not selling its services to Smoky River for money. Counsel for Greenview conceded in oral argument that Greenview did not deny and could not have denied Smoky River the services it provided, although Smoky River did not pay its property taxes. Property taxes are not the purchase price for the services provided by Greenview; instead they are the means of generating the revenue to provide those services.

33 Greenview was not engaged in the act of trading and cannot be a trade creditor. While nothing prevents a government that exchanges goods or services for money from being a trade creditor, in this case the nature of the property tax is determinative.

34 Greenview was not entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge. Its appeal is dismissed.

Appeal of CNR re: Royalty Payments to the Alberta Department of Resource Development

35 The CCAA judge decided that resource royalties on coal leases payable to the Alberta Department of Resource Development were entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge. CNR appeals this decision. It argues that ADRD is not a trade creditor, and that because the royalties in issue are in the nature of a tax, they are not properly considered trade debt.

36 Smoky River was required to pay monthly royalties to the ADRD to keep its most fundamental asset, its coal leases, in good standing. Because Smoky River needed its coal leases to continue its coal mine operations, the ADRD provided goods to Smoky River that were essential to "keeping the lights on" during the CCAA period. The royalty payments were not a tax but an exchange of money for goods, which could properly be characterized as a trade debt. The CCAA judge did not err in deciding that the ADRD was entitled to participate in the PPTC Charge. CNR's appeal is dismissed.

Appeal of CNR re: Vacation Pay

37 The CCAA judge made the receiving order retroactive to April 1, 2000. With the agreement of counsel, he also held that the employees were entitled to the benefit of the PPTC Charge for their vacation pay.

38 CNR appeals these decisions. It argues that the employment relationship is not one which would give rise to a "trade debt". Employees, therefore are not "trade creditors", and as such cannot participate in the PPTC Charge.

39 CNR also argues that because the time and date of bankruptcy is established by s. 2.1(a) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, the CCAA judge did not have the discretion to make that date retroactive. As the date of the receiving order was July 31, 2000, this also was the date of bankruptcy. Accordingly, vacation pay would have been paid before the bankruptcy, would have been given super-priority status under s.109(3) of the *Employment Standards Code*, and should not have been included in the PPTC Charge. CNR argues that including vacation pay in the PPTC Charge diluted the payments to *bona fide* trade creditors.

40 Because the decision to include vacation pay in the PPTC Charge was based on a concession by counsel for all the parties that Smoky River's employees were PPTC creditors for wages and vacation pay accrued during the CCAA period, we will not interfere. However, we offer no opinion whether employees should be characterized as trade creditors or whether wages and vacation pay should be characterized as trade debts. It is also unnecessary for us to decide and we express no opinion whether the CCAA judge erred in making the receiving order retroactive to April 1, 2000. CNR's appeal is dismissed.

Appeal of CNR re: Severance Pay

41 Severance payments calculated under the *Employment Standards Code* were paid to all Smoky River employees whose employment was terminated before March 29, 2000. Severance payments were suspended under the March 29, 2000 order. However, the order indicated that employees' rights were not affected and that the order could not be used to alter their legal entitlement. The CCAA judge decided that severance obligations for employees terminated between March 29 and March 31, 2000 were entitled to benefit from the PPTC Charge.

42 CNR appeals this decision. It argues that employees were not trade creditors and that severance pay was not an obligation that was incurred in connection with the daily operating activities of Smoky River, but rather arose from the cessation or termination of services.

43 In a complex case such as this, a great deal of deference must be given to the CCAA judge. The CCAA judge dealt with more than 100 applications, attempting to balance the rights and equities of many parties. The lack of precision in the initial order of August 17, 1998, and the failure to hold the special hearing to define the scope of the PPTC Charge made this task even more complex.

44 *Alberta v. Bank of Canada* (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 335 (Alta. C.A.), at 337 sets forth the proper standard of review to be taken by an appellate court in these circumstances:

> [The chambers judge] has heard numerous applications and has made many orders and directions with respect to these proceedings. He, better than anyone, has gained insight into the problems relating to this matter and how to attempt to resolve them. At times, no doubt, resolutions to these problems require some innovation. Suffice it to say that we will not lightly interfere with the enormous task undertaken by this chambers judge. We would do so only if clear error is shown.

45 This court also commented on the appropriate standard in *Re Smoky River Coal Ltd.* (1999), 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703 (Alta. C.A.), at 724:

> The fact that an appeal lies only with leave of an appellate court (s. 13, CCAA) suggests that Parliament, mindful that CCAA cases often require quick decision making, intended that most decisions be made by the supervising judge. This supports the view that those decisions should be interfered with only in clear cases.

46 The CCAA judge, in permitting the severance pay to be included in the PPTC Charge, clarified his March 29, 2000 order which expressly stated that it was not meant to alter the legal entitlements of employees. The CCAA judge interpreted his earlier order to mean that employees were to be treated equally: those terminated after March 29 were not to be denied the severance pay that employees terminated before March 29 had received. By deciding that the March 29, 2000 order did not create two classes of employees, the CCAA judge attempted to balance the equities.

47 Based on the unusual circumstances of this case and the standard of review, we dismiss CNR's appeal. In doing so we do not suggest that employees are properly considered trade creditors, or that severance pay is properly included in a PPTC Charge. We offer no opinion on either of these issues.

SUMMARY

48 The appeals of Coneco and Finning are allowed. The appeals of the Municipal District of Greenview No. 16 and CNR are dismissed. The judgment of the CCAA judge will be varied in accordance with these reasons.

Order accordingly.

TAB 16

2014 ONSC 6998
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Cline Mining Corp., Re

2014 CarswellOnt 18943, 2014 ONSC 6998, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 278, 251 A.C.W.S. (3d) 381

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Cline Mining Corporation, New Elk Coal Company LLC and North Central Energy Company

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: December 3, 2014
Judgment: December 3, 2014
Docket: CV-14-10781-00CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for Applicants
J. Swartz for Secured Noteholders
Marc Wasserman, Michael De Lellis for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicants were group of mining companies and subsidiaries — Applicant C Inc. was incorporated in B.C. and did business from head office in Toronto — Other two applicants were subsidiaries incorporated in Colorado, directed from C Inc.'s Toronto head office, with assets in Canada — Applicants sought to recapitalize under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Applicants applied for initial order and, inter alia, orders approving claims process, accepting filing of applicants' plan of compromise and arrangement; authorizing applicants to conduct creditor meetings to approve plan; and approving meeting procedure — Application granted — Each applicant was insolvent and was "debtor company" within meaning of CCAA — Applicants authorized to pay certain pre- and post-filing obligations — Administration charge, directors' charge approved — Monitor appointed as foreign representative for purpose of having CCAA proceedings recognized outside Canada — While it is not usual practice for applicants to request claims procedure order and meetings order concurrently with initial CCAA application, in circumstances it was appropriate to exercise discretion to grant orders requested — It was appropriate to authorize filing of consolidated plan of arrangement to address combined claims against all applicants — "Comeback clause" would allow parties to come back to amend or vary claims procedure order or meetings order.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Cinram International Inc., Re (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 146, 1988 CarswellBC 531, 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 266, 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 150 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2 "company" — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — considered

s. 2(1) "equity claim" — considered

s. 3(1) — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 56 — considered

APPLICATION by debtor companies for initial order and other relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

1 Cline Mining Corporation ("Cline"), New Elk Coal Company LLC ("New Elk"), North Central Energy Company ("North Central") and, together with Cline and New Elk (the "Applicants") are in the business of locating, exploring and developing mineral resource properties, with a focus on gold and metallurgical coal (the "Cline Business"). The Applicants, along with their wholly-owned subsidiary, Raton Basin Analytical LLC ("Raton Basin") and, together with the Applicants (the "Cline Group") have interests in resource properties in Canada, the United States and Madagascar.

2 The Applicants apply for an initial order pursuant to the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and, if granted, the Applicants also seek an order (the "Claims Procedure Order") approving a claims process (the "Claims Procedure") for the identification and determination of claims against the Applicants and their present and former directors and officers. The Applicants also seek an order (the "Meetings Order") *inter alia*: (i) accepting the filing of a plan of compromise and arrangement in respect of the Applicants (the "Plan"); (ii) authorizing the Applicants to call, hold and conduct meetings (the "Meetings") of creditors whose claims are to be affected by the Plan for the purpose of enabling such creditors to consider and vote on a resolution to approve the Plan; and (iii) approving the procedures to be followed with respect to the calling and conduct of the Meetings.

3 The Cline Group has experienced financial challenges that necessitate a recapitalization of the Applicants under the CCAA. As set out in the affidavit of Mr. Matthew Goldfarb, Chief Restructuring Officer and Acting Chief Executive Officer of Cline, the performance of the Cline Business has been adversely affected by the broader industry wide challenges, particularly the protracted downturn in prevailing prices for metallurgical coal. Operations at the New Elk metallurgical coal mine in Colorado (the "New Elk Mine") were suspended in July 2012 because the mine could not operate profitably as a result of a decline in the market price of metallurgical coal. The suspension of mining activities was intended to be temporary. However, Mr. Goldfarb contends that market conditions in the coal industry have not sufficiently recovered and the suspension of full scale mining activities is still in effect.

4 Mr. Goldfarb contends that the Cline Group's other resource investments remain at the feasibility, exploration and/or development stages and the Cline Group's current inability to derive profit from the New Elk Mine has rendered the Applicants unable to meet their financial obligations as they become due.

5 Cline is in default of its 2011 series 10% Senior Secured Notes (the "2011 Notes") as well as its 2013 series 10% Senior Secured Notes (the "2013 Notes", and collectively with the 2011 Notes, the "Secured Notes"). As at December 1, 2014, total obligations in excess of $110 million are owed in respect of the Secured Notes, which matured on June 15, 2014. The Secured Notes were subject to Forbearance Agreements that expired on November 28, 2014 and Mr. Goldfarb contends that the Applicants do not have the ability to repay the Secured Notes.

6 The Secured Notes are issued by Cline and guaranteed by New Elk and North Central. The indenture trustee in respect of the Secured Notes (the "Trustee") holds a first ranking security interest over substantially all the assets of Cline, New Elk and North Central. Mr. Goldfarb states that the amounts owing under the Secured Notes exceed the value of the Cline Business and that there would be no recovery for unsecured creditors if the Trustee were to enforce its security against the Applicants in respect of the Secured Notes.

7 The Secured Notes are held by beneficial owners whose investments are managed by Marret Asset Management Inc. ("Marret"). Marret exercises all discretion and authority in respect of the holders of the Secured Notes (the "Secured Noteholders"). Cline has engaged in discussions with representatives of Marret regarding a consensual recapitalization of the Applicants and these discussions have resulted in a proposed recapitalization transaction that is supported by Marret, on behalf of the Secured Noteholders (the "Recapitalization").

8 Mr. Goldfarb states that if implemented, the Recapitalization would:

a. maintain the Cline Group as a unified corporate enterprise;

b. reduce the Applicants' secured indebtedness by more than $55 million;

c. reduce the Applicants' annual interest expense in the near term;

d. preserve certain tax attributes within the restructured company; and

e. effectuate a reduced debt structure to enable the Cline Group to better withstand prolonged weakness in the price of metallurgical coal.

9 Mr. Goldfarb also states that the Recapitalization would also provide a limited recovery for the Applicants' unsecured creditors, who would otherwise receive no recovery in a security enforcement or asset sale scenario. It is contemplated that the Recapitalization would be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA (the "CCAA Plan) that is recognized in the United States under Chapter 15, Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15").

10 Cline and Marret have entered into a Support Agreement dated December 2, 2014 that sets forth the principal terms of the proposed Recapitalization. Based on Marret's agreement to the Recapitalization (on behalf of the Secured Noteholders), the Applicants have achieved support from their senior ranking creditors, which represent in excess of 95% of the Applicants' total indebtedness.

11 The Applicants seek the Initial Order to stabilize their financial situation and to proceed with the Recapitalization as efficiently as possible, and to this end, the Applicants request that the Court also grant the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order.

12 Cline is a public company incorporated under the laws of British Columbia, with its registered head office located in Vancouver. Cline commenced business under the laws of Ontario in 2003 and Mr. Goldfarb states that its principal office, which serves as the head office and nerve centre of the Cline Group is located in Toronto.

13 Cline is the direct or indirect parent company of New Elk, North Central and Raton Basin. Cline also holds minority interests in Iron Ore Corporation in Madagascar SARL, Strike Minerals Inc. and UMC Energy plc, all of which are exploration companies.

14 Cline is the sole shareholder of New Elk, a limited liability company incorporated pursuant to the laws of Colorado. New Elk holds mining rights in the New Elk Mine and maintains a Canadian bank account with the Bank of Montreal in Toronto.

15 New Elk is the sole shareholder of North Central and Raton Basin, both of which are incorporated pursuant to the laws of Colorado. North Central holds a fee-simple interest in certain coal parcels on which the New Elk Mine is situated and maintains a Canadian bank account with the Bank of Montreal in Toronto. Raton Basis in inactive and is not an applicant in the proceedings.

16 Cline Group prepares its financial statements on a consolidated basis. The required financial statements are in the record. As at August 31, 2014, the Cline Group's liabilities were approximately $99 million. The primary secured liabilities were the 2011 Notes in the principal amount in excess of $71 million, plus accrued and unpaid interest, and the 2013 Notes in the principal amount of approximately $12 million, plus accrued and unpaid interest. Both the 2011 Notes and the 2013 Notes matured on June 15, 2014.

17 Pursuant to an Inter-Creditor Agreement, the 2011 Notes and the 2013 Notes have a first ranking security interest on the property and undertakings of the Applicants and rank *pari passu* as between each other.

18 Cline and New Elk are defendants in an uncertified class action lawsuit alleging that they violated the *WARN Act* by failing to provide personnel who provided services to New Elk with at least 60 days advance written notice of the suspension of both scale production at the New Elk Mine. These allegations are disputed.

19 The Applicants are aware of approximately $3.5 million in other unsecured claims.

20 On December 16, 2013, Cline was unable to make semi-annual interest payments in respect of both the 2011 and 2013 Notes. A Forbearance Agreement was entered into. During the forbearance period, the Applicants engaged Moelis & Company to conduct a comprehensive sale process in an effort to maximize value for the Applicant and its stakeholders (the "Sales Process"). No offers or expressions of interest were received in the Sale Process.

21 The forbearance period expired on November 28, 2014 and Mr. Goldfarb has stated that Marret has confirmed that the Secured Noteholders have given instructions to the Trustee to accelerate the Secured Notes.

22 Accordingly, Cline is immediately required to pay in excess of $110 million in respect of the Secured Notes. Mr. Goldfarb states that the Cline Group does not have the ability to pay these amounts and consequently the Trustee is in a position to enforce its security over the assets and property of the Applicants.

23 In light of these financial conditions, Mr. Goldfarb states that the Applicants are insolvent.

24 Mr. Goldfarb also contends that without the benefit of CCAA protection, there could be an erosion of the value of the Cline Group and that the stay of proceedings under the CCAA is required to preserve the value of the Cline Group.

25 The Applicants are seeking the appointment of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI") as the proposed monitor in these proceedings (the "Monitor").

26 The proposed Initial Order also provides for a court ordered charge (the "Administration Charge") to be granted in favour of the Monitor, its counsel, counsel to the Applicants, the Chief Restructuring Officer (the "CRO") and counsel to Marret in respect of their fees and disbursements incurred at the standard rates and charges. The proposed Administration Charge is an aggregate amount of $350,000.

27 The directors and officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Goldfarb states that in order to continue to carry on business during the CCAA proceedings and in order to conduct the Recapitalization most effectively, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of the board and, accordingly, the proposed Initial Order provides for a court ordered charge (the "Directors' Charge") in the amount of $500,000 to secure the Applicants' indemnification of its directors and officers in respect of liabilities they may incur during the CCAA proceedings. The amount of the Directors' Charge has been calculated based on the estimated exposure of the directors and officers and has been reviewed with the prospective Monitor. The proposed Directors Charge would only apply to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under the D&O insurance policy with AIG Insurance Company of Canada.

28 The Applicants seek to complete the Recapitalization as quickly as reasonably possible and they anticipate that their existing cash resources will provide the Cline Group with sufficient liquidity during the CCAA proceedings.

29 It is also contemplated that foreign recognition proceedings will be sought in Colorado pursuant to Chapter 15. The Applicants seek the authorization for the Monitor to act as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the CCAA proceedings and to seek recognition of these proceedings in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15.

30 Having reviewed the record, including the affidavit of Mr. Goldfarb and the pre-filing report submitted by FTI, I am satisfied that each of the Applicants is "a debtor company" within the meaning of the defined term in s. 2 of the CCAA.

31 Cline is a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA. It is incorporated under the laws of British Columbia with gold development assets in Ontario and does business from its head office in Toronto.

32 New Elk and North Central are incorporated in Colorado, have assets in Canada, namely bank accounts in Toronto and are directed from Cline's head office in Toronto. In my view, each of New Elk and North Central is a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA because it is an incorporated company having assets in Canada.

33 I am also satisfied that the Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition given that Cline has been unable to make interest payments under the Secured Notes, the Secured Notes have matured, the Forbearance Agreement has expired and the Trustee is in a position to enforce its security over the property of the Applicants. Further, I am satisfied that the Applicants are unable to obtain traditional or alternative financing to support the day-to-day operations and there is no reasonable expectation that the Applicants will be able to generate sufficient cash flow from operations to support their existing debt obligations (see: *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to CA refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to SCC refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.)).

34 It is also clear that the Applicants' liabilities far exceed the $5 million threshold amount under the CCAA.

35 In my view, the CCAA applies to the Applicants' as "debtor companies" in accordance with s. 3(1) of the CCAA.

36 The Applicants have filed the required financial information, including audited financial statements and the cash-flow forecast.

37 The Applicants in the Initial Order seek authorization (but not a requirement) to make certain pre-filing payments, including, *inter alia*:

> a. payments to employees of effective wages, benefits and related amounts;
>
> b. the amounts owing to respective individuals working as independent contractors;
>
> c. the fees and disbursements of any consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel or other persons currently retained by the Applicants in respect of the CCAA; and
>
> d. certain expenses incurred by the Applicants in carrying on the business in the ordinary course, that pertains to the period prior to the date of the Initial Order, if, in the opinion of the Applicants and with the consent of the Monitor, the applicable supplier or service provider is critical to the Cline Business and the ongoing operations of the Cline Group.

38 The court has jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor's companies (see: *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])). In granting such authorization, the courts consider a number of factors, including:

> a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;
>
> b. the applicants' need for the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;
>
> c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the monitor;
>
> d. the monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities were appropriate;

e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of goods on hand to meet their needs; and

f. the effect on the debtor's ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

39 In this case, the Applicants are of the view that their employees and certain of their independent contractors, certain suppliers of goods and services and certain providers of permits and licences are critical to the operation of the Cline Business. Mr. Goldfarb believes that such persons should be paid in the ordinary course, including in respect of pre-filing amounts, in order to avoid disruption to the Applicants' operations during the CCAA proceedings.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the present circumstances to grant the Applicants the authority to pay certain pre and post-filing obligations, subject to the terms and conditions in the proposed Initial Order.

41 Turning now to the request for the Administration Charge, s. 11.52 of the CCAA expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant the Administration Charge. In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), the court noted that s. 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provide a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. The list of factors to consider include:

a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

f. the position of the monitor.

42 The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary for the reasons set forth in Mr. Goldfarb's affidavit at paragraphs 133 - 140.

43 I am satisfied that in these circumstances, the granting of the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary and that it is appropriate for the court to exercise its jurisdiction to grant the Administration Charge in the amount of $350,000.

44 The Applicants also seek a Directors' Charge in the amount of $500,000.

45 Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis. The court has granted director and officer charges in a number of cases including *Canwest Global*, *supra*, *Canwest Publishing*, *supra*, *Cinram*, *supra* and *SkyLink*, *supra.*

46 The Applicants submit that the Directors' Charge is warranted and necessary and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for the court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the charge in the amount of $500,000.

47 For the reasons set out in Mr. Goldfarb's affidavit at paragraphs 134 - 138, I accept these submissions.

48 The Applicants have also indicated that, with the assistance of the Monitor as foreign representative, they intend to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Pursuant to s. 56 of the CCAA, the court has the authority to appoint a foreign representative of the Applicants for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside of Canada.

49 The Applicants seek authorization for each of the Applicants and the Monitor to apply to any court for recognition of the Initial Order and authorization for the Monitor to act as representative in respect of these CCAA proceedings for the purpose of having the CCAA proceedings recognized outside of Canada.

50 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to appoint the Monitor as foreign representative of the Applicants with respect to these proceedings.

51 The Applicants, in their factum, also address the issue of the Applicants' "center of main interest" as being in Ontario. These submissions are set out at paragraphs 77 - 84 of the Applicants' Factum.

52 Although the submissions are of interest, the determination of the Applicants' "center of main interest" ("COMI") is an issue to be considered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, rather than this court.

53 The Applicants also seek a postponement of the Annual Shareholders Meeting. The previous Annual Meeting of Cline was held on August 15, 2013 and therefore Cline was required by statute to hold an annual general meeting by November 15, 2014.

54 Mr. Goldfarb states that it would serve no purpose for Cline to call and hold its annual meeting of Shareholders given that the Shareholders of Cline no longer have an economic interest in Cline as a result of the insolvency. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate for the court to exercise its jurisdiction to relieve Cline from its obligation to call and hold its annual meeting of Shareholders until after the termination of the CCAA proceedings or further order of the court. In support of this request, the Applicants reference *Canwest Global*, *supra* and *SkyLink*, *supra.*

55 In my view, the request to postpone the annual Shareholders meeting is appropriate in the circumstances and is granted.

56 In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications required to obtain the requested relief under the CCAA and the Initial Order is granted in the form presented.

57 The Applicants also request two additional orders that they believe are necessary to advance the Recapitalization:

> a. an order establishing a process for the identification and determination of claims against the Applicants and their present and former directors and officers (the Claims Procedure Order); and
>
> b. an order authorizing the Applicants to file the Plan and to convene meetings of their affected creditors to consider and vote on the Plan (the Meetings Order).

58 The Applicants seek the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order at this stage because they wish to effectuate the recapitalization as efficiently as possible. Further, the Applicants submit that the "comeback clauses" included in the draft Claims Procedure Order and Meetings Order ensure that no party is prejudiced by the granting of such order at this time.

59 The Applicants have submitted a factum in support of the Claims Procedure Order and Meetings Order. In the factual background to the Recapitalization and proposed Plan, the Claims Procedure and the meeting of creditors is set out at paragraphs 8 - 29 of the factum. For informational purposes, these paragraphs are set out in Appendix "A" to this Endorsement.

60 The issues to be considered on this motion are whether:

> (a) it is appropriate to proceed with the Claims Procedure;
>
> (b) it is appropriate to permit the Applicants to file the Plan and call the meetings;

(c) the proposed classification of creditors is appropriate; and

(d) a consolidated plan is appropriate in the circumstances.

61 In *SkyLink*, *supra* at paragraph 35, I noted that while it is not the usual practice for applicants to request claims procedure and meetings order concurrently with an initial CCAA application, the court has granted such relief in appropriate circumstances. The support for a restructuring proposal from the only creditors with an economic interest, and the existence of a comeback hearing at which any issues in respect of the orders can be addressed, are two factors that militate in favour of granting the Claims Procedure and Meetings Order concurrently with the initial application.

62 In my view, the foregoing comment is applicable in these proceedings.

63 I also note that both the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order provide that any interested party that wishes to amend the Claims Procedure Order or the Meetings Order, as applicable, can bring a motion on a comeback date to be set by the court.

64 I also accept that most of the Applicants' known creditors are familiar with the Applicants and the Cline Business and the determination of most of the claims against the Applicants would be carried out by the Applicants using the Notice of Claim Procedure. As such, the Applicants submit that a claims bar date of January 13, 2015 will provide sufficient time for creditors to assert their claims and will not result in any prejudice to said creditors.

65 Based on the submissions of the Applicants, I accept this submission.

66 Accordingly, I am satisfied that the court should exercise its discretion and grant the requested Claims Procedure Order at this time.

67 Turning now to the issue as to whether it is appropriate to permit the Applicants to file the Plan and call the meetings, the court is not required to address the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan at this stage.

68 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Meetings Order at this time in order to allow the Meetings Procedure to proceed concurrently with the Claims Procedure, with a view to completing the Recapitalization as efficiently as possible.

69 Commencing at paragraph 42 of the factum, the Applicants make submissions with respect to the proposed classification of creditors for voting purposes.

70 The Applicants submit that the holders of the 2011 Notes and the 2013 Notes have a commonality of interest in respect of their *pro rata* share of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim and should be placed in the same class for voting purposes.

71 For the purposes of the motion today, I am prepared to accept that it is appropriate for the Secured Noteholders to vote in the same class in respect of their Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim.

72 The Affected Unsecured Creditors' Class includes creditors with unsecured claims against the Applicants, including the Secured Noteholders in respect of their Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim and, if applicable, Marret in respect of the Marret Unsecured Claim. The Applicants submit that the affected Unsecured Creditors have a commonality of interest and should be placed in the same class for voting purposes.

73 It is noted that the determination of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim has been determined by the Applicants and Marret and, for purposes of voting at the Secured Noteholders Meeting, is set at $17.5 million.

74 For the purposes of the motion today, I am prepared to accept the submissions of the Applicants including their determination of the affected Unsecured Creditors class.

75 The *WARN Act* plaintiffs class consists of potential members of an uncertified class action proceeding. The Applicants submit that the *WARN Act* claims have been asserted by only two *WARN Act* plaintiffs on behalf of other potential members of the class and these claims have not been proven and are contested by the Applicants.

76 Due to the unique nature and status of these claims, the Applicants have offered the *WARN Act* plaintiffs consideration that is different than the consideration offered to the Affected Unsecured Creditors.

77 I accept, for the purposes of this motion, that the *WARN Act* plaintiffs should be placed in a separate class for voting purposes.

78 With respect to holders of "Equity Claims", the Meetings Order provides that any person with a claim that meets the definition of "equity claim" under s. 2(1) of the CCAA will have no right to, and will not, vote at meetings; and the Plan provides that equity claimants will not receive a distribution under the Plan or otherwise recover anything in respect of their equity claims or equity interest.

79 For the purposes of this motion, I accept the submission of the Applicants that it is appropriate for equity claimants to be prohibited from voting on the Plan.

80 The Plan as proposed by the Applicants is a consolidated plan of arrangement that is intended to address the combined claims against all the Applicants. Courts will authorize a consolidated plan of arrangement to be filed for two or more related companies in appropriate circumstances (see, for example: *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 266 (B.C. S.C.); *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])).

81 In this case, the Applicants submit that a consolidated plan is appropriate because:

a. New Elk is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cline and North Central is a wholly-owned subsidiary of New Elk;

b. the Applicants are integrated members of the Cline Group, and there is significant sharing of business functions within the Cline Group;

c. the Applicants have prepared consolidated financial statements;

d. all three of the Applicants are obligors in respect of the Secured Notes;

e. the Secured Noteholders are the only creditors with an economic interest in any of the three Applicants and have a first ranking security interest over all or substantially all of the assets, property and undertakings of each of the Applicants;

f. the *WARN Act* claims are asserted against both Cline and New Elk under a "single employer" theory of liability;

g. North Central has no known liabilities other than its obligations in respect of the Secured Notes;

h. Unsecured Creditors of the Applicants would receive no recovery outside of the Plan; and

i. the filing of a consolidated plan does not prejudice any affected Unsecured Creditor or *WARN Act* plaintiff, since a consolidated plan will not eliminate any veto position with respect to approval of the plan that such creditors would have if separate plans of arrangement were filed in respect of each of the Applicants.

82 For the purposes of the motion today, I accept these submissions and consider it appropriate to authorize the filing of a consolidated plan.

83 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant both the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order at this time.

84 It is specifically noted that the "comeback clause" that is included in both the Claims Procedure and the Meetings Orders will allow parties to come back before this court to amend or vary the Claims Procedure Order or the Meetings Order. The comeback hearing has been scheduled for Monday, December 22, 2014.

Application granted.

Appendix "A"

A. Recapitalization and Proposed Plan

(1) Overview of the Recapitalization

8. The Applicants have been actively engaged in discussions with Marret, on behalf of the Secured Noteholders, regarding a possible recapitalization of the Applicants. The Applicants believe that that the Recapitalization, in the circumstances, is in the best interests of the Applicants and their stakeholders. The Recapitalization provides for, *inter alia*, the following:

(a) the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim will be compromised, released and discharged as against the Applicants upon implementation of the Plan (the "*Plan Implementation Date*") for new Cline common shares representing 100% of the equity in Cline (the "*New Cline Common Shares*"), and new indebtedness in favour of the Secured Noteholders in the principal amount of $55 million (the "*New Secured Debt*");

(b) Cline will be the borrower and New Elk and North Central will be the guarantors of the New Secured Debt, which will be evidenced by a credit agreement with a term of seven (7) years, bearing interest at a rate of 0.01% per annum plus an additional variable interest payable only once the Applicants have achieved certain operating revenue targets;

(c) the claims of Affected Unsecured Creditors, which exclude the WARN Act Plaintiffs but include the Secured Noteholders in respect of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim, will be compromised, released and discharged as against the Applicants on the Plan Implementation Date in exchange for an unsecured, subordinated, non-interest bearing entitlement to receive $225,000 from Cline on the date that is eight (8) years from the Plan Implementation Date (the "*Unsecured Plan Entitlement*");

(d) notwithstanding the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim, the Secured Noteholders will waive their entitlement to the proceeds of the Unsecured Plan Entitlement, and all such proceeds will be available for distribution to the other Affected Unsecured Creditors with valid claims who are entitled to the Unsecured Plan Entitlement, allocated on a *pro rata* basis;

(e) all Affected Unsecured Creditors with Affected Unsecured Claims of up to $10,000 will, instead of receiving their *pro rata* share of the Unsecured Plan Entitlement, be paid in cash for the full value of their claim and will be deemed to vote in favour of the Plan unless they indicate otherwise, provided that this cash payment will not apply to any Secured Noteholder with respect to its Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim;

(f) all WARN Act Claims will be compromised, released and discharged as against the Applicants on the Plan Implementation Date in exchange for an unsecured, subordinated, non-interest bearing entitlement to receive $100,000 from Cline on the date this is eight (8) years from the Plan Implementation Date (the "*WARN Act Plan Entitlement*");

(g) certain claims against the Applicants, including claims covered by insurance, certain prior-ranking secured claims of equipment providers and the secured claim of Bank of Montreal in respect of corporate credit card payables, will remain unaffected by the Plan;

(h) existing equity interests in Cline will be cancelled for no consideration; and

(i) the shares of New Elk and North Central will not be affected by the Recapitalization and will remain owned by Cline and New Elk, respectively.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 124; Application Record, Tab 4.

9. Any Affected Creditor with a Disputed Distribution Claim will not be entitled to receive any distribution under the Plan with respect to such Disputed Distribution Claim unless and until such Claim becomes an Allowed Affected Claim. A Disputed Distribution Claim will be resolved in the manner set out in the Claims Procedure Order.

Plan, Section 3.6.

10. Unaffected Creditors will not be affected by the Plan and will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan in respect of their Unaffected Claims (except to the extent their Unaffected Claims are paid in full on the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the express terms of the Plan).

Plan, Sections 1.1, 2.3 and 3.5.

11. If implemented, the Recapitalization would result in a reduction of over $55 million in interest-bearing debt.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 126; Application Record, Tab 4.

12. The proposed Recapitalization is supported by Marret, which has the ability to exercise all discretion and authority of the Secured Noteholders. Consequently, the proposed Recapitalization is supported by 100% of the Secured Noteholders, both as secured creditors of the Applicants and as unsecured creditors of the Applicants in respect of the portion of their claims that is unsecured.

Goldfarb Affidavit at paras. 63, 67 and 145; Application Record, Tab 4.

(2) Classification for Purposes of Voting on the Plan

13. The only classes of creditors for the purposes of considering and voting on the Plan will be (i) the Secured Noteholders Class, (ii) the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class, and (iii) the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class.

Plan, Section 3.2.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 153; Application Record, Tab 4.

14. The Secured Noteholders Class consists of the Secured Noteholders in respect of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim, being the portion of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim against the Applicants that is designated as secured. Each Secured Noteholder will be entitled to vote its *pro rata* portion of that amount in the Secured Noteholders Class.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 154; Application Record, Tab 4.

15. The Affected Unsecured Creditors Class consists of the unsecured creditors of the Applicants who are to be affected by the Plan, excluding the WARN Act Plaintiffs (who are addressed in a separate class). The Affected Unsecured Creditors Class includes the Secured Noteholders in respect of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim, being the portion of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim that is designated as unsecured. Each Secured Noteholder will be entitled to vote its *pro rata* portion of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim in the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 155; Application Record, Tab 4.

16. Within the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class, unsecured creditors with Affected Unsecured Claims of up to $10,000 will be paid in full and will be deemed to vote in favour of the Plan, unless they indicate otherwise.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 156; Application Record, Tab 4.

17. The WARN Act Plaintiffs Class consists of all WARN Act Plaintiffs in the WARN Act Class Action who may assert WARN Act Claims against the Applicants. Each WARN Act Plaintiff will be entitled to vote its *pro rata* portion of all WARN Act Claims.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 157; Application Record, Tab 4.

18. Unaffected Creditors and Equity Claimants are not entitled to vote on the Plan at the Meetings in respect of their Unaffected Claims and Equity Claims, respectively.

Plan, Sections 3.4(3) and 3.5.

19. The Plan provides that, if the Plan is not approved by the required majorities of both the Unsecured Creditors Class and the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class, or the Applicants determine that such approvals are not forthcoming, the Applicants are permitted to withdraw the Plan and file an amended and restated plan with the features described on Schedule "B" to the Plan (the "Alternate Plan"). The Alternate Plan would provide, *inter alia*, that all unsecured claims and all WARN Act Claims against the Applicants would be treated as unaffected claims, the only voting class under the Alternate Plan would be the Secured Noteholders Class, and all assets of the Applicants would be transferred to an entity designated by the Secured Noteholders in exchange for a release of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 125; Application Record, Tab 4.

B. Claims Procedure

20. The Applicants wish to commence the Claims Procedure as soon as possible to ascertain all of the Claims against the Applicants for the purpose of voting and receiving distributions under the Plan.

21. Liabilities and claims against the Applicants that the Applicants are aware of, include, *inter alia*, secured obligations in respect of the Secured Notes, secured obligations in respect of leased equipment used at the New Elk Mine, contingent claims for damages and other amounts in connection with certain pending litigation claims against the Applicants, and unsecured liabilities in respect of accounts payable relating to ordinary course trade and employee obligations.

Goldfarb Affidavit at paras. 52-57; Application Record, Tab 4.

22. The draft Claims Procedure Order provides a process for identifying and determining claims against the Applicants and their directors and officers, including, *inter alia*, the following:

(a) Cline, with the consent of Marret, will determine the aggregate of all amounts owing by the Applicants under the 2011 Indenture and the 2013 Indenture up to the Filing Date, such aggregate amounts being the "*Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim*";

(b) the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim will be apportioned between the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim and the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim (being the amount of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim that is designated as unsecured in the Plan);

(c) the Monitor will send a Claims Package to all Known Creditors, which Claims Package will include a Notice of Claim specifying the Known Creditor's Claim against the Applicants for voting and distribution purposes, as

valued by the Applicants based on their books and records, and specifying whether the Known Creditor's Claim is secured or unsecured;

(d) the Claims Procedure Order contains provisions allowing a Known Creditor to dispute its Claim as set out in the applicable Notice of Claim for either voting or distribution purposes or with respect to whether such Claim is secured or unsecured, and sets out a procedure for resolving such disputes;

(e) the Monitor will publish a notice to creditors in The Globe and Mail (National Edition), the Denver Post and the Pueblo Chieftain to solicit Claims against the Applicants by Unknown Creditors who are as yet unknown to the Applicants;

(f) the Monitor will deliver a Claims Package to any Unknown Creditor who makes a request therefor prior to the Claims Bar Date, containing a Proof of Claim to be completed by such Unknown Creditor and filed with the Monitor prior to the Claims Bar Date;

(g) the proposed Claims Bar Date for Proofs of Claim for Unknown Creditors and for Notices of Dispute in the case of Known Creditors is January 13, 2015;

(h) the Claims Procedure Order contains provisions allowing the Applicants to dispute a Proof of Claim as against an Unknown Creditor and provides a procedure for resolving such disputes for either voting or distribution purposes and with respect to whether such claim is secured or unsecured;

(i) the Claims Procedure Order allows the Applicants to allow a Claim for purposes of voting on the Plan without prejudice to whether that Claim has been accepted for purposes of receiving distributions under the Plan;

(j) where the Applicants or the Monitor send a notice of disclaimer or resiliation to any Creditor after the Filing Date, such notice will be accompanied by a Claims Package allowing such Creditor to make a claim against the Applicants in respect of a Restructuring Period Claim;

(k) the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date, in respect of claims arising on or after the date of the Applicants' CCAA filing, will be seven (7) days after the day such Restructuring Period Claim arises;

(l) for purposes of the matters set out in the Claims Procedure Order in respect of any WARN Act Claims: (i) the WARN Act Plaintiffs will be treated as Unknown Creditors since the Applicants are not aware of (and have not quantified) any bona fide claims of the WARN Act Plaintiffs; and (ii) Class Action Counsel shall be entitled to file Proofs of Claim, Notices of Dispute of Revision and Disallowance, receive service and notice of materials and to otherwise deal with the Applicants and the Monitor on behalf of the WARN Act Plaintiffs, provided that Class Action Counsel shall require an executed proxy in order to cast votes on behalf of any WARN Act Plaintiffs at the WARN Act Plaintiffs' Meeting; and

(m) Creditors may file a Proof of Claim with respect to a Director/Officer Claim.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 151; Application Record, Tab 4.

23. As further discussed below, the Applicants may elect to proceed with the Meetings notwithstanding that the resolution of Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure may not be complete. The Meetings Order provides for the separate tabulation of votes cast in respect of Disputed Voting Claims and provides that the Monitor will report to the Court on whether the outcome of any vote would be affected by votes cast in respect of Disputed Voting Claims.

Goldfarb Affidavit at paras. 161(f)-(h) and 162; Application Record, Tab 4.

24. The Claims Procedure Order includes a comeback provision providing interested parties who wish to amend or vary the Claims Procedure Order with the ability to appear before the Court or bring a motion on a date to be set by this Court.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para 149; Application Record, Tab 4.

C. Meetings of Creditors

25. It is proposed that the Meetings to vote on the Plan will be held at Goodmans LLP, 333 Bay Street, Suite 3400, Toronto, Ontario on January 21, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. for the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class, 11:00 a.m. for the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class, and 12:00 p.m. for the Secured Noteholders Class.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 160; Application Record, Tab 4. Meetings Order, Section 20.

26. The draft Meetings Order provides for, *inter alia*, the following in respect of the governance of the Meetings:

(a) an officer of the Monitor will preside as the chair of the Meetings;

(b) the only parties entitled to attend the Meetings are the Eligible Voting Creditors (or their proxyholders), representatives of the Monitor, the Applicants, Marret, all such parties' financial and legal advisors, the Chair, the Secretary, the Scrutineers, and such other parties as may be admitted to a Meeting by invitation of the Applicants or the Chair;

(c) only Creditors with Voting Claims (or their proxyholders) are entitled to vote at the Meetings; provided that, in the event a Creditor holds a Disputed Voting Claim as at the date of a Meeting, such Disputed Voting Claim may be voted at the Meeting but will be tabulated separately and will not be counted for any purpose unless such Claim is ultimately determined to be a Voting Claim;

(d) each WARN Act Plaintiff (or its proxyholder) shall be entitled to cast an individual vote on the Plan as part of the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class, and Class Action Counsel shall be permitted to cast votes on behalf of those WARN Act Plaintiffs who have appointed Class Action Counsel as their proxy;

(e) the quorum for each Meeting is one Creditor with a Voting Claim, provided that if there are no WARN Act Plaintiffs voting in the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class, the Applicants will have the right to combine the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class with the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and proceed without a vote of the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class, in which case there shall be no WARN Act Plan Entitlement under the Plan;

(f) the Monitor will keep separate tabulations of votes in respect of:

i. Voting Claims; and

ii. Disputed Voting Claims, if any;

(g) the Scrutineers will tabulate the vote(s) taken at each Meeting and will determine whether the Plan has been accepted by the required majorities of each class; and

(h) the results of the vote conducted at the Meetings will be binding on each creditor of the Applicants whether or not such creditor is present in person or by proxy or voting at a Meeting.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 161; Application Record, Tab 4.

27. The Applicants may elect to proceed with the Meetings notwithstanding that the resolution of Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure may not be complete. The Meetings Order, if approved, authorizes and directs the Scrutineers to tabulate votes in respect of Voting Claims separately from votes in respect of Disputed Voting Claims, if any. If the approval or non-approval of the Plan may be affected by the votes cast in respect of Disputed Voting Claims, then the Monitor will report such matters to the Court and the Applicants and the Monitor may seek advice and directions at that

time. This way, the Meetings can proceed concurrently with the Claims Procedure without prejudice to the Applicants' Creditors.

Goldfarb Affidavit at paras. 161(f)-(h) and 162; Application Record, Tab 4.

28. Like the Claims Procedure Order, the Meetings Order includes a comeback provision providing interested parties who wish to amend or vary the Meetings Order with the ability to appear before the Court or bring a motion on a date to be set by the Court.

Meetings Order, Section 68.

29. By seeking the Claims Procedure Order and the Meetings Order concurrently, the Applicants hope to move efficiently and expeditiously towards the implementation of the Recapitalization.

Goldfarb Affidavit at para. 148; Application Record, Tab 4.

TAB 17

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished
Most Recent Distinguished: Bauscher-Grant Farms Inc. v. Lake Diefenbaker Potato Corp. | 1998 CarswellSask 335, 167 Sask. R. 14, [1998] S.J. No. 344, 80 A.C.W.S. (3d) 62, [1998] 8 W.W.R. 751 | (Sask. Q.B., May 11, 1998)

1993 CarswellOnt 183
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992
Judgment: January 6, 1993
Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison* and *Melissa J. Kennedy* , for applicants.
L. Crozier , for Royal Bank of Canada.
R.C. Heintzman , for Bank of Montreal.
J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and *James Hilton* , for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.
Jay Schwartz , for Citibank Canada.
Stephen Golick , for Peat Marwick Thorne * Inc., proposed monitor.
John Teolis , for Fuji Bank Canada.
Robert Thorton , for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.i General principles

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 , Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, *(*sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.)* 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — *referred to*

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — *referred to*

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — *considered*

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — *referred to*

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — *referred to*

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — *referred to*

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — *referred to*

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon)* 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.)* 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

***Farley J.*:**

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act* , R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately $370 million, LPC $45 million and LPC II $7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately $543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

(a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.

(b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

(c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.

(d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.

(e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.

(f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.

(g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.

(h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and

(i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 ; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) , at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's*

Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) , at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.) . It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

> 11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act* , whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> (*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(*b*) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(*c*) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

> The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

> 8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik* , unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained

CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

> 5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.* , unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

> In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these* . (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

> **The Power to Stay**
>
> The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) , and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:
>
> > 106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.
>
> Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.
>
> Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure* . The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.
>
> **The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings**
>
> By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) , and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

> To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct* against the debtor company *the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period* .

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance* , supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems* , supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

> Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach)* [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.) .
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> In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 , appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.)* 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.) , Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

> The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:
>
> > (1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships* , (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure* , O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership* , 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,

1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

> The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test* , (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

Footnotes

* As amended by the court.

TAB 18

2016 BCSC 107
British Columbia Supreme Court

Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc., Re

2016 CarswellBC 158, 2016 BCSC 107, [2016] B.C.W.L.D. 844,
23 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 201, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 300, 33 C.B.R. (6th) 60

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as Amended

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. and the Other Petitioners Listed on Schedule "A"

Fitzpatrick J.

Heard: January 5, 2016
Judgment: January 5, 2016
Written reasons: January 26, 2016
Docket: Vancouver S1510120

Counsel: Marc Wasserman, Mary I.A. Buttery, Tijana Gavric, Joshua Hurwitz, for Petitioners
John Sandrelli, Tevia Jeffries, for United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust
Matthew Nied, for Steering Committee of First Lien Creditors of Walter Energy, Inc.
Aaron Welch, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia
Kathryn Esaw, for Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc.
Peter Reardon, Wael Rostom, Caitlin Fell, for KPMG Inc., Monitor
Neva Beckie, for Canada Revenue Agency
Stephanie Drake, for United States Steel Workers, Local 1-424

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Insolvent corporations ("petitioners") were granted initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Petitioners were on path towards equity or debt restructuring, or sale and liquidation of their assets — Petitioners brought application for approval of sale and solicitation process, appointment of professionals to manage that process, key employee retention plan, and extension of stay — Application granted — Proposed sale and investment solicitation process represented best opportunity to restructure as going concern, was reasonable, was not opposed by any stakeholders, and was approved — It was appropriate to appoint chief restructuring officer (CRO) and financial advisor, as they were necessary for successful restructuring — Petitioners' assets and operations were significantly complex so as to justify appointments and proposed compensation and charges — Recommendations for financial advisor and CRO were accepted as being most qualified candidates — Key employee retention plan was approved, even in light of earlier salary raise and pension plan's objections, as employee was most senior remaining executive — Loss of this person's expertise now or during process would be extremely detrimental to chances of successful restructuring — Stay that was

granted under initial order was extended in order to provide sufficient time to solicit letters of intent — Union was not entitled to proceed with its claims as it was not imperative that they be determined now.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Fitzpatrick J.*:

CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies Ltd. (2012), 2012 ONSC 1750, 2012 CarswellOnt 3158, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Forest & Marine Financial Corp., Re (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738, 54 C.B.R. (5th) 201, [2009] 9 W.W.R. 567, 96 B.C.L.R. (4th) 77, 273 B.C.A.C. 271, 461 W.A.C. 271 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd. (2007), 2007 SKQB 121, 2007 CarswellSask 157, 33 C.B.R. (5th) 39, (sub nom. *Bricore Land Group Ltd., Re)* 296 Sask. R. 64 (Sask. Q.B.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 2840, 2012 CarswellOnt 5922, 94 C.B.R. (5th) 69 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sahlin v. Nature Trust of British Columbia Inc. (2010), 2010 BCCA 516, 2010 CarswellBC 3510, 296 B.C.A.C. 126, 503 W.A.C. 126 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re (2014), 2014 ONSC 6145, 2014 CarswellOnt 16465, 20 C.B.R. (6th) 116 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Yukon Zinc Corp., Re (2015), 2015 BCSC 1961, 2015 CarswellBC 3121, 5 P.P.S.A.C. (4th) 9 (B.C. S.C.) — followed

8440522 Canada Inc., Re (2013), 2013 ONSC 6167, 2013 CarswellOnt 13921, 8 C.B.R. (6th) 86 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1974, Pub.L 93-406; 88 Stat. 829; 29 U.S.C. 18

Generally — referred to

s. 1001 — referred to

Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244

Generally — referred to

s. 54 — considered

APPLICATION by insolvent corporations for extension of stay of proceedings and other relief to lead to potential restructuring.

***Fitzpatrick J.*:**

Introduction and Background

1 On December 7, 2015, I granted an initial order in favour of the petitioners, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("*CCAA*").

2 The "Walter Group" is a major exporter of metallurgical coal for the steel industry, with mines and operations in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. The petitioners comprise part of the Canadian arm of the Walter Group and are known as the "Walter Canada Group". The Canadian entities were acquired by the Walter Group only recently in 2011.

3 The Canadian operations principally include the Brule and Willow Creek coal mines, located near Chetwynd, B.C., and the Wolverine coal mine, near Tumbler Ridge, B.C. The mine operations are conducted through various limited partnerships. The petitioners include the Canadian parent holding company and the general partners of the partnerships. Given the complex corporate structure of the Walter Canada Group, the initial order also included stay provisions relating to the partnerships: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Forest & Marine Financial Corp., Re*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 21.

4 The timing of the Canadian acquisition could not have been worse. Since 2011, the market for metallurgical coal has fallen dramatically. This in turn led to financial difficulties in all three jurisdictions in which the Walter Group operated. The three Canadian mines were placed in care and maintenance between April 2013 and June 2014. The mines remain in this state today, at an estimated annual cost in excess of $16 million. Similarly, the U.K. mines were idled in 2015. In July 2015, the U.S. companies in the Walter Group filed and sought creditor protection by filing a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U.S. *Bankruptcy Code*. It is my understanding that the U.S. entities have coal mining operations in Alabama and West Virginia.

5 From the time of the granting of the initial order, it was apparent that the outcome of the U.S. proceedings would have a substantial impact on the Walter Canada Group. A sales process completed in the U.S. proceeding is anticipated to result in a transfer of the U.S. assets to a stalking horse bidder sometime early this year. This is significant because the U.S. companies have historically supported the Canadian operations with funding and provided essential management services. This is a relevant factor in terms of the proposed relief, as I will discuss below.

6 The Walter Canada Group faces various significant contingent liabilities. The various entities are liable under a 2011 credit agreement of approximately $22.6 million in undrawn letters of credit for post-mining reclamation obligations. Estimated reclamation costs for all three mines exceed this amount. Further obligations potentially arise with respect to the now laid-off employees of the Wolverine mine, who are represented by the United Steelworkers, Local 1-424 (the "Union"). If these employees are not recalled before April 2016, the Wolverine partnership faces an estimated claim of $11.3 million. As I will discuss below, an even more significant contingent liability has also recently been advanced.

7 This anticipated "parting of the ways" as between the U.S. and Canadian entities in turn prompted the filing of this proceeding, which is intended to provide the petitioners with time to develop a restructuring plan. The principal goal of that plan, as I will describe below, is to complete a going concern sale of the Canadian operations as soon as possible. Fortunately, as of early December 2015, the Walter Canada Group has slightly in excess of US$40.5 million in cash resources to fund the restructuring efforts. However, ongoing operating costs remain high and are now compounded by the restructuring costs.

8 As was appropriate, the petitioners did not seek extensive orders on December 7, 2015, given the lack of service on certain major stakeholders. A stay was granted on that date, together with other ancillary relief. KPMG Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "Monitor").

9 The petitioners now seek relief that will set them on a path to a potential restructuring; essentially, an equity and/or debt restructuring or alternatively, a sale and liquidation of their assets. That relief includes approving a sale and solicitation process and the appointment of further professionals to manage that process and complete other necessary management functions. They also seek a key employee retention plan. Finally, the petitioners seek an extension of the stay to early April 2016.

10 For obvious reasons, the financial and environmental issues associated with the coal mines loom large in this matter. For that reason, the Walter Canada Group has engaged in discussions with the provincial regulators, being the B.C. Ministry of Energy and Mines and the B.C. Ministry of the Environment, concerning the environmental issues and the proposed restructuring plan. No issues arise from the regulators' perspective at this time in terms of the relief on this application. Other stakeholders have responded to the application and contributed to the final terms of the relief sought.

11 The stakeholders appearing on this application are largely supportive of the relief sought, save for two.

12 Firstly, the United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust (the "1974 Pension Plan") opposes certain aspects of the relief sought as to who should be appointed to conduct the sales process.

13 The status of the 1974 Pension Plan arises from somewhat unusual circumstances. One of the U.S. entities, Jim Walter Resources, Inc. ("JWR") is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the 1974 Pension Plan (the "CBA"). In late December 2015, the U.S. bankruptcy court issued a decision that allowed JWR to reject the CBA. The court also ordered that the sale of the U.S. assets would be free and clear of any liabilities under the CBA. As a result, the 1974 Pension Plan has filed a proof of claim in the U.S. proceedings advancing a contingent claim against JWR with respect to a potential "withdrawal liability" under U.S. law of approximately US$900 million. The U.S. law in question is the *Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974*, 29 USC § 101, as amended, which is commonly referred to as "*ERISA*".

14 The 1974 Pension Plan alleges that it is only a matter of time before JWR formally rejects the CBA. In that event, the 1974 Pension Plan contends that *ERISA* provides that all companies under common control with JWR are jointly and severally liable for this withdrawal liability, and that some of the entities in the Walter Canada Group come within this provision.

15 It is apparent at this time that neither the Walter Canada Group nor the Monitor has had an opportunity to assess the 1974 Pension Plan's contingent claim. No claims process has even been contemplated at this time. Nevertheless, the standing of the 1974 Pension Plan to make submissions on this application is not seriously contested.

16 Secondly, the Union only opposes an extension of the stay of certain proceedings underway in this court and the Labour Relations Board in relation to some of its employee claims, which it wishes to continue to litigate.

17 At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the orders sought by the petitioners, with reasons to follow. Hence, these reasons.

The Sale and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP")

18 The proposed SISP has been developed by the Walter Canada Group in consultation with the Monitor. By this process, bidders may submit a letter of intent or bid for a restructuring, recapitalization or other form of reorganization of the business and affairs of the Walter Canada Group as a going concern, or a purchase of any or all equity interests held by Walter Energy Canada. Alternatively, any bid may relate to a purchase of all or substantially all, or any portion of the Walter Canada Group assets (including the Brule, Willow Creek and Wolverine mines).

19 It is intended that the SISP will be led by a chief restructuring officer (the "CRO"), implemented by a financial advisor (both as discussed below) and supervised by the Monitor.

20 Approvals of SISPs are a common feature in *CCAA* restructuring proceedings. The Walter Canada Group refers to *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies Ltd.*, 2012 ONSC 1750 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). At para. 6, Brown J. (as he then was) stated that in reviewing a proposed sale process, the court should consider:

> (i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;
>
> (ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,
>
> (iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

21 Although the court in *CCM Master Qualified Fund* was considering a sales process proposed by a receiver, I agree that these factors are also applicable when assessing the reasonableness of a proposed sales process in a *CCAA* proceeding: see *PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2840 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 17-19.

22 In this case, the proposed timelines would see a deadline of March 18 for letters of intent, due diligence thereafter with a bid deadline of May 27 and a target closing date of June 30, 2016. In my view, the timeline is reasonable, particularly with regard to the need to move as quickly as possible to preserve cash resources pending a sale or investment; or, in the worst case scenario, to allow the Walter Canada Group to close the mines permanently. There is sufficient flexibility built into the SISP to allow the person conducting it to amend these deadlines if the circumstances justify it.

23 The SISP proposed here is consistent with similar sales processes approved in other Canadian insolvency proceedings. In addition, I agree with the Monitor's assessment that the SISP represents the best opportunity for the Walter Canada Group to successfully restructure as a going concern, if such an opportunity should arise.

24 No stakeholder, including the 1974 Pension Plan, opposed this relief. All concerned recognize the need to monetize, if possible, the assets held by the Walter Canada Group. I conclude that the proposed SISP is reasonable and it is approved.

Appointment of Financial Advisor and CRO

25 The more contentious issues are who should conduct the SISP and manage the operations of the Walter Canada Group pending a transaction and what their compensation should be.

26 The Walter Canada Group seeks the appointment of a financial advisor and CRO to assist with the implementation of the SISP.

27 In restructuring proceedings it is not unusual that professionals are engaged to advance the restructuring where the existing management is either unable or unwilling to bring the required expertise to bear. In such circumstances, courts have granted enhanced powers to the monitor; otherwise, the appointment of a CRO and/or financial advisor can be considered.

28 A consideration of this issue requires some context in terms of the current governance status of the Walter Canada Group. At present, there is only one remaining director, who is based in West Virginia. The petitioners' counsel does not anticipate his long-term involvement in these proceedings and expects he will resign once the U.S. sale completes. Similarly, the petitioners have been largely instructed to date by William Harvey. Mr. Harvey is the executive vice-president and chief financial officer of Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc., one of the petitioners. He lives in Birmingham, Alabama. As with the director, the petitioners' counsel expects him to resign in the near future.

29 The only other high level employee does reside in British Columbia, but his expertise is more toward operational matters, particularly regarding environmental and regulatory issues.

30 Accordingly, there is a legitimate risk that the Walter Canada Group ship may become rudderless in the midst of these proceedings and most significantly, in the midst of the very important sales and solicitation process. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that the management support traditionally provided by the U.S. entities will not be provided after the sale of the U.S. assets. Significant work must be done to effect a transition of those shared services in order to allow the Canadian operations to continue running smoothly. It is anticipated that the CRO will play a key role in assisting in this transition of the shared services.

31 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that professional advisors are not just desirable, but indeed necessary, in order to have a chance for a successful restructuring. Both appointments ensure that the SISP will be implemented by professionals who will enhance the likelihood that it generates maximum value for the Walter Canada Group's stakeholders. In addition, the appointment of a CRO will allow the Canadian operations to continue in an orderly fashion, pending a transaction.

32 The proposal is to retain PJT Partners LP ("PJT") as a financial advisor and investment banker to implement the SISP. PJT is a natural choice given that it had already been retained in the context of the U.S. proceedings to market the Walter Group's assets, which of course indirectly included the Walter Canada Group's assets. As such, PJT is familiar with the assets in this jurisdiction, knowledge that will no doubt be of great assistance in respect of the SISP.

33 In addition, the proposal is to retain BlueTree Advisors Inc. as the CRO, by which it would provide the services of William E. Aziz. Mr. Aziz is a well-known figure in the Canadian insolvency community; in particular, he is well known for having provided chief restructuring services in other proceedings (see for example *8440522 Canada Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 6167 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 17). No question arises as to his extensive qualifications to fulfil this role.

34 The materials as to how Mr. Aziz was selected were somewhat thin, which raised some concerns from the 1974 Pension Plan as to the appropriateness of his involvement. However, after submissions by the petitioners' counsel, I am satisfied that there was a thorough consideration of potential candidates and their particular qualifications to undertake what will no doubt be a time-consuming and complex assignment. In that regard, I accept the recommendations of the petitioners that Mr. Aziz is the most qualified candidate.

35 The Monitor was involved in the process by which PJT and BlueTree/Mr. Aziz were selected. It has reviewed both proposals and supports that both PJT and BlueTree are necessary appointments that will result in the Walter Canada Group obtaining the necessary expertise to proceed with its restructuring efforts. In that sense, such appointments fulfill the requirements of being "appropriate", in the sense that that expertise will assist the debtor in achieving the objectives of the *CCAA*: see s. 11; *ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd.*, 2007 SKQB 121 (Sask. Q.B.) at para. 19.

36 The 1974 Pension Plan does not mount any serious argument against the need for such appointments, other than to note that the costs of these retainers will result in a very expensive process going forward. The matter of PJT and the CRO's compensation was the subject of some negative comment by the 1974 Pension Plan. However, the 1974 Pension Plan did not suggest any alternate way of proceeding with the SISP and the operations generally. When pressed by the Court on the subject, the 1974 Pension Plan acknowledged that time was of the essence in implementing the SISP and it did not contend that a further delay was warranted to canvas other options.

37 PJT is to receive a monthly work fee of US$100,000, although some savings are achieved since this amount will not be charged until the completion of the U.S. sale. In addition, PJT will receive a capital raising fee based on the different types of financing that might be arranged. Lastly, PJT is entitled to a transaction or success fee, based on the consideration received from any transaction.

38 At the outset of the application, the proposed compensation for the CRO was similar to that of PJT. The CRO was to obtain a monthly work fee of US$75,000. In addition, the CRO was to receive a transaction or success fee based on the consideration received from any transaction. After further consideration by the petitioners and BlueTree, this proposed compensation was subsequently renegotiated so as to limit the success fee to $1 million upon the happening of a "triggering event" (essentially, a recapitalization, refinancing, acquisition or sale of assets or liabilities).

39 To secure the success fees of PJT and the CRO, the Walter Canada Group seeks a charge of up to a maximum of $10 million, with each being secured to a limit of half that amount. Any other fees payable by the Walter Canada Group to PJT and the CRO would be secured by the Administration Charge granted in the initial order.

40 The jurisdiction to grant charges for such professional fees is found in s. 11.52 of the *CCAA*:

> 11.52(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of
>
> (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
>
> (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
>
> (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

41 In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 22, Justice Wilton-Siegel commented on the necessity of such a charge in a restructuring, as it is usually required to ensure the involvement of these professionals and achieve the best possible outcome for the stakeholders. I concur in that sentiment here, as the involvement of PJT and BlueTree is premised on this charge being granted.

42 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 54, Justice Pepall (as she then was) set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether the proposed compensation is appropriate and whether charges should be granted for that compensation:

> (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
>
> (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
>
> (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
>
> (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
>
> (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
>
> (f) the position of the Monitor.

43 I am satisfied that the Walter Canada Group's assets and operations are significantly complex so as to justify both these appointments and the proposed compensation. I have already referred to the significant regulatory and environmental issues that arise. In addition, relevant employment issues are already present. Any transaction relating to these assets and operations will be anything but straightforward.

44 The factors relating to the proposed role of the professionals and whether there is unwarranted duplication can be addressed at the same time. As conceded by the petitioners' and Monitor's counsel, there will undoubtedly be some

duplication with the involvement of the Monitor, PJT and the CRO. However, the issue is whether there is *unwarranted* duplication of effort. I am satisfied that the process has been crafted in a fashion that recognizes the respective roles of these professionals but also allows for a coordinated effort that will assist each of them in achieving their specific goals. Each has a distinct focus and I would expect that their joint enterprise will produce a better result overall.

45 Any consideration of compensation will inevitably be driven by the particular facts that arise in the proceedings in issue. Even so, I have not been referred to any material that indicates that the proposed compensation and charge in favour of PJT and the CRO are inconsistent with compensation structures and protections approved in other similarly complex insolvency proceedings. In that regard, I accept the petitioners' submissions that the task ahead justifies both the amount of the fees to be charged and the protections afforded by the charge. In short, I find that the proposed compensation is fair and reasonable in these circumstances.

46 The secured creditors likely to be affected by the charges for PJT and the CRO's fees have been given notice and do not oppose the relief being sought.

47 Finally, the Monitor is of the view that the agreed compensation of PJT and the CRO and the charge in their favour are appropriate.

48 In summary, all circumstances support the relief sought. Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to appoint the CRO and approve the engagement of PJT on the terms sought. In addition, I grant a charge in favour of PJT and the CRO to a maximum of $10 million to secure their compensation beyond the monthly work fees, subject to the Administration Charge, the Director's Charge and the KERP Charge (as discussed below).

Key Employee Retention Plan ("KERP")

49 The Walter Canada Group also seeks approval of a KERP, for what it describes as a "key" employee needed to maintain the Canadian operations while the SISP is being conducted. In addition, Mr. Harvey states that this employee has specific information which the CRO, PJT and the Monitor will need to draw on during the implementation of the SISP.

50 The detailed terms of the KERP are contained in a letter attached to Mr. Harvey's affidavit #3 sworn December 31, 2015. In the course of submissions, the Walter Canada Group sought an order to seal this affidavit, on the basis that the affidavit and attached exhibit contained sensitive information, being the identity of the employee and the compensation proposed to be paid to him.

51 I was satisfied that a sealing order should be granted with respect to this affidavit, based on the potential disclosure of this personal information to the public: see *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para. 53; *Sahlin v. Nature Trust of British Columbia Inc.*, 2010 BCCA 516 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 6. A sealing order was granted on January 5, 2016.

52 The proposed KERP must be considered in the context of earlier events. This individual was to receive a retention bonus from the U.S. entities; however, this amount is now not likely to be paid. In addition, just prior to the commencement of these proceedings, this person was given a salary increase to reflect his additional responsibilities, including those arising from the loss of support and the shared services from the U.S. entities. This new salary level has not been disclosed to the court or the stakeholders.

53 The Walter Canada Group has proposed that this employee be paid a retention bonus on the occurrence of a "triggering event", provided he remains an active employee providing management and other services. The defined triggering events are such that the retention bonus is likely to be paid whatever the outcome might be. In addition, to secure the payment of the KERP to this employee, Walter Energy Canada seeks a charge up to the maximum amount of the retention bonus.

54 The amount of the retention bonus is large. It has been disclosed in the sealed affidavit but has not been disclosed to certain stakeholders, including the 1974 Pension Plan. The Monitor states in its report:

> The combination of the salary increase and proposed retention bonus ... were designed to replace the retention bonus previously promised to the KERP Participant by Walter Energy U.S.

55 I did not understand the submissions of the 1974 Pension Plan to be that the granting of a KERP for this employee was inappropriate. Rather, the concern related to the amount of the retention bonus, which is to be considered in the context of the earlier salary raise. At the end of the day, the 1974 Pension Plan was content to leave a consideration of the level of compensation to the Court, given the sealing of the affidavit.

56 The authority to approve a KERP is found in the courts' general statutory jurisdiction under s. 11 of the *CCAA* to grant relief if "appropriate": see *U.S. Steel Canada* at para. 27.

57 As noted by the court in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 506 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 72, KERPs have been approved in numerous insolvency proceedings, particularly where the retention of certain employees was deemed critical to a successful restructuring.

58 Factors to be considered by the court in approving a KERP will vary from case to case, but some factors will generally be present. See for example, *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); and *U.S. Steel Canada* at paras. 28-33.

59 I will discuss those factors and the relevant evidence on this application, as follows:

a) Is this employee important to the restructuring process?: In its report, the Monitor states that this employee is the most senior remaining executive in the Walter Canada Group, with extensive knowledge of its assets and operations. He was involved in the development of the Wolverine mine and has extensive knowledge of all three mines. He also has strong relationships in the communities in which the mines are located, with the Group's suppliers and with the regulatory authorities. In that sense, this person's expertise will enhance the efforts of the other professionals to be involved, including PJT, the CRO and the Monitor: *U.S. Steel* at para. 28;

b) Does the employee have specialized knowledge that cannot be easily replaced?: I accept that the background and expertise of this employee is such that it would be virtually impossible to replace him if he left the employ of the Walter Canada Group: *U.S. Steel* at para. 29;

c) Will the employee consider other employment options if the KERP is not approved?: There is no evidence here on this point, but I presume that the KERP is more a prophylactic measure, rather than a reactionary one. In any event, this is but one factor and I would adopt the comments of Justice Newbould in *Grant Forest Products* at paras. 13-15, that a "potential" loss of this person's employment is a factor to be considered;

d) Was the KERP developed through a consultative process involving the Monitor and other professionals?: The Monitor has reviewed the proposed KERP, but does not appear to have been involved in the process. Mr. Harvey confirms the business decision of the Walter Canada Group to raise this employee's salary and propose the KERP. The business judgment of the board and management is entitled to some deference in these circumstances: *Grant Forest Products* at para. 18; *U.S. Steel Canada* at para. 31; and

e) Does the Monitor support the KERP and a charge?: The answer to this question is a resounding "yes". As to the amount, the Monitor notes that the amount of the retention bonus is at the "high end" of other KERP amounts of which it is aware. However, the Monitor supports the KERP amount even in light of the earlier salary increase and after considering the value and type of assets under this person's supervision and the critical nature of his involvement in the restructuring. As this Court's officer, the views of the Monitor are also entitled to considerable deference by this Court: *U.S. Steel* at para. 32.

60 In summary, the petitioners' counsel described the involvement of this individual in the *CCAA* restructuring process as "essential" or "critical". These sentiments are echoed by the Monitor, who supports the proposed KERP and charge to secure it. The Monitor's report states that this individual's ongoing employment will be "highly beneficial" to the Walter Canada Group's restructuring efforts, and that this employee is "critical" to the care and maintenance operations at the mines, the transitioning of the shared services from the U.S. and finally, assisting with efforts under the SISP.

61 What I take from these submissions is that a loss of this person's expertise either now or during the course of the *CCAA* process would be extremely detrimental to the chances of a successful restructuring. In my view, it is more than evident that there is serious risk to the stakeholders if this person does not remain engaged in the process. Such a result would be directly opposed to the objectives of the *CCAA*. I find that such relief is appropriate and therefore, the KERP and charge to secure the KERP are approved.

Cash Collateralization / Intercompany Charge

62 Pursuant to the initial order, the Walter Canada Group was authorized and directed to cash collateralize all letters of credit secured by the 2011 credit agreement within 15 days of any demand to do so from the administrative agent, Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc. ("Morgan Stanley"). This order was made on the basis of representations by the Monitor's counsel that it had obtained a legal opinion that the security held by Morgan Stanley was valid and enforceable against the Walter Canada Group.

63 On December 9, 2015, Morgan Stanley demanded the cash collateralization of approximately $22.6 million of undrawn letters of credit. On December 21, 2015, Morgan Stanley requested that the Walter Canada Group enter into a cash collateral agreement (the "Cash Collateral Agreement") to formalize these arrangements.

64 The Walter Canada Group seeks the approval of the Cash Collateral Agreement, which provides for the establishment of a bank account containing the cash collateral and confirms Morgan Stanley's pre-filing first-ranking security interest in the cash in the bank account. The cash collateralization is intended to relate to letters of credit issued on behalf of Brule Coal Partnership, Walter Canadian Coal Partnership, Wolverine Coal Partnership and Willow Creek Coal Partnership. However, only the Brule Coal Partnership has sufficient cash to collateralize all these letters of credit.

65 Accordingly, the Walter Canada Group seeks an intercompany charge in favour of Brule Coal Partnership, and any member of the Walter Canada Group, to the extent that a member of the Walter Canada Group makes any payment or incurs or discharges any obligation on behalf of any other member of the Walter Canada Group in respect of obligations under the letters of credit. The intercompany charge is proposed to rank behind all of the other court-ordered charges granted in these proceedings, including the charges for PJT and the CRO and the KERP.

66 No objection is raised in respect of this relief. The Monitor is of the view that the intercompany charge is appropriate.

67 In my view, this relief is simply a formalization of the earlier authorization regarding the trusting up of these contingent obligations. On that basis, I approve the Cash Collateral Agreement. I also approve the intercompany charge in favour of the Brule Coal Partnership, on the basis that it is necessary to preserve the *status quo* as between the various members of the Walter Canada Group who will potentially benefit from the use of this Partnership's funds. Such a charge will, as stated by the Monitor, protect the interests of creditors as against the individual entities within the Walter Canada Group.

Stay Extension

68 In order to implement the SISP, and further its restructuring efforts in general, the Walter Canada Group is seeking an extension of the stay and other relief granted in the initial order until April 5, 2016.

69 Section 11.02(2) and (3) of the *CCAA* authorizes the court to make an order extending a stay of proceedings granted in the initial application. In this case, the evidence, together with the conclusions of the Monitor, support that

an extension is appropriate and that the petitioners are acting in good faith and with due diligence. No stakeholder has suggested otherwise.

70 As noted above, it is anticipated that the Walter Canada Group will have sufficient liquidity to continue operating throughout the requested stay period.

71 Further, as the Phase 1 deadline in the SISP is March 18 2016, an extension of the stay until April 5, 2016 will provide sufficient time for PJT to solicit, and the CRO (in consultation with the Monitor and PJT) to consider, any letters of intent. At that time, the process may continue to Phase 2 of the SISP, if the CRO, in consultation with the Monitor and PJT, deems it advisable. In any event, at the time of the next court date, there will be a formal update to the court and the stakeholders on the progress under the SISP.

72 The only issue relating to the extension of the stay arises from the submissions of the Union, who represents the employees at the Wolverine mine owned and operated by the Wolverine Coal Partnership ("Wolverine LP"). The Union wishes to continue with certain outstanding legal proceedings outstanding against Wolverine LP, as follows:

> a) In June 2015, the B.C. Labour Relations Board (the "Board") found that Wolverine LP was in breach of s. 54 of the *Labour Relations Code*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 224 (the "*Code*"). The Board ordered Wolverine LP to pay $771,378.70 into trust by way of remedy. This was estimated to be the amount of damages owed by Wolverine LP, but the Union took the position that further amounts are owed. In any event, this amount was paid and is currently held in trust;
>
> b) In November 2015, Wolverine LP filed a proceeding in this court seeking a judicial review of the Board's decision on the s. 54 issue. As a result, the final determination of the damages arising from the *Code* breach has not yet occurred and may never occur if Wolverine LP succeeds in its judicial review; and
>
> c) Following layoffs in April 2014, the Union claimed that a "northern allowance" was payable by Wolverine LP to the employees, including those on layoff. This claim was rejected at arbitration, and upheld on review at the Board. In February 2015, the Union filed a proceeding in this court seeking a judicial review of the Board's decision.

73 The Union's counsel has referred me to my earlier decision in *Yukon Zinc Corp., Re*, 2015 BCSC 1961 (B.C. S.C.). There, I summarized the principles that govern applications by a creditor to lift the stay of proceedings to litigate claims:

> [26] There is also no controversy concerning the principles which govern applications by creditors under the *CCAA* to lift the stay of proceedings to litigate claims in other courts or forums, other than by the procedures in place in the restructuring proceedings:
>
> > a) the lifting of the stay is discretionary: *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, 2011 ONSC 2215, at paras. 19, 27;
> >
> > b) there are no statutory guidelines and the applicant faces a "very heavy onus" in making such an application: *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)* (2009), 61 C.B.R. (5th) 200, at para. 32, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) (Ont. S.C.J.) ("*Canwest* (2009)"), as applied in *Azure Dynamics Corporation (Re)*, 2012 BCSC 781, at para. 5 and *505396 B.C. Ltd. (Re)*, 2013 BCSC 1580, at para. 19;
> >
> > c) there are no set circumstances where a stay will or will not be lifted, although examples of situations where the courts have lifted stay orders are set out in *Canwest* (2009) at para. 33;
> >
> > d) relevant factors will include the status of the *CCAA* proceedings and what impact the lifting of the stay will have on the proceedings. The court may consider whether there are sound reasons for doing so consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA*, including a consideration of the relative prejudice to parties and, where relevant, the merits of the proposed action: *Canwest* (2009) at para. 32;

e) particularly where the issue is one which is engaged by a claims process in place, it must be remembered that one of the objectives of the *CCAA* is to promote a streamlined process to determine claims that reduces expense and delay; and

f) as an overarching consideration, the court must consider whether it is in the interests of justice to lift the stay: *Canwest* (2009); *Azure Dynamics* at para. 28.

74 I concluded that the Union had not met the "heavy onus" on it to justify the lifting of the stay to allow these various proceedings to continue. My specific reasons are:

a) The Union argues that the materials are essentially already assembled and that these judicial reviews can be scheduled for short chambers matters. As such, the Union argues that there is "minimal prejudice" to Wolverine LP. While this may be so, proceeding with these matters will inevitably detract both managerial and legal focus from the primary task at hand, namely to implement the SISP, and as such, potentially interfere with the restructuring efforts;

b) The Union argues that any purchaser of Wolverine LP's mine will inherit outstanding employee obligations pursuant to the *Code*. Accordingly, the Union argues that it will be more attractive to a buyer for the mine to have all outstanding employee claims resolved. Again, while this may come to pass, such an argument presupposes an outcome that is anything less than clear at this time. Such a rationale is clearly premature;

c) The Union argues that it is unable to distribute the $771,378.70 to its members until Wolverine LP's judicial review is addressed. Frankly, I see this delay as the only real prejudice to the Union members. However, on the other hand, one might argue that the Union members are in a favourable position with these monies being held in trust as opposed to being unsecured creditors of Wolverine. In any event, the Union's claim to these monies has not yet been determined and arises from a dispute that dates back to April 2014. Therefore, there is no settled liability that would allow such payment to be made; and

d) The Union claims that these matters must be determined "in any event" and that they should be determined "sooner rather than later". However, the outcome of the SISP may significantly affect what recovery any creditor may hope to achieve in this restructuring. In the happy circumstance where there will be monies to distribute, I expect that a claims process will be implemented to determine valid claims, not only in respect of the Union's claims, but all creditors.

75 In summary, there is nothing to elevate the Union's claims such that it is imperative that they be determined now. There is nothing to justify the distraction and expense of proceeding with these actions to the detriment of the restructuring efforts. If it should come to pass that monies will be distributed to creditors, such as the Union, then I expect that the usual claims process will be implemented to decide the validity of those claims.

76 In the meantime, if it becomes necessary to determine the validity of these claims quickly (such as to clarify potential successor claims for a purchaser), the Union will be at liberty to renew its application to lift the stay for that purpose.

77 Accordingly, I grant an extension of the stay of proceedings and other ancillary relief until April 5, 2016.

Application granted.

TAB 19

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001
Judgment: April 26, 2002
Docket: 28020

Proceedings: reversing (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 970, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: *J. Brett Ledger* and *Peter Chapin*, for appellant

Timothy J. Howard and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada

Graham Garton, Q.C., and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure; Evidence; Environmental

Evidence --- Documentary evidence — Privilege as to documents — Miscellaneous documents

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/

98-106, R. 151, 312.

Practice --- Discovery — Discovery of documents — Privileged document — Miscellaneous privileges

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Practice --- Discovery — Examination for discovery — Range of examination — Privilege — Miscellaneous privileges

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Preuve --- Preuve documentaire — Confidentialité en ce qui concerne les documents — Documents divers

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Communication des documents — Documents confidentiels — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Interrogatoire préalable — Étendue de l'interrogatoire —

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

Confidentialité — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

The federal government provided a Crown corporation with a $1.5 billion loan for the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China. An environmental organization sought judicial review of that decision, maintaining that the authorization of financial assistance triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. The Crown corporation was an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review. The Crown corporation filed an affidavit by a senior manager referring to and summarizing confidential documents. Before cross-examining the senior manager, the environmental organization applied for production of the documents. After receiving authorization from the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the Crown corporation sought to introduce the documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and requested a confidentiality order. The confidentiality order would make the documents available only to the parties and the court but would not restrict public access to the proceedings.

The trial judge refused to grant the order and ordered the Crown corporation to file the documents in their current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. The Crown corporation appealed under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and the environmental organization cross-appealed under R. 312. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The confidentiality order would have been granted by the dissenting judge. The Crown corporation appealed.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Publication bans and confidentiality orders, in the context of judicial proceedings, are similar. The analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles set out in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). A confidentiality order under R. 151 should be granted in only two circumstances, when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

The alternatives to the confidentiality order suggested by the Trial Division and Court of Appeal were problematic. Expunging the documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution. Providing summaries was not a reasonable alternative measure to having the underlying documents available to the parties. The confidentiality order was necessary in that disclosure of the documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the Crown corporation, and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting the order.

The confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the Crown corporation's right to a fair trial and on freedom of expression. The deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal. If the order was not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the Crown corporation was not required to mount a defence under the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, it was possible that the Crown corporation would suffer the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. The salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects.

Le gouvernement fédéral a fait un prêt de l'ordre de 1,5 milliards de dollar en rapport avec la construction et la vente par une société d'État de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU à la Chine. Un organisme environnemental a sollicité le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision, soutenant que cette autorisation d'aide financière avait déclenché l'application de l'art. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*. La société d'État était intervenante au débat et elle avait reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire. Elle a déposé l'affidavit d'un cadre supérieur dans lequel ce dernier faisait référence à certains documents confidentiels et en faisait le résumé. L'organisme environnemental a demandé la production des documents avant de procéder au contre-interrogatoire du cadre supérieur. Après avoir obtenu l'autorisation des autorités chinoises de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, la société d'État a cherché à les introduire en invoquant la r. 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et elle a aussi demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon les termes de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, les documents seraient uniquement mis à la disposition des parties et du tribunal, mais l'accès du public aux débats ne serait pas interdit.

Le juge de première instance a refusé l'ordonnance de confidentialité et a ordonné à la société d'État de déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une forme révisée, à son gré. La société d'État a interjeté appel en vertu de la r. 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et l'organisme environnemental a formé un appel incident en vertu de la r. 312. Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d'appel ont rejeté le pourvoi et le pourvoi incident. Le juge dissident aurait accordé l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La société d'État a interjeté appel.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Il y a de grandes ressemblances entre l'ordonnance de non-publication et l'ordonnance de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la r. 151 devrait refléter les principes sous-jacents énoncés dans l'arrêt *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Une ordonnance de confidentialité rendue en vertu de la r. 151 ne devrait l'être que lorsque: 1) une telle ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le cadre d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres solutions raisonnables pour écarter ce risque; et 2) les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris les effets sur les droits des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris les effets sur le droit à la liberté d'expression, lequel droit comprend l'intérêt du public à l'accès aux débats judiciaires.

Les solutions proposées par la Division de première instance et par la Cour d'appel comportaient toutes deux des problèmes. Épurer les documents serait virtuellement impraticable et inefficace. Fournir des résumés des documents ne constituait pas une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base. L'ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la communication des documents menacerait gravement un intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'existait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance.

L'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression. Elle n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression. Advenant que l'ordonnance ne soit pas accordée et que, dans le cadre de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, la société d'État n'ait pas l'obligation de présenter une défense en vertu de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, il se pouvait que la société d'État subisse un préjudice du fait d'avoir communiqué cette information confidentielle en violation de ses obligations, sans avoir pu profiter d'un avantage similaire à celui du droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables.

Cases considered by *Iacobucci J.*:

AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), 1998 CarswellNat 2520, 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428, 161 F.T.R. 15 (Fed. T.D.) — considered

AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), 2000 CarswellNat 356, 5 C.P.R. (4th) 149, 253 N.R. 284, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, 2000 CarswellNat 3254 (Fed. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 2 C.R. (5th) 1, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 182 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 463 A.P.R. 81, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 203 N.R. 169, 1996 CarswellNB 462, 1996 CarswellNB 463, 2 B.H.R.C. 210 (S.C.C.) — followed

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 34 C.R. (4th) 269, 20 O.R. (3d) 816 (note), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, 175 N.R. 1, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 76 O.A.C. 81, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 1994 CarswellOnt 112, 1994 CarswellOnt 1168 (S.C.C.) — followed

Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General) (1989), [1990] 1 W.W.R. 577, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 102 N.R. 321, 71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 273, 103 A.R. 321, 41 C.P.C. (2d) 109, 45 C.R.R. 1, 1989 CarswellAlta 198, 1989 CarswellAlta 623 (S.C.C.) — followed

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437, 82 F.T.R. 147, 1994 CarswellNat 537 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to

Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CarswellOnt 380, 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général), 94 N.R. 167, *(*sub nom. *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General))* [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 24 Q.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 39 C.R.R. 193, 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 CarswellQue 115 (S.C.C.) — followed

M. (A.) v. Ryan, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 207 N.R. 81, 4 C.R. (5th) 220, 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 133, [1997] 4 W.W.R. 1, 85 B.C.A.C. 81, 138 W.A.C. 81, 34 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 42 C.R.R. (2d) 37, 8 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 1997 CarswellBC 99, 1997 CarswellBC 100 (S.C.C.) — considered

N. (F.), Re, 2000 SCC 35, 2000 CarswellNfld 213, 2000 CarswellNfld 214, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 35 C.R. (5th) 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 191 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 577 A.P.R. 181 (S.C.C.) — considered

R. v. E. (O.N.), 2001 SCC 77, 2001 CarswellBC 2479, 2001 CarswellBC 2480, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187, 97 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C.

161, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Keegstra, 1 C.R. (4th) 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 77 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R. 1, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 114 A.R. 81, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 53 O.R. (2d) 719, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally — referred to

s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 11(d) — referred to

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37

Generally — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — referred to

s. 8 — referred to

s. 54 — referred to

s. 54(2)(b) — referred to

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

s. 486(1) — referred to

Rules considered:

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

APPEAL from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (Fed. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (Fed. T.D.), granting application in part.

POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (C.A. Féd.), qui a rejeté le pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (C.F. (1re inst.)), qui avait accueilli en partie la demande.

The judgment of the court was delivered by *Iacobucci J.*:

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and, accordingly, would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

6 In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant filed an

affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Dr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang, which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order; otherwise, it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Dr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

11 *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106

> 151.(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.
>
> (2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments below

A. Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to R. 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondents would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents

because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under R. 312.

22 With respect to R. 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b), which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under R. 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered R. 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

24 In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (Fed. C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

25 Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the in-

clusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

26 Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus, the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

31 Robertson J.A. stated that, although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets," this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

> (1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35

> A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?
>
> B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

(1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

> The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

37 A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, *supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais*, *supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in ac-

cordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

> (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
>
> (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
>
> (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case *R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve *any* important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed

under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

> The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the *Oakes* test", *we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right*. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 *Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be

viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

> A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:
>
> > (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
> >
> > (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in *Mentuck*, *supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of pre-

serving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35 (S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields" where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

(1) Necessity

58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been" accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality

order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEAA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

64 There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and, in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal in the sense that at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

65 Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the Court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are *reasonably* alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits" may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries

alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order

70 As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck*, *supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

71 The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

72 Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 287 N.R. 203, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, REJB 2002-30902, J.E. 2002-803, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219

(b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a *general* principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the *particular* deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.), at p. 976, *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), *per* Dickson C.J., at pp. 762-764. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra*, *supra*, at pp. 760-761. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

76 Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, *per* Wilson J., at pp. 1357-1358. Clearly, the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

77 However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be *promoted* by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents, with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would, in turn, assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by

denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focuses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

81 The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

> It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

83 Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will *always* be engaged where the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the *substance* of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below, where he stated, at para. 87:

> While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nucle-

ar energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish *public* interest from *media* interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public *nature* of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values," we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity."

86 Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application *as a whole* is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

> Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1353-1354:

> One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for

some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the CEAA or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the CEAA are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the CEAA, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on *either* the public interest in freedom of expression *or* the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

90 In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

91 In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the CEAA, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

92 Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

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Date of Printing: Mar 12, 2013

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C 97 K. v. K. (E.), 373 A.R. 69, 2004 CarswellAlta 1553, 2004 ABQB 847, [2005] A.W.L.D. 549, 37 Alta. L.R. (4th) 118 (Alta. Q.B. Nov 22, 2004) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

98 Robertson v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, [2005] 11 W.W.R. 656, 362 A.R. 44, 2004 CarswellAlta 927, 2004 ABQB 519, [2004] A.W.L.D. 478, [2004] A.J. No. 805, 39 Alta. L.R. (4th) 263, 19 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1 (Alta. Q.B. Jul 06, 2004) **(Judicially considered 26 times)**

C 99 Pham Estate, Re, 352 A.R. 307, 2004 CarswellAlta 1864, 2004 ABPC 96, [2005] A.W.L.D. 1474, [2004] A.J. No. 611, 26 Admin. L.R. (4th) 256 (Alta. Prov. Ct. Jun 03, 2004) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

C 100 Sinclair v. Blackmore, 2004 CarswellBC 3523, 49 C.H.R.R. D/232, [2006] B.C.W.L.D. 1180, [2006] B.C.W.L.D. 1196, 2004 BCHRT 37, [2004] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 33 (B.C. Human Rights Trib. May 07, 2004) **(Judicially considered 9 times)**

C 101 Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 253 F.T.R. 178, 2004 CarswellNat 1014, 2004 CarswellNat 3390, 32 C.P.R. (4TH) 203, [2004] F.C.J. No. 684, 2004 FC 567, 2004 CF 567 (F.C. Apr 14, 2004) **(Judicially considered 11 times)**

C 102 Byer v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2004 CarswellNat 175, 2004 CarswellNat 3042, 2004 FC 119, 2004 CF 119 (F.C. Jan 26, 2004) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

H 103 Camoplast Inc. c. Soucy International Inc., 280 F.T.R. 1 (Eng.), 2004 CarswellNat 83, 2004 CarswellNat 4286, 2004 FC 35, 2004 CF 35 (F.C. Jan 19, 2004)

C 104 C. (A.) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 33 Imm. L.R. (3d) 45, 243 F.T.R. 211, 2003 CarswellNat 3976, 2003 CarswellNat 4558, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1861, 2003 FC 1452, 2003 CF 1452 (F.C. Dec 11, 2003) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

H 105 Camoplast Inc. c. Soucy International Inc., 2003 CarswellNat 3817, 2003 CarswellNat 5080, 135 A.C.W.S. (3d) 214, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1791, 2003 FC 1401, 2003 CF 1401 (F.C. Nov 28, 2003) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

106 Jane Doe v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Canada, 341 A.R. 395, 2003 CarswellAlta 1341, 2003 ABQB 794, [2003] A.W.L.D. 488, 37 C.P.C. (5th) 259, [2003] A.J. No. 1165 (Alta. Q.B. Sep 18, 2003) **(Judicially considered 12 times)**

C 107 Doe Estate, Re, 345 A.R. 136, 2003 CarswellAlta 1346, 2003 ABQB 793, 37 C.P.C. (5th) 256, [2003] A.J. No. 1174, 5 E.T.R. (3d) 116 (Alta. Q.B. Sep 18, 2003)

C 108 Ishmela v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 29 Imm. L.R. (3d) 204, 2003 CarswellNat 2178, 2003 CarswellNat 3441, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1085, 2003 FC 838, 2003 CF 838 (F.C. Jul 04, 2003) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

H 109 Hadjiyianni v Berkshire Investment Group Inc., 2003 CarswellOnt 3646 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 25, 2003)

C 110 R. v. Quintal, [2003] 10 W.W.R. 548, 335 A.R. 14, 2003 CarswellAlta 566, 2003 ABPC 79, [2003] A.W.L.D. 307, [2003] A.J. No. 509, 18 Alta. L.R. (4th) 155 (Alta. Prov. Ct. Apr 17, 2003) **(Judicially considered 8 times)**

C 111 Canada (Ministre de la Citoyennete & de l'Immigration) c. Obodzinsky, 31 Imm. L.R. (3d) 251, 230 F.T.R. 253, 2003 CarswellNat 551, 2003 CarswellNat 1351, 2003 FCT 239, 2003 CFPI 239, [2003] A.C.F. No. 370, [2003] F.C.J. No. 370 (Fed. T.D. Feb 26, 2003) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

112 Ritter v. Hoag, 334 A.R. 266, 2003 CarswellAlta 144, 2003 ABQB 88, [2003] A.J. No. 124 (Alta.

Q.B. Feb 06, 2003) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

H 113 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Apotex Inc., 247 F.T.R. 315 (note), 301 N.R. 102, 2003 CarswellNat 251, 2003 CarswellNat 1344, 23 C.P.R. (4TH) 465, 2003 CAF 59, 2003 FCA 59, [2003] F.C.J. No. 143 (Fed. C.A. Jan 30, 2003) **(Judicially considered 4 times)**

C 114 Kobilke v. Phillips, 2003 CarswellOnt 180, [2003] O.J. No. 122 (Ont. S.C.J. Jan 22, 2003) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 115 Prendiville v. 407 International Inc., 2002 CarswellOnt 6164, [2002] O.J. No. 3913 (Ont. S.C.J. Sep 10, 2002) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

H 116 Shibley v St. Joseph's Health Centre, 2002 CarswellOnt 2360 (Ont. S.C.J. Jul 17, 2002)

117 Allerex Laboratory Ltd. v. Dey Laboratories L.P., 2002 CarswellOnt 2723, [2002] O.J. No. 3168 (Ont. Master Jun 28, 2002) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 118 Prendiville v. 407 International Inc., 2002 CarswellOnt 2174, 24 C.P.C. (5th) 184, [2002] O.J. No. 2549 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 27, 2002) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

Considered in

H 119 Pinnacle Capital Resources Ltd. v. Kraus Inc., 2012 CarswellOnt 14138, 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, [2012] O.J. No. 5301, 2012 ONSC 6376 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Nov 09, 2012)

120 Demolition & excavation Demex inc. c. 6745016 Canada inc., 2012 CarswellQue 7586, J.E. 2012-1769, EYB 2012-209528, 2012 QCCS 3528 (C.S. Que. Jul 25, 2012)

H 121 Conseil quebecois sur le tabac & la sante c. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2012 CarswellQue 5861, J.E. 2012-1291, EYB 2012-207718, 2012 QCCS 2581 (C.S. Que. Jun 05, 2012)

122 Centre de la communaute sourde du Montreal metropolitain c. Institut Raymond-Dewar, 2012 CarswellQue 5584, J.E. 2012-1333, EYB 2012-207355, 2012 QCCS 2454 (C.S. Que. Jun 04, 2012)

123 Bergeron c. Montreal (Ville), 2012 CarswellQue 1771, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 663, J.E. 2012-618, EYB 2012-203235, 2012 QCCS 768 (C.S. Que. Mar 05, 2012)

124 Sangha v. Reliance Investment Group Ltd., 2012 CarswellBC 379, 2012 BCSC 127, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 558, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 2792 (B.C. S.C. Jan 26, 2012)

125 Syndicat de l'enseignement de Champlain c. Marie-Victorin (Commission scolaire), 2012 CarswellQue 5741, D.T.E. 2012T-190, EYB 2012-207632 (Que.Arb. Jan 23, 2012)

126 Syndicat de l'enseignement de la Haute-Yamaska c. Val-des-Cerfs (Commission scolaire), 2012 CarswellQue 5740, D.T.E. 2012T-189, EYB 2012-207631 (Que.Arb. Jan 23, 2012)

127 Regent Artiostic & Athletic Management Services Inc. c. Kamar (K-Maro), 2011 CarswellQue 15121, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 81, J.E. 2012-485, EYB 2011-201503, 2011 QCCS 7363 (C.S. Que. Dec 21, 2011)

128 Yarney v. Canada (Deputy Head - Department of Health), 2011 CarswellNat 4597, 2011 CarswellNat 4598, 2011 PSLRB 112, 2011 CRTFP 112 (Unknown Court - Canada Sep 21, 2011)

129 Drouin c. R., 2011 CarswellNat 4710, 2012 D.T.C. 1020 (Fr.), 209 A.C.W.S. (3d) 468, 2011 CCI 425 (T.C.C. (G.P.) Sep 14, 2011)

C 130 X. v. Y., 338 D.L.R. (4th) 156, [2011] 11 W.W.R. 514, 2011 CarswellBC 1874, 2011 BCSC 943, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6760, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 410 (B.C. S.C. Jul 18, 2011) **(Judicially considered**

2 times)

C 131 Foster-Jacques v. Jacques, 336 D.L.R. (4th) 522, 306 N.S.R. (2d) 51, 2011 CarswellNS 492, 968 A.P.R. 51, [2011] W.D.F.L. 4997, 2011 NSSC 290, 23 C.P.C. (7th) 180, 5 R.F.L. (7th) 306 (N.S. S.C. Jul 13, 2011) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

C 132 Globe & Mail v. R., 340 D.L.R. (4th) 371, 520 A.R. 279, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 179, 2011 CarswellAlta 1039, 2011 ABQB 363, [2011] A.W.L.D. 4115, [2011] A.W.L.D. 4132, 97 W.C.B. (2d) 130, [2011] A.J. No. 682 (Alta. Q.B. Jun 23, 2011) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

H 133 Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2011 CarswellNat 2304, 94 C.P.R. (4TH) 173, 2011 FC 505 (F.C. May 24, 2011)

134 Direct Energy Regulated Services, Re, 2011 CarswellAlta 865, [2011] A.W.L.D. 3492, [2011] A.W.L.D. 3494 (Alta. U.C. . May 05, 2011)

C 135 Foster-Jacques v. Jacques, 302 N.S.R. (2d) 329, 2011 CarswellNS 262, 955 A.P.R. 329, 2011 NSSC 174, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 330 (N.S. S.C. May 04, 2011) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 136 Royal Bank v. Walker Hall Winery Ltd., 2011 CarswellOnt 15720, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 90, 2011 ONSC 1877 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Mar 25, 2011) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

137 A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 301 N.S.R. (2d) 34, 2011 CarswellNS 135, 80 C.C.L.T. (3d) 180, 953 A.P.R. 34, 228 C.R.R. (2d) 181, 2011 NSCA 26, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 54 (N.S. C.A. Mar 04, 2011) **(Judicially considered 12 times)**

138 Centre hospitalier universitaire de Quebec c. Geneohm sciences Canada inc., 2011 CarswellQue 335, EYB 2011-185168, 2011 QCCS 110 (C.S. Que. Jan 18, 2011)

139 Villa St-Georges inc. (9103-6475 Quebec inc.) c. Bergeron, 2010 CarswellQue 12131, EYB 2010-182080, 2010 QCCS 5472 (C.S. Que. Nov 04, 2010)

140 Sellathurai, 93 Imm. L.R. (3d) 219, 375 F.T.R. 181 (Eng.), 2010 CarswellNat 4172, 2010 CarswellNat 5654, 2010 FC 1082, 2010 CF 1082, [2012] 2 F.C.R. 218 (F.C. Nov 03, 2010) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 141 Sahlin v. Nature Trust of British Columbia Inc., 296 B.C.A.C. 126, 2010 CarswellBC 3510, 503 W.A.C. 126, 2010 BCCA 516, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 756, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 758 (B.C. [In Chambers] Oct 29, 2010) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 142 Reference re Criminal Code, s. 293, [2011] 4 W.W.R. 536, 2010 CarswellBC 2566, 220 C.R.R. (2d) 200, 2010 BCSC 1351, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 106, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 127, 14 B.C.L.R. (5th) 131 (B.C. S.C. Sep 24, 2010) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

143 Market Surveillance Administrator, Re, 2010 CarswellAlta 1293, [2010] A.W.L.D. 3957 (Alta. U.C. . Jun 11, 2010)

144 A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 293 N.S.R. (2d) 222, 2010 CarswellNS 397, 928 A.P.R. 222, 2010 NSSC 215, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 24 (N.S. S.C. Jun 04, 2010) **(Judicially considered 4 times)**

145 Syncrude Canada Ltd., Re, 2010 CarswellAlta 1278, [2010] A.W.L.D. 3958 (Alta. U.C. . May 14, 2010)

C 146 White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re, 2010 CarswellQue 1780, J.E. 2010-711, [2010] Q.J. No. 1723, EYB 2010-170526, 2010 QCCS 764 (Que. Bktcy. Mar 04, 2010) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 147 Epicept Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2010 CarswellNat 220, 81 C.P.R. (4TH) 277, 2010 FC 120 (F.C. Feb 04, 2010)

148 9008-4062 Quebec inc. c. T.U.A.C. - local 502, 2009 CarswellQue 13997, D.T.E. 2010T-320, EYB 2009-169534 (Que.Arb. Dec 27, 2009)

C 149 Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corp., 2009 CarswellOnt 7952 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Dec 18, 2009) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 150 Orr v. Sojitz Tungsten Resources Inc., 2009 CarswellBC 3221, 2009 BCSC 1635, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 1681 (B.C. S.C. Nov 30, 2009) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

151 Audette c. Societe Radio-Canada, 2009 CarswellQue 9468, J.E. 2009-1795, EYB 2009-164081, 2009 QCCS 4241 (C.S. Que. Sep 23, 2009)

C 152 John Doe v. Nunavut (Commissioner), 2009 CarswellNun 23, 2009 NUCJ 23, 79 C.P.C. (6th) 193 (Nun. C.J. Sep 18, 2009) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 153 Jane Doe v. D'Amelio, 2009 CarswellOnt 5842, 98 O.R. (3d) 387, [2009] O.J. No. 4042, 83 C.P.C. (6th) 67 (Ont. S.C.J. Aug 31, 2009) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

H 154 Canada (Procureur general) c. Groupe Polygone editeurs inc., [2009] R.J.Q. 1951, 2009 CarswellQue 8181, 2009 QCCA 1534 (C.A. Que. Aug 13, 2009) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 155 Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4838, [2009] O.J. No. 4487, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 224 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Jul 28, 2009) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

C 156 J.B. Trust (Trustee of) v. B. (J.) (Litigation Guardian of), 2009 CarswellOnt 3723, 97 O.R. (3d) 544, [2009] W.D.F.L. 3342, [2009] O.J. No. 2693, 50 E.T.R. (3d) 50, 81 C.P.C. (6th) 107 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 29, 2009) **(Judicially considered 4 times)**

157 HudBay Minerals Inc., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 2899, 32 O.S.C.B. 4427 (Ont. Securities Comm. May 21, 2009)

C 158 R. v. Dagenais, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 554, 332 Sask. R. 244, 2009 CarswellSask 186, 189 C.R.R. (2d) 301, 2009 SKQB 104, [2009] S.J. No. 150 (Sask. Q.B. Mar 17, 2009) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

C 159 Almrei, Re, 342 F.T.R. 27 (Eng.), 2009 CarswellNat 690, 2009 CarswellNat 6713, [2009] F.C.J. No. 346, 2009 FC 240, 2009 CF 240, [2010] 2 F.C.R. 165 (F.C. Mar 05, 2009) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

C 160 R. v. Henry, 244 C.C.C. (3d) 175, 270 B.C.A.C. 5, 2009 CarswellBC 439, 187 C.R.R. (2d) 366, 454 W.A.C. 5, 2009 BCCA 86, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 2366 (B.C. [In Chambers] Feb 26, 2009) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

C 161 Harkat, Re, 80 Imm. L.R. (3d) 89, 339 F.T.R. 92 (Eng.), 2009 CarswellNat 436, 2009 CarswellNat 6732, [2009] F.C.J. No. 228, 2009 FC 167, 2009 CF 167 (F.C. Feb 18, 2009) **(Judicially considered 6 times)**

162 Robinson c. Films Cinar inc., 2009 CarswellQue 5517, EYB 2009-159807, 2009 QCCS 2474 (C.S. Que. Jan 28, 2009)

163 GEA Group AG v. Ventra Group Co., 307 D.L.R. (4th) 329, 2009 CarswellOnt 118, 66 C.P.C. (6th) 37 (Ont. S.C.J. Jan 09, 2009)

164 Pet Supplies (USA) Inc. v. Pet Supplies (USA) Inc., 2008 CarswellBC 2107, 2008 BCSC 1336, [2008] B.C.W.L.D. 7487, [2008] B.C.W.L.D. 7488 (B.C. S.C. Oct 08, 2008)

C 165 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 2008 CarswellNat 4162, 2008 CarswellNat 6430, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1593, 2008 FC 892, 2008 CF 892 (F.C. Jul 21, 2008) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

C 166 Root v. Root, 2008 CarswellOnt 3995, [2008] W.D.F.L. 4122, [2008] W.D.F.L. 4135, [2008] W.D.F.L. 4184 (Ont. S.C.J. Jul 08, 2008) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

C 167 Marcotte c. Banque de Montreal, 2008 CarswellQue 8627, J.E. 2008-1477, EYB 2008-146990, 2008 QCCS 3225 (C.S. Que. Jun 20, 2008) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

C 168 Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v. Wang, 318 Sask. R. 221, 2008 CarswellSask 250, 2008 SKQB 126, 61 C.P.C. (6th) 355 (Sask. Q.B. Mar 14, 2008)

C 169 Factor Gas Liquids Inc. v. Lanxess Inc., 2008 CarswellOnt 626 (Ont. Master Feb 12, 2008)

C 170 A. c. B., [2008] R.J.Q. 449, 2008 CarswellQue 667, [2008] R.D.F. 140, J.E. 2008-407, EYB 2008-129298, 2008 QCCS 285 (C.S. Que. Feb 05, 2008)

C 171 Grand River Enterprises v. Burnham, 2007 CarswellOnt 8463, 54 C.P.C. (6th) 195 (Ont. S.C.J. Dec 21, 2007)

172 Societe Radio-Canada c. Quebec (Juge de la Cour du Quebec), 2007 CarswellQue 13641, J.E. 2008-383, EYB 2007-132186 (Que. Bktcy. Dec 19, 2007)

C 173 Moore v. Bertuzzi, 2007 CarswellOnt 8533, 88 O.R. (3d) 499, 88 O.R. (3d) 519, 163 A.C.W.S. (3d) 364, [2007] O.J. No. 5113, 51 C.P.C. (6th) 10 (Ont. Master Dec 17, 2007) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

H 174 B. (A.) v. D. (C.), 426 A.R. 352, 2007 CarswellAlta 1091, 2007 ABQB 516, [2007] A.W.L.D. 3490, 78 Alta. L.R. (4th) 327, 45 C.P.C. (6th) 266 (Alta. Q.B. Aug 15, 2007)

C 175 Blue Line Hockey Acquisition Co. v. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership, [2008] 5 W.W.R. 498, 2007 CarswellBC 2408, 2007 BCSC 1483, 162 A.C.W.S. (3d) 757, [2008] B.C.W.L.D. 921, [2008] B.C.W.L.D. 991, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2167, 78 B.C.L.R. (4th) 100 (B.C. S.C. Jul 04, 2007) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

C 176 Aboriginal Diamonds Group Ltd., Re, 2007 CarswellNWT 42, 2007 NWTSC 37, [2008] A.W.L.D. 485, [2008] A.W.L.D. 491 (N.W.T. S.C. Jun 06, 2007) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

177 Airth v. Minister of National Revenue, [2007] 3 C.T.C. 99, 2007 CarswellNat 787, 2007 CarswellNat 2082, 2007 D.T.C. 5333 (Eng.), 2007 FC 370, 2007 CF 370 (F.C. Apr 05, 2007) **(Judicially considered 4 times)**

178 Cinar Corp. c. Weinberg, 2006 CarswellQue 10757, J.E. 2007-307, EYB 2006-111943 (C.S. Que. Dec 12, 2006)

179 R. v. C. (T.), 251 N.S.R. (2d) 86, 2006 CarswellNS 590, 802 A.P.R. 86, 73 W.C.B. (2d) 156, 2006 NSPC 61, [2006] N.S.J. No. 531 (N.S. Prov. Ct. Dec 08, 2006) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

H 180 Tajdin c. Shamji, 2006 CarswellQue 10491, 2006 QCCA 1528, EYB 2006-111549 (C.A. Que. Dec 01, 2006)

181 Societe Radio-Canada c. Quebec (Procureur general), [2006] R.J.Q. 2826, 2006 CarswellQue 9008, 2006 CarswellQue 14112, J.E. 2006-2292, EYB 2006-110436, 2006 QCCS 5274 (C.S. Que. Oct 20, 2006) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 182 R. v. B. (A.A.), 244 N.S.R. (2d) 90, 2006 CarswellNS 229, 774 A.P.R. 90, 71 W.C.B. (2d) 208,

2006 NSPC 16, [2006] N.S.J. No. 226 (N.S. Prov. Ct. Apr 19, 2006) **(Judicially considered 4 times)**

C 183 Nova Scotia (Department of Environment & Labour) v. Nova Scotia (Department of Transportation & Public Works), 243 N.S.R. (2d) 54, 2006 CarswellNS 136, 772 A.P.R. 54, 144 C.R.R. (2d) 72, 2006 NSPC 3 (N.S. Prov. Ct. Feb 15, 2006) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 184 Stelco Inc., Re, 2006 CarswellOnt 407, [2006] O.J. No. 277, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Jan 20, 2006) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

185 Smyth v Edmonton (City) Police Service, 386 A.R. 129, 2005 CarswellAlta 1336, 2005 ABQB 669 (Alta. Q.B. Sep 06, 2005)

C 186 Milne (Next Friend of) v. Pfizer Inc., 379 A.R. 345, 2005 CarswellAlta 602, 2005 ABQB 236, [2005] A.W.L.D. 2291, [2005] A.J. No. 507, 51 Alta. L.R. (4th) 52, 28 C.P.C. (6th) 345 (Alta. Q.B. Apr 01, 2005) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

C 187 GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. R., [2005] 2 C.T.C. 2480, 2005 CarswellNat 588, 2005 CarswellNat 6830, 2005 D.T.C. 371 (Eng.), 137 A.C.W.S. (3d) 876, [2005] T.C.J. No. 109, 2005 TCC 120, 2005 CCI 120 (T.C.C. (G.P.) Mar 01, 2005) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

188 I.B.E.W. v. Tricin Electric Ltd., 2004 CarswellOnt 6329, 112 C.L.R.B.R.(2d) 285, [2004] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1224, [2004] O.L.R.D. No. 4423 (Ont. L.R.B. Nov 10, 2004) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

189 P. (M.N.) (Next Friend of) v. Whitecourt General Hospital, [2005] 7 W.W.R. 269, 359 A.R. 259, 2004 CarswellAlta 1602, 2004 ABQB 761, [2005] A.W.L.D. 862, [2005] A.W.L.D. 863, [2005] A.W.L.D. 864, [2005] A.W.L.D. 866, [2005] A.W.L.D. 885, [2004] A.J. No. 1342, 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 150 (Alta. Q.B. Oct 21, 2004) **(Judicially considered 6 times)**

C 190 Guccione v. Bell, 2004 CarswellAlta 1282, 2004 ABQB 729, [2004] A.W.L.D. 624, 15 C.P.C. (6th) 321 (Alta. Q.B. Oct 12, 2004) **(Judicially considered 3 times)**

191 Logan v. Harper, 2004 CarswellOnt 4072, 72 O.R. (3d) 706, [2004] O.J. No. 4132, 9 C.P.C. (6th) 118 (Ont. Master Aug 12, 2004) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

C 192 G. v. College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2004 CarswellBC 1028, 2004 BCSC 626, 130 A.C.W.S. (3d) 952, [2004] B.C.J. No. 944 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers] May 07, 2004) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

C 193 Robertson v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, [2005] 11 W.W.R. 638, 355 A.R. 265, 2004 CarswellAlta 396, 2004 ABQB 242, [2004] A.W.L.D. 291, 39 Alta. L.R. (4th) 221, 13 Admin. L.R. (4th) 226 (Alta. Q.B. Mar 26, 2004) **(Judicially considered 5 times)**

194 Mitchell v. College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2004 CarswellBC 399, 2004 BCSC 264, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 558, [2004] B.C.J. No. 363, 26 B.C.L.R. (4th) 147 (B.C. S.C. Feb 25, 2004) **(Judicially considered 8 times)**

195 Anadarko Canada Corp. v Gibson Petroleum Co., 2004 CarswellAlta 612 (Alta. Q.B. [In Chambers] Jan 22, 2004)

C 196 Parsons v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 2003 CarswellOnt 4511, 48 C.P.C. (5th) 396, [2003] O.J. No. 4732 (Ont. S.C.J. Nov 13, 2003) **(Judicially considered 2 times)**

H 197 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Sears Canada Inc., 2003 CarswellNat 4526, 28 C.P.R. (4TH) 385, [2003] C.C.T.D. No. 16 (Competition Trib. Oct 17, 2003) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

198 Ontario (Attorney General) v Williams, 2003 CarswellOnt 1828 (Ont. S.C.J. May 16, 2003)

199 Cook v. Calgary Metal Ltd., 2003 CarswellAlta 267, 2003 ABQB 115, 121 A.C.W.S. (3d) 150, [2003] A.W.L.D. 217, [2003] A.J. No. 258, 13 Alta. L.R. (4th) 361 (Alta. Q.B. Feb 10, 2003) **(Judicially considered 1 time)**

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TAB 20

2015 ONSC 7371
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Re

2015 CarswellOnt 19150, 2015 ONSC 7371, 261 A.C.W.S. (3d) 517, 32 C.B.R. (6th) 236

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as Amended

In the Matter of Section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C-43 as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada - Eastern Region, and Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada - Western Region

Penny J.

Heard: November 25, 2015
Judgment: November 27, 2015
Docket: CV-15-11192-00CL

Proceedings: reasons in full to *Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Re* (November 25, 2015), Doc. Toronto CV-15-11192-00CL, Penny J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: Evan Cobb, Matthew Halpin, for Applicants
Joseph Bellissimo, for Bank of Nova Scotia
Mark Laugesen, for Collins Barrow Toronto Limited (Proposed Monitor)
Kenneth Kraft, for Board of Directors of the Applicants

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.a Procedure
XIX.2.a.iv Miscellaneous
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Miscellaneous
Applicants, VON, provided home and community care services that addressed healthcare needs in various locations across country on non-profit basis — Current net losses from 2012 to 2015 totalled over $13 million and cash flows from operations from 2012 to 2015 were negative $8 million — Applicants brought application for initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Applicants were unable to meet obligations as they became due and fair value of property was not sufficient to enable them to pay all obligations — While corporate structure of applicants did not conform to parent/subsidiary structure typically found in business corporation context, regional subsidiaries were under control of VON Canada from practical perspective — Applicants as group clearly faced claims in excess of $5 million — Applicants complied with s. 10(2) of CCAA, and court had jurisdiction to make order sought — Prior notice to all creditors or potential creditors was not feasible or practical in circumstances, but application was made on notice to VON group, proposed monitor/receiver, proposed restructuring officer and most significant secured creditor, bank — Stay of proceedings against applicants was granted — Administration charge of $250,000 was required and was reasonable in circumstances to allow applicants to have access to necessary professional

advice to carry out proposed restructuring — As all known secured creditors had not been provided with notice of initial application, administration charge was to initially rank subordinate to security interests of all secured creditors except for bank — Directors' charge of $750,000 was appropriate in circumstances, but priority was to be handled in same way as administration charge — As this was specialized business where experience and knowledge of critical employees was very valuable to applicants, key employee retention plan of up to $240,00, payable to key employees, was approved — Appointment of receiver over goodwill and intellectual property of applicants was just and convenient — Proposed notice procedure was reasonable and appropriate and was approved.

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REASONS IN FULL to judgment reported at *Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Re* (2015), 2015 CarswellOnt 20633 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), concerning application by home and community nursing care service for initial order under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Penny J.*:**

Overview

1 On November 25, 2015 I heard an application for an initial order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for court protection of certain Victorian Order of Nurses entities. I treated the application as essentially *ex parte*. In a brief handwritten endorsement, I granted the application and signed an initial order under the CCAA and an order appointing a receiver of certain of the VON group's assets, with written reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Background

2 The Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada and the other entities in the VON group have, for over 100 years, provided home and community care services which address the healthcare needs of Canadians in various locations across the country on a not-for-profit basis.

3 The VON group delivers its programs through four regional entities:

(1) VON — Eastern Region

(2) VON — Western Region

(3) VON — Ontario and

(4) VON — Nova Scotia.

VON Canada does not itself provide direct patient service but functions as the "head office" infrastructure supporting the operations of the regional entities.

4 The VON group has, for a number of years, suffered liquidity problems. Current liabilities have consistently exceeded current assets by a significant margin; current net losses from 2012 to 2015 total over $13 million; and cash flows from operations from 2012 to 2015 were similarly negative in the amount of over $8 million. The VON group faces a significant working capital shortfall. A number of less drastic restructuring efforts have been ongoing since 2006 but these efforts have not turned the tide. Current forecasts suggest that the VON group will face a liquidity crisis in the near future if restructuring steps are not taken.

5 Financial analysis of the VON group reveals that VON Canada, VON East and VON West account for a disproportionately high share of the VON group's overall losses and operating cash shortfalls relative to the revenues generated from these entities.

6 As a result of these circumstances, VON Canada, VON East and VON West seek protection from their creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.* The applicants also seek certain limited protections for VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia, which carry on a core aspect of the VON group's business but are not applicants in these proceedings. The applicants also seek the appointment of a receiver of certain of the VON group's assets.

7 The goal of the contemplated restructuring is to modify the scope of the VON group's operations and focus on its core business and regions. This will involve winding down the non-viable operations of VON East and VON West in an orderly fashion and restructuring and downsizing the management services provided by VON Canada in order to have a more efficient and cost-effective operating structure.

Jurisdiction

8 The CCAA applies to a "debtor company" with total claims against it of more than $5 million. A debtor company is "any company that is bankrupt or insolvent." "Insolvent" is not defined in the CCAA but has been found to include a corporation that is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within the period of time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

9 In any event, based on the affidavit evidence of the VON group's CEO, Jo-Anne Poirier, the applicants are each unable to meet their obligations that have become due and the aggregate fair value of their property is not sufficient to enable them to pay all of their obligations.

10 The corporate structure of the applicants does not conform to the parent/subsidiary structure that would be typically found in the business corporation context. I am satisfied, however, that VON East and VON West are under the control of VON Canada from a practical perspective. They are all affiliated companies with the same board of directors. Accordingly, while VON East and VON West do not, on a standalone basis, face claims in excess of $5 million, the applicants, as a group, clearly do. The applicants have complied with s. 10(2) of the CCAA. The application for an initial order is accompanied by a statement indicating on a weekly basis the projected cash flow of the applicants, a report

containing the prescribed representations of the applicants regarding the preparation of the cash flow statement and copies of all financial statements prepared during the year before the application.

11 I am therefore satisfied that I have the jurisdiction to make the order sought.

Notice

12 The VON group is a large organization with over 4,000 employees operating from coast to coast. I accept that prior notice to all creditors, or potential creditors, is neither feasible nor practical in the circumstances. The application is made on notice to the VON group, the proposed monitor/receiver, the proposed chief restructuring officer and to the VON group's most significant secured creditor, the Bank of Nova Scotia.

13 There shall be a comeback hearing within two weeks of my initial order which will enable any creditor which had no notice of the application to raise any issues of concern.

Stay

14 Under s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may in its initial order make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings against the debtor provided that the stay is no longer than 30 days.

15 The CCAA's broad remedial purpose is to allow a debtor the opportunity to emerge from financial difficulty with a view to allowing the business to continue, to maximize returns to creditors and other stakeholders and to preserve employment and economic activity. The remedy of a stay is usually essential to achieve this purpose. I am satisfied that the stay of proceedings against the applicants should be granted.

16 Slightly more unusual is the request for a stay of proceedings against VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia, neither of which are applicants in these proceedings. However, the evidence of Ms. Poirier establishes that VON Canada is a cost, not a revenue, center and that VON Canada is entirely reliant upon revenues generated by VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia for its own day-to-day operations. There is a concern that VON Canada's filing of this application could trigger termination or other rights with respect to funding relationships VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia have with various third party entities which purchase their services. Such actions would create material prejudice to VON Canada's potential restructuring by interrupting its most important revenue stream.

17 In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the stay requested in respect of VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia, which is limited only to those steps that third party entities might otherwise take against VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia *due to the applicants being parties to this proceeding*, is appropriate.

Payment of Pre-filing and Other Obligations

18 The initial order authorizes, but does not require, payment of outstanding and future wages as well as fees and disbursements for any restructuring assistance, fees and disbursements of the monitor, counsel to the monitor, the chief restructuring officer, the applicants' counsel and counsel to the boards of directors. These are all payments necessary to operate the business on an ongoing basis or to facilitate the restructuring.

19 The initial order also contemplates payment of liabilities for pre-filing charges incurred on VON group credit cards issued by the Bank of Nova Scotia. The Bank is a secured creditor. It is funding the restructuring (there is no DIP financing or DIP charge). It has agreed to extend credit by continuing to make these cards available on a go forward basis, but conditioned on payment of the pre-filing credit card liabilities. I am satisfied that these measures are necessary for the conduct of the restructuring.

Modified Cash Management System

20 Historically, net cash flows were not uniform across the VON group entities. This resulted in significant timing differences between inflows and outflows for any particular VON organization. To assist with this lack of uniformity, the VON group entered into an agreement with the Bank of Nova Scotia whereby funds could be effectively pooled among the VON group, outflows and inflows netted out and a net overall cash position for the VON group determined and maintained. At the date of the commencement of these proceedings, the cash balance in the VON Canada pooled account was approximately $1.8 million. These funds will remain available to the applicants during the CCAA proceedings.

21 Immediately upon the granting of the initial order, however, the cash management system will be replaced with a new, modified cash management arrangement. Under the new arrangement, the VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia cash inflows and outflows will take place in a segregated pooling arrangement pursuant to which the consolidated cash position of only those two entities will be maintained.

22 The applicants will establish their own arrangement under which a consolidated cash position of the applicants will be maintained. Thus, VON Canada, VON East and VON West will continue to utilize their own consolidated cash balance held by those entities collectively.

23 The segregation of the VON Ontario and VON Nova Scotia cash management is necessary because they are not applicants.

24 A consolidated cash management arrangement is, however, necessary for the applicants, *inter se*, in order to ensure that the applicants continue to have sufficient liquidity to cover their costs during these proceedings. Without this arrangement, during the proposed CCAA proceedings VON East and VON West would face periodic cash deficiencies to the detriment of the group as a whole and which would put the orderly wind down of the critical services offered by VON East and VON West at risk.

25 I am satisfied that the introduction of the new cash management is both necessary and appropriate in order to:

(a) segregate the cash operations of the VON group entities which are subject to the CCAA proceedings from the VON group entities which are not; and

(b) allow the applicants in the CCAA proceedings to pool their cash inputs and outputs, which is necessary in order to avoid liquidity crises in respect of VON East and VON West operations during the wind down period.

Proposed Monitor

26 Under s. 11.7 of the CCAA, the court is required to appoint a monitor. The applicants have proposed Collins Barrow Toronto Limited, which has consented to act as the court-appointed monitor. I accept Collins Barrow as the court appointed monitor.

Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO)

27 Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with authority to allow the applicants to enter into arrangements to facilitate restructuring. This includes the retention of expert advisors where necessary to help with the restructuring efforts. March Advisory Services Inc. has worked extensively with VON Canada to date with its pre-court endorsed restructuring efforts and has extensive background knowledge of the VON group's structure and business operations. The VON group lacks internal business transformation and restructuring expertise. VON Canada's "head office" personnel will be fully engaged simply running the business and implementing necessary changes. I am satisfied that March Advisory Services Inc.'s engagement is both appropriate and essential to a successful restructuring effort and that its appointment as CRO should be approved.

28 Both the VON group and the monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to the CRO is fair and reasonable. I am therefore satisfied that the court should approve the CRO's engagement letter. I

am also satisfied that the CRO's engagement letter should be sealed. This sealing order meets the test under the SCC decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [2002 CarswellNat 822 (S.C.C.)]. The information is commercially sensitive, in that it could impair the CRO's ability to obtain market rates in other engagements, and the salutary effects of granting the sealing order (enabling March Advisory Services Inc. to accept this assignment) outweigh the minimal impact on the principle of open courts.

Administration Charge

29 Section 11.52 of the CCAA enables the court to grant an administration charge. In order to grant this charge, the court must be satisfied that notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the amount is appropriate, and the charge extends to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

30 Due to the confidential nature of this application and the operational issues that would have arisen had prior disclosure of these proceedings been given to all secured creditors, all known secured creditors were not been provided with notice of the initial application. The only secured creditor of the applicants provided with notice is the Bank of Nova Scotia.

31 For this reason, the proposed initial order provides that the administration charge shall initially rank subordinate to the security interests of all other secured creditors of the applicants with the exception of the Bank of Nova Scotia. The applicants will seek an order providing for the subordination of all other security interests to the administration charge in the near future following notice to all potentially affected secured creditors.

32 The amount of the administration charge is $250,000. In the scheme of things, this is a relatively modest amount. The proposed monitor has reviewed the administration charge and has found it reasonable. The beneficiaries of the administrative charge are the monitor and its counsel, counsel to the applicants, the CRO, and counsel to the boards of directors.

33 The evidence is that the applicants and the proposed monitor believe that the above noted professionals have played and will continue to play a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities of the applicants.

34 I am satisfied that the administration charge is required and reasonable in the circumstances to allow the debtor to have access to necessary professional advice to carry out the proposed restructuring.

Directors' Charge

35 In order to secure indemnities granted by the applicants to their directors and officers and to the CRO for obligations that may be incurred in connection with the restructuring efforts after the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the applicants seek a directors' charge in favor of the directors and officers and the CRO in the amount of $750,000.

36 Section 11.51 of the CCAA allows the court to approve a directors' charge on a priority basis. In order to grant a directors' charge the court must be satisfied that notice has been given to the secured creditors, the amount is appropriate, the applicant could not obtain adequate indemnification for the directors or officers otherwise and the charge does not apply in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

37 As noted above, all known secured creditors have not been provided with notice. For this reason, the applicants propose that the priority of the directors' charged be handled in the same manner as the administration charge.

38 The evidence of Ms. Poirier shows that there is already a considerable level of directors' and officers' insurance. There is no evidence that this insurance is likely to be discontinued or that the VON group can not or will not be able to continue to pay the premiums. However, given the size of the VON group's operations, the number of employees, the diverse geographic scope in which the group operates, the potential for coverage disputes which always attends on insurance arrangements and the important fact that this board is composed entirely of volunteers, additional protection

for the directors to remain involved post-filing is warranted, *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 45.

39 The amount of the charge was estimated by taking into consideration the existing directors' and officers' insurance and potential liabilities which may attach including employee related obligations such as outstanding payroll obligations, outstanding vacation pay and liability for remittances to government authorities. This charge only relates to matters arising after the commencement of these proceeding. It also covers the CRO.

40 The proposed monitor has reviewed and has raised no concerns about the proposed directors' charge.

41 The director' charge contemplated by the initial order expressly excludes claims that arise as a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

42 For these reasons, I am satisfied that the directors' charge is appropriate in all the circumstances.

Key Employee Retention Plan

43 The applicants seek approval of a key employee retention plan in the amount of up to $240,000, payable to key employees during 2016.

44 This is a specialized business. The experience and knowledge of critical employees is highly valuable to the applicants. These employees have extensive knowledge of and experience with the applicants. The applicants are unlikely to be able to replace critical employees post-filing. Under the contemplated restructuring, the employee ranks of the applicants will be significantly downsized. As a result, there is a strong possibility that certain critical employees will consider other employment options in the absence of retention compensation.

45 The KERP was approved by the board of directors of the applicants. Provided the arrangements are reasonable, decisions of this kind fall within the business judgment rule as a result of which they are not second-guessed by the courts.

46 The amount is relatively modest given the size of the operation and the number of employees. I am satisfied that the KERP is reasonable in all the circumstances. I am also satisfied that the specific allocation of the KERP is reasonably left to the business judgment of the board.

47 Because the KERP involves sensitive personal compensation information about identifiable individuals, disclosure of this information could be harmful to the beneficiaries of the KERP. I am satisfied that the *Sierra Club* test is met in connection with the sealing of this limited information.

Receivership Order

48 The *Wage Earner Protection Program Act* was established to make payments to individuals in respect of wages owed to them by employers who are bankrupt or subject to a receivership. The amounts that may be paid under WEPPA to an individual include severance and termination pay as well as vacation pay accrued.

49 In aggregate, over 300 employees are expected to be terminated at the commencement of these proceedings. These employees will be paid their ordinary course salary and wages up to the date of their terminations. However, the applicants do not have sufficient liquidity to pay these employees' termination or severance pay or accrued vacation pay.

50 The terminated employees would not be able to enjoy the benefit of the WEPPA in the current circumstances. This is because the WEPPA does not specifically contemplate the effect of proceedings under the CCAA.

51 A receiver under the WEPPA includes a receiver within the meaning of s. 243(2) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. A receiver under the BIA includes a receiver appointed under the *Courts of Justice Act* if appointed to take control

over the debtor's property. Under the WEPPA, an employer is subject to receivership if any property of the employer is in the possession or control of the receiver.

52 In this case, the applicants seek the appointment of a receiver under s. 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* to enable the receiver to take possession and control of the applicants' goodwill and intellectual property (i.e., substantially all of the debtor's property *other than* accounts receivable and inventory, which must necessarily remain with the debtors during restructuring).

53 *In Cinram (Re)* (October 19, 2012), Toronto CV-12-9767-00CL, Morawetz R.S.J. found it was just and convenient to appoint a receiver under s. 101 over certain property of a CCAA debtor within a concurrent CCAA proceeding where the purpose of the receivership was to clarify the position of employees with respect to the WEPPA.

54 In this case, the evidence is that no stakeholder will be prejudiced by the proposed receivership order. To the contrary, there could be significant prejudice to the terminated employees if there is no receivership and former employees are not able to avail themselves of benefits under the WEPPA.

55 In the circumstances, I find it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver under s. 101 over the goodwill and intellectual property of the applicants.

Further Notice

56 I am satisfied that the proposed notice procedure is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances and it is approved.

Comeback Hearing

57 In summary, I am satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate to grant CCAA protection to VON Canada, VON East and VON West. There shall be a comeback hearing at 10 a.m. before me on Wednesday, December 9, 2015.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

TAB 21

2005 NLTD 137
Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court (Trial Division)

Navionics Inc., Re

2005 CarswellNfld 221, 2005 NLTD 137, 12 C.B.R. (5th) 271,
141 A.C.W.S. (3d) 361, 251 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 216, 752 A.P.R. 216

IN THE MATTER OF the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3

AND IN THE MATTER OF a Notice of Motion of Navionics Inc. and C-Map USA Inc.

Russell J.

Heard: August 8, 2005
Judgment: August 12, 2005
Docket: 2005 01 11464, Estate No. 51119304

Counsel: Paul Schabas, Geoffrey Spencer for Applicants, Navionics Inc., C-Map USA Inc.
Thomas R. Kendell, Q.C., Susan Day for Nautical Data International Inc.
D. Bradford Wicks for Trustee, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XVI Effect of bankruptcy on other proceedings
XVI.1 Proceedings against bankrupt
XVI.1.a Before discharge of trustee
XVI.1.a.ii Granting of leave
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Effect of bankruptcy on other proceedings — Proceedings against bankrupt — Before discharge of trustee — Granting of leave
Bankrupt had exclusive right and licence to use data from Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to produce its products — Dispute arose between bankrupt and applicants with bankrupt alleging applicants utilized data without payment of royalties — Bankrupt commenced copyright action against applicants — Applicants commenced defamation action against bankrupt and bankrupt's CEO for damages and cease and desist order for publication of comments that applicants distribute pirated material — DFO terminated contract with bankrupt — Bankrupt filed notice of intent to make proposal under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and then brought action against DFO — Stay of proceedings under Act applied only to applicants' defamation action and bankrupt could continue its actions against applicants and DFO — Applicants brought application for order lifting stay on defamation action — Application granted on condition that any monetary judgment would not be enforced against bankrupt without further court order — Complex nature of defamation actions makes it difficult for trustee in bankruptcy to assess merits of claim and its value — Availability of discovery favours litigation of defamation action in ordinary civil courts — Cease and desist order could not be dealt with by trustee — Defamation action was also attempt to vindicate applicants' reputations which could not be dealt with by trustee — Applicants and bankrupt were both parties in copyright and defamation actions which both arose out of same ongoing dispute — It was equitable to lift stay so that both actions could be heard at same time.
Table of Authorities
Cases considered by *Russell J.*:
Advocate Mines Ltd., Re (1984), 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 277, 1984 CarswellOnt 156 (Ont. S.C.) — followed
Best v. Spasic (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 994 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Big Quill Resources Inc. v. Potassium Sulphate Co. Alsask Inc. (2002), 2002 SKCA 31, 2002 CarswellSask 147, 33 C.B.R. (4th) 38, (sub nom. *Big Quill Resources Inc. v. Potassium Sulphate Co. Alsask Inc. (Bankrupt)*) 219 Sask. R. 265, (sub nom. *Big Quill Resources Inc. v. Potassium Sulphate Co. Alsask Inc. (Bankrupt)*) 272 W.A.C. 265 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Ma, Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1019, 24 C.B.R. (4th) 68, 143 O.A.C. 52 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Taylor Ventures Ltd., Re (2002), 2002 BCSC 82, 2002 CarswellBC 55, 32 C.B.R. (4th) 120 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Wagman, Re (1977), 23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240, 1977 CarswellOnt 70 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Wagman, Re (1978), 28 C.B.R. (N.S.) 179, 1978 CarswellOnt 186 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — considered

s. 69.1(1)(a) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 69.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 69.4(a) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — referred to

APPLICATION to lift stay of action on applicants' defamation action against bankrupt.

***Russell J.*:**

1 The applicants apply for an order pursuant to s. 69.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ("*BIA*") lifting the statutory stay of proceedings currently in place as against Nautical Data International, Inc. ("NDI") in Action 04-CV-277311 CMI in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

Background

2 NDI is a party to a contract with Canadian Hydrographic Services Division of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans ("CHS") wherein CHS supplies raw data to NDI who, in turn, electronically processes this information for marine-related applications and distributes the data. Under their contract it is alleged that NDI holds the exclusive right and licence to use this data to produce data products.

3 A dispute arose between NDI and the applicants, with NDI alleging the applicants had utilized the CHS data, without paying the requisite royalties owing to NDI. On June 24, 2004 NDI commenced copyright actions against the applicants in the Federal Court of Canada (Pleadings T-1219-04 for C-Map USA Inc. and T-1220-04 for Navionics Inc.). In these actions NDI seeks damages of $68,000,000. The applicants have filed a defence denying this claim.

4 On October 15, 2004 the applicants commenced a defamation action against NDI and its Chief Executor Officer, Al Zaibak, claiming $4,000,000. The claim for defamation arises out of publications by NDI and Zaibak wherein comments are made that the applicants are distributing pirated data products of NDI and CHS and putting boaters and boating safety at risk.

5 That action initially contained other causes of action but on February 1, 2005 the applicants amended the statement of claim leaving only the claim for defamation. Both defendants are represented by the same solicitor.

6 On January 4, 2005 CHS purported to terminate its contract with NDI effective February 4, 2005. NDI has not accepted the termination and on February 2, 2005 it filed a Notice of Intention to make a Proposal under the *BIA*. On February 3, 2005 NDI commenced legal action against CHS for damages arising out of the purported termination of the CHS Contract. That action seeks compensatory damages of $109,000,000 as well as a declaration that the Contract remains in full force and effect.

7 The stay of proceedings imposed by the *BIA* does not affect proceedings brought by NDI but does stay the proceedings against NDI. Accordingly, NDI is able to continue to pursue its remedies sought against the applicants and, as well, its action against CHS but the defamation action by the applicants against NDI is stayed.

8 The defendant Zaibak, who is not bankrupt, made an application in the defamation action to have that action also stayed against him, claiming in part that there would be an injustice in having the allegations determined only against him personally. That application was heard by the case management master on June 28, 2005. The master stated it would not be appropriate for her to determine that application until a determination of the present application under s. 69.4 of the *BIA*.

Issue

9 The issue is whether the statutory stay of the defamation action against NDI should be lifted pursuant to s. 69.4 of the *BIA*.

Statutory Provisions of BIA

10

> 69.1 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (6) and sections 69.4 and 69.5, on the filing of a proposal under subsection 62(1) in respect of an insolvent person,
>
> > (a) no creditor has any remedy against the insolvent person or the insolvent person's property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy, until the trustee has been discharged or the insolvent person becomes bankrupt;
>
> . . . . .
>
> 69.4 A creditor who is affected by the operation of sections 69 to 69.31 or any other person affected by the operation of section 69.31 may apply to the court for a declaration that those sections no longer operate in respect of that creditor or person, and the court may make such a declaration, subject to any qualifications that the court considers proper, if it is satisfied
>
> > (a) that the creditor or person is likely to be materially prejudiced by the continued operation of those sections; or
> >
> > (b) that it is equitable on other grounds to make such a declaration.

Position of Applicants

11 The applicants submit the stay should be lifted as a defamation action is complex and the summary procedures in the *BIA* are inappropriate for dealing with it; the *BIA* cannot grant some of the relief claimed (cease and desist order); it would be inequitable to allow NDI to proceed with its copyright actions and not allow the applicants to proceed with their action; the liabilities of all the defendants (NDI and Zaibak) in the defamation actions should be determined by one court (Ontario Superior Court of Justice).

Position of NDI

12 NDI submits the applicants' sole goal in this application is to weaken their competitor (NDI). It submits the Trustee is capable of dealing with a defamation claim; that the applicants can vindicate their reputation through the copyright actions; and to allow the stay to be lifted would delay the *BIA* proceedings and prejudice creditors.

Position of Trustee

13 The Trustee took no position on the merits of the application but did submit that if the stay is lifted the order should stipulate that if the applicants obtain any monetary judgment it is not to be enforced until such further order of this Court.

Analysis

14 The granting or refusal of leave to lift the stay is within the discretion of the Court. In *Ma, Re*, [2001] O.J. No. 1189 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at para. 3:

> ... lifting the automatic stay is far from a routine matter. There is an onus on the applicant to establish a basis for the order within the meaning of s. 69.4. As stated in Re Francisco, the role of the court is to ensure that there are 'sound reasons, consistent with the scheme of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act' to relieve against the automatic stay. While the test is not whether there is a prima facie case, that does not, in our view, preclude any consideration of the merits of the proposed action where relevant to the issue of whether there are 'sound reasons' for lifting the stay. For example, if it were apparent that the proposed action had little prospect of success, it would be difficult to find that there were sound reasons for lifting the stay.

15 In *Advocate Mines Ltd., Re*, [1984] O.J. No. 2330 (Ont. S.C.), the Court referred to cases where the stay of proceedings had been lifted, stating at para. 2

> The Court may, however, remove the stay of proceedings prescribed by that section in appropriate cases and has done so in the following circumstances:
>
> 1. Actions against the bankrupt for a debt to which a discharge would not be a defence.
>
> 2. Actions in respect of a contingent or unliquidated debt, the proof of which and valuation has that degree of complexity which makes the summary procedure prescribed by s. 95(2) of the Bankruptcy Act inappropriate.
>
> 3. Actions in which the bankrupt is a necessary party for the complete adjudication of the matters at issue involving other parties.
>
> 4. Actions brought to establish judgment against the bankrupt to enable the plaintiff to recover under a contract of insurance or indemnity or under compensatory legislation.
>
> 5. Actions in Ontario which, at the date of bankruptcy, have progressed to a point where logic dictates that the action be permitted to continue to judgment.

16 The applicants rely on circumstances 2 and 3 of that case.

17 Defamation actions are complex, both with respect to determination of liability and quantum. Some cases have said defamation is not a cause of action that easily lends itself to the Court rules dealing with simplified procedure. (See *Best v. Spasic*, [2005] O.J. No. 970 (Ont. S.C.J.)). *Taylor Ventures Ltd., Re*, [2002] B.C.J. No. 74 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) is another case where the Court said it was inappropriate to deal with complex claims under the *BIA*. I accept the applicants' submission that the complex nature of a defamation action makes it difficult for the Trustee to assess the merits of the claim and to value the claim. In addition the availability of discovery rules favor the applicants' defamation action being litigated in the ordinary civil courts.

18 I also note that in the defamation action the applicants, in addition to seeking monetary damages, are seeking a cease and desist order precluding NDI from making further defamatory statements concerning them. This relief is important for the applicants as it is alleged NDI continues to operate a website on which the very defamatory statements the applicants complain of in the defamation action are published. This relief can only be sought in the civil court. The

Trustee will be unable to deal with this. This favors the lifting of the stay. Declaratory relief alone can be grounds for lifting the stay (See *Big Quill Resources Inc. v. Potassium Sulphate Co. Alsask Inc.*, [2002] S.J. No. 129 (Sask. C.A.).)

19 The defamation action is also an attempt by the applicants for vindication of their reputations. That cannot be dealt with by the Trustee and I am unable to accept NDI's submission that it could be achieved through the litigation of the copyright actions. There is no guarantee that those actions will deal with that matter. The issue of vindication of reputation favors the lifting of the stay.

20 NDI is carrying on with its copyright actions (as those actions are not stayed by the *BIA*). As well, in the defamation action, while the action against NDI is statutorily stayed, there is no stay of the action against the other defendant, Zaibak.

21 A somewhat similar situation occurred in *Wagman, Re* (1977), 23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed (1978), 28 C.B.R. (N.S.) 179 (Ont. C.A.). There the Court stated at p. 242:

> ... In the present case, the substance of the applicant's claim is already before the Supreme Court of Ontario in the action which it is now sought to continue. It is obvious that the bankrupt's liability in that action should be determined along with that of the other defendants in the same proceeding. The effect of refusing leave would be to extract from the action already in progress the bankrupt as a party defendant and to deprive the plaintiff of a means of asserting his claim against the bankrupt and the estate. Alternatively, the mater would be brought on under s. 95(2) to be determined by the bankruptcy judge with respect to the bankrupt alone, which would have the effect of instituting parallel proceedings in two courts, arising out of the same facts, a situation that this court should not either precipitate or contemplate. ...

22 Indeed this is the same position taken by the defendant Zaibak when he applied for a stay of those proceedings against him on the basis of the stay entered against NDI by reason of the *BIA*. The motion on behalf of the defendant Zaibak, who is the CEO of NDI, stated in para. 26:

> ... clearly, the allegations against NDI are intimately intertwined with those against Al Zaibak, and there is injustice in having these allegations determined only against Al Zaibak personally. Continuing the action against Al Zaibak and not against NDI will result in two different inquiries into the same facts and the same damages at two different times. This I not an efficient use of judicial resources.

23 That being the case I conclude there is merit to the applicants' submission that the better course of action is to lift the stay of proceedings against NDI, so that the liabilities of all parties may be determined in the same proceeding.

24 There is also merit in the applicants' submission that NDI is a necessary party for the complete adjudication of all the matters against all defendants in the defamation action.

25 The applicants and NDI are competitors in the nautical chart industry. They are both parties in the defamation action and in the copyright actions, with the applicants being plaintiffs in the defamation action and NDI being plaintiff in the copyright actions. All actions arise out of the same ongoing dispute between the parties over whether NDI holds the exclusive right and licence to use the CHS data.

26 The copyright actions are not stayed and NDI is proceeding with these actions. While the defamation action is stayed against NDI, I note that in the Trustee's Report on the Proposal the Trustee makes reference to the defamation action and states NDI intends to defend itself vigorously against this action after receiving the Court approval of its proposal.

27 This in my view supports the applicants' position that it is equitable that the stay be lifted so that all actions can proceed at the same time. Any set-off issues arising from the final adjudication of all actions would then be possible.

28 I conclude that all of the above analysis leads to a finding that it is equitable to lift the stay.

29 NDI submits that lifting the stay would delay the *BIA* proceedings and prejudice creditors. I am not satisfied that this will be the case. The trustee did not make any submission to this effect and it is clear that even if the stay is not lifted NDI still has to proceed with its copyright actions and its action against CHS. There is no evidence that the defamation action in and of itself will cause further delays or prejudice to creditors and thereby make it inequitable to lift the stay. Conditions can be attached to the lifting of the stay so that there will be no enforcement of any judgment by the applicants until further order of this Court.

30 From the above analysis I conclude that pursuant to s. 69.4 it is equitable that the stay be lifted. In view of that determination it is not necessary to determine under s. 69.4(a) whether on the same analysis the applicants are materially prejudiced by the continuation of the stay.

Disposition

31 The statutory stay of proceedings currently in place against NDI in action 04-CV-277311 CMI in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice is lifted on condition that if the applicants obtain any monetary judgment in that action it is not to be enforced until such further order of this Court.

32 There is no order as to costs.

Application granted on condition.

TAB 22

2013 ONSC 2270
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Jema International Food Products Inc. v. Scholle Canada Ltd.

2013 CarswellOnt 4515, 2013 ONSC 2270, [2013] O.J. No. 1776, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 592

Jema International Food Products Inc. Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim and Scholle Canada Limited Defendant/Plaintiff by Counterclaim

E.M. Morgan J.

Heard: March 6-March 8, 11 2013
Judgment: April 17, 2013 *
Docket: 02-CV-298897PD3

Proceedings: additional reasons at *Jema International Food Products Inc. v. Scholle Canada Ltd.* (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 5801, 2013 ONSC 2785 (Ont. S.C.J.)

Counsel: Nawaz Tahir, Brent Hodge for Plaintiff / Defendant by Counterclaim
Kelly Smith, Thomas Whillier for Defendant / Plaintiff by Counterclaim

Subject: Torts; Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XVII Practice and procedure in courts
XVII.4 Stay of proceedings
Torts
XVI Negligence
XVI.6 Strict liability (rule in Rylands v. Fletcher)
XVI.6.c Product liability
XVI.6.c.iv Miscellaneous
Headnote
Torts --- Negligence — Strict liability (rule in Rylands v. Fletcher) — Product liability — Miscellaneous
Over 1,200 50-gallon containers of tomato sauce spilled at plaintiff's storage facility, causing major financial loss and serious mess — Containers were made of corrugated boxes lined with aseptic bags, and bags were manufactured by defendant — Plaintiff brought claim against defendant, claiming that bags were defective — Claim dismissed — Plaintiff did not prove on balance of probabilities that bags were defective and that they caused spill — Although there was more than one possible explanation, more likely one was that ill-fitting boxes stacked on top of each other caused spill — Defendant did not have duty to warn plaintiff of risk of ordering ill-fitting boxes or risk of stacking boxes two and three tiers high — Plaintiff specifically rejected defendant's recommendation in selecting boxes, instead purchasing inferior boxes without consulting defendant — Plaintiff thereby assumed risk that this choice would cause harm — Law does not impose duty on manufacturer to warn of dangers inherent in another manufacturer's product that it did not recommend, or to warn of self-evident risk of storing very heavy cardboard containers on top of each other.
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Stay of proceedings
Over 1,200 50-gallon containers of tomato sauce spilled at plaintiff's storage facility, causing major financial loss and serious mess — Containers were made of corrugated boxes lined with aseptic bags, and bags were manufactured by defendant — Plaintiff brought claim against defendant, claiming that bags were defective — Defendant brought counterclaim for unpaid invoice for 10,800 bags, in amount of $18,932.04 — Claim dismissed on other grounds;

counterclaim stayed — Plaintiff had filed notice of intention to make proposal to its creditors under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), s. 69(1)(a) of which imposed stay on any claim by creditor against plaintiff — Defendant did not present adequate grounds for lifting stay — Lifting stay impacts on position of other creditors, and is not something court can do without sounds reasons consistent with BIA — Fact that defendant was notified at late stage about plaintiff's proposal to its creditors did not affect counterclaim or remove it from ambit of stay of proceedings — Moreover, counterclaim was claim provable in this bankruptcy — Discretion found in s. 69.4 of BIA was to be exercised, if at all, by bankruptcy court — Court hearing bankruptcy proceeding, Quebec Superior Court, was only court that could consider request in overall position of debtor and all of its creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *E.M. Morgan J.*:

Colonial Furniture Co. (Ottawa) Ltd. v. Saul Tanner Realty Ltd. (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 52 O.R. (3d) 539, 12 B.L.R. (3d) 172, 2001 CarswellOnt 286, [2001] I.L.R. I-3953, 25 C.C.L.I. (3d) 166, 140 O.A.C. 384 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 121, 1971 CarswellOnt 174, 1971 CarswellOnt 174F (S.C.C.) — considered

Ma, Re (2001), 143 O.A.C. 52, 2001 CarswellOnt 1019, 24 C.B.R. (4th) 68 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Navionics Inc., Re (2005), 2005 NLTD 137, 2005 CarswellNfld 221, (sub nom. *Nautical Data International Inc., Re*) 251 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 216, (sub nom. *Nautical Data International Inc., Re*) 752 A.P.R. 216, 12 C.B.R. (5th) 271 (N.L. T.D.) — considered

Siemens v. Pfizer C & G Inc. (1988), 51 Man. R. (2d) 252, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 1988 CarswellMan 121, 3 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 157, [1988] 3 W.W.R. 577 (Man. C.A.) — referred to

Startek Computer Inc. (Trustee of) v. Samtack Computer Inc. (2000), 2000 CarswellBC 1802, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 166, 2000 BCSC 1316 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 69(1)(a) — considered

s. 69.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

CLAIM by plaintiff alleging damage caused by defective product; COUNTERCLAIM by defendant for unpaid invoice for product.

***E.M. Morgan J.*:**

I. The Question

1 This three day trial explored the sticky question of how over 1,200 50-gallon containers of tomato sauce spilled in storage. The containers were made of corrugated boxes lined with aseptic bags, comprising a storage system known as the bag-in-box.

2 In a warm July of 2000, something in the Plaintiff's warehouse went terribly wrong. Was it the bags or was it the boxes?

II. The Parties

3 The Plaintiff is the owner and operator of a tomato processing plant and storage facility in Leamington, Ontario. According to Michael Mazzaferro, the president of the Plaintiff, Leamington is site of the largest tomato harvesting and processing operations in Canada. It is known as the tomato capital of the country.

4 The annual tomato harvest and processing season is relatively short. It lasts from the beginning of August to the beginning of October. The Plaintiff processes the newly harvested tomatoes in its Leamington plant, packaging and

wholesaling products such as pizza sauce, tomato paste, and crushed tomatoes. The entire manufacturing process has to be done in the short period from August to October, after which the processed tomato products are stored in the warehouse for sale throughout the coming year.

5 The Defendant is a pioneer of the bag-in-box storage system. It manufactures aseptic bags that line the inside of the boxes. The bags are not designed to be used alone, but rather are part of the two-part system when used together with corrugated boxes. The Defendant does not make the boxes that go with the aseptic bags, but recommends box manufacturers whom it knows to have products that are compatible with its liner bags.

6 The Defendant supplied the bags in issue to the Plaintiff. It did not supply the boxes. Further, although a representative of the Defendant has seen and visited the Plaintiff's plant, the Defendant was not involved in any aspect of the Plaintiff's tomato processing, sales, or storage operations.

III. The Spill

7 In late June and early July 2000, the Plaintiff had several thousand containers of concentrated tomato sauce stored in its warehouse. Mr. Mazzaferro testified that the Plaintiff had produced between 7,000 and 8,000 50 gallon boxes of tomato produce in the 1999-2000 year. The Defendant's invoice shows that the Plaintiff ordered 12,000 liner bags that year. Whatever the precise figure, the Plaintiff clearly had a large number of anticipated orders that year, and the stock of bags and boxes was well above the previous year's order of 5000 container units.

8 Mr. Mazzaferro was not yet the corporate president of the Plaintiff in 2000, but he was working in the business. He testified that in early July what started as a small problem with leaking boxes of tomato sauce escalated quickly into a major disaster. He described what he called a "domino effect" in which sauce leaked out of the corrugated containers, causing the boxes to explode and the pallets on which they rested in the warehouse to collapse. Contemporaneous photographs in the record show pallets stacked with large corrugated boxes saturated with a dark, thick liquid leaking through the cardboard.

9 The Plaintiff's plant manager at the time, Jim DiMenna, estimated at his examination for discovery that somewhere around 1,200 boxes of sauce were damaged. The staff tried to re-package the damaged containers in other types of receptacles (tins, jars, etc.), and were able to salvage 500 containers of sauce in that way. The accounting records show that 1,404 boxes were ultimately destroyed.

10 Plaintiff's management saw red. Mr. Mazzaferro described not only a major financial loss but a serious mess. The cleanup lasted many days, as there were gallons of pizza sauce on the floor and all over the warehouse. Specialized cleaning and moving equipment had to be rented to facilitate restoring the premises to a point where product could be stored there again.

11 In the heat of the summer, the situation was a rather unhygienic one for a food processing plant. It was imperative that the cleanup be as thorough and as expeditious as possible. There were, in Mr. Mazzaferro's words, "fruit flies everywhere".

IV. The Bags

12 The Plaintiff had a consulting engineer, Neil Stone, examine the some of the leaking bags that the Plaintiff had purchased from the Defendant. Mr. Stone was produced by the Plaintiff as an expert witness at trial. He was qualified to testify as an expert process engineer. The majority of his professional experience, however, is as a chemical engineer for the food industry, with a focus on pickling systems. He has limited experience with packaging and materials engineering.

13 Nevertheless, Mr. Stone did perform a first-hand examination of the damaged linings in 2000, and was able to describe in detail the state of these bags just after the spill.

14 In testing the failed bags, he found that there were weak zones in the side seams of the bags where the seams could be pulled apart by hand. In the strong parts, he could not pull the bag apart. This led him to the conclusion that the seams had intermittent bonding problems resulting in some sections of the seam being weak while most of the seam was quite strong.

15 In his testimony, Mr. Stone also pointed out that the failures in the bags all appeared to be on the side seams, not the bottom of the bags. He also tested some of the undamaged bags by filling them with water under pressure, and found that none of them ruptured upon filling. This conformed with the Plaintiff's own experience, as none of the sauce-filled bags had burst when being filled; rather, all of the leaking and tearing of bags had occurred while stored in the corrugated boxes in the warehouse.

16 In Mr. Stone's testimony and his report, which was admitted into evidence, he did not address any issues about the way in which the boxes were stored in the Plaintiff's premises. He did observe that the boxes were somewhat larger than the bags that lined their interior, and that the sides of the bags therefore were not well supported within the boxes. He stated that it would have been better if the top of the boxes had been filled to the top with packing filler to prevent the sauce in the bags from "sloshing about".

17 To be clear, Mr. Stone never spoke with the box suppliers and never got any of the box specifications. He did not know the material strength of the corrugated material, and had no particular insight into how, or whether, they should be stacked when stored.

18 Mr. Stone did observe that the boxes "bowed" outward in the middle when full. He opined that the boxes would have provided better support for the sauce-filled bags if they had stiff corner posts for side support, but he did not go so far as to say that the design of the boxes caused the bags to burst at the seams. Rather, to the extent that he had studied the matter, he indicated that he would put the fault squarely on the bags themselves.

19 Mr. Stone did not know a great deal about the Defendant's manufacturing process for the bags. Indeed, although he surmised that the problem was with the joint seals, he did not know whether the joints are made with adhesive or with a heat seal. But he reasoned that there must have been some sporadically faulty seaming when the failed bags were made.

20 In Mr. Stone's view, the possible causes of seam failure were: a) contamination of the seam area when the bag was being made; or b) an intermittent problem with the seaming equipment (whether it be heat sealed with intermittent failure of heat, or intermittent pressure issues with the sealing equipment, or intermittent contamination of the seal causing a faulty adhesive seal). He conceded that this was conjecture on his part — although in his view a logical conjecture — as he had never inspected or even seen a picture of the Defendant's manufacturing equipment and assembly line.

V. The Boxes

21 In response to the expert evidence of Neil Stone, who addressed what he saw as problems with the bags, the Defendant produced Ralph Young, a packaging expert who addressed what he saw as problems with the boxes. Mr. Young is not a professional engineer, but he has substantial industry experience in product development with respect to corrugated containers. He was qualified to testify as an expert packaging consultant.

22 Mr. Young was not retained at the time of the spill in 2000, but rather was brought in years later by the Defendant in the run-up to trial. Accordingly, he did not have the opportunity to study first-hand any of the boxes used by the Plaintiff. In addition, the Defendant could not provide him with any samples of the boxes in issue, as they were manufactured by another company and were ordered directly from that company by the Plaintiff.

23 What Mr. Young did have was a series of photographs taken by the Plaintiff in July 2000. These photos showed the leaking boxes as stored in the Plaintiff's warehouse. On the witness stand he used the photos as a visual aid, and pointed out that in these photos there is ample evidence of bulging boxes. Mr. Young explained that this is a sign that they were

not compatible with their contents or with the way they were being stored, as packaging should be designed for bulge resistance and top-to-bottom compression. This is especially true for a product like tomato sauce, which is heavy and stresses the bottom part of the boxes.

24 He also indicated that a few of the boxes have visible corner posts, but that these appear to have been placed in the containers as an afterthought. The Plaintiff conceded that after the spill, it had ordered corner posts from the box manufacturer in an effort to salvage the containers that were left undamaged. Mr. Young stated that with vertical compression — especially with stacked boxes — the corners or columns of the box support about 2/3 of its strength. He opined that the internal corner posts should always have been there, and must go from the bottom vertical edge to the top vertical edge in order to become rigid and integral to the box.

25 The photos also depict the boxes stored on wooden pallets in the Plaintiff's warehouse. These pallets often supported two and sometimes with three tiers of boxes stacked on top of each other. Mr. Young pointed out that with this vertical compression comes the most severe bulging of the boxes.

26 Mr. Young also noted numerous instances in the photos where the boxes were not sitting flush on the pallets. When the box hangs over the edge of the pallet, Mr. Young explained, it stresses the corrugated walls of the box; and when another box is then loaded vertically on top of the first one, container failure is likely to occur.

27 Finally, Mr. Young noted that time is not friendly to corrugated containers. The Fibre Box Association, an industry group of which Mr. Young is a member, states that a box under load will lose 40% of its initial compression strength in the first 30 days after being packed.

28 Moreover, there is a tendency for corrugated boxes to break down with the change from winter to summer (i.e. from the dry air of a heated warehouse to the humid air of July). In Mr. Young's view, it is not surprising that the spill occurred at the beginning of July, the most humid month in southern Ontario, and after the boxes had sat in the warehouse some 8 to 9 months.

29 It was put to Mr. Young on the stand that the numbers of boxes in storage had increased over the two previous years in which the bag-in-box system was used by the Plaintiff, and that while there was single tier storage in previous years there was double and triple tier stacking in 1999-2000. Mr. Young responded to this information rather forcefully and without hesitation: "You can't do that."

30 The multiple stacking was, in Mr. Young's view, the major cause of the rupture in the bags. He opined that the increase in vertical compression, in combination with the humidity, length of storage time, and bulging of the boxes due to their oversized construction and lack of corner support, combined to cause the failure of the bag-in-box units.

VI. The Contest

31 In the contest between bags and boxes, there is no 100% winner.

32 In terms of aseptic bag production, the most knowledgeable witness was Steven Falk, the Defendant's in-house technical support specialist during in the late 1990's and 2000. Mr. Falk was quite familiar with the Defendant's manufacturing process, and had spent much time looking after problems with bags in the field. He explained that problems generally occurred because of incompatibility with a customer's equipment or storage vessels that were not manufactured by the Defendant.

33 Mr. Falk recalled visiting the Plaintiff's warehouse on July 18, 2000. In his testimony he described it as being "a mess". He inspected a number of leaking containers as well as non-leaking containers, and discussed the leakage problem with Jim DiMenna, who at the time was the Plaintiff's manager.

34 Mr. DiMenna said that he had initially moved from metal drums to the bag-in-box system as a more up to date means of storage. On inspection, it was Mr. Falk's view that the problem was the compatibility of the bag with the size

of the box. He recalled explaining this to Mr. DiMenna, and that it was Mr. DiMenna himself who had proposed using cardboard corner posts as a possible solution.

35 Mr. Falk testified that there were large gaps in the corners of the boxes when the bags were full, evidencing the incompatibility of the boxes with the bags. He took some measurements of the full boxes, and advised Mr. DiMenna that the boxes might need even bigger corner posts than he was suggesting.

36 In cross-examination, Mr. Falk conceded that the material that the aseptic bags are made from often doesn't seal well on its own. For that reason, the Defendant encapsulates each bag with polyethylene on the sides, which reinforces the sealing at the seams. An extra layer of plastic is then added to tie the two layers together, and through this co-excrusion process the seams of the bags come together into a single material.

37 After Mr. Falk's visit to the Plaintiff's premises in July 2000, he sent a Quality Variance Report to the Defendant's office in Chicago, along with a sample bag from the Plaintiff's batch. The quality experts in Chicago checked the sample, and found no issue with the seals.

38 The Defendant's manager for Canada, Michael Doucas, also testified at trial. He briefly described the process by which the Defendant manufactures the bags in their plant in California. He indicated, among other things, that the horizontal seals along the top and bottom of the bags are identical to the vertical seals along the sides. This is significant since the damaged bags, as described by Neil Stone, were all torn along the side seams. If there were problems in the Defendant's sealing process, one would surmise that all the seams would potentially be damaged, not just the side seams.

39 Most importantly, Mr. Doucas testified that the bags are made on continuous runs, such that one purchaser's bags are produced at the same time as those of other purchasers. There are no custom orders, and there is not a separate run of the machinery in the Defendant's plant for each customer who buys the aseptic bags.

40 For this reason, Mr. Doucas explained, it does not make sense that there was a defect in the bags purchased by the Plaintiff but no defect in the bags purchased by any other customer. The Defendant's plant in California produces 700,000 bags annually; in 1999, 12,000 of these bags were sold to the Plaintiff. No other customer complained about spillage or leaks in 1999-2000.

41 Like Mr. Falk, Mr. Doucas had also visited the Plaintiff's warehouse during the July 2000 cleanup. He also recalled that the full boxes bulged in the centre.

42 The one witness who may have been able to shed more light on the problem would have been the Plaintiff's plant manager, Mr. DiMenna. However, he has ceased working for the Plaintiff and was not produced as a witness.

43 Counsel for the Defendant has asked me to draw an adverse inference from Mr. DiMenna's absence, but I find there is no need to do so. Mr. DiMenna was examined for discovery on behalf of the Plaintiff, and Defendant's counsel read portions of his transcript into evidence. That transcript provides more than sufficient insight into *Mr. DiMenna's view of the bag vs. box controversy*.

44 Mr. DiMenna confirmed in discovery that he was the one in charge of selecting the boxes for the Plaintiff. The Defendant had recommended one manufacturer of corrugated containers — a company called Wilomet Industries Inc. that produced a box called the Wil Pac. Mr. DiMenna had briefly considered ordering the Wil Pac boxes, but opted against it when he discovered that another manufacturer, Noram Pak, produced much cheaper boxes. Noram Pak is located in the southern United States and ultimately was selected by the Plaintiff to supply the boxes in issue.

45 At his examination for discovery Mr. DiMenna also conceded that he had initially considered smaller boxes that would have been sturdier and more compatible with the Defendant's bags. He changed his mind and ultimately chose the larger Noram Pak boxes, however, because they displayed better for customers when stacked on pallets.

46 One series of answers given by Mr. DiMenna on discovery is particularly revealing:

> Q. ...You said you did testing on that and I'm just wondering what testing. I mean, you could see the bag was unsupported couldn't you?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. And wouldn't it have been apparent that you could have used a smaller box?
>
> A. It fit the pallet perfectly, provided very good stacking in the warehouse. If you look at the photos of the stretch-wrapped finished product on the pallet, it's beautiful. It's very attractive. So it made the stacking very simple for the warehouse, for the forklift driver.
>
> Q. Well, there's some competition between the prettiness of the pallet stack and the ethicacy *[sic]* of the packaging, and the cost of the packaging was, obviously, you've said it a few times, important. Less cardboard, cheaper box. You turned down the Wil Pac because it was too expensive.
>
> A. Yes. Because it was six to seven times more expensive.

47 In other words, the Plaintiff was focused on the price and presentation of the boxes more than it was on the efficacy and physical integrity of the bag-in-box system. The Wil Pac boxes recommended by the Defendant were rejected, and the further testing of the storage system recommended by the Defendant was curtailed, all due to the Plaintiff's non-structural considerations.

VII. The Onus

48 I cannot rule out that the bags may have suffered intermittent seam failure due to a faulty sealing process in the Defendant's plant. Mr. Stone's testing of the bags suggests that possibility. At the same time, I cannot rule out that the boxes may have been the wrong size and stored or stacked in a way that made them structurally unsound. Mr. Young's analysis of the 2000 photos suggests that possibility.

49 The expert witnesses — Mr. Stone for the Plaintiff and Mr. Young for the Defendant — each expressed compelling opinions pointing in opposite directions. Looking at the experts alone, the contest comes out more or less even.

50 The testimony supplied by Mr. Falk and Mr. Ducous must also be factored into this equation. Both of those witnesses cast doubt on the Plaintiff's theory about the failed sealant on the seams of the bags. It is difficult to understand how the same manufacturing process that produced an annual run of 700,000 bags could have failed in sealing 1,200 to 1,400 of them, all belonging to the Plaintiff.

51 In addition, I must take into account the evidence given by Mr. DiMenna at discoveries. It is clear that he was aware that a smaller size box, or a box with sturdier corner support, would be more suitable to the bags supplied by the Defendant.

52 It is also clear that Mr. DiMenna rejected the box company recommended by the Defendant for reasons of price and aesthetics. In choosing the Noram Pak boxes, the Plaintiff opted for corrugated containers containing less cardboard (making them cheaper) and that fit squarely onto its pallets (making them neatly stackable in tiers). Both of these considerations point to problems with the boxes and storage identified by Mr. Young, and point away from problems with the bags and seams identified by Mr. Stone.

53 On the evidence before me I cannot conclude definitively that the Plaintiff's choice of boxes and its method of stacking them was the sole cause of the spill in July 2000. What I can certainly conclude, however, is that the Plaintiff has not proved on the balance of probabilities that the bags were defective and that they caused the spill.

54 There are two possible explanations in evidence; but once all of the evidence is reviewed, the more likely explanation is that it was the ill-fitting boxes stacked on top of each other that caused the spill. That does not fully explain Mr. Stone's findings that some of the bags had intermittent weak spots, but it does explain why of all the Defendant's customers for aseptic bag liners in 1999-2000, only the Plaintiff suffered torn bags and leakage.

55 Needless to say, the onus of proof is on the Plaintiff. The Defendant does not have to prove that its theory about the boxes is correct. It is sufficient to dismiss the claim that the Plaintiff has not proved on a balance of probabilities that its own theory about the bags is correct.

VIII. The Warning

56 The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendant failed to warn the Plaintiff of the danger of storing the boxes in a way which might burst the bags. Counsel for the Plaintiff points to *Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co.* (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) for the proposition that a manufacturer must warn of the dangers that arise due to the fault of the purchaser itself if that fault is reasonably foreseeable.

57 I agree that manufacturers have a duty to warn their customers of the inherent risks of a given product. Generally, only if the consumer voluntarily assumed the risks of the injury caused by the product is the manufacturer absolved of the duty to warn of all dangers in the product that it puts into the stream of commerce. *Siemens v. Pfizer C & G Inc.*, [1988] 3 W.W.R. 577 (Man. C.A.).

58 Under the circumstances, however, I cannot see how the Defendant failed in any legal duty to warn the Plaintiff. In the Plaintiff's view, the Defendant would have had to warn it of the danger of ordering ill-fitting boxes, or the risk it was taking in stacking 50 gallon boxes two and three tiers high. That view of the duty to warn seems to stretch the legal duty to the breaking point.

59 The important point here is that the Plaintiff specifically rejected the Defendant's recommendation in selecting its boxes. Without consulting with the Defendant, it purchased a box that was inferior in quality to the one that the Defendant recommended and that did not suit the bags. The Plaintiff was free to make this choice, but in doing so it assumed the risk that the choice would cause it harm.

60 Furthermore, the evidence of Mr. DiMenna was that the Plaintiff disregarded all of the Defendant's advice regarding the boxes specifically because it wanted to stack the boxes on pallets as a visually pleasing form of display. The Defendant had nothing to do with the stacking of the boxes in the Plaintiff's warehouse. The Plaintiff cannot complain that the Defendant failed to advise it on its storage method when the Plaintiff failed to consult the Defendant on that very storage method.

61 It is one thing for a manufacturer to be under an obligation to warn of dangers inherent in its own product; however, the law does not impose a duty on a manufacturer to warn of dangers inherent in another manufacturer's product that it did not recommend, or to warn of the self-evident risk of storing very heavy cardboard containers on top of each other.

62 The Plaintiff cannot shift the cost of its own cavalier attitude to box selection and storage by arguing that the Defendant should somehow have warned it. In fact, one might say that in recommending a sturdier, more expensive box, the Defendant had in effect warned the Plaintiff of the risks of its choice. The loss must lie where it spilled.

IX. The Counterclaim

63 Despite the Plaintiff's complaint that the Defendant's bags caused the spill, the Plaintiff re-ordered bags from the Defendant for the 2000-2001 year. In his testimony, Mr. Ducous identified the invoice issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the amount of $81,932.04 dated May 9, 2000. This invoice was for 10,800 bags, which Mr. Ducous testified were delivered to the Plaintiff for the upcoming season.

64 The Defendant's bill was never paid and is the subject of the counterclaim. On the merits, the Plaintiff has no real defense to this counterclaim. The bags were ordered and delivered, but not paid for.

65 However, at the opening of trial I was advised by Plaintiff's counsel that the Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal to its creditors under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 ("*BIA*"). Section 69(1)(a) of the *BIA* imposes a stay on any claim by a creditor claiming against the Plaintiff. Across the country courts have consistently held that, "[t]he stay of proceedings imposed by the *BIA* does not affect proceedings brought by [the debtor] but does stay the proceedings against [the debtor]." *Navionics Inc., Re* (2005), 251 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 216 (N.L. T.D.). That would include the counterclaim in these proceedings.

66 The Defendant also raises a defence of set off, proposing to deduct the 2000 invoice from any amount found owing to the Plaintiff. However, set off only arises where the claims to be set off against each other exist in the same right.

67 The Plaintiff produced as a damages witness James Hoare, who was hired by Canadian General Insurance to calculate the losses suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the spill, and who made it clear that the Plaintiff's claim is a subrogated insurance claim. The Court of Appeal has specifically held that, "as a result of subrogation the claims sought to be set off do not exist in the same right" as the main claim. *Colonial Furniture Co. (Ottawa) Ltd. v. Saul Tanner Realty Ltd.* (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 539 (Ont. C.A.), at para 22. Therefore, as a matter of law no defence of set off can apply here.

68 In any case, I have found that the Defendant is not liable for the Plaintiff's losses. Accordingly, no question of set off arises.

69 Finally, Defendant's counsel submits that the court has discretion to permit its counterclaim to proceed. Section 69.4 of the *BIA* provides that the court has discretion to lift a stay if a creditor can show that it is especially prejudiced or if there are other equitable grounds to do so. In particular, counsel complains that the Defendant was not given timely notice of the Plaintiff's Notice of Intention to make a proposal. Apparently, the Plaintiff's Notice was issued on October 10, 2012, but the Defendant was not served with it until after the pre-trial of this matter on January 22, 2013.

70 Frustrating at a stay of proceedings under section 69(1)(a) might be for a creditor of an insolvent party, the Defendant has not presented adequate grounds for lifting the stay. Lifting a stay impacts on the position of other creditors, and so is not something that the court can do without "sound reasons, consistent with the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*." *Ma, Re*, [2001] O.J. No. 1189 (Ont. C.A.), at para 3.

71 The British Columbia Supreme Court has confirmed that, "knowledge of the filing of the Notice of Intention to make a proposal is not necessary for the stay to be effective." *Startek Computer Inc. (Trustee of) v. Samtack Computer Inc.* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 166 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), at para 12. The fact that the Defendant was only notified late in the day of the Plaintiff's proposal to its creditors is disconcerting to the Defendant, but it does not affect the within counterclaim or remove it from the ambit of the stay of proceedings.

72 Moreover, the counterclaim is a claim provable in the bankruptcy. The court hearing the Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding, which according to the Notice of Intention is the Quebec Superior Court, is the appropriate forum for that claim. The discretion found in section 69.4 of the *BIA* is to exercised, if at all, by the bankruptcy court. It is only that court that can consider the claimant's request in the context of the overall position of the debtor and all of its creditors.

X. The Disposition

73 The Plaintiff's claim is dismissed. The Defendant's counterclaim is stayed.

74 The parties may make written submissions on costs. I would ask that they be sent directly to my attention within two weeks of the release of these reasons for judgment.

Claim dismissed; counterclaim stayed.

Footnotes

* Additional reasons at *Jema International Food Products Inc. v. Scholle Canada Ltd.* (2013), 2013 ONSC 2785, 2013 CarswellOnt 5801 (Ont. S.C.J.).

TAB 23

2014 ONSC 7015
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

8527504 Canada Inc. v. Liquibrands Inc.

2014 CarswellOnt 17188, 2014 ONSC 7015, 247 A.C.W.S. (3d) 365

8527504 Canada Inc., Applicant and Liquibrands Inc., Respondent

8527504 Canada Inc., Applicant and Sun Pac Foods Limited, Respondent

Newbould J.

Heard: November 28, 2014
Judgment: December 4, 2014
Docket: CV-14-10543-00CL, CV-13-10331-00CL

Counsel: Harvey Chaiton, Sam Rappos for Applicant
David E. Wires, Krista Bulmer for Respondents, Liquibrands Inc. and Sun Pac Foods Limited
Anthony J. O'Brien for BDO Canada Limited, receiver of Sun Pac Foods Limited

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
V Bankruptcy and receiving orders
V.2 Effect of order
Bankruptcy and insolvency
V Bankruptcy and receiving orders
V.5 Miscellaneous
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.3 Appointment
VII.3.b Application for appointment
VII.3.b.iii Grounds
VII.3.b.iii.A Just and convenient
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.7 Actions involving receiver
VII.7.c Actions by debtor in receivership

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Bankruptcy and receiving orders — Effect of order

L Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary S Limited commenced action against creditors for alleged breach of forbearance agreement — Receivership order was made later that day with respect to S Limited — L Inc. brought application for order lifting stay of proceedings in receivership order to permit action by S Limited and L Inc. against creditors to proceed — Application dismissed — Receiver was entitled to continue action commenced by S Limited without necessity of obtaining leave to do so — Order gave receiver power to initiate, prosecute, and continue prosecution of any and all proceedings — Paragraph 7 of order dealt with actions against debtor or its property and did not apply to actions commenced by debtor.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Bankruptcy and receiving orders — Miscellaneous

L Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary S Limited commenced action against creditors 8 Inc. and B Inc. on November 12, 2013 for alleged breach of forbearance agreement — Receivership order was made later that same day with respect to S Limited — L Inc. had loaned money to S Limited but its security ranked second after security held by creditor 8 Inc. — Receiver sold assets of S Limited and proposed distribution of proceeds to 8 Inc. on account of its first-ranking security interest — L Inc. brought application for order directing receiver to pay funds into court pending completion of lawsuit against 8 Inc. and B Inc. — Application dismissed — Money in question resulted from proceeds of sale of assets of S Limited — L Inc.'s security was second to security of 8 Inc. — There was no question that security of 8 Inc. was valid — L Inc. was attempting to secure its claim for damages before judgment — On day that receivership order was made S Limited and L Inc. were represented in court by experienced counsel and could not now contend that money was not owing to 8 Inc. — There was no serious issue to be tried with respect to L Inc.'s claim to proceeds as 8 Inc. clearly had right to them.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Grounds — Just and convenient

8 Inc. brought application for appointment of receiver of assets of L Inc. under security granted by L Inc. to B Inc. and assigned to 8 Inc. — Application granted — Under general security agreement 8 Inc. could appoint receiver over all property of L Inc. in event of default — Demand was made under guarantee given by L Inc. and no payment was made and thus there was event of default — L Inc. was represented by counsel at time it signed guarantee and there was no reason why its terms were not enforceable — Terms of guarantee precluded L Inc. from contending that guarantee might be unenforceable if L Inc. were to succeed in action against 8 Inc. — Furthermore, in subordination agreement made at same time as guarantee, L Inc. agreed not to take any steps to delay or defeat priority or rights of 8 Inc. — It was just and convenient that receiver of L Inc. be appointed.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Actions involving receiver — Actions by debtor in receivership

L Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary S Limited commenced action against creditors for alleged breach of forbearance agreement — Receivership order was made later that day with respect to S Limited — L Inc. brought application for order lifting stay of proceedings in receivership order to permit action by S Limited and L Inc. against creditors to proceed — Application dismissed — Receiver was entitled to continue action commenced by S Limited without necessity of obtaining leave to do so — Order gave receiver power to initiate, prosecute, and continue prosecution of any and all proceedings — Paragraph 7 of order dealt with actions against debtor or its property and did not apply to actions commenced by debtor.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd. (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 2011 ONSC 1007, 2011 CarswellOnt 896 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed

Bank of Montreal v. Wilder (1986), 1986 CarswellBC 370, 1986 CarswellBC 763, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 551, 32 D.L.R. (4th) 9, 70 N.R. 341, [1987] 1 W.W.R. 289, 8 B.C.L.R. (2d) 282, 37 B.L.R. 290 (S.C.C.) — distinguished

Bauer v. Bank of Montreal (1980), 1980 CarswellOnt 141, 33 C.B.R. (N.S.) 291, 1980 CarswellOnt 638, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 102, 32 N.R. 191, 10 B.L.R. 209, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 424 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Central 1 Credit Union v. UM Financial Inc. (2012), 2012 ONSC 1893, 2012 CarswellOnt 4068, 19 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 242 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

DIRECTV Inc. v. Gillott (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 883, 39 C.P.C. (6th) 227, 84 O.R. (3d) 595 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 243(1) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

R. 45.02 — considered

APPLICATION by creditor 8 Inc. for appointment of receiver of assets of debtor L Inc.; APPLICATION by L Inc. for order lifting stay of proceedings in receivership order of S Limited and to appoint receiver of remaining assets

of S Limited; APPLICATION by L Inc. for order directing receiver of S Limited to pay funds held by it into court; APPLICATION by receiver of S Limited for order to pay funds to creditor 8 Inc.

***Newbould J.*:**

1 The applicant 8527504 Canada Inc.("852") applies for the appointment of a receiver of the assets of the respondent Liquibrands Inc. ("Liquibrands") under security granted by Liquibrands to Bridging Canada Inc. ("Bridging") and assigned to 852.

2 Liquibrands applies for an order lifting a stay of proceedings in the receivership order of Sun Pac Foods Limited ("Sun Pac") to permit an action commenced by Sun Pac and Liquibrands against 852 and Bridging to proceed and to appoint a receiver of the remaining assets of Sun Pac for the purpose of advancing the litigation. Liquibrands is a secured creditor of Sun Pac in second place after 852 and requests an order directing the receiver to pay into court the balance of funds held by the receiver of Sun Pac from the sale of its assets pending the completion of the law suit. The receiver applies for an order to pay the funds it holds to 852.

3 Sun Pac was a Canadian manufacturer of private label and branded beverage products, and a manufacturer of croutons and bread crumbs and other private label brands (the "Breadcrumbs Division").

4 Sun Pac was acquired by Liquibrands in November 2011. Liquibrands is the sole shareholder of Sun Pac. Mr. Csaba Reider is the sole shareholder, officer and director of Liquibrands. He was also the sole officer and director of Sun Pac.

5 Bridging provides middle-market commercial customers with alternative financing solutions to borrowers who are unable to obtain financing from traditional lenders. 852 is a company related to Bridging and took an assignment of the loans and security for loans made by Bridging to Sun Pac.

6 On October 1, 2012, Bridging advanced a revolving loan of up to $5 million based on a lending formula under Facility A, $500,000.00 (before facility fees) on January 18, 2013 under a Facility B term loan on equipment, and the balance of the facility B loan, $1,182,524.00 (before facility fees), was advanced on January 31, 2013. The loans were secured on the assets of Sun Pac. Liquibrands guaranteed $1 million of the Sun Pac Facility A loan and provided security over all of its assets to support the guarantee.

7 Mr. Reider was in discussion with Loblaws to produce private label drinks for Loblaws. However Sun Pac was running short of working capital and in August 2013 was in default of its loan obligations to 852. He decided to sell the Breadcrumbs Division for $3.1 million and he requested additional funding to continue operating.

8 On September 11, 2013 852, Sun Pac and Liquibrands signed a Forbearance and Amending Agreement dated September 11, 2013. The Forbearance Agreement was entered into to provide Sun Pac with a temporary bridge loan in the hopes of obtaining equity and debt financing for the anticipated Loblaws contract and to complete a sale of the Breadcrumbs Division to repay the bridge loan. In the Forbearance Agreement, Sun Pac acknowledged that it was in default of the terms of its loans.

9 Notwithstanding the default, 852 agreed not to take any steps to enforce any of the loans or its security prior to the earlier of December 9, 2013 or the occurrence of an Event of Default.

10 In the Forbearance Agreement, 852 agreed to extend a temporary bridge loan to Sun Pac in two tranches. Facility C was a demand non-revolving loan in the amount of $500,000 less fees. Facility C was advanced to Sun Pac in the amount of $475,000 on or about September 13, 2013.

11 Facility D was a demand non-revolving loan in the maximum amount of 2 times EBITDA of the Breadcrumbs Division as determined by a report from BDO Canada Limited, less the amount advanced under Facility C. Paragraph 13 of the Forbearance Agreement provided:

> Provided that 852 has received and is satisfied with the report to be prepared by BDO at the expense of Sun Pac, 852 shall, promptly following the execution of this Agreement, advance to Sun Pac as a Facility D Loan advance a single advance in an amount equal to 2 times EBITDA of the Breadcrumbs Division (as defined below) (as determined by BDO in its report to Sun Pac and 852 in its sole discretion), less the Facility C Principal Amount...Each advance shall be conditional on there being no Event of Default under this Agreement and the Loan Agreement.

12 One event of default contained in the Forbearance Agreement was if Sun Pac failed to have a binding agreement for the sale of the Breadcrumbs Division by November 6, 2013 that was acceptable to 852 in its sole and absolute discretion and failed to close it by December 6, 2013.

13 BDO prepared a report dated September 25, 2013, which it delivered to Sun Pac and 852 on September 30, 2013. Based on the report, the Facility D loan was to be approximately $1.15 million. 852 took no issue with the amount of the EBITDA as reported by BDO.

14 852 did not advance the Facility D loan. There is a dispute among the parties as to whether 852 was in breach of the Forbearance Agreement in failing to advance the loan. I do not intend to get into that issue, although was invited to do so.

15 On October 4, 2013, 852 informed Mr. Reider that it was not prepared to advance Facility D without certain matters being addressed. According to 852, they were not addressed.

16 On November 11, 2013, 852's lawyers were informed by Sun Pac's insolvency lawyers that Sun Pac's operations had been shut down on November 7, 2013, at which time all but a few employees were terminated. As a result, 852 commenced an urgent receivership application heard on November 12, 2013. Sun Pac and Liquibrands had counsel attend the hearing but did not oppose the receivership application. BDO was appointed as receiver of Sun Pac on November 12, 2013.

17 On the morning of November 12, 2013, Liquibrands and Sun Pac commenced an action against 852 and Bridging seeking, *inter alia*, general damages of $100 million for breach of the Forbearance Agreement by not advancing Facility D in the amount of approximately $1.15 million. Sun Pac had signed an agreement with Loblaws made as of September 18, 2013 containing terms regarding the sale of drink products by Sun Pac to Loblaws, and the damage claim is for alleged lost profits that would have been earned under that agreement.

Issues and analysis

(a) Need for leave to continue the action by Sun Pac

18 Sun Pac and Liquibrands say that the receivership order of November 12, 2013 in which BDO was appointed receiver of Sun Pac has stayed the action commenced that day by Liquibrands and Sun Pac against 852 and Bridging, and asks leave to proceed with that action. This request is based on a misreading of the receivership order, which followed the standard form used in the Commercial List and approved by the Commercial List Users Committee.

19 Mr. Wires said that he reads paragraph 7 of the order as staying the action. However, paragraph 7 deals with actions against the debtor or its property and states that "no proceeding against or in respect of the debtor or its property shall be commenced or continued" without the consent of the receiver or leave of the court. To read a proceeding "in respect of the debtor or its property" as applying to an action commenced by the debtor would be to ignore the heading in the order for paragraph 7 "NO PROCEEDING AGAINST THE DEBTOR OR THE PROPERTY". It would also ignore paragraph 3(j) of the order which gives the receiver the power "to initiate, prosecute and continue the prosecution of any and all proceedings...now pending or hereafter instituted".

20 The receiver of Sun Pac is quite entitled to continue the action commenced by Sun Pac against 852 and Liquibrands without the necessity of obtaining leave to do so.

(b) Proceeds of the sale of Sun Pac's assets

21 The receiver has realized on the assets of Sun Pac and has proposed an interim distribution of $383,381 from the proceeds of Sun Pac's assets to 852 on account of its first ranking security interest. 852 is owed approximately $4.0 million and will suffer a substantial shortfall on its loans to Sun Pac.

22 Liquibrands holds security from its wholly owned subsidiary Sun Pac to secure $2.54 million loaned to Sun Pac. Its security ranks second after the security held by 852. Liquibrands asserts that the proceeds held by the receiver of Sun Pac should be paid into court pending the determination of the action by Sun Pac and Liquibrands against 852 and Bridging. It claims that based on the claims in the action, there is a serious issue to be tried regarding 852's claim to the fund. It relies on rule 45.02 that provides:

> 45.02 Where the right of a party to a specific fund is in question, the court may order the fund to be paid into court or otherwise secured on such terms as are just.

23 I do not see that the rule assists Liquibrands. The test for granting an order preserving a specific fund is threefold: (1) the plaintiff claims a right to the specific fund; (2) there is a serious issue to be tried regarding the plaintiff's claim to the fund; and (3) the balance of convenience favours granting the relief sought. The plaintiff must have a proprietary claim against the specific funds beyond the funds utility to satisfy the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. See *DIRECTV Inc. v. Gillott* (2007), 84 O.R. (3d) 595 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 44 and 59.

24 Liquibrands cannot meet this test. The money in question results from the proceeds of the sale of the assets of Sun Pac. Liquibrands as a second creditor has security over the assets of Sun Pac second to the security of 852. There is no question that the security of 852 is valid and what Liquibrands is essentially doing is attempting to secure before judgment its claim for damages against 852 and Bridging.

25 The law suit was started on the morning of November 12, 2013 before the receivership order was made later that day. The court had to be satisfied that the loan to Sun Pac was owed in order to make the receivership order. Sun Pac and Liquibrands were represented in court that day by experienced insolvency counsel and no objection was made to the request for the receivership order. Sun Pac and Liquibrands cannot now contend that the money is not owing to 852 and that Liquibrands has a claim to it. That would amount to a collateral attack on the order.

26 There is no serious issue to be tried regarding Liquibrands' claim to the proceeds of the sale of Sun Pac's assets held by the receiver. 852 has the right to those proceeds. There may be a serious issue to be tried regarding the claim for damages by Sun Pac and Liquibrands against 852 and Bridging, although I make no such finding, but that is a different matter.

27 The funds held by the receiver of Sun Pac may be paid out to 852.

(c) Should a receiver of Liquibrands be appointed?

28 Under the GSA security from Liquibrands to 852, Liquibrands may appoint a receiver over all of the property of Liquibrands upon an event of default. Demand under the guarantee of Liquibrands was made in April, 2014 and no payment was made. Thus there has been an event of default. There is no issue as to the validity of the security.

29 A receiver may be appointed under section 243(1) of the BIA if it is considered just or convenient to do so. The principles applicable are referred to in *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.* (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300 (Ont. S.C.J.).

30 Liquibrands contends that there should be no receiver appointed pending the outcome of its lawsuit against 852 and Bridging, and relies on *Bank of Montreal v. Wilder*, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.). In that case the bank breached an agreement not to call the loan for a period of time if guarantees were provided and an injection of capital was made into the customer company, which happened. The guarantors were relieved of liability because of the wrong doing of the Bank. The bank relied on a provision in the guarantee that it could deal with the customer "as the Bank may see fit". It was held that this did provision did not protect the bank. Wilson J. for the Court stated:

> The Bank under the umbrella agreement could have decided to make the business decision to stop financing the Company at any time prior to the June agreement. After that agreement this option was closed to it. It agreed with the Company and with the guarantors that it would continue to finance the Company at least until it had completed the Alberta road projects. It failed to do so despite the fact that the Wilders kept their part of the bargain. The Bank's breach not only increased the guarantors' risk in a way which was "not plainly unsubstantial" and impaired their security; it put the principal debtor out of business and into bankruptcy. Such conduct on the part of the Bank cannot, in my opinion, be viewed as within the purview of the clause in the guarantee contracts permitting the Bank to deal with the Company and the guarantors as it "may see fit". I agree with Lambert J.A. that such a clause must be construed as extending to lawful dealings only.

31 In this case, however, the guarantee given by Liquibrands was much broader than in *Bank of Montreal v. Wilder*. Section 2 of the guarantee provided:

> 2. **Guarantee Unconditional**. The obligations of the guarantor under this guarantee are continuing, unconditional and absolute and...will not be released, discharged, diminished, limited or otherwise affected by (and the Guarantor hereby waives, to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law) *inter alia*:
>
> > (e) the existence of any claim, set-off or other rights which the Guarantor may have at any time against the Debtor, the Creditor, or any other person, whether in connection herewith or any unrelated transactions;
> >
> > (p) any dealing whatsoever with the Debtor or other person or any security, whether negligently or not, or any failure to do so; ...
> >
> > (r) any other act or omission to act or delay of any kind by the Debtor, the Creditor, or any other person or any other circumstances whatsoever, whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, which might, but for the provisions of this Section 2, constitute a legal or equitable discharge, limitation or reduction of the Guarantor's obligations hereunder (other than the payment or extinguishment in full of all of the Obligations).
>
> The foregoing provisions apply (and the foregoing waivers will be effective) even if the effect of any action (or failure to take action) by the Creditor is to destroy or diminish the Guarantor's subrogation rights, the Guarantor's right to proceed against the Debtor for reimbursement, the Guarantor's right to recover contribution from any other guarantor or any other right or remedy.

32 A party may contract out of an equitable rule regarding guarantees. See *Bauer v. Bank of Montreal*, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 102 (S.C.C.). Liquibrands was represented by counsel at the time it signed the guarantee and there is no reason why the terms are not enforceable. The terms of the guarantee preclude Liquibrands from contending that the guarantee may be unenforceable if it succeeds in its action against 852.

33 Moreover, in a Subordination, Assignment, Postponement and Standstill Agreement made by Liquibrands and Sun Pac with Bridging at the same time as the guarantee, Liquibrands agreed not to take any steps whereby the priority or rights of 852 might be delayed, defeated, impaired or diminished and agreed not to challenge, object to, compete with or impede in any manner any act taken or proceeding commenced by 852 in connection with the enforcement of 852's security.

34 Liquibrands also claims that as second secured creditor of Sun Pac, it should have priority over the security of 852 because of the breach by 852 of the Forbearance Agreement. I am not in a position to say that there has been a breach of that agreement and in any event the Subordination, Assignment, Postponement and Standstill Agreement precludes that contention. It provides that Liquibrands consents to the security granted to Bridging by Sun Pac and acknowledges that notwithstanding any priority provided by any principle of law or equity, the security of Liquibrands is unconditionally subordinated to the security held by Bridging. Liquibrands also agreed in that agreement that it would not take any

steps whereby the priority of Bridging might be defeated and that it would not challenge any proceeding to enforce that security. 852 holds those rights as assignee from Bridging.

35 I find that it is just and convenient that a receiver of Liquibrands be appointed and BDO is appointed as receiver of all of its property, assets and undertakings in the form contained at tab 3 of the Application Record.

(d) Procedure for the litigation

36 The action by Liquibrands and Sun Pac against 852 and Bridging for breach of the Forbearance Agreement is outstanding. Liquibrands requests an order that a different receiver from BDO be appointed as receiver of "the remaining assets" of Sun Pac for the purposes of advancing the litigation. The reason is that BDO, the receiver of Sun Pac, has indicated that it does not wish to spend money on the law suit.

37 BDO is prepared to market the right to commence the action. There is precedent for such a procedure. In *Central 1 Credit Union v. UM Financial Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 1893 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) it was held that a lawsuit by the debtor in receivership constituted collateral that was subject to the existing receivership proceeding. The court appointed receiver subsequently brought a motion seeking court approval to conduct a marketing process for the sale of the claim and that relief was granted by Justice C. Campbell. It seems sensible that now that BDO is the receiver of both Sun Pac and Liquibrands, the two plaintiffs in the action, BDO should be permitted to market the litigation in a marketing process.

38 No specific marketing process has been proposed. The receiver should propose a marketing process and Sun Pac and Liquibrands can consider whether it is agreeable to the marketing process proposed. If there is agreement to the marketing process, it can be included in the order to be signed reflecting these reasons. If there is no agreement, a further attendance to settle it can be arranged at a 9:30 am conference.

(e) Receiver's motion

39 The receiver has applied for orders approving the Third Supplement to its First Report, approving its Third Report, approving its fees and disbursements of those of its counsel, approving its statement of receipts and disbursements, and authorizing and directing the receiver to make a distribution to 852 and maintain a holdback in accordance with its Third Report. The relief requested is reasonable and is granted.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **JTI-MACDONALD CORP.**

Applicant

Court File No.: 19-CV- 615862-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceedings commenced at Toronto

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